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1 Introduction 
The Committee’s inquiry 
1. On 7 July 2005, 52 people were killed and more than 770 others injured in attacks on the 
London transport network carried out by four men from West Yorkshire who had been 
radicalised by the ideology and rhetoric of Al Qa’ida. The nature of the current, deadly 
threat facing the UK from home-grown terrorism was fully exposed for the first time. This 
was only one of a number of terrorist plots which caused the British authorities to shift 
their attention over the past decade from external threats to national security to those lying 
within the UK borders. Radicalisation is one of four strategic factors identified in the 
Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, that have enabled 
terrorist groups to grow and flourish.1 Yet four years after 7/7, the reasons why some 
British-born and raised individuals are vulnerable to violent radicalisation remain unclear. 
2. On taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government announced a wholesale review of 
the Prevent Strategy (often referred to simply as “Prevent”), which was drawn up to tackle 
violent radicalisation in the UK in the wake of the 7/7 bombings.2 The original strategy had 
attracted criticism for its alleged exclusive focus on Muslim communities, spying, and 
unhealthy conflation of law enforcement with integration policy. The outcome of the 
Prevent Review was published in June 2011. 
3. In anticipation of this, we decided in May 2011 to launch an inquiry that would test the 
evidence base for the Prevent Review and explore issues regarding its implementation. We 
undertook to examine the root causes of violent radicalisation in the UK, the individuals 
and groups particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and the locations where this 
radicalisation tends to take place, in relation to the primary terrorist threats facing the UK. 
Specifically, we intended to: 
• determine the major drivers of, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements 
linked to (a) Islamic fundamentalism (b) Irish dissident republicanism and (c) 
domestic extremism;  
• examine the relative importance of prisons and criminal networks, religious premises, 
universities and the internet as fora for violent radicalisation;  
• examine the operation and impact of the current process for proscribing terrorist 
groups;  
• consider the appropriateness of current preventative approaches to violent 
radicalisation, in light of these findings, including the roles of different organisations at 
national and local level; and  
• make recommendations to inform implementation of the Government’s forthcoming 
revised Prevent strategy. 
 
1 HM Government, Contest: The UK’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2011.The other three factors are conflict and 
instability; ideology; and technology. 
2 “Prevent” is one of four strands of CONTEST. The others are “Protect”, “Pursue” and “Prepare”. 
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4. To this end, we took oral evidence on seven occasions between September 2011 and 
December 2011 and received 17 written submissions. A list of those who gave evidence is 
appended to our Report. We visited Belmarsh prison to speak to prisoners and staff and 
held a round-table discussion with a group of students from the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London. We also held a conference at De Montfort 
University on 13 December 2011, attended by around 200 people involved in Prevent, 
including police officers, local authority workers, prison and probation staff, academics, 
faith leaders, students, community groups and politicians. The conference was addressed 
by, amongst others, Rev. Jesse Jackson and by Dr. Dipu Moni MP, the Foreign Minister of 
Bangladesh, and allowed us to hear a wide range of views which have informed our inquiry 
to a significant extent. We are grateful to all those who contributed to our inquiry. We are 
particularly grateful to De Montfort University and the Barrow Cadbury Trust for hosting 
and supporting our conference.   
Context  
Definitions 
5. Much of the language used to talk about the issues we consider in our Report is itself the 
subject of debate. However, whilst we briefly consider the use of language in chapter four, 
in general we use the Government’s definitions as set out in legislation and the Prevent 
Strategy:  
• Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as “the use or threat of action ... 
designed to influence the Government or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public ... for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.”  
• Radicalisation is defined in the Prevent Strategy as “the process by which a person 
comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”  
• Extremism is defined in the Prevent Strategy as “vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our 
definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in 
this country or overseas.”3  
•  “Violent extremism” is considered by the Prevent Strategy to mean the endorsement of 
violence to achieve extreme ends. 
The terrorist threat 
6. The Government concluded in its Prevent Review that the Strategy should continue to 
focus on radicalisation linked to the main terrorist threat facing the UK, from groups that 
are usually collectively referred to as  Islamic fundamentalist, Al Qa’ida-related, or Islamist 
terrorists (we will use this last term). Other than the 7/7 bombings, some of the most high-
 
3 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, Annex A: Glossary of Terms 
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profile Islamist plots discovered by the authorities involving British citizens or residents 
over the last decade included: 
• the attempt by Richard Reid to detonate explosives in his shoes while on board a flight 
from Paris to Miami in December 2001; 
• the conviction of Kamel Bourgass for his role in a plot to produce ricin for use in a 
terrorist attack in London in 2003; 
• the conviction of five men in 2004 for attempting to produce explosives to attack utility 
companies, the Ministry of Sound nightclub, Bluewater Shopping Centre and Amec 
construction firm; 
• the conviction of four individuals who tried and failed to detonate bombs on London’s 
transport network on 21 July 2005; 
• the conviction of seven individuals in connection with the Bojinka II Plot to blow up 
six to ten flights from the UK to the US; 
• the discovery in June 2007 of two improvised devices in a car outside the Tiger Tiger 
club near Trafalgar Square—the following day the two perpetrators drove a Jeep packed 
with gas cylinders into the lounge at Glasgow Airport; and 
• the jailing of Rajib Karim for 30 years in March 2011 after he joined British Airways in 
order to plan suicide bombings. 
The threat level from such groups has reached the highest level of CRITICAL over the past 
decade (meaning an attack is expected imminently) but was most recently lowered in Great 
Britain from SEVERE (meaning an attack is highly likely) to SUBSTANTIAL (a strong 
possibility) in July 2011. 4 
7. However, the Government also believes that “Prevent should be flexible enough to 
address the challenge posed by terrorism of any kind” and cited two further forms of 
terrorism in the Strategy.5 Firstly, it noted the threat from Northern Ireland-related 
terrorism had “increased significantly” over the past two years.6 The current threat level 
from Northern Ireland-terrorism is set separately from that for Great Britain and currently 
stands at SEVERE. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has responsibility in 
government for Northern Ireland-related terrorism with most relevant policy areas the 
responsibility of the devolved administration.  
8. Secondly, the Strategy cited extreme right-wing terrorism, which in the UK has been 
“much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida”;7 
however, there are 17 people in Britain currently serving prison sentences for terrorism 
offences who are known to be associated with extreme right-wing groups.8 Although the 
 
4 The Security Service website, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/threat-levels.html#history. 
5 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 6.11 
6 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 5.6 
7 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, July 2011, p 30 
8 Ev 89, para 1.18 
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last major terrorist attacks by a right-wing extremist in the UK took place in 1999,9 there 
have been more recent convictions for offences connected with planning terrorist attacks, 
including:  
• Nathan Worrell, jailed for at least seven years in December 2008 for possessing material 
for terrorist purposes and racially aggravated harassment; 
• Neil Lewington, convicted and sentenced for a least six years in September 2009 on 
seven separate charges, including preparing acts of terrorism;  
• Martyn Gilleard, sentenced to 16 years in prison in June 2008 for preparing for terrorist 
acts and possessing articles and collecting information for terrorist purposes;  
• Ian and Nicky Davison, convicted in May 2010 of preparing a terrorist attack to target 
Jews, Muslims and ethnic minorities using ricin poison; and 
• Terence Gavan, jailed for 11 years in January 2010 for assembling one of the largest 
arms caches found in England in recent years.10  
Delivery of the Prevent Strategy 
9. The Prevent Strategy is coordinated by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in 
the Home Office and delivered in partnership with a number of other Government 
Departments and statutory agencies and community groups at a local level. The Home 
Office currently funds Prevent coordinators in 25 priority local authority areas and also 
provides grant funding for project work within these areas. The Home Office provides 
further funding to police forces for officers to fulfil Prevent coordination and engagement 
roles. Key to local Prevent delivery is the Channel programme, a multi-agency programme 
coordinated by the police to identify individuals vulnerable to radicalisation and direct 
them towards appropriate support, supplied by a Channel provider. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office provides funding for Prevent work overseas (which we do not 




9 Hansard, 26 April 1999, col. 37ff. 
10 Alexander Melegrou-Hitchens and Edmund Standing, Blood and Honour: Britain’s far right militants, Centre for 
Social Cohesion, January 2010, pp 36-7; HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism, July 2011, p 30  
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2 Who is at risk of radicalisation? 
The scale of radicalisation 
10. In 2007, the Director-General of MI5 said that there were “at least 2,000 people” in the 
UK who posed a threat because they supported terrorism, a figure that had increased by 
400 from the previous year. Charles Farr, Director-General of the Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism at the Home Office, told us that, more recently, “we have seen that 
sympathy for violent extremism is declining rather than increasing”.11 Most witnesses were 
more or less in agreement, in relation to Islamist terrorism. Professor Peter Neumann, of 
the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation, said that is it “definitely” on the 
decrease, citing a large decline in the number of people mobilised by organisations like 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun.12 Witnesses did not consider that this was necessarily 
reflected in the conviction data;13 however, we note from the most recent statistics 
published in December 2011 that only four people were convicted of terrorist or terrorism-
related offences in Great Britain in the 2010/11 financial year, compared with 19 the 
previous year and a peak of 51 in 2006/07. Even allowing for the fact that some cases are 
still awaiting prosecution, only three individuals were charged for these offences in the year 
ending June 2011, compared with 27 during the previous year.14 
 
Source: Home Office (see footnote) 
 
11 Q 299 
12 Q 349 
13 Ibid 
14 Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, 
outcomes and stop and searches, Quarterly update to June 2011, Great Britain, December 2011, Table 1.04; Home 
Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and 










2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Charged Awaiting prosecution Convicted
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11. Charles Farr thought that the reasons for this decline were unclear. While we received 
no definitive answers, it was suggested to us by a student from SOAS, during our round-
table discussion, that supporting violent extremist preachers had been a “novelty” for some 
young Muslims, which had largely worn off.15 Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent who now 
runs a counter-radicalisation organisation, also posited that the Arab Spring had 
contributed to the waning appeal of global jihad.16  
12. However, some witnesses were concerned about a growth in non-violent extremism, 
including Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation.17 Jamie Bartlett of the think-tank 
Demos told us: 
Other types of extremism appear to be on the increase. Part of that may be what 
Professor [Roger] Eatwell [of the University of Bath] calls cumulative, that groups 
feed off each other. Classic examples are the English Defence League and Hizb-ut-
Tahrir, who require each other’s presence in order to justify their continuing 
existence and just continually spur each other on.18 
The Government cites in the Prevent Strategy examples of where those who have 
previously been members of non-violent extremist groups have gone on to support 
terrorism.  
13. Some witnesses and participants in our conference at De Montfort University 
suggested that the threat from the far right was increasing in two ways. The number of 
supporters for non-violent extremist groups was growing, and, while support for more 
explicitly violent groups remained low, Dr Matthew Goodwin, of the University of 
Nottingham, asserted that “the far right is becoming far more confrontational and willing 
to engage in violence”.19 Much of the current discourse about the far right tends to focus on 
the self-styled English Defence League, which recent research estimates has 25,000–35,000 
online supporters but is not seen as a terrorist threat.20 Dr Matthew Feldman, of the 
University of Northampton, made the point that there are other groups that are far more 
extreme, such as the Aryan Strike Force, four members of which have been convicted of 
various acts of preparation for terrorism.21 
The drivers of radicalisation 
14. The Prevent Strategy cites research suggesting that, in relation to Islamist terrorism, the 
following groups are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation: 
• young people and people from lower income and socio-economic groups; 
 
15 Annex C 
16 Q 105 
17 Q 93 
18 Q 349 
19 Q 205 
20 Q 359 [Mr Bartlett – citing his own research published by Demos, 2011] 
21 See Annex A 
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• those who distrust Parliament and who see a conflict between being British and their 
own cultural identity; and 
• those who perceive discrimination, experience racial or religious harassment, and have 
a negative view of policing.22 
15. It became apparent during our inquiry that radicalised individuals come from a wide 
range of backgrounds: recent research described them as “demographically 
unremarkable”.23 For example, although only five women were convicted of Islamist 
offences between 1999 and 2009 and over 90% of referrals to the multi-agency Channel 
programme, which evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of radicalisation, were male,24 
we heard that Al Qa’ida is “specifically launching and targeting women for violent acts of 
radicalisation” and that “there is absolutely no gender imbalance whatsoever” in terms of 
support for extremism.25 The majority of individuals referred to the Channel programme 
were aged between 13 and 25 and just over two-thirds of all terrorist offences since 2001 
were committed by those under 30, but the age of offenders ranged from 16 to 48.26 
Education levels and economic status vary.27 Those particularly vulnerable to radicalisation 
include converts to the Muslim faith, meaning they may originate from many different 
ethnic communities rather than what we would regard as “traditional” British Muslim 
communities. Rashad Ali, of the counter-radicalisation organisation Centri, concluded that 
“I don’t think there is a typical profile ... It actually could be anybody”.28  
16. Evidence to our inquiry suggested that there were also many drivers of, and routes into, 
Islamist radicalisation. We initially heard that there were four main pathways: ideology, 
theology, grievance and mental health problems.29 Further evidence emphasised 
grievance30 and its links to social exclusion.31 Arguments about social exclusion were not 
entirely convincing, given that 42% of offences were perpetrated by individuals either in 
employment or full-time education, and the recent Home Office research finding that 
individuals tend to have similar socio-economic status to the broader population in which 
they live.32 Genuine theology also appeared to play a very limited role: Alyas Karmani 
 
22 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, paras 5.26-5.30 
23 Home Office Occasional Paper 98, Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the influence of AQ 
violent extremism, November 2011 
24 Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections, Centre for Social 
Cohesion, 2010 
25 Q 55 [Mr Ali; Mr Nawaz] 
26 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 9.23; Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist 
Terrorism: The British Connections, Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010 
27 Q 214 [Sir Norman Bettison] 
28 Q 53 
29 Qq 45, 54 [Mr Ali] 
30 See for example Q 139 [Mr Hassan Shaikh] 
31 See, for example, Q 139 [Mr Karmani] 
32 Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections, Centre for Social 
Cohesion, 2010; Home Office Occasional Paper 98, Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the 
influence of AQ violent extremism, November 2011 
10    Roots of violent radicalisation 
 
 
noted that the Islamic understanding of individuals at risk of radicalisation seen by his 
organisation, STREET, “equated to a primary school level”.33  
17. Charles Farr argued that “we have a fairly good idea about what is driving 
radicalisation”.34 However, a recent Home Office-commissioned research paper 
contradicted this: 
The empirical evidence base on what factors make an individual more vulnerable to 
Al Qa’ida-influenced violent extremism is weak. Even less is known about why 
certain individuals resort to violence, when other individuals from the same 
community, with similar experiences, do not become involved in violent activity.35  
The weakness of the evidence base came across strongly during our inquiry. Jamie Bartlett 
said that there were three reasons for this: the difficulty in generating primary evidence 
because of the lack of research subjects and their unwillingness to participate; the fact that 
research tended to be theoretical rather than evidence-based; and the difficulty in analysing 
personal stories in a rigorous, scientific way.36 Much of what is cited as “evidence” is often 
anecdotal. Professor Peter Neumann, of the International Center for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence, told us there was some good understanding of the 
“ingredients” for radicalisation but “do we not know absolutely everything about how these 
ingredients fit together, how to cook the recipe”.37 
18. However, most people with whom we spoke mentioned the centrality of grievance to 
the radicalisation process.38 The Prevent Review found that sources of grievance included 
‘stop and search’ powers used by the police under counter-terrorism legislation; the UK’s 
counter-terrorism strategy more generally; a perception of biased and Islamophobic media 
coverage; and UK foreign policy, notably with regard to Muslim countries, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq.39 This was supported by evidence to our inquiry. 
Maajid Nawaz, who was formerly a member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, told us: 
I had many grievances, including experiencing violent racism on the streets of Essex 
as a teenager before the age of 16; being stabbed at in the street by Combat 18; being 
falsely arrested by Essex police authorities. I saw what was happening in Bosnia.40 
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh, of the Averroes Institute, argued in particular that “the common 
denominator is not the foreign policy but the perception, whether it is perceived or real, 
 
33 Q 139. STREET is a Brixton-based project working with young Muslims at risk of criminality, social exclusion and 
violent extremism. It was until recently funded as a Channel provider by the Home Office. 
34 Q 306 
35 Home Office Occasional Paper 98, Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the influence of AQ 
violent extremism, November 2011 
36 Q 347 
37 Q 348 
38 See also Annex A, Annex B, Annex C 
39 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, para 5.27 
40 Q 48 [Mr Nawaz] 
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that there is an attack or a targeting or a singling out or a discriminatory attitude towards 
Muslims and Islam.”41 
19. Charles Farr told us that the drivers of terrorism in Northern Ireland-related terrorism, 
Al Qaeda-related terrorism and far right extremism tended to be “comparable in type but 
not in detail” in terms of the combination of ideology and personal vulnerabilities.42 In 
Prevent, the Government claims the drivers for extreme right-wing terrorism include a 
combination of supremacist ideology—which in recent years has increasingly 
encompassed Islamophobia—peer pressure, and the prospect of personal benefit, with 
individuals involved tending to be male, poorly educated and unemployed, in some cases 
with a criminal record.43 Dr Goodwin stated that, while their demographics might vary 
dependent on the organisation they supported, far right supporters were: 
United through a heavy preoccupation with immigration, profound levels of concern 
over the effects of immigration on British society, high levels of dissatisfaction with 
all of the mainstream parties and anxiety over the role of Islam and British Muslims 
in wider society.44  
As with supporters of Islamist terrorist groups, however, “not enough systematic, 
longitudinal research has been done to paint an accurate picture of who they are, how they 
come to be radicalised”.45 
20. Violent extremists reject mainstream methods of political participation. Dr Goodwin 
argued that “the vast majority of far right supporters are so dissatisfied with mainstream 
parties, and so distrustful of the political system generally that they either refuse to believe 
anything is being done or they simply take the view that what is being done is 
insufficient”.46 Akeela Ahmed, of the Muslim Youth Helpline, considered that the summer 
riots had highlighted some of the challenges facing young Muslims: they do not feel like 
they are being heard; they do not have the tools to express their grievances in the right way; 
and they feel disempowered and unable to effect change or influence what is going on in 
their lives.47 A student from SOAS told us that Muslims felt particularly targeted by the 
police in legitimate protests.48  
21. We suspect that violent radicalisation is declining within the Muslim community.  
There may be growing support for nonviolent extremism, fed by feelings of alienation, 
and while this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging post for violent 
extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general and for the police 
in particular. There also appears to be a growth in more extreme and violent forms of 
far-right ideology. Indeed it is clear that individuals from many different backgrounds 
 
41 Q 140 
42 Q 309 
43 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, paras 5.43-5.45 
44 Q 187 
45 Q 187 
46 Q 189 
47 Q 145 
48 Annex C 
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are vulnerable, with no typical profile or pathway to radicalisation. However, there is a 
lack of objective data, much of the evidence inevitably being anecdotal. Only 250 people 
have been convicted in the UK of terrorism-related offences since 11 September 2001. 
However, there is a wealth of knowledge held by people working with individuals 
judged to be vulnerable to violent radicalisation at a local level that could better inform 
our understanding of why some of these individuals do become radicalised and, 
crucially, why some do not. One of the aims of the increased auditing demands to be 
placed on Channel providers should be the collection of a wider range of data to 
contribute to this evidence base. We recommend that the Government publish the 
methodology whereby this data will be collated and analysed, and make arrangements 
for suitably de-sensitised data to be made available to the wider research community. 
22. One of the few clear conclusions we were able to draw about the drivers of 
radicalisation is that a sense of grievance is key to the process. Addressing perceptions 
of Islamophobia, and demonstrating that the British state is not antithetical to Islam, 
should constitute a main focus of the part of the Prevent Strategy which is designed to 
counter the ideology feeding violent radicalisation. 
23. The Government notes in the Prevent Strategy that individuals “who distrust 
Parliament” are at particular risk of violent radicalisation. This appeared to be borne 
out in our inquiry, both in terms of Islamist and extreme far-right- radicalisation. 
Individuals are frustrated because they feel unable to participate in the political process 
and feel that mainstream parties do not recognise their concerns.  This may not be true 
and we stress that we are talking about perceptions. Clearly there is much to be done by 
Parliamentarians and by the political parties to ensure that there is a nonviolent outlet 
for individuals throughout society, but we also consider that there is an insufficient 
focus within Prevent on building trust in democratic institutions at all levels. This 
should be emphasised more strongly, including how work currently being undertaken 
by the Government Equality Office to implement the 2010 recommendations of the 
Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary Representation feeds into Prevent. 
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3 Where does radicalisation take place? 
24. The revised Prevent Strategy lists a number of sectors and institutions where the 
Government believes there to be particular risks of violent radicalisation or where it 
believes radicalisation can be identified: education, the internet, faith institutions and 
organisations, health services, the criminal justice system, the charitable sector and 
overseas. In our terms of reference, published before the Prevent Review, we identified 
universities, religious institutions, the internet and prisons for particular inquiry and we 
consider each of them below.  
Universities 
25. In the Prevent Review, the Government drew a link between university education and 
terrorist activity, but our evidence suggests that there may be a much less direct link than 
was thought in the past, and a recent Home Office document suggests that individuals 
involved in violent extremism are little different to others around them in terms of their 
education. The Prevent Review says this: 
More than 30% of people convicted for Al Qa’ida-associated terrorist offences in the 
UK between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or a higher 
education institution. Another 15% studied or achieved a vocational or further 
education qualification. About 10% of the sample were students at the time when 
they were charged or the incident for which they were convicted took place. These 
statistics roughly correspond to classified data about the educational backgrounds of 
those who have engaged recently in terrorist-related activity in this country: a 
significant proportion has attended further or higher education. 
We believe there is unambiguous evidence to indicate that some extremist 
organisations, notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir, target specific universities and colleges 
(notably those with a large number of Muslim students) with the objective of 
radicalising and recruiting students. 49 
26. The Henry Jackson Society , whose staff carried out some of the analysis on which this 
was based, highlighted several specific cases: 
• at least four individuals involved in acts of terrorism in the UK were senior members of 
a university Islamic Society (Kafeel Ahmed, Waseem Mughal, Yassin Nassari and 
Waheed Zaman);  
• Omar Sharif, a suicide bomber in Tel Aviv in 2003, was radicalised during his first year 
at King’s College London after he attended Hizb-ut-Tahrir meetings on campus;  
• Anthony Garcia, convicted for his role in the 2004 ‘fertiliser’ bomb plot, attended 
religious talks in the late 1990s at the University of East London Islamic Society; and  
 
49 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, paras 10.61, 10.66 
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• Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, convicted for his role in Dhiren Barot’s 2004 ‘dirty bomb’ 
plot, was studying at Brunel University and met Barot in the university’s prayer room.50 
27. However, Universities UK expressed concern that: 
Simplistic linkages have been made between violent radicalisation and the fact an 
individual has attended university without acknowledgement that the radicalisation 
process is far more nuanced and difficult to predict ... 
What is not taken into account is that the proportion of young men now 
participating in higher education stands at 41%, a fact that indicates that attending 
university may actually reduce the risk of vulnerability to violent radicalisation.51  
A Home Office Rapid Evidence Assessment of open source empirical studies published 
more recently found that individuals involved in Islamist violence “tend to be educated to a 
similar level ... as the broader population in which they live”.52  
28. When asked whether attending university meant an individual was more at risk of 
extremism, Professor Geoff Petts, representing Universities UK replied that universities 
“acknowledge the threat, but we do not see evidence to support that”. Nabil Ahmed, of the 
Federation of Student Islamic Societies, added: 
There are various myths surrounding the issue of campus extremism. There is far too 
much sensationalism and insufficient evidence or expertise in this wider discussion 
... There is a notion that campuses are hotbeds of extremism, which is unfounded in 
the expertise and experience of the sector and the experience of students. There is a 
notion that, just because these people who have gone on to become terrorists went to 
university, in some way those two things are connected—the evidence suggests not. 
There was an independent inquiry, for example, into the case of Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, who went to UCL, which showed that he was not actually radicalised 
at university.53 
Professor Petts argued that the evidence that extremist groups were actively targeting 
universities was “circumstantial” and Nabil Ahmed said that he had not come across any 
instances of campus preaching that would be in breach of British law.54 Other students we 
met through SOAS, including practicing Muslims, were adamant that they had not 
encountered anyone on campus who supported terrorism. 
29. Hannah Stuart of the Henry Jackson Society said that she understood why the 
Federation of Students Islamic Societies felt the need to defend Muslim students against 
the media focus on them, but pointed out that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was a former 
president of his University’s Islamic Society, who had been convicted in the US in October 
2011 for a failed bomb attack on an aircraft. She said: 
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I think it is not just about the admittedly very small number of Muslim students who 
have gone on to commit terrorist acts but it is about the atmosphere that is created 
sometimes on campus by Islamic societies or other organisations who consistently 
invite a certain type of speaker that does not reflect the plurality of Islam in this 
country.55 
30. Charles Farr claimed that the Prevent Review had not stated that terrorists themselves 
were active recruiters in universities, but rather that the Government was concerned about 
people “who are speaking regularly against core UK values and whose ideology incidentally 
is also shared by terrorist organisations” and the fact that this appeared to be going 
unchallenged.56 Other witnesses gave examples of such individuals who were allowed to 
speak on campus, for example Raed Salah, who is banned from entering the UK for his 
anti-semitic views but was admitted to the country by mistake in June 2011, and Al Qa’ida 
supporter Anwar Al-Awlaki who, we were told, addressed a UK university by video link.57   
31. Professor Neumann undertook a study in 2007 for the European Commission which 
came to the conclusion that:  
Like prisons or like the internet, universities were places of vulnerability ... because 
you get people of a certain age, often away from home for the first time, often feeling 
quite lost and often experiencing a sort of crisis of identify and so on. That makes it 
easy for extremist groups to pick them up.58 
Religious institutions 
32. Charles Farr told us that violent radicalisation in mosques or other religious 
institutions comprises “no more than 1% or 2%” of the total cases of radicalisation.59 Our 
witnesses tended to agree that there was very little threat from the mosques. Alyas 
Karmani, for example, argued that “mosques are completely disconnected from young at 
risk Muslims”.60 The Prevent Strategy states that community resistance has reduced the 
open operation of radical preachers and driven many to operate out of private homes or 
the internet. Consequently, while the Strategy cautions ongoing vigilance against potential 
threats, its focus on mosques is more as a tool to help in countering extremist ideology by 
presenting competing points of view.61  
The internet 
33.  Many of our witnesses cited the internet as the main forum for radicalisation.62 Sir 
Norman Bettison, the Association of Chief Police Officers’ lead for Prevent, told us that 
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“the internet does seem to feature in most, if not all, of the routes of radicalisation”.63 It was 
regarded as particularly dangerous as it was now one of the few unregulated spaces where 
radicalisation is able to take place. According to the Home Office, the internet “plays a role 
in terms of sustaining and reinforcing terrorist ideological messages and enabling 
individuals to find and communicate with like-minded individuals and groups”.64 This 
seemed to be contradicted by more recent Home Office-commissioned research, which 
concluded that the internet “does not appear to play a significant role in Al Qa’ida-
influenced radicalisation”. 65 Even those witnesses who attributed a significant role to the 
internet tended to support that report’s conclusion that some element of face-to-face 
contact was generally essential to radicalisation taking place, including with regards to the 
extreme far right, but by definition this does not deal with the issue of self radicalisation 
which by its very nature takes place in isolation and concerns have been expressed about 
the impact of ‘Sheikh Google’ on individuals who may be vulnerable, but have not been 
identified as starting on a journey of self radicalisation.66 
Prisons 
34. The Prevent Strategy states that: 
We know that some people who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-
related offences have sought to radicalise and recruit other prisoners. We also know 
that some people who have been convicted for non-terrorism-related offences but 
who have previously been associated with extremist or terrorist networks have 
engaged in radicalising and recruitment activity while in prison. The extent to which 
radicalisation which takes place in prison will endure beyond the confines of the 
prison environment is not yet clear.67 
The Chief Executive of the National Offender Management Service, Michael Spurr, told us 
that the Service had “some evidence of individual prisoners who may have attempted to say 
things or have indicated views that could attract people to a radical cause” but no evidence 
to suggest it was on the increase.68 We were given the following example of an individual 
who had been radicalised in prison:  
An individual who went into Belmarsh on remand was three cells away from 
Abdullah al-Faisal when he was there. Within three days, Abdullah al-Faisal had 
convinced him to undertake a martyrdom mission. He left prison—he was acquitted 
of his offence—went straight to Yemen, desperately looking for jihad, desperately 
seeking a training camp. Fortunately, the handlers there in Yemen channelled him 
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into an appropriate kind of madrassa ... who taught him the correct understanding 
and sent him back to us.69 
35. It is clear that a time in prison can lead to a young person being drawn into friendships 
and networks which increase the likelihood of them being involved in criminal activity.  
Prison has often been described as an instrument for ‘making bad people worse’ and short 
prison sentences, in particular, have been identified as leading to serious unintended 
consequences in terms of life choices and behaviour. There are plenty of examples of 
recruitment of vulnerable inmates to gangs and there are specific examples—for instance 
from Los Angeles—of recruitment through gangs being linked in some way to terrorist 
purposes.  It is difficult to find firm evidence or to quantify the impact, and from our visit 
to Belmarsh it does appear that being recruited to a self-identified Muslim grouping within 
prison is more about association and personal safety than about radicalisation, but the 
authorities would do well to work closely with Muslim organisations to understand what is 
happening within the prison community and its links with the outside world.Professor 
Peter Neumann’s study of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in the prisons of 15 
countries found that: 
• prisons are “places of vulnerability ... highly unsettling environments in which 
individuals are more likely than elsewhere to explore new beliefs and associations”; 
• “radicalisation is driven by behaviours and conditions that are typical of the prison 
environment, especially religious seeking, defiance and the need for protection”; and 
• “over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that lend themselves to 
radicalisation”.70 
While Michael Spurr disagreed about the effects of overcrowding, he did agree that there is 
a potential in prisons for “people to be manipulated because they are vulnerable” and that 
the risk was exacerbated if people’s negative perceptions of society were reinforced while in 
prison.71 
36. However, it is difficult to judge the extent to which radicalisation in prisons a) is 
genuine and b) endures beyond release. Staff at Belmarsh believed that extremist views 
were widely disseminated but found it hard to know how far they were adopted.72 The 
Home Office noted that “the formation of temporary and opportunistic alliances between 
offenders is a commonly observed behaviour in prisons, and not necessarily indicative of 
radicalisation”73 and this was repeated to us in conversations with prison staff. There are 
frequently-cited examples of prisoners who became terrorists, such as the shoe-bomber 
Richard Reid, who spent time in Feltham Young Offenders Institution, in which it is in fact 
unclear whether radicalisation actually took place in custody.74  
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37. In most of the fora we examined, the evidence as to whether there was a real problem 
with radicalisation seemed ambiguous at best. Charles Farr told us that: 
Most radicalisation does not take place in fora at all; it takes place in private 
premises, simply because the people who are doing the radicalising are now much 
more aware of the activities that we are conducting, which you are investigating, than 
was the case two or three years ago when, as they saw it, it was much more possible 
to conduct radicalisation in the margins of religious institutions: mosques, 
madrassas, and others.75 
There was one further forum which came to our attention where radicalisation appeared to 
be a particular risk, although we were not able to explore it fully. According to Alyas 
Karmani, in cities, gang members are another critically vulnerable group because of the 
significant numbers of converts in gangs and the kind of ideology prevalent within these 
groups. 76  
38. As with the scale and drivers of radicalisation, it proved difficult for us to gain a 
clear understanding of where violent radicalisation takes place. In terms of the four 
sectors we explored—universities, prisons, religious institutions and the internet—we 
conclude that religious institutions are not a major cause for concern but that the 
internet does play a role in violent radicalisation, although a level of face-to-face 
interaction is also usually required. The role of prisons and universities was less 
obvious. Much of the uncertainty relates to the fact that a number of convicted 
terrorists have attended prisons and universities, but there is seldom concrete evidence 
to confirm that this is where they were radicalised. The Home Office told us that violent 
radicalisation is increasingly taking place in private homes, particularly as the 
authorities clamp down on radicalisation in more public arenas. Given this, we are 
concerned that too much focus in the Prevent Strategy is placed on public institutions 
such as universities, and that it may be more accurate, and less inflammatory, to 
describe them as places where radicalisation “may best be identified”. We consider that 
the emphasis on the role of universities by government departments is now 
disproportionate.  
39. One further issue that came to our attention was that there may be a particular risk 
of radicalisation linked to membership of some criminal gangs, of which there is no 
mention in the Prevent Strategy. Given the fact that elsewhere some terrorist 
organisations appear to have identified recruitment to gangs within prison as 
providing an opportunity for radicalisation, we suggest that the authorities should be 
alert to the potential for a future threat in this area. We recommend that the 
Government commission a piece of research to explore these issues in more detail. 
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4 The Prevent Strategy 
The Prevent Review 
40. The revised Prevent Strategy was published in June 2011. It has three objectives: 
challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it; protecting 
vulnerable people; and supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of 
radicalisation.77 Witnesses tended to broadly welcome the outcome of the Prevent Review, 
favouring the clearer split between counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation work; the 
separation out of activity between the Home Office, focusing on violent extremism and the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, focusing on non-violent extremism; 
and the fact that more care would be taken to ensure that funding was not given to groups 
that opposed British values.78 Nevertheless, some reservations about the strategy were 
raised and some regarding its implementation. We explore each of these below. 
41. On the whole, witnesses supported the outcome of the Prevent Review. We too 
welcome many aspects of the new Strategy, which appears to address some of the major 
criticisms levelled at its predecessors.  
Targeting resources proportionate to the threat 
42. As previously stated, the revised Prevent Strategy is designed to address all forms of 
terrorism, whereas the original focus of the strategy dealt only with Islamist terrorism and 
therefore almost exclusively focused on Muslim communities. Resources are to be 
allocated proportionate to the threat. To a certain extent Prevent has already begun to 
address other threats; for example, 8% of those referred to the Government’s Channel 
programme as being potentially vulnerable to violent extremism were referred owing to 
concerns around right-wing violent extremism.79 However, some witnesses, and a number 
of participants in our conference, disputed whether the Strategy and in particular its 
implementation accurately reflected the threat, arguing in particular that the threat from 
extreme right-wing terrorism is played down by the authorities.80  
43. The Government does not publish a threat level for any non-Al Qa’ida or Northern 
Ireland-related forms of terrorism. There is some disagreement as to whether there is a 
“terrorist” threat from the extreme right-wing. In its most recent EU terrorist threat 
assessment, Europol stated that: 
Some incidents that occurred in 2010 could be classified as right-wing extremism. 
These raised public order concerns, but have not in any way endangered the political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of any of the Member States.81 
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However, concern about extreme right-wing terrorism grew in 2011 following the killing 
of 77 people in two terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 by Anders Breivik, whose 
extreme right-wing views were linked to Islamophobia.  
44. The Community Security Trust and Board of Deputies of British Jews jointly argued, in 
relation to the 17 right-wing extremists currently serving prison sentences for acts of 
terrorism, that their plots “involved the use of military explosives, biological warfare and 
firearms, indicating a capability not hitherto used by Islamist terrorism in the UK.”82 Mike 
Whine, their representative, added in oral evidence that “one should not belittle the far 
right’s capacity to engage in really serious terrorism and, if you look within Europe 
generally, then there have been even more serious cases.”83 Dr Goodwin suggested the 
focus on Muslim communities in the delivery of Prevent had left a “noticeable gap”: 
I think even though far right parties and movements like the EDL are not overtly 
violent in their ambitions to the same extent that Al Qa’ida-inspired groups are, I 
would make a case that this movement contains the potential for violence. It gives its 
followers a specific set of narratives that under certain conditions validate the use of 
violence.84 
45. Dr Goodwin further warned of the need to pay closer attention to the interplay 
between different forms of extremism and take more seriously: 
The potential for a spiral of violence between different forms of extremism. What I 
mean by that is something that we have not seen since Northern Ireland, which is the 
potential for far right extremisms to enact violence or confrontation against, for 
example, an AQ-inspired group, to bomb a mosque or something of that nature and 
then for that action to be retaliated. It wouldn’t really take too long for a spiral of 
violence to emerge.85 
This was reiterated by Professor Nigel Copsey, of Teesside University, at our conference.86  
46. A view was expressed by some of those giving evidence to us, and those to whom we 
spoke less formally, that the revised Prevent Strategy only pays lip service to the threat 
from extreme far-right terrorism. We accept that Prevent resources should be allocated 
proportionately to the terrorist threat, and that to an extent we must rely upon the 
intelligence and security services to make this judgement. However, we received 
persuasive evidence about the potential threat from extreme far-right terrorism. The 
ease of travel and communications between countries in Europe and the growth of far-
right organisations, which appear to have good communications with like-minded 
groups within Europe, suggest that the current lack of firm evidence should not be a 
reason for neglecting this area of risk. The Prevent Strategy should outline more clearly 
the actions to be taken to tackle far right radicalisation as well as explicitly acknowledge 
the potential interplay between different forms of violent extremism, and the potential 
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for measures directed at far-right extremism to have a consequential effect on Islamist 
extremism, and vice versa.  
Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of 
radicalisation 
Universities  
47. The Government argued in the Prevent Strategy that: 
We accept that universities and colleges of further education will need guidance, 
information and best practice to address these issues ... But we are concerned that 
some universities and colleges have failed to engage in Prevent.87 
Professor Neumann agreed that “universities have been a little bit complacent ... in the 
past”.88 Universities UK acknowledged that “universities can and should do more” and 
drew our attention to the recommendations contained within their 2011 report, Freedom of 
speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities, which have sought to 
redress this. Professor Petts told us: 
We are all very aware that, in an environment where we have a very large cohort of 
young, potentially vulnerable people, there is a threat, and we are very alert to that 
threat. We are acutely aware of our responsibility to those young people ... 
What this report has done is refocus institutions’ minds on how we deliver 
practically freedom of speech in an environment that is safe and fair to all people.89 
48. On the basis of a survey undertaken by Universities UK, Professor Petts considered that 
“the vast majority of institutions” have “signed up wholeheartedly” to the Prevent 
Strategy.90 He gave some examples from his own institution, the University of 
Westminster: 
We have a detailed process in place and we check all organisations that wish to 
become engaged with our students, and we draw a line. To give you an example, I 
believe that we are one of the few universities in the country where, in the last year, 
we actually said no on one occasion, and we engaged with an organisation on 
another occasion to change the programme of events to ensure that our students 
were not exposed to radical extremism ... 
In my own institution, we have a team of four individuals who are responsible for 
ensuring that we have the right protocols in place, that staff are aware of those 
protocols and that students are aware of those protocols through the student charter, 
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which explains to students their responsibilities to each other and the staff’s 
responsibilities to them.91 
Universities UK contended that “selective media reporting and reliance on an evidence 
base that frequently ignores the positive work universities have undertaken in addressing 
this issue ... has resulted in universities being disproportionately targeted in the broader 
debate.”92  
49. However, some university and student representatives also expressed broader concerns 
about the role they were expected to play. The Federation of Student Islamic Societies 
stated that it was: 
Gravely concerned over the impact the revised strategy will have on freedom of 
expression on campuses across the UK. All higher education stakeholders ... are 
obliged by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights to allow the 
expression of opinions as long as they do not compromise public safety.93 
The National Union of Students (NUS) expressed the view of many students with whom 
we met in arguing that “universities are one of the only places where [extremist] views and 
opinions can be challenged effectively in open forums and debates.”94 At our conference, 
Dr Richard Hall cited Cardinal Newman’s description of universities as places of “collision 
of mind with mind”.95 However, a case study undertaken at City University by the Quilliam 
Foundation found that, where students and academics had tried to challenge the activities 
and views of the Islamic society, they were subject to intimidation.96  
50. The NUS has produced guidance for student unions which seeks to provide 
information and advice on their legal implications as charities, the safety and welfare 
implications of visiting speakers and how to manage associated risks of external speakers 
speaking or presenting at events organised by the union. However, NUS representative 
Pete Mercer was concerned that support from the NUS was the only form of guidance 
available to students but that the Union were not experts on extremism. More generally:  
Our conversations with staff in institutions and the HE sector indicate that they are 
unclear about what is expected of them.   
It is NUS’ view that the government should provide clearer guidance for the sector 
on what role they expect institutions to play in the delivery of Prevent.97 
51. We accept that some universities may have been complacent about their role, and, 
while we agree in principle that universities are ideal places to confront extremist 
ideology, we are not convinced that extremists on campus are always subject to equal 
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and robust challenge. We recommend that the Government issue clearer guidance to 
universities about their expected role in Prevent, following consultation with university 
and student representative bodies. We would hope that college authorities and student 
bodies will recognise that individuals or groups expressing hatred against any 
particular race or nationality is simply not acceptable on a British campus, and 
certainly needs to be challenged immediately. 
52. We further recommend that, a designated contact point with relevant expertise 
within Government is provided to student unions and university administrators to 
assist them in making difficult decisions about speakers on campus. 
The internet 
53. The Home Office launched a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit in 2010 to 
investigate internet-based content which might be illegal under UK law and take 
appropriate action against it, although Sir Norman Bettison described it as “a pebble 
thrown into the World Wide Web ocean”.98 It had received 2,025 referrals thus far, about 
10% of which led to websites or web pages being taken down. Sir Norman believed that the 
referral site needed greater publicity which would in turn require greater capacity: at the 
time of our inquiry it consisted of around a dozen officers. 99 Charles Farr told us: 
Every internet service provider (ISP) has acceptable behaviour codes for use on their 
systems. So having that conversation, even where the website is operating in a 
broadly legal space, is not unusual for them. Governments all around the world have 
those conversations with ISPs every day, and the public will very often make their 
own representations to ISPs about particularly unacceptable content that may still be 
legal on websites around the world.100  
He later clarified that Governments would only make representations if websites were 
breaching the law.  
54. Under the Terrorism Act 2006, if a law enforcement agency approached a hosting 
provider in respect of the Act’s provisions regarding liability for hosting terrorist content, 
they would be compelled to take it down and if an internet service provider failed to 
remove the content upon receipt of a valid notice under section 3 of the Act, it would be 
committing an offence.101 The Internet Service Providers’ Association argued that: 
When section 3 notices of the Act are invoked to remove material then there is no 
issue; when they're not invoked it becomes more problematic. As in other areas, ISPs 
are not best placed to determine what constitutes violent extremism and where the 
line should be drawn. This is particularly true of a sensitive area like radicalisation, 
with differing views on what may constitute violent extremist.102  
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55. Professor Neumann, who co-authored Countering Online Radicalisation for the 
International Center for Radicalisation in 2009, told us that the Government had 
implemented a number of their recommendations: 
One of our recommendations was to bring strategic prosecutions—not necessarily 
taking down websites but to prosecute the people who are producing the content for 
the websites. That has happened, to some extent. There is also a mechanism that the 
Government have introduced for deciding what kind of content should be taken 
down and that has also been done. Most importantly, we believe that there is no 
technical solution to this problem and that this problem needs to be addressed 
differently, and the Government have followed us there.  
However, he considered that more remained to be done: 
The most profitable way for any Government to address this problem is to bring 
political pressure, in some cases, to bear on internet providers-big internet 
companies who are hosting extremist videos in places like YouTube, Google, 
Facebook ... They do that to some extent but they could do it more consistently. I 
believe that, for example, all the measures that have been taken by YouTube to clean 
up its act have always been in response to political pressure, both from the United 
States and the United Kingdom ... 
This is not about freedom of speech. All these websites, whether it is YouTube or 
Facebook, have their own rules. They have acceptable behaviours. They all say, "We 
are against hate speech" and they are very effective in removing sexual content or 
copyright content. Why can they not be equally effective at removing, for example, 
extremist Islamist or extremist right-wing content? Primarily, I believe it is because it 
is not in their commercial interest and that is why it is so important that politicians 
and Governments bring political pressure to bear. 103 
The Internet Service Providers’ Association argued that it would be “impractical” for ISPs 
to be expected to proactively monitor material, given the sheer volume of content online, 
as well as undesirable,  given the implications for freedom of expression.104 
56. Assistant Chief Constable John Wright, the National Prevent Coordinator for the 
police, added that there was a need for greater international cooperation, given that most of 
the websites are hosted outside the UK’s jurisdiction.105 The Internet Service Providers’ 
Association confirmed that if material was hosted outside of the UK, a UK intermediary 
would be unable to remove it. They agreed that “to improve this, greater international 
cooperation could be explored, although what constitutes violent extremist under the law 
in one country is not necessarily the same elsewhere.”106 
57. Given the impossibility of comprehensively controlling the internet, it is necessary to 
employ other methods to tackle the issue. Alyas Karmani argued: 
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If you are thinking about banning the internet, you have just got to provide a 
counter-narrative. That is what we do at STREET, so what we do is we identify their 
narrative and then you have to put an equally effective counter-narrative, because if 
you ban one site, 10 others emerge, and the sophistication of various ideologues in 
terms of promoting on the internet and through social media is highly proficient.107 
The Government has been attempting to counter terrorist ideology, this work being led by 
the Research, Information and Communications Unit at the Home Office; however, 
Charles Farr admitted that: 
Getting that message across ... to a group of people who would rarely read the media 
that we would normally work with, is very challenging.108 
The Government’s focus will be on “increasing the confidence of civil society activists to 
challenge online extremist material effectively and to provide credible alternatives.”109 
58. Jamie Bartlett was also concerned that children were not developing the skills that 
would enable them to sift critically material on the internet: 
A lot of the information that looks very trustworthy and accurate—and people tend 
to go on aesthetics of websites—is absolutely bogus but we are not taught this in 
schools because it has happened so quickly. People are not being taught in school 
how to critically evaluate internet-based content and I think that is one of the biggest 
weaknesses that we face at the moment.110 
59. The Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit does limited but valuable work in 
challenging internet service providers to remove violent extremist material where it 
contravenes the law. We suggest that the Government work with internet service 
providers in the UK to develop a Code of Conduct committing them to removing 
violent extremist material, as defined for the purposes of section 3 of the Terrorism Act 
2006. Many relevant websites are hosted abroad: the Government should also therefore 
strive towards greater international cooperation to tackle this issue.  
60. Given the impossibility of completely ridding the internet of violent extremist 
material, it is important to support defences against it. We support the Government’s 
approach to empowering civil society groups to counter extremist ideology online. The 
whole area of communications technology and social networking is complex and 
extremely fast-moving. A form of interaction that is commonly used by thousands or 
even millions of people at one point in time may only have been developed a matter of 
months or even weeks earlier. It follows that legislation and regulation struggle to keep 
up and can provide a blunt instrument at best. Leaders in fields such as education, the 
law and Parliament also need to be involved. Evidence taken by this committee in 
regard to the riots in London last August showed that some police forces have 
identified social networks as providing both challenges and opportunities, with the 
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message from one chief constable that the police recognised that ‘we need to be 
engaged’. In respect of terrorism, as in respect of organised crime, the Government 
should seek to build on the partnership approach to prevention that has proved 
successful in the field of child abuse and child protection. 
Prisons 
61. As well as recommending more staff training to recognise the signs of radicalisation 
and cautioning against an over-reliance on imams, Professor Neumann’s study of 
radicalisation and de-radicalisation in prisons concluded that “there exists no systematic 
programme” in the UK for the de-radicalisation of prisoners and that prison services 
should be “more ambitious in promoting positive influences inside prison”, and develop 
“more innovative approaches to facilitate prisoners’ transition back into mainstream 
society.”111 When asked about progress to implement these recommendations, Richard 
Pickering, of the National Offender Management Service, told us: 
I have discussed Peter Neumann’s book with him and that was right at its time ... 
since 2009/10 when he was doing the background work for this and since 2010 when 
it was published, we have made significant advances, not least in the areas of training 
and of interventions.112 
Professor Neumann agreed that a lot of his recommendations were being implemented 
and that NOMS had “got the emphasis right” in focusing on staff training, aftercare for 
prisoners and providing mainstream-based services.113  
62. We heard, both in evidence from the National Offender Management Service and also 
during our visit to Belmarsh, that systems were in place to gather intelligence and thereby 
identify at-risk prisoners.114 Staff appeared to be well briefed on the issues and there was an 
evident focus on the Decency Agenda, so as not to exacerbate prisoners’ potential sense of 
grievance. However, Alyas Karmani considered that practice varied across the estate; some 
prisons welcomed the support that could be provided by expert organisations, whereas in 
other institutions “doors are completely closed, with a lack of awareness”.115 Some of the 
Muslim prisoners with whom we spoke also felt stereotyped by prison staff.116 
63. Ten terrorist or terrorism-related prisoners were discharged between January and June 
2011; the numbers of non-terrorist prisoners leaving prison having been radicalised are 
unknown. The aftercare provided for these prisoners is very important. Ali Soufan, whose 
organisation has carried out a comparative study of initiatives to counter radicalisation, 
considered that the involvement of families and the wider community in rehabilitation was 
the key to successful aftercare.117 Given this, it may be unhelpful for offenders to be moved 
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into hostels far from their families, which we heard has happened with some Belmarsh 
inmates. At our conference it was suggested that when inmates are released back into the 
community there is a lack of resettlement projects or community-led projects that would 
provide them with the necessary support.118 However, Ahtsham Ali, Muslim Advisor to the 
National Offender Management Service, said that probation officers often asked him for 
assistance in signposting individuals to mosques who can help them with family 
reintegration; there are also various Muslim community organisations who provide this 
support.119 The Community Chaplain programme also works alongside prisoners in their 
transition to the community. 
64. One further issue that was highlighted to us during our visit to Belmarsh concerned the 
sharing of information. Prison authorities share information about prisoners who have 
been potentially vulnerable to radicalising influences with police officers embedded in the 
prison and multi-agency public protection partners upon release but receive little 
information back.120 We were told that, at Belmarsh at least, the prison authorities would 
find it helpful to receive feedback about what happens to these inmates after their release, 
to add to their understanding of prison radicalisation. When we raised this in evidence 
with Charles Farr, he agreed that this should happen.121 The Governor of Belmarsh, Phil 
Wragg, noted a few intelligence breakdowns between different agencies—and told us that 
they had no links at all with the UK Border Agency.122 He advocated development of a 
portal which would allow all the relevant agencies to share intelligence more quickly.123 
65. Good aftercare is critical to ensuring that prisoners who may have been vulnerable 
to violent extremist ideology in prison can make the transition safely into the 
community, and family involvement is critical to good aftercare. We are concerned that 
The National Offender Management Service has not paid more attention to ensuring 
that conditions of release do not unnecessarily restrict family contact and indeed 
actively encourage positive family support and engagement. Where there is a tendency 
for a family to reject the offender it can be important for the mosque to encourage the 
family to provide support and engagement. We are not convinced that the work of the 
chaplaincy in facilitating the transition from prison to the home community is as 
effective as it needs to be, although we were impressed with the hopes and aspirations 
which were described to us by the Imams we met and it is clear that there are serious 
moves within the Muslim community to create the necessary structures and 
arrangements.. We recommend that this is always taken into account.  We also heard 
conflicting evidence about the level of support available in the community and 
recommend that resources are prioritised towards closing any gaps.  
 
118 Q 441 [Iman Sikander] 
119 Q 296 
120 Q 296 [Mr Pickering] 
121 Q 322 
122 The National Offender Management Service clarified subsequent to the visit that they had a Memorandum of 
Understanding in place with the UK Border Agency on information sharing about TACT offenders of common 
interest but little contact with UKBA specifically in relation to prisons. 
123 Annex B 
28    Roots of violent radicalisation 
 
 
66. The National Offender Management Service must be an equal participant in the 
Prevent strategy, alongside other agencies. We are very concerned that prison 
authorities are not receiving feedback about prisoners vulnerable to radicalisation after 
their release. Such information would be critical to improving understanding of prison 
radicalisation and prison processes for monitoring and dealing with it. We recommend 
that the Government should a) implement a system whereby this information is fed 
back into prisons and b) develop a portal that would allow the relevant agencies dealing 
with prisoner intelligence, including the UK Border Agency, to share data more quickly 
and easily.  
Supporting vulnerable people 
67. The Government has used, and will continue to use with some adaptations, the 
Channel programme as a means to identify and support people at risk of radicalisation. 
Identifications are made against a range of possible indicators, including expressed support 
for violence and terrorism; possession of violent extremist literature; attempts to access or 
contribute to websites; possession of material regarding weapons; and possession of 
literature regarding military training, skills and techniques. Some 1,120 people were 
referred to the Channel programme between April 2007 and the end of December 2010. 
The majority of referrals were made by education partners, the police and youth offending 
services.124 Both coordination of the Channel programme by the police and Channel 
interventions themselves are funded by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. 
Funding 
68. Several community-based Channel providers have lost funding since the new Prevent 
Strategy was published, including STREET, who gave evidence to us. There was some 
speculation in the media that this was as a result of the Government withdrawing funding 
from extremist groups but, according to Charles Farr, while this has sometimes been the 
case, organisations have also lost funding because they were not providing value for 
money.  
69. Maajid Nawaz—whose organisation also lost funding—was concerned that there was 
insufficient capacity on the ground to deliver counter-radicalisation programmes and 
queried how the strategy would be implemented.125 This was supported by what we heard 
anecdotally. Charles Farr, however, told us that only a “small number” of groups have had 
their funding withdrawn and that he was “completely confident” that other organisations 
would be available to take their place. He later confirmed that Home Office had withdrawn 
Prevent funding from 9 of the 17 organisations that provided support to individuals at risk 
of radicalisation.126  
70. Jamie Bartlett recognised there had been problems in the past with local authorities 
lacking the right information to make judicious decisions about which groups to fund, but 
cautioned that: 
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If it comes to a situation where groups that are doing very good and documented 
work in preventing terrorist activity are accused of being extremists, for whatever 
reasons and from whoever, and that money is then withdrawn, that could be a 
problem for everybody.127  
Maajid Nawaz noted that the new Prevent strategy does not contain criteria as to who 
should be engaged128 and the Henry Jackson Society recommended that the Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism should “circulate centralised criteria to all Prevent 
partners for identifying group’s whose ideology, trustees, senior members or previous 
speaker record would disqualify it from engagement.”129 
Methods 
71. Jamie Bartlett considered that the best way to defeat non-violent extremism was 
“probably funding projects that are not about extremism, that bring communities together 
for completely unrelated reasons to extremism”.130 Both in formal evidence and in informal 
conversations, those involved in the delivery of Channel agreed that the best way to engage 
with young people at risk was via some other form of “hook”: 
We use anything in our toolkit that enables us to connect and hook up with young 
people. For example, we’re doing a lot of work around sexual violence at the 
moment, the reason being that our sexual relationship education workshops were the 
most popular with young people, and it provided a safe space environment for them 
to talk about issues where they didn’t have any other opportunity. That is a hook for 
us. In the same way, sport, football, boxing is a hook for us to engage young people, 
to connect with them, build relationships with them and engage them in more 
complex and challenging issues.131 
After they are drawn in, then the relevant experts can tackle the ideology, theology, 
emotional support needs and so forth. Akeela Ahmed cautioned that a too-narrow focus 
risked dealing with the symptoms rather than the causes of radicalisation.132 
72. This fits into a broader argument that favours mainstreaming Prevent provision. A 
representative of the London Borough of Harrow stressed at our conference that 
mainstreamed support provided for at-risk individuals by youth workers, delivered by 
good partnership working between police and local authority, was a recipe for success; and 
raised the question of whether more of the Prevent agenda should be mainstreamed. The 
police also considered that “we will be successful in Prevent policing only when it is 
mainstreamed” into neighbourhood policing.133  
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73. Channel is modelled on other multi-agency risk management processes and uses 
processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs and gangs. It was 
mentioned in informal discussions and at our conference that at a local level Prevent is 
becoming increasingly viewed as part of the safeguarding agenda. One individual suggested 
that Prevent should be re-named “safeguarding”. 
74. We fully agree with the Government that public money should not be used to fund 
groups who hold views that contradict fundamental British values. However, we are 
concerned that the parameters for this policy are not sufficiently clear and that the 
situation could arise whereby risk-averse public authorities discontinue funding for 
effective groups because of unfounded allegations of “extremism”. The Government 
should draw up and issue guidelines with clear criteria to potential funders. We also 
note that several Channel providers have recently lost funding and there is currently a 
lack of capacity on the ground to deliver the Strategy. This should be rectified urgently.  
75. The view came across strongly in our evidence that Prevent is most successful at the 
local level where it is mainstreamed into local safeguarding procedures, youth services, 
neighbourhood policing and so forth. We support this approach and encourage the 
Government to do the same. 
Community responses to Prevent 
76. We got the distinct impression that for many Muslim communities, radicalisation was 
not a problem that they recognised. Murtaza Hassan Shaikh told us:  
On the community level in mosques and in community organisations there is a 
general sentiment that Muslims don’t see the problem themselves in their 
communities. So when they see in the news or when they see the issue of violent 
extremism being raised at the political level or national level they wonder where it 
actually is. It is not to say it does not exist, but the examples are so few that people 
develop a sense of paranoia and many conspiracy theories because they themselves 
are not exposed to these ideas in their own community.134 
As a result, and because of the way in which the original Prevent Strategy was phrased and 
communicated, Muslim communities felt unfairly targeted by Prevent. Nabil Ahmed 
criticised a “disproportionate and unfair focus on Muslim students”.135 A number of 
Muslims attended our conference and made it very clear that considerable suspicion about 
the Prevent Strategy remained within their communities, including the suggestion that it 
was used to spy on them. In the words of Sir Iqbal Sacranie, of Muslim Aid, the impression 
created by the first Prevent Strategy remained “the lasting one”.136 At our conference, the 
potential to rename the Strategy was discussed, with Ian Paisley MP suggesting a more 
appropriate term for this part of CONTEST would be “partnership”.137 
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77. Sir Iqbal Sacranie also felt that the current Government had not learnt from its 
predecessor in terms of engaging Muslims: certain individuals continue to be selected by 
the Government to act as “Muslim spokesman” who are not representatives of the varied 
Muslim communities throughout the UK.138 Cage Prisoners told us that “Muslims will 
continue to reject any such [Prevent] strategy if they feel their voice has not been heard” 
and argued that “the names/organisations of those involved in supporting Prevent should 
be published in order for the Muslim community to see where advice has been sought. 
Without this, they will assume that the various communities that exist in the UK have not 
been adequately consulted”.139 
78. Dr Colin Roberts, speaking at our conference, suggested that resistance of the 
community to Prevent had been overstated: Muslim attitudes to police are broadly 
comparable with those of the general population.140 Interestingly, research cited by Dr Sara 
Silvestri at our conference suggested that communities felt that it was the general public, 
rather than the police, who were discriminatory. Where there was resistance, it tended to 
be against “national” rather than “local” Prevent policing in a kind of “reverse 
nimbyism”.141 Communities are being gradually won over but this has been inhibited by 
the lack of a positive campaign to counter some of the negative press surrounding Channel.  
79. Language remains a huge issue. The Averroes Institute posited that: 
Conflation [of Muslims with terrorism] only serves to reduce the chances of 
cooperation with the Muslim community in opposing the violent ideology as the 
community itself feels at risk of being identified as those with terrorist tendencies 
even though they are against it ... The use of terms that link violence with religion are 
... unproductive given that they legitimise extreme elements of society to attack 
aspects of Islam that have nothing to do with ‘violence’, but merely on an ideological 
basis.142 
At our conference, Sir Iqbal Sacranie stated that, while he welcomed much in the tone of 
the Prevent Review, this did not always tally with Government statements. Alyas Karmani 
of the STREET Project considered that the type of language used by the media explained 
why some young Muslims might be particularly exposed to extremist media on the 
internet: 
The end result [of a perception of Islamophobia] is that people access alternative 
media, so they become completely disillusioned with mainstream and they go to 
layers underneath that.143 
80. Despite the Government’s efforts to remedy this perception, there is a lingering 
suspicion about the Prevent Strategy amongst Muslim communities, many of whom 
continue to believe that it is essentially a tool for intelligence-gathering or spying. This 
 
138 Annex A 
139 Ev w11, paras 3.2-3.3 
140 Q 440 
141 Annex A 
142 Ev 116 
143 Q 140 
32    Roots of violent radicalisation 
 
 
might be mitigated if these communities felt more ownership of  the strategy: the 
Government should be even more open and transparent about whom it engages with in 
the UK’s varied Muslim communities and should seek to engage more widely. Only 
through engagement will the Government be able to get communities on their side and 
really prevent radicalisation. It would also be assisted by adopting a more pro-active 
approach to combating negative publicity, particularly in respect of the Channel 
programme. We saw plenty of evidence during our enquiry both of engagement and of 
considerable expertise within the Muslim community. This needs to be acknowledged 
and respected by the authorities in order to strengthen the foundations of the 
partnership approach, which is proving effective in many places. Finally, we believe 
there is a strong case for re-naming the Prevent Strategy to reflect a positive approach 
to collaboration with the Muslim communities of the UK, for example the Engage 
Strategy. 
81. The language used to talk about Prevent, and counter-terrorism more generally, can 
have a detrimental effect on Muslim communities’ willingness to cooperate with 
Prevent where it conflates terrorism with the religion of Islam. The Prevent Strategy 
largely manages to avoid this. However, those engaged in public life must ensure that 
the language they use reflects the same tone.  
Proscription 
82. A further issue we considered in our inquiry is the usefulness of the proscription 
regime in deterring people from joining extremist groups, and how the regime is working. 
Professor Clive Walker, an expert on counter-terrorism legislation from the University of 
Leeds, stated that: 
Successive governments have called in aid three arguments for proscription: First, it 
has been, and remains, a powerful deterrent to people to engage in terrorist activity. 
Secondly, related offences are a way of tackling some of the lower-level support for 
terrorist organisations. … Thirdly, proscription acts as a powerful signal of the 
rejection by the Government—and indeed by society as a whole—of organisations’ 
claim to legitimacy.144 
83. Under Part II of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary can proscribe any 
organisation she believes “is concerned with terrorism”. An organisation “is concerned in 
terrorism” if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, 
promotes or encourages terrorism (including unlawful glorification) or is otherwise 
concerned in terrorism. If this statutory test is met, the Home Secretary must consider 
whether the organisation should be proscribed on policy grounds. The five policy criteria 
are: 
• the nature and scale of the terrorist threat; 
• the specific threat that it poses to the UK; 
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• the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; 
• the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and 
• the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight 
against terrorism. 
There are 48 proscribed international terrorist organisations in the UK in addition to 14 
organisations proscribed in relation to Northern Ireland.145 There are no proscribed 
organisations relating to extreme far-right terrorism. Most recently the Home Secretary 
proscribed Muslims Against Crusades, on 10 November 2011, on the grounds that she was 
satisfied it was simply another name for an organisation already proscribed under a 
number of other names.146 
84. While he acknowledged some of the weaknesses in the current proscription regime, for 
example the propensity of some groups to change their names, Charles Farr argued that it 
was effective based on the 20 convictions for proscription-related offences since 9/11.147 
85. As part of the review of Counter-Terrorism Powers that reported in January 2011, the 
Government considered widening the basis for proscription so that incitement to violence 
or hatred should become reasons for proscribing organisations that openly espouse this 
sort of behaviour: this proposal was rejected. This was supported by our evidence. Such a 
change in the law may have allowed for the banning of groups including Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
and the English Defence League.  Some witnesses argued that it would not be advantageous 
to proscribe such groups, but Jamie Bartlett suggested that the threat of proscription could 
be a useful deterrent: 
Having the Sword of Damocles constantly hanging over groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
has been helpful in forcing them to moderate in many respects.148  
86. Proscription is meant to be subject to ongoing review. However, only one organisation 
has been de-proscribed since 2000, following a direct request from the organisation 
concerned; no Minister has taken the decision to de-proscribe an organisation. Our Chair 
raised, as an example of an organisation which might merit a review, the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam which is still banned in this country despite no longer appearing to be an 
active terrorist force in Sri Lanka or elsewhere.149 In some cases, the Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, said he had “no doubt at all” that 
proscription was done at the behest of foreign governments.150 Given this pressure and the 
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difficulties organisations face in challenging proscription, Mr Anderson has argued that 
proscription orders should be time-limited.151 
87. The Government recently reviewed proscription legislation as part of the review of 
counter-terrorism powers published in January 2011. We agree with the decision not to 
strengthen the law on proscription in a way which would allow for the banning of 
groups which are currently operating within the law, as the evidence suggests that 
proscription would not be effective and could be counter-productive. However, we are 
concerned that it is too difficult for groups who no longer pose a terrorist threat to 
obtain de-proscription, a move which might encourage some groups in their move 
away from active support for terrorism. We therefore endorse the recommendation of 
the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the law be changed to make 
proscription orders time-limited. 
88. Violent radicalisation is clearly a problem within the UK but it takes place within an 
international context and it is important for the UK authorities to be aware of 
developments elsewhere and to share information with partners abroad, both in respect 
of extremist Islamist organisations or movements, and in respect of extreme right-wing 
groups within Europe and America. However, the strongest forces against 
radicalisation are the partnerships of mutual respect and shared citizenship within the 
UK and within local communities in our towns and cities. The evidence given by 
Muslim organisations was impressive and we were encouraged by the evidence of 
greater effectiveness of local partnerships, of leadership within individual communities 
such as the student community, and the evidence of joined up thinking, for instance in 
preparing for the return of offenders to the community. It is important for the 
government to demonstrate, by action and words, strong support for these initiatives as 
well as maintaining the determination to support the work of intelligence agencies and 
the police in tackling those who choose the route of violence and intervening to protect 
those they seek to recruit. 
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Annex A: Conference note 
We held a conference at De Montfort University on 13 December 2011 with support from 
De Montfort University and the Barrow Cadbury Trust. A summary of the key issues 
raised follows. 
Speech (by video link) from James Brokenshire MP, Home Office Minister – The 
Prevent Review 
The Government recognised that Prevent was not working as well as it should and drew 
the following conclusions: 
• putting Prevent within the community cohesion agenda limited its ambition, 
undermined its effectiveness and led to resentment; 
• Prevent funding needed to be more carefully spent and audited and not given to 
extremists; and 
• the Strategy should be more flexible in responding to new threats. 
The revised strategy had three clear objectives: responding to ideological challenges; 
supporting those vulnerable to radicalisation; and working with sectors where there was a 
risk of radicalisation. 
In relation to ideology, programmes were being developed to challenge propaganda online 
with better use of social media and other technology. The Government looked to members 
of the public to help identify extremist websites that should be removed. 
In relation to vulnerability, the Government would build on the successful Channel 
programme to protect those who might be preyed upon, complementing existing 
safeguarding arrangements. 
Relevant sectors included education, healthcare providers, charities and the criminal justice 
system. Some good progress had been made in the university sector and a network of 
regional coordinators had been put in place to support universities and student unions. 
Response from Sir Iqbal Sacranie, Muslim Aid 
Sir Iqbal welcomed many aspects of the Minister’s presentation—including the recognition 
of the level of mistrust of the previous Prevent Strategy amongst Muslim communities and 
that the Strategy needed to apply to other types of violent extremism, including far right 
extremism.  
However, he was concerned that Government statements did not always tally with the 
contents of the new Strategy—for example the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich in which 
he said that “Islamic terrorism is the greatest threat”. Such statements had a detrimental 
impact on Muslim communities. 
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Furthermore, in practice, the Government was not engaging with moderate Muslim voices. 
Particular individuals, who were not representative, continued to be selected by the 
Government to act as Muslim spokesmen. 
While the new Strategy was an improvement, the impression created by the first document 
remained the lasting one amongst Muslim communities. 
Response from Pete Mercer, National Union of Students 
Prevent appeared unhelpfully to conflate violent and non-violent extremism and the 
Strategy did not adequately define its terms, which was unhelpful for those trying to 
implement it. 
The NUS helped student unions, which are on the whole registered charities, to make 
decisions about speakers; to identify and mitigate risks. They accepted that the propagation 
of extremist views could be threatening to some individuals; however it was a challenge to 
find the right balance. Student unions received no support other than that provided by the 
NUS. The Government expected organisations to behave in a certain way but did not issue 
any guidance. For example, there was no guidance as to which speakers should be banned. 
The Government sometimes asked student unions to pass on the names of people “at risk 
of radicalisation”, which put them in a difficult position. 
Prevent as a term was tarnished which made some students groups reluctant to engage in 
the Strategy; however, he believed that at a central level the Government and the NUS had 
resolved this issue. 
Universities were frustrated at being described as “hotbeds of extremism” when they were 
not. 
Responses from the floor 
• There was a need for stronger leadership from Muslim communities to tackle 
radicalisation and less reliance on the Government and other institutions. 
• The media perpetuated stereotypes of “Islamic terrorists” and this was a driver of 
further radicalisation. 
• Muslim communities still perceived Prevent to be a means of spying on them and as 
part of the “war on terror” which extended the guilt of 9/11 to all Muslims. 
• Universities would be able to fulfil the role anticipated for them in Prevent more 
effectively if they had better systems of pastoral care in place.  
• The police were not necessarily the best agency to lead Prevent because they were 
primarily an enforcement agency. Prevent operated in the pre-criminal space and 
therefore should be led by local authorities, social workers and teachers. 
• There was a need for greater clarity about the role of the Department for Communities 
and Local Government in Prevent.  
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• A succession of Borough Commanders in Harrow had integrated local authority and 
police work in this area very effectively. The conclusion was that the key to delivering 
the Prevent agenda was mainstreaming. 
• More funding and emphasis should be devoted to tackling the threat from far right 
extremism. 
• The primary assistance in relation to national security the Government was requesting 
from Universities UK had moved away from radicalisation to cyber security. 
• In terms of prison radicalisation, it needed to be borne in mind that there were only 
120 Terrorism Act (TACT) prisoners within an overall prison population of 80,000: the 
risks were small. Viewing all Muslim prisoners within the prism of security had 
negative consequences. The alienation felt by Muslim communities in relation to 
Prevent was reflected in prisons. 
• Prisons had hugely increased the numbers of imams they employed and imams were 
the key to tackling this issue. 
Speech from Reverend Jesse Jackson 
Reverend Jackson spoke about the positive role that non-violent radicals could play in 
society and warned against confusing non-violent radicals with terrorists.  
He spoke of the dangers of calling people terrorists based on their faith or the colour of 
their skin and defining a religious faith by way of the actions carried out in its name.  
The police and communities needed to be allies rather than adversaries. Democratic 
Governments should not stoop to tackling these issues through racial profiling via stop and 
search and questioning people at ports and airports  
Workshops 
Five workshops were held in relation to: the lessons from Northern Ireland; the threat from 
far right extremism; challenges faced by the police in delivering Prevent; the role of prisons; 
and the role of universities. Feedback from the workshops was recorded as oral evidence 
and is included as such in our Report.  
Speech from Dr Dipu Moni, Foreign Minister, Bangladesh 
Dr Moni described how radicalisation had existed in different forms in different times and 
had not been predominantly associated with Muslims. 
In Bangladesh they had succeeded in rooting out violent extremists with a groundswell of 
support from their people but it had proved difficult to completely extinguish.  
They dealt with radicalisation as a process—the inculcation of a set of values. Counter-
narratives should be delivered via traditional as well as more recent media. 
There was a growing proximity between transnational criminals and terrorists. 
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Annex B: Note of visit to Belmarsh 
We met with prisoners and staff at Belmarsh prison on 28 November 2011 to discuss 
prison radicalisation and measures in place to counter it. A summary of the main issues 
raised follows. 
Meeting with Mr Abu Hamza, originally detained in Belmarsh following conviction for 
11 terrorism-related offences but now on remand following US extradition request 
Mr Abu Hamza believed the drivers of radicalisation to be grievance, guilt and capability.  
Grievances were driven by British foreign policy (relating to Palestine and Afghanistan) 
and a sense that the Prophet was being mocked. He did not believe that unemployment 
was a source of grievance, and considered that groups who suggested it was were 
“blackmailing” the Government for funding. 
Guilt was driven by a feeling that you were safe but your brother was not and you could not 
help him. 
Mr Abu Hamza denied that his sermons contributed to radicalisation—he believed it was 
enough for people to watch the news to be radicalised and in any case he condemned the 
“wrong kind of  violence”, where third parties were injured or killed. He told Muslims to 
express their grievances and guilt through lobbying, donating money and educating 
people. 
In terms of radicalisation in prisons, Mr Abu Hamza noted that prisons were a good 
environment for contemplation and that it was usual for prisoners to seek to re-evaluate 
their lives. 
Meeting with Muslim prisoners 
In general, Muslim prisoners felt they were treated the same as other prisoners, except that 
there was a degree of stereotyping because of the media and some officers regarded them as 
potential terrorists. Prisoners therefore did not feel that they could talk to each other 
openly about their religion because it might be misconstrued by staff. They wanted to be 
able to practice their faith and to support each other. They were happy with their imam but 
had some concerns about the cleanliness of their cells.  
The prisoners queried what was meant by the term radical in relation to the Committee 
inquiry. There were certainly prisoners originating from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Eastern 
Europe who had strong political views which could be termed radical. 
However, they had not come across anyone in prison who had tried to persuade them to 
become terrorists and they did not think that individuals were more likely to become 
radicalised in a prison environment than in any other. 
They had not encountered anyone espousing far-right ideology in prison and 
Islamophobia was not really a problem. 
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The families of Muslim prisoners tended to be unhappy about their offending but 
supportive of them as individuals while they were in prison. 
Meeting with prison staff 
Muslim prisoners made up 20% of the Belmarsh population (compared with 12% across 
the estate). 
The Imam (Muslim chaplain) noted that prisoners did give regard to Abu Hamza, but he 
and his colleagues made it quite clear that Abu Hamza was not an Imam or spiritual leader 
and instead they should come to them for advice. Abu Hamza was more likely to influence 
the High Security Unit prisoners than other prisoners, owing to the detention regime. In 
the same way as for all members of staff, Muslim Chaplains in prisons are required to 
submit Security Intelligence Reports if they become aware of any issue which could impact 
on the security of the establishment or public protection.  Working for the safety of society 
is also an Islamic injunction. 
The Imam agreed that foreign policy and how Muslims are perceived in the UK were 
important drivers of radicalisation.  
All prison officers were responsible for intelligence gathering and they were advised as to 
which specific individuals to look out for. They knew of one example of a prisoner 
requesting a transfer out of his cell because other inmates had tried to radicalise him. 
Many moderate religious prisoners were quite solitary, therefore officers noticed when 
recruiters honed in them. Such behaviour would form the basis of an intelligence report. 
Staff attended briefings three times a day in which any issues could be passed on. 
Signs they looked out for included open compliance with staff despite there clearly being 
more going on, and groups dispersing when officers walked past. The counter-terrorism 
unit in Belmarsh passed them information about what to look for. 
The First Night Centre staff saw all prisoners at the beginning of their detention—this 
involves a full induction as well as health and educational assessments and a series of 
questions, including about their religion.  
Sometimes the family of Muslim prisoners, particularly from Asian communities, might 
reject them. Five Terrorism Act (TACT) prisoners had been released that year and moved 
quite far from home into hostels with curfews that make it difficult to see their families. 
Belmarsh was involved in several projects, including Community Chaplaincys, which 
supported prisoners in their transition after release. 
One of the prison psychologists advised that a risk assessment tool had been developed by 
NOMS for use with TACT offenders prior to release but there was possibly a gap in 
assessing non-TACT offenders. They did not currently assess prisoners for extremism 
when entering prison but there were relevant NOMS interventions that could be used with 
those at-risk. 
There were 17 or 18 extremists in Belmarsh at the time of the visit. Staff did not consider 
radicalisation to be a significant problem in the prison; the real issue they perceived in 
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relation to Muslim prisoners was a violent gang using the Muslim label. A number of 
prisoners would say they had converted to Islam to gain protection from the gang. 
Meeting with the Counter-Terrorism Unit 
The counter-terrorism unit held a daily intelligence briefing and, if appropriate, 
information would be fed back to other staff in the prison. Better-trained staff would be 
briefed more regularly. They had a reasonably accurate picture of what was going on in 
Belmarsh through the management of relevant intelligence. 
The ability for staff to fully understand what a prisoner was thinking was very difficult but 
there was no evidence to suggest that prisoners arrived, adopted radical views then 
committed terrorist offences on release.  
Around 31 terrorist offenders were being held in Belmarsh at the time of the visit. The 
current thinking in the prison service was that dispersal of terrorist prisoners around the 
estate was the best method for containing the spread of terrorist views but some argued 
that concentration would be more effective. Staff kept a record of who associated with 
terrorist prisoners but would only intervene with an individual who presented “challenging 
behaviour”. 
All counter-terrorism intelligence was shared with the Metropolitan Police, who were 
embedded in Belmarsh, to use in the community. However, it would be useful for the 
prison authorities to receive better feedback as to what happened to prisoners after their 
release. 
Meeting with Governor Phil Wragg 
The Governor supported this last point and gave some examples where intelligence had 
not been shared between the relevant agencies as effectively as it could have been. He also 
noted that Belmarsh had no links at all with the UK Border Agency. 
There were many different systems in place for the sharing of intelligence but what was 
required was a single portal to share data between agencies about individuals who are a 
risk, quickly. 
He also believed there should be a greater recognition of the prison service as a major 
player in terms of counter-terrorism intelligence. 
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Annex C: Note of SOAS meeting 
We met with around 15 students from SOAS, including the Student Union officers, on 6 
December 2011 to discuss radicalisation at British universities and student responses to the 
Prevent Strategy. A summary of the main issues raised follows. 
Drivers of radicalisation 
• Young Muslims were disenfranchised from mainstream culture. Although the UK was 
less anti-Muslim than most other Western countries, Islamophobia was growing, with 
David Cameron’s speech on multiculturalism in Munich a turning point.  
• Individuals did not behave in a vacuum—disenfranchisement was also driven by the 
closure of youth services and a feeling that Muslims were disproportionately targeted 
by police during legal protests, for example. 
• There was a link between radicalisation and UK foreign policy. 
• Radicalisation was linked to individual vulnerabilities, and could be countered through 
the development of critical analytical skills. 
• Radicalisation took place behind closed doors, with the internet playing a large role. 
Scale of radicalisation at university 
• Universities were not a major forum for radicalisation. Muslims students had not 
encountered anyone supporting terrorism at Islamic societies or elsewhere at 
university. 
• The statistic that around 30% of terrorist offenders attended university should not be 
used on its own to imply cause and effect between university attendance and support 
for terrorism. 
• Extremist preachers were a “novelty” for Muslim youth, which had now largely worn 
off, particularly since people had been killed. Radicalisation had decreased as a result. 
• To the extent that there was a problem, it was in London and linked to the fact that 
universities provided “free space” whose use was difficult to regulate. 
Attitudes towards Prevent 
• Many students were unhappy with the definitions of radicalisation and extremism and 
the negative connotation given to the word radical in the Prevent Strategy. 
• The perception was that Prevent was clearly targeted at Muslims, which would lead to 
further radicalisation. 
• Universities were places of challenge for extremist ideology and should be defended as 
such. Community cohesion occurred through discussions between groups with 
conflicting ideas. 
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• Students Unions distrusted Prevent because it appeared to deal with the symptoms 
rather than the causes of radicalisation. It was viewed as a sophisticated intelligence-
gathering structure. 
• SOAS Student Union had never been approached by Prevent police officers but 
believed this practice was counter-productive. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
1. We suspect that violent radicalisation is declining within the Muslim community.  
There may be growing support for nonviolent extremism, fed by feelings of 
alienation, and while this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging 
post for violent extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general 
and for the police in particular. There also appears to be a growth in more extreme 
and violent forms of far-right ideology. Indeed it is clear that individuals from many 
different backgrounds are vulnerable, with no typical profile or pathway to 
radicalisation. However, there is a lack of objective data, much of the evidence 
inevitably being anecdotal. Only 250 people have been convicted in the UK of 
terrorism-related offences since 11 September 2001. However, there is a wealth of 
knowledge held by people working with individuals judged to be vulnerable to 
violent radicalisation at a local level that could better inform our understanding of 
why some of these individuals do become radicalised and, crucially, why some do 
not. One of the aims of the increased auditing demands to be placed on Channel 
providers should be the collection of a wider range of data to contribute to this 
evidence base. We recommend that the Government publish the methodology 
whereby this data will be collated and analysed, and make arrangements for suitably 
de-sensitised data to be made available to the wider research community. (Paragraph 
21) 
2. One of the few clear conclusions we were able to draw about the drivers of 
radicalisation is that a sense of grievance is key to the process. Addressing 
perceptions of Islamophobia, and demonstrating that the British state is not 
antithetical to Islam, should constitute a main focus of the part of the Prevent 
Strategy which is designed to counter the ideology feeding violent radicalisation. 
(Paragraph 22) 
3. The Government notes in the Prevent Strategy that individuals “who distrust 
Parliament” are at particular risk of violent radicalisation. This appeared to be borne 
out in our inquiry, both in terms of Islamist and extreme far-right- radicalisation. 
Individuals are frustrated because they feel unable to participate in the political 
process and feel that mainstream parties do not recognise their concerns.  This may 
not be true and we stress that we are talking about perceptions. Clearly there is much 
to be done by Parliamentarians and by the political parties to ensure that there is a 
nonviolent outlet for individuals throughout society, but we also consider that there 
is an insufficient focus within Prevent on building trust in democratic institutions at 
all levels. This should be emphasised more strongly, including how work currently 
being undertaken by the Government Equality Office to implement the 2010 
recommendations of the Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary Representation 
feeds into Prevent. (Paragraph 23) 
4. As with the scale and drivers of radicalisation, it proved difficult for us to gain a clear 
understanding of where violent radicalisation takes place. In terms of the four sectors 
we explored—universities, prisons, religious institutions and the internet—we 
conclude that religious institutions are not a major cause for concern but that the 
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internet does play a role in violent radicalisation, although a level of face-to-face 
interaction is also usually required. The role of prisons and universities was less 
obvious. Much of the uncertainty relates to the fact that a number of convicted 
terrorists have attended prisons and universities, but there is seldom concrete 
evidence to confirm that this is where they were radicalised. The Home Office told us 
that violent radicalisation is increasingly taking place in private homes, particularly 
as the authorities clamp down on radicalisation in more public arenas. Given this, we 
are concerned that too much focus in the Prevent Strategy is placed on public 
institutions such as universities, and that it may be more accurate, and less 
inflammatory, to describe them as places where radicalisation “may best be 
identified”. We consider that the emphasis on the role of universities by government 
departments is now disproportionate.  (Paragraph 38) 
5. One further issue that came to our attention was that there may be a particular risk 
of radicalisation linked to membership of some criminal gangs, of which there is no 
mention in the Prevent Strategy. Given the fact that elsewhere some terrorist 
organisations appear to have identified recruitment to gangs within prison as 
providing an opportunity for radicalisation, we suggest that the authorities should be 
alert to the potential for a future threat in this area. We recommend that the 
Government commission a piece of research to explore these issues in more detail. 
(Paragraph 39) 
6. On the whole, witnesses supported the outcome of the Prevent Review. We too 
welcome many aspects of the new Strategy, which appears to address some of the 
major criticisms levelled at its predecessors.  (Paragraph 41) 
7. A view was expressed by some of those giving evidence to us, and those to whom we 
spoke less formally, that the revised Prevent Strategy only pays lip service to the 
threat from extreme far-right terrorism. We accept that Prevent resources should be 
allocated proportionately to the terrorist threat, and that to an extent we must rely 
upon the intelligence and security services to make this judgement. However, we 
received persuasive evidence about the potential threat from extreme far-right 
terrorism. The ease of travel and communications between countries in Europe and 
the growth of far-right organisations, which appear to have good communications 
with like-minded groups within Europe, suggest that the current lack of firm 
evidence should not be a reason for neglecting this area of risk. The Prevent Strategy 
should outline more clearly the actions to be taken to tackle far right radicalisation as 
well as explicitly acknowledge the potential interplay between different forms of 
violent extremism, and the potential for measures directed at far-right extremism to 
have a consequential effect on Islamist extremism, and vice versa.  (Paragraph 46) 
8. We accept that some universities may have been complacent about their role, and, 
while we agree in principle that universities are ideal places to confront extremist 
ideology, we are not convinced that extremists on campus are always subject to equal 
and robust challenge. We recommend that the Government issue clearer guidance to 
universities about their expected role in Prevent, following consultation with 
university and student representative bodies. We would hope that college authorities 
and student bodies will recognise that individuals or groups expressing hatred 
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against any particular race or nationality is simply not acceptable on a British 
campus, and certainly needs to be challenged immediately. (Paragraph 51) 
9. We further recommend that, a designated contact point with relevant expertise 
within Government is provided to student unions and university administrators to 
assist them in making difficult decisions about speakers on campus. (Paragraph 52) 
10. The Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit does limited but valuable work in 
challenging internet service providers to remove violent extremist material where it 
contravenes the law. We suggest that the Government work with internet service 
providers in the UK to develop a Code of Conduct committing them to removing 
violent extremist material, as defined for the purposes of section 3 of the Terrorism 
Act 2006. Many relevant websites are hosted abroad: the Government should also 
therefore strive towards greater international cooperation to tackle this issue.  
(Paragraph 59) 
11. Given the impossibility of completely ridding the internet of violent extremist 
material, it is important to support defences against it. We support the Government’s 
approach to empowering civil society groups to counter extremist ideology online. 
The whole area of communications technology and social networking is complex 
and extremely fast-moving. A form of interaction that is commonly used by 
thousands or even millions of people at one point in time may only have been 
developed a matter of months or even weeks earlier. It follows that legislation and 
regulation struggle to keep up and can provide a blunt instrument at best. Leaders in 
fields such as education, the law and Parliament also need to be involved. Evidence 
taken by this committee in regard to the riots in London last August showed that 
some police forces have identified social networks as providing both challenges and 
opportunities, with the message from one chief constable that the police recognised 
that ‘we need to be engaged’. In respect of terrorism, as in respect of organised crime, 
the Government should seek to build on the partnership approach to prevention that 
has proved successful in the field of child abuse and child protection. (Paragraph 60) 
12. Good aftercare is critical to ensuring that prisoners who may have been vulnerable to 
violent extremist ideology in prison can make the transition safely into the 
community, and family involvement is critical to good aftercare. We are concerned 
that The National Offender Management Service has not paid more attention to 
ensuring that conditions of release do not unnecessarily restrict family contact and 
indeed actively encourage positive family support and engagement. Where there is a 
tendency for a family to reject the offender it can be important for the mosque to 
encourage the family to provide support and engagement. We are not convinced that 
the work of the chaplaincy in facilitating the transition from prison to the home 
community is as effective as it needs to be, although we were impressed with the 
hopes and aspirations which were described to us by the Imams we met and it is clear 
that there are serious moves within the Muslim community to create the necessary 
structures and arrangements.. We recommend that this is always taken into account.  
We also heard conflicting evidence about the level of support available in the 
community and recommend that resources are prioritised towards closing any gaps.  
(Paragraph 65) 
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13. The National Offender Management Service must be an equal participant in the 
Prevent strategy, alongside other agencies. We are very concerned that prison 
authorities are not receiving feedback about prisoners vulnerable to radicalisation 
after their release. Such information would be critical to improving understanding of 
prison radicalisation and prison processes for monitoring and dealing with it. We 
recommend that the Government should a) implement a system whereby this 
information is fed back into prisons and b) develop a portal that would allow the 
relevant agencies dealing with prisoner intelligence, including the UK Border 
Agency, to share data more quickly and easily.  (Paragraph 66) 
14. We fully agree with the Government that public money should not be used to fund 
groups who hold views that contradict fundamental British values. However, we are 
concerned that the parameters for this policy are not sufficiently clear and that the 
situation could arise whereby risk-averse public authorities discontinue funding for 
effective groups because of unfounded allegations of “extremism”. The Government 
should draw up and issue guidelines with clear criteria to potential funders. We also 
note that several Channel providers have recently lost funding and there is currently 
a lack of capacity on the ground to deliver the Strategy. This should be rectified 
urgently.  (Paragraph 74) 
15. The view came across strongly in our evidence that Prevent is most successful at the 
local level where it is mainstreamed into local safeguarding procedures, youth 
services, neighbourhood policing and so forth. We support this approach and 
encourage the Government to do the same. (Paragraph 75) 
16. Despite the Government’s efforts to remedy this perception, there is a lingering 
suspicion about the Prevent Strategy amongst Muslim communities, many of whom 
continue to believe that it is essentially a tool for intelligence-gathering or spying. 
This might be mitigated if these communities felt more ownership of  the strategy: 
the Government should be even more open and transparent about whom it engages 
with in the UK’s varied Muslim communities and should seek to engage more 
widely. Only through engagement will the Government be able to get communities 
on their side and really prevent radicalisation. It would also be assisted by adopting a 
more pro-active approach to combating negative publicity, particularly in respect of 
the Channel programme. We saw plenty of evidence during our enquiry both of 
engagement and of considerable expertise within the Muslim community. This 
needs to be acknowledged and respected by the authorities in order to strengthen the 
foundations of the partnership approach, which is proving effective in many places. 
Finally, we believe there is a strong case for re-naming the Prevent Strategy to reflect 
a positive approach to collaboration with the Muslim communities of the UK, for 
example the Engage Strategy. (Paragraph 80) 
17. The language used to talk about Prevent, and counter-terrorism more generally, can 
have a detrimental effect on Muslim communities’ willingness to cooperate with 
Prevent where it conflates terrorism with the religion of Islam. The Prevent Strategy 
largely manages to avoid this. However, those engaged in public life must ensure that 
the language they use reflects the same tone.  (Paragraph 81) 
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18. The Government recently reviewed proscription legislation as part of the review of 
counter-terrorism powers published in January 2011. We agree with the decision not 
to strengthen the law on proscription in a way which would allow for the banning of 
groups which are currently operating within the law, as the evidence suggests that 
proscription would not be effective and could be counter-productive. However, we 
are concerned that it is too difficult for groups who no longer pose a terrorist threat 
to obtain de-proscription, a move which might encourage some groups in their 
move away from active support for terrorism. We therefore endorse the 
recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the law 
be changed to make proscription orders time-limited. (Paragraph 87) 
19. Violent radicalisation is clearly a problem within the UK but it takes place within an 
international context and it is important for the UK authorities to be aware of 
developments elsewhere and to share information with partners abroad, both in 
respect of extremist Islamist organisations or movements, and in respect of extreme 
right-wing groups within Europe and America. However, the strongest forces against 
radicalisation are the partnerships of mutual respect and shared citizenship within 
the UK and within local communities in our towns and cities. The evidence given by 
Muslim organisations was impressive and we were encouraged by the evidence of 
greater effectiveness of local partnerships, of leadership within individual 
communities such as the student community, and the evidence of joined up 
thinking, for instance in preparing for the return of offenders to the community. It is 
important for the government to demonstrate, by action and words, strong support 
for these initiatives as well as maintaining the determination to support the work of 
intelligence agencies and the police in tackling those who choose the route of 
violence and intervening to protect those they seek to recruit. (Paragraph 88) 
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Draft Report (Roots of violent radicalisation), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 88 read and agreed to. 
Three Papers were annexed to the Report as Annexes A, B and C. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Nineteenth Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of 
Standing Order No. 134. 
[Adjourned till Tuesday 7 February at 10.40 am 
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Oral evidence
Taken before the Home Affairs Committee










Witness: Congressman Peter King, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, US House of
Representatives, gave evidence.
Q1 Chair: Could I call the Committee to order and
welcome our first witness for our inquiry into the roots
of radicalism. Congressman King, you are most
welcome to this session of the Home Affairs Select
Committee. I understand this is the first time that the
Chairman of Homeland Security has given evidence
to a parliamentary committee in the United Kingdom,
and I welcome you most warmly and I thank you for
coming all this way.
Congressman King: Chairman, thank you.
Chair: This session launches the Committee’s series
of hearings into the roots of violent extremism and
radicalism. We noted, in preparing for these hearings,
that your Committee under your chairmanship had
already commenced hearings in the United States
Congress. Could I start by asking you, looking back
at the sessions that you have had so far, what are the
main themes that have appeared as a result of your
inquiries about the way in which radicalism has
developed in the United States?
Congressman King: Chairman, first of all, thank you
very much for inviting me to appear before the
Committee. It is a great honour to be here and I want
to thank all of you, and especially you, Mr Chairman.
Yes, we had the first hearing back in March of this
year. We had a second hearing in June and another
one in July. If I could just say, when I announced the
first hearing, there was virtually national furore. It was
around the clock television. I was being attacked as a
bigot and a racist because I was saying that there was
a very real attempt to recruit by Al-Qa’ida in the
Muslim American community, and while I always say
the overwhelming majority of Muslims are
outstanding Americans, nevertheless, there was a
reluctance on the part of many to come forward and
that there was progress being made by Al-Qa’ida in
recruiting and it was an issue that was not being
discussed. At the hearings what I think the evidence
clearly showed was there is an attempt to recruit in the
Muslim American community, that there have been
successes, that even though, again, the overwhelming
majority of Muslims are good Americans, when there
is a problem—for instance, we found young men
being recruited to Al-Shabaab or to Al-Qa’ida in the





local mosque and go to local leaders and ask for
assistance. They were basically told not to go to the
police, “Don’t tell anyone,” and in some cases almost
threatened, the course of action taken against them
within the community. So that is real; that is there.
Also at the first hearing we had Dr Zuhdi Jasser, who
is a prominent Muslim American, testify. He called
on the Government to directly confront the Islamist
theology, if you will, or the Islamist beliefs, and not
be afraid to confront it. He was saying that it is more
and more difficult for moderate Muslim leaders to
come forward unless the Government takes a more
positive role in defining what the terms should be.
The second hearing was on prisoner radicalisation and
clearly—I mean, literally—it is a captive audience,
and you will find many of the imams in the prisons
are extremely radical. In New York, we have had
imams with criminal records who have been involved
in very questionable activities themselves, and we
found a number of men being recruited in the prisons
and then coming out of prison and being involved
terrorist activities.
The third hearing was more specific. It was about Al-
Shabaab, because the Somali American community is
not unique but it is separate from other parts of the
Muslim community, in that in many ways it is
shunned by other Muslims. They have less money;
they have less access to the greater Muslim
community, and also there is a war going on in
Somalia, so there are extra elements for them to be
recruited. We have had at least four dozen Americans,
young men, Somali Americans, who have been
recruited, gone back to Somalia and have been
trained. For a while, American law enforcement and
intelligence sources were not that concerned, from our
perspective, because it was felt they were going back
to Somalia to fight in Somalia. But now there is
increasing evidence of them attempting to come back
to the US and also linking up with Al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula, in Yemen, and forming an alliance
between Al-Shabaab and AQAP.
Q2 Chair: That is extremely helpful. On Sunday,
America marked 10 years of 9/11 and you lost 150 of
your own constituents, because you represent New
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York, in the tragedy that occurred. Do you think that
radicalisation is on the increase or on the decrease
over the last 10 years? Is it becoming worse or better?
Congressman King: Radicalisation is much worse.
This isn’t just me—and I am a member of the
Republican Party—this is developing into a consensus
view. Denis McDonough, who is the President’s
Deputy National Security Advisor, gave a major
speech back in March saying that Al-Qa’ida is
definitely recruiting within the Muslim American
community, and the reason for that is, all of us
working together—and let me give tremendous credit
to the British for being such strong allies in this—we
have together made it very difficult for Al-Qa’ida to
attack us from the outside. A 9/11-type attack would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The 9/11
attack itself could not happen again because there
were so many tripwires that we missed along the way.
Al-Qa’ida realises that, and they have now adapted
their strategy and their tactics and they are—knowing
that it would be very difficult to attack on a large scale
from the outside—attempting to recruit from within.
We have had a number of serious attempts with people
who were recruited in the United States. These are
Muslims, beneath the radar screen, living in the US
legally, who have been taken back to Afghanistan and
Pakistan to be trained in a very sophisticated way to
come back to carry out attacks.
Q3 Chair: The Pew Research Center seems to
indicate that their research shows that there is a
decrease and there is no appetite for radicalism within
the Muslim community. What do you say about that,
Congressman?
Congressman King: Yes, I don’t accept that. I accept
the numbers of Pew, but when you actually look
within those numbers, you find out that 21% of
Muslim Americans say that they are aware of
extremist activity in their community; I think it is 16%
of Muslims say that they have a favourable or not a
particularly unfavourable view of Al-Qa’ida, so
considering the large number of Muslims we have in
the community, one-sixth is an awful lot. All we
needed was 19 on September 11.
So, no, I agree to the extent that the overwhelming
majority reject Al-Qa’ida, and they are good
Americans, but there is a significant enough minority
that is a cause for great concern. You don’t need a lot
of people. Despite their numbers, I mean for 16%
living in the United States to say they don’t have an
unfavourable view of Al-Qa’ida when they have seen
the devastation that was caused. If I could just give
one example that first hit me right after September
11. I had a very close relationship with the Muslim
community and I used to speak at a local mosque very
often. I was involved very much with Bosnia and
Kosovo, and I knew these leaders and they were
professionals; they were doctors, real estate
developers. I was at their homes; I went to their
weddings. I had children of theirs interning in my
office, and they wore full Muslim headgear and
everything, and yet I found these same people, two
and three, four weeks after September 11, saying,
“Well, it could have been the Jews that attacked
Ground Zero. It could have been the FBI. It could
have been the CIA,” and these were very educated.
One person had an extremely high medical position in
our local Government and yet he was saying this. That
is when I first started watching, becoming aware of
that, and I think since then it has gotten considerably
worse.
Q4 Steve McCabe: Good morning, Congressman.
Can I ask you, how important do you think theology
is to the radicalisation process?
Congressman King: The “what” is—I am sorry?
Steve McCabe: Theological thought; the whole
process of theology. How important is that to
radicalisation?
Congressman King: I am sorry I am missing on the
accent, I think the—
Steve McCabe: It must be this Birmingham accent of
mine, Congressman.
Congressman King: I am surprised anyone can
understand me.
Steve McCabe: I am working on it. I am asking you
about the whole process of religious studies, the
theological process.
Congressman King: Yes. First of all, I reject that there
is anything in Muslim theology or ideology that
allows for violence or wars, but the danger is when
you take a cause and you try to wrap it in religion, it
gives it a fervour that it doesn’t have. Some people
have asked me about Timothy McVeigh, who was a
brutal mass murderer, but what would separate him
and what would keep him more as an individual is he
had his own psychopathic views. You can take
psychopathic views or murderous views and wrap it
in the name of religion, whether it is Christianity or
Judaism or Islam, whatever, it just gives it an extra
fervour and a greater intensity. I think that allows it
to spread, especially among people who, for whatever
reason, have been going through a crisis in their own
life—you know whatever the reason is. I am not a
psychiatrist, but I just think having a religious
element, as perverted as that would be, makes the
enemy that much more dangerous.
Q5 Michael Ellis: Congressman, I would like to ask
you about the background and profile of those
Islamists who have become radicalised in the United
States. There has been some talk here in the United
Kingdom about the background and the evidence has
not tended, necessarily, to support the theory that it is
those of low achievement status, or low employment
or education abilities, that are necessarily the ones
radicalised. Do you have any observations about what
the position is in the United States?
Congressman King: Yes, I would pretty much share
the point that you were making. I know we in the
United States were surprised when we saw back in
2005, and especially 2006 with the liquid explosives
plot, where many of these were second and third
generation Pakistanis who were established in their
community, their families were basically middle class,
as we would call them. That is similar to what we
have seen in the United States. For instance, last
year’s Times Square bomber was from Pakistan, but
he became an American citizen. He had a background
in financial services and yet he attempted to carry out
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the bombing in Times Square. Zazi, who was the
subway bomber in New York—attempted subway
bomber in 2009—while he wasn’t wealthy, he was
living in New York. He was a graduate of a local high
school. He was a pushcart vendor in lower Manhattan.
He wasn’t rich, but certainly he was not poor, and yet
he was recruited and went to Afghanistan for training.
No, I don’t find that the lack of job opportunity or
economics is that major a factor at all. In fact, I find
some of the most zealous Islamists are actually either
middle class or people with advanced education. So
this is not similar to some of the civil rights
disturbances we have had where it does come out of
a ghetto or come out of poverty. The Somali American
community may be a little different because, as I say,
they are more ghettoised by their own community. We
have more assimilation in our country, but even
among Muslims, as I say, the Somali American
community is a little more isolated and, even though
they make great contributions, they are almost like the
last ones in. So there could be some economic factor
or more sense of desperation among Somali
Americans.
Q6 Mr Winnick: Congressman King, there has been
some surprise in the United States, and also in Britain,
that you have a job of looking into and investigating
terrorism when your own past quotes about
terrorism—and you are obviously anticipating what I
am going to ask you—seems to be as an apologist for
terrorism. You were quoted as saying the following in
1982, and I quote you, “We must pledge ourselves to
support those brave men and women who this very
moment are carrying forth the struggle against British
imperialism in the streets of Belfast and Derry.” Three
years later you said, “If civilians are killed in an attack
on a military installation, it is certainly regrettable but
I won’t morally blame the IRA for it.” Do you stand
by that?
Congressman King: I stand by it in the context of
when it was said, and if I could just have a moment
to expand on that.
Chair: Of course, please.
Congressman King: If I can just jump ahead. I can
just cite you Tony Blair, as recently as March of this
year, who put out a long statement defending my
record, both in the 1980s and throughout the Irish
peace process. I was just out in the hallway and
Baroness Kennedy came up to me to thank me for the
work I did in the Irish peace process. Paul Murphy
came by last evening.
What I was saying—and I stand by it—is that the
situation in Northern Ireland, there were loyalist
paramilitaries and obviously Republican
paramilitaries, and I had gotten to know Gerry Adams
and Martin McGuinness, and I was very confident
that, if the Republican movement could get to the
table, you would see a peace process. I believed the
United States had a very significant role to play as an
honest mediator, as an honest broker. I worked very
closely with Bill Clinton. I was very much involved
in the Good Friday Agreement. I was very involved
in getting Gerry Adams a visa, but also involved in
getting loyalists into the United States. I felt that when
it was on the table, that Adams and McGuinness
would be able to, if you will, control the Republican
movement, and I think it’s worked. Tony Blair said I
made invaluable contribution to peace. Bill Clinton
has cited me in his memoirs as a person who was very
much involved.
It was never my position, as an Irish-American,
whether or not Ireland was united. To me there were
injustices in the north. There were good people on
both sides. I spent a lot of time meeting with the
loyalist community, the unionist community, at the
same time, and I came away from that convinced that
there was a role for the US to play. What I was saying
with those quotes—I was also trying to put it in
perspective. All of the quotes were anti-IRA in the
United States—no mention ever made of the UVF or
the UDA or the Red Hand Commandos or whatever.
I was trying to put it in a perspective to show that
there were people—that this is not just the terrorist
mayhem it was made out to be—that there were
significant leaders on the Republican side.
Mr Winnick: I wonder if I could interrupt,
Congressman King, because this is not about Northern
Ireland. I raised the subject, and I thought we should
be aware of it, and you have been praised by quite a
number of people in helping the peace process, and
the situation in Northern Ireland has changed
drastically. Let’s hope it remains that way. So we
won’t go back. I have made the point and you have
answered accordingly, even if I strongly disagree
with you.
Congressman King: Sure.
Q7 Mr Winnick: There is criticism, Congressman
King, of the United States in facing up to the acute
terrorist danger, and I was in the United States, as it
so happens, on that infamous day on 9/11. I was in
that part of Philadelphia that is pretty near New York.
Congressman King, the criticism is along these lines
that various measures that have been taken by your
country, like Guantanamo—have I got it right?
Chair: Guantanamo; Guantanamo Bay.
Mr Winnick: Guantanamo Bay. The tortures that
have been carried out, which have been well
publicised, and the rest of it. Does that really help in
dealing with terrorism and shouldn’t the United States
learn the lessons from Northern Ireland, where the
techniques used by the British—the tortures that were
used and have been condemned—often they were
saying was a recruiting sergeant for the IRA?
Congressman King: Yes, I would reject your premise
as regards torture. First of all, there was one element
I will certainly look at, Abu Ghraib. That was wholly
indefensible and wrong. That was not part of
American policy and that was totally wrong, but if
you are talking about Guantanamo, you are talking
about a situation where you had suddenly hundreds
and hundreds of people captured. Where do you take
them? Where do you interrogate them? As far as the
torture, you are probably talking about three instances
of water boarding that were carried out; Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed was one of them. Every SEAL was water
boarded in training. There was no permanent damage
to any of those three, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or
the other two, and we did get invaluable information.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did provide invaluable
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information. Water boarding has not been done, I
don’t think, since 2004 or 2005, and it was focused
on those three. There were doctors present; there were
legal opinions sought. They were very, very difficult
times.
As for Guantanamo, and I know it is a very
controversial issue over here, I have been to
Guantanamo. It is a model facility. I don’t know what
you see or hear. There is one medical personnel for
every two prisoners. They are taught language, arts.
They are out playing soccer, or football as you call it.
Q8 Chair: You visited?
Congressman King: I visited Guantanamo,
absolutely, yes.
Chair: On how many occasions?
Congressman King: I have been down there once, and
I have—
Q9 Chair: So as far as you are concerned, the
treatment is appropriate?
Congressman King: I would say it is better than
almost any American prison. It is certainly better than
any Army or Marine Corp training facility in the
country.
Q10 Mr Winnick: Water boarding 160 times on one
prisoner; 160 times. If that is not torture,
Congressman King, what on earth is it?
Congressman King: To me, it is enhanced
interrogation. I have seen Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
in person since then. He is not all the worse for wear
for it, I can tell you, and he did provide information.
Again, if you are talking about a moral equivalency
here, we are talking about a type of interrogation that
was extremely uncomfortable, extremely painful—I
wouldn’t want to go through it—no permanent
damage. At the same time, if that led to the saving of
500, 600, 700 people, who did not have to jump from
buildings or be burnt to death, it is a price I will pay.
Q11 Chair: Yes. Of course. Let us move on and go
back to our topic, if I may, and that is the threat of
each of these areas in terms of radicalisation. It may
be difficult, but if we just go through them. First of
all, the Internet. Is that seen by you and your
committee, and in the evidence you received, as being
a way in which people are radicalised? I notice that
Frances Townsend, the former Homeland Security
Advisor to President Bush, specifically talked about
social networking sites, the way in which people
speak to each other, encourage others to be involved
in violence. How serious is this threat from the
Internet?
Congressman King: The Internet is a very serious
threat, both involving terrorists and prospective
terrorists, and those who are just curious,
communicating among themselves on the Internet,
also the direct recruiting by someone such as al-
Awlaki. This is having a real impact in the United
States. Al-Awlaki is an American citizen. He
understands how Americans think. He is able to
appeal to the American Muslim mind; it is written in
American idiom. His magazine Inspire—and I think
there have been seven editions of it coming out—it
definitely has an impact.
Q12 Chair: Would you like to see better controls on
the Internet, on the social networking sites like
Facebook and Twitter?
Congressman King: Yes I do. We have a First
Amendment issue that does not confront you or does
not really pertain in Great Britain, so we are trying to
find ways of how it can be done without violating the
First Amendment involving freedom of speech and
communication.
Q13 Chair: You mention mosques and prisons;
finally, on universities, how serious is the
radicalisation in American universities?
Congressman King: I don’t believe radicalisation is a
major issue to the extent it appears to be here in Great
Britain. I have a lot of differences with universities,
but as far as actual radicalisation, I don’t see it being
carried on. There are some various Muslim extremist
groups in the university, but we haven’t seen a direct
nexus between what happens in universities and what
happens in the communities.
Q14 Alun Michael: Can I look at it the other way
around? You refer to the motivation that leads to
individuals being recruited or becoming radicalised,
but on the question of how individuals are recruited,
how does the organisation seek people? I will just
preface this by saying I went, as part of the British
American Parliamentary Group, recently to Los
Angeles. We looked at some of the things and we
heard from police and those involved with issues
there. One of the things that came through for that
was that the mosque is no longer seen as a place of
recruitment. The place of recruitment is prison,
particularly short-term prison, where there is quite a
calculated approach of recruiting foot soldiers as
distinct from intellectually engaged individuals, and
problems particularly with the short-term prison
population. Is that something that is particularly
general?
Congressman King: I certainly agree as far as the
prisons, and before any question of the religious
element comes in, that is especially true in the prisons
because you may find a person who is not a Muslim,
who suddenly realises his life has come undone and
he makes a genuine conversion and he converts to
Islam. So there is a religious fervour that is involving
him trying to straighten out his life, turning his life
around, and then slowly the radical element, the
extremist and the terrorist element, is injected. So,
yes, the prisons can be a major source of recruitment.
We have seen definite evidence of it, especially since
a number of the imams in the prisons have very
radical and extremist beliefs. Unlike other organised
religions in our country—priests, ministers, rabbis—
there is no set way or certification for a person to be
an imam. Almost any person can declare himself to
be an imam. We have imams that aren’t imams but
they—
Q15 Alun Michael: When I was asking about this
one person said to me, “Yes, the person you have to
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worry about is ‘Sheikh Google’.” What he is implying
there is that, rather than through structured religion, it
is taking some of the trappings. Would you accept
that?
Congressman King: Yes, I do. I am always reluctant
to comment on another religion but, just from a
governmental perspective, it is hard to vet who the
imam is going to be. Generally, with Jewish Shabbat,
you go to a board of rabbis; Catholic chaplain, you go
to the Catholic Church. There are obviously various
Protestant denominations. There is a way of
categorising who is a minister and who is not; what
their education level has been; what their background
has been. With an imam, you don’t find that. I
wouldn’t rule out the question of mosques, and I can’t
speak for Los Angeles but I do know, for instance in
New York, that while the mosques are not as open an
area for recruitment as they used to be, I think partly
because they know that police are keeping an eye on
them, but still mosques are nowhere near as co-
operative as they should be. I will give you an
example. Right where I live there is a mosque and
they are very open to the police. The police come in;
they give them brotherhood awards, and they have
Ramadan events, and so on. It turned out there was a
young man from that mosque who joined Al-Qa’ida,
went to Afghanistan and was captured. He had
actually been planning attacks. He was in Afghanistan
but was also planning attacks against the United
States. When the police went to the mosque and said,
“What is this about?” they said, “Well, he told us that
he wanted to do jihad. We told him we don’t do that
here.” They said, “Well, couldn’t you have told us?
We are always in here. We are in here every few
weeks. You sit down with us and we dine with each
other,” and they didn’t. So I am using that as example
where the mosques are, maybe, not as overt as they
used to be but in many cases they are not as co-
operative as they should be.
Q16 Dr Huppert: I would like to ask about counter-
radicalisation, but before that can I just check that I
understood an answer that you gave earlier. Mr
Winnick quoted you as saying, “If civilians are killed
in an attack on a military installation, it is certainly
regrettable but I will not morally blame the IRA for
it.” You spoke very eloquently about your role since
then in the peace process, but can I just be very clear
with that quote. Did you say it? Do you stand by it?
Does it apply to other terrorist groups or only the
IRA?
Congressman King: It would apply to—for instance,
if we are talking about the African National Congress,
if we are talking the Ergon in Israel, we are talking
about a movement within a country. If all attempts are
made not to kill civilians then I would put that in a
separate category from a group like Al-Qa’ida, which
is intentionally out to kill as many civilians as they
can.
Also, what I was saying in Northern Ireland was it
was what it was; it has been going on for 800 years,
60 years, 16 years, depending on where you want it
to start. To put it in context, I was saying, “This is
going to go on for a very, very long time unless an
outside force moves in,” and that is what I was
recommending in the US. Once that process started to
me it was up to the people in Northern Ireland to
resolve.
Chair: Mr Reckless has one supplementary on this
and then we must move on from Northern Ireland.
Q17 Mark Reckless: Congressman King, with these
terrorists, there is the possibility that they get succour
from people overseas that they feel support them. You
make a reference to the ANC, but there was no
democracy in South Africa. There was a democracy
in Northern Ireland. I think one of the issues—and I
think there may be a parallel to the Muslims here—is
that many of your constituents, with perhaps an Irish
heritage, did not have an understanding of Northern
Ireland, did not understand there was a democracy. As
a Catholic with an Irish mother, with a grandfather
who was a Fianna Fáil nationalist Republican in the
Dáil, many of us feel that it was statements, such as
yours, through the 1980s that gave succour to the IRA
and led to that terrorism continuing for many more
years than it needed to. Aren’t there lessons for us to
learn from that for tackling Muslim extremism now?
Congressman King: I would not equate what Al-
Qa’ida is doing in any way with what was done in
Northern Ireland. Again, the question of democracy:
that is a debate going back 30 years, but the fact is
that the Good Friday Agreement showed the necessity
of restructuring the entire electoral process in
Northern Ireland because, in fact, the Catholics were
disenfranchised in many ways. I am reluctant to bring
this up at all. I think my friend Ian Paisley is in the
audience. I don’t want to ruin my new friendship with
him. But the fact is I believe there was discrimination,
much of it was institutional, the fact that the struggle
had been going on for so many years by good people,
I mean, for instance, Gerry Adams and Martin
McGuinness were the face of the Republican
movement—
Chair: Sorry, Congressman, as briefly as you can so
we can move on.
Congressman King: Sure. Yet within several years
they were being welcomed to 10 Downing Street,
even before the Good Friday Agreement. These were
the same people that I was talking about in 1982.
Chair: Thank you, that is very helpful. Let us move
on to radicalism.
Q18 Dr Huppert: If I can then move to on counter-
radicalisation. Somewhat to my surprise, I understand
that, despite the fact that it is now 10 years since the
tragedy of 9/11, it is only in the last few weeks that
the White House has published a strategy on counter-
radicalisation. Firstly, why has it taken so long to
actually get somewhere on that?
Congressman King: I think it was a question of just
putting it in written form. The fact is there have been
counter-radicalisation efforts going on over the years,
some at the state level. The Department of Homeland
Security has been affirmatively going out into Muslim
communities trying to encourage de-radicalisation.
This was put in writing. It is a document that I pretty
much agree with, but it is basically putting into
writing what had been in practice for a number of
years now.
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Q19 Dr Huppert: It particularly warns against
creating a backlash against Muslim Americans. How
do you try to ensure that everything that you do and
your committee does avoids creating that backlash?
Congressman King: By conducting the type of
hearings we did, where the witnesses that come in
were very positive. Everything they said was backed
up factually, and also I don’t want to fall into the
narrative of saying that there is this anti-Muslim
attitude in our country. For instance, there are still
eight or nine times as many anti-Semitic incidents
every year as there are anti-Muslim. I know the
populations are different, but there are as many anti-
Christian attacks every year as there are anti-Muslim.
Probably the better comparison, though, is between
Muslims and Jews because it is roughly the same
number in the population and yet there are eight times
as many against Jews as there are against Muslims.
Q20 Chair: You mentioned in your opening
statement at your hearings the fact that there were no
structural organisations to deal with—the Council on
American-Islamic Relations had not, you felt,
performed the task they ought to have done. We have
come across this poster that was put up, which I am
sure you have seen before.
Congressman King: Right.
Chair: When communities were asked to help and
exchange information they were told not to do so. Is
that one of the problems, the lack of structures on a
national basis in America where the authorities can go
to them and ask them to help achieve a countering of
radicalism; something we have here that perhaps you
don’t have in America?
Congressman King: Certainly, the Council on
American-Islamic Relations, I have strong differences
with them in many ways. For one thing, it should be
noted that they were named as an unindicted co-
conspirator in a major terrorist funding case in the
United States, and when they attempted to have their
name removed the Federal Judge would not, saying
there was more than sufficient evidence to keep them
listed as an unindicted co-conspirator. The Council on
American-Islamic Relations at a time when we are
trying to encourage co-operation instead puts up
posters, such as the one you showed, basically making
the FBI to be the enemy that is coming in. If they
have particular grievances with the FBI or the police
that is one thing, but to be creating this stigma in the
community against law enforcement, who are doing
all they can to stop radicalisation and stop terrorist
activities, to me it is totally unacceptable. I found
them on many occasions to be apologists for
extremist policies.
Q21 Chair: Do you think the Government has a role
in trying to help communities create these
organisations without them being seen to be
Government organisations, so that you can deal with
them more effectively?
Congressman King: We have to find a way to work
with organisations that don’t necessarily have views
that we agree with particularly but are not extremist
and not terrorist supporting. Again, there is always a
danger that when the Government gets involved, is
giving money to an ideological group, that it can end
up being Government control. So it is tricky. There is
any number of Muslim organisations I can think of
that I would want the Government to support, but
once you get into that then are you going to end up
supporting other groups that may not be as acceptable.
I am looking more for spontaneous reaction from
within the community, so with encouragement from
the outside. It could lead to authority control if there
is Government money going to particular groups.
Q22 Lorraine Fullbrook: I have a two-part question,
Congressman. Can I ask, in answer to some of the
questions you were asked earlier about torture, a
recent ex-head of MI5, Baroness Manningham-Buller,
said that she did not believe that torture was justified
in any manner? Do you agree with that? Do you think
torture is a justifiable means for information?
Congressman King: First of all, I don’t consider what
was done at Guantanamo to be torture, but if we are
talking about torture I think there certainly could be
cases. The ticking time bomb, or the ticking nuclear
device, should it used in a case such as that? Yes, I
would say, morally, yes, but it is something that
should be the rarest, very, very rarest, and certainly
not any kind of accepted policy. Other than that rare
exception, where there is the nuclear bomb that is
going to go off in one or two hours and this person
knows where it is, then I would say, “Try everything,”
to be honest with you. Again, too many good people
are going to be killed, burnt to death, destroyed, and if
one person has to suffer that—I am not here to defend
torture. I am talking about a theoretical situation that
as far as I know has not happened. These are the
academic debates that I hear from people like Alan
Dershowitz.
Q23 Lorraine Fullbrook: Thank you, Congressman.
Can I ask now about some testimonies that were given
to your committee, about the solution of counter-
terrorism within the Muslim American community,
and 48% of Muslim Americans believe that Muslim
leaders within the United States are not doing enough
within their own community to counter radicalisation.
What are you doing in terms of your strategy on the
ground? You said that Homeland Security was
working in communities but what exactly does that
mean?
Congressman King: The Department of Homeland
Security, which my committee has jurisdiction over,
do have programmes where they meet with local
leaders to encourage local leaders to stop
radicalisation; to de-radicalise, if you will.
Q24 Lorraine Fullbrook: Is there a set programme
in place?
Congressman King: No, I wouldn’t say there is a set
programme in place, but it is adapted as it goes along.
It is a work-in-progress. Again, as a Government, we
are reluctant to be too heavily involved in laying out
exactly how something should be done. I think the
paper that came out most recently is probably the best
example, to be confronting the ideology. To me, from
my perspective, it has to be more leaders within the
Muslim community. I think we in Government should
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reach out, which is why I have given some
prominence or some coverage to leaders who I think
are moderate and are reasonable in the Muslim
community—give them the opportunity to make a
name for themselves—because, unfortunately, I find
the mainstream media relies on CAIR.
For instance, Chairman Vaz mentioned CAIR. I
consider that a very radical organisation. Yet, if you
read the average news story in America, you will have
someone—such as myself, or whoever—making a
statement and then the counter to that comes from
CAIR, and never mentioning that CAIR is an
unindicted co-conspirator in a major terrorist
financing case. So I think a lot of it is the role of
Government to unofficially find spokesmen in the
community, not pay them, not give them paid
positions but to encourage them, give them a forum,
give them an outlet.
Q25 Lorraine Fullbrook: Is it being successful? Are
you finding success through this programme, this non-
prescribed programme?
Congressman King: No, I think at best we try to
maintain where we are. The situation is getting worse
because Al-Qa’ida is actively recruiting in the
communities and in the prisons, as we said, and the
establishment, if you will the media or academics,
pretty much refuse to acknowledge that, and if it is
brought out you are branded as anti-Muslim and
people back away from it. I think we have done
well—if nothing else, the hearings I have been
holding I think are changing the dialogue and are
getting people to talk about it. They were even
refusing to acknowledge earlier this year that there
was a problem within the community and then, in
March of this year, right before my hearing, the White
House actually put out a statement saying, “Yes, this
is a real problem,” but it has to be addressed primarily
by people in the community and I believe by pressure.
In the third hearing we had, the President of the
Canadian Somali Congress came to testify. He said
that he would not have testified at the first hearing
because of all of the criticism that was being made,
but he thanked me and the committee for holding the
hearings, saying that we had emboldened and
empowered moderate leaders in the Muslim
community to come forward. He would not have been
able to come forward in March of this year, but he
was able to come forward in July, and he said it was
because of the series of hearings that we had been
holding—it was encouraging debate within the
Muslim community and had given positions and a
certain stature to those who are more moderate.
Q26 Nicola Blackwood: In the UK at the moment,
there is a debate about whether there is a role for non-
violent extremists to work with the Government, as a
sort of link to certain sections of the Muslim
community, to counter radicalisation within those
sections of the Muslim community. Can I ask whether
you received any evidence about this kind of
technique in the US and whether you came to any
conclusions about that kind of technique?
Congressman King: No, we did not get any evidence
at our committee. I am not aware of that being used
or considered by the Administration. I wouldn’t rule
out any plan or any tactic, but I would be very wary
of that, because once you start getting a forum or
encouraging an extremist, whether or not he is violent
or non-violent, then you are giving creditability to an
extremist view and that can be just the next step
toward a violent view, whether or not he or she
happens to be non-violent themselves. Once you are
giving creditability to someone who is an extremist, I
think it is a dangerous path to go down. Law
enforcement may find ways to use that and there could
be certain particular instances, but as a general policy
I would be very wary of it.
Q27 Nicola Blackwood: In the UK at the moment,
there is a theory of radicalisation that is called the
“conveyor belt” theory, on which you assume an
individual starts from a grievance, moves through
radicalisation and along to violence. Is that the basic
theory on which you would be basing your
understanding of radicalisation as a committee?
Congressman King: Yes. That would be my concern
on that. Even though the person may be non-violent,
the fact is that he is an extremist; you are giving
credibility to an extremist position. If that is
considered acceptable then the next logical step after
that could well be a violent reaction. That is why I
would be very wary of giving any type of Government
seal of approval to someone who is a known
extremist.
Q28 Nicola Blackwood: Would your basic response
to extremist groups be to ban them entirely?
Congressman King: I am not aware of any
organisation that has been banned in the United States.
We tried to ban the Communist Party in 1950, but, no,
I am not aware of anyone being banned. We can
declare a Foreign Terrorist Organization but, as far as
an actual group within the country, under our First
Amendment it is virtually impossible to ban any
organisation.
Q29 Chair: Are there no proscribed organisations as
we have in this country?
Congressman King: None, no.
Q30 Chair: They can continue to do whatever they
have to do?
Congressman King: Well, they can continue to speak;
they can continue to put out information; they
continue to have forums.
Q31 Chair: Do you think there ought to be, even
though you mentioned the First Amendment?
Obviously, the First Amendment came at a time when
we didn’t have these kinds of problems.
Congressman King: I think if there was not a First
Amendment I think there are certain instances and
extreme conditions, yes, where organisation should
be banned.
Q32 Mark Reckless: What scope would you see for
greater collaboration between the United States and
the United Kingdom to combat radicalisation, and
through that a terrorist threat?
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Congressman King: That is probably the most
difficult question you could ask me today because I
don’t know where else we can go. The level of co-
operation is so high between the United States and
Britain at every level—at the federal level, certainly
with the FBI and MI5, the CIA and MI6, Homeland
Security and all of your counter-terrorism and
intelligence agencies. For instance, at the local level,
members of the New York Police Department are in
Scotland Yard now. We have had someone there full
time. I think going back eight or nine years, the
position there is full time. Information is shared
entirely. So, as far as sharing information, as far as
sharing strategies and comparing strategies, I would
say the level of co-operation is so high now, with the
counter-radicalisation programmes that you are
introducing, as you said, and the White House has put
out its paper on counter radicalisation. I don’t think
any of us believes we have the answers to that. We
can have answers, as far as law enforcement, as far as
intelligence and trying to seek that, but as far as
counter-radicalisation is concerned that I think is an
area where there can and should be more dialogue,
which is also one of the reasons why I have spoken
to the Chairman. We are going to try and have as
much interchange as we can between our committees,
because we realise none of us is a sole source of
knowledge in this area. The whole counter-
radicalisation really is a work-in-progress.
Q33 Mark Reckless: One area that the Government
and this Committee are looking at is where counter-
terrorism is placed in the structure of UK policing.
You probably have some experience of the structures
in the US and the impact that change has. The
Government is planning to set up a National Crime
Agency. Currently, anti-terrorism for the country as a
whole is run by the Metropolitan police in Greater
London. While that will remain the case at least
through the Olympics, there is an open question of
whether we should transfer that responsibility from
the London force to a new National Crime Agency.
From your experience in the US would you have any
advice for us with reference to that decision?
Congressman King: Considering the furore that was
caused when Commissioner Bratton was named, I
don’t want to get involved in telling the British how
to run their police. Each country has its own
traditions, and we have the FBI that has always had a
limited role police-wise but takes the lead in counter-
terrorism. For instance, in New York, we have 1,000
police officers, in New York City alone, who are
dedicated to counter-terrorism and terrorist
intelligence. I am really not in a position to say. We
have had this debate in our country whether the FBI
should be more like MI5; should we separate the
FBI’s law enforcement capacity out and set up a
separate organisation similar to MI5. We decided not
to do that. It is not any reflection on MI5. We don’t
even work through their knowledge system. That
really is something that I think depends on the local
situation.
Q34 Mark Reckless: For tasking anti-terrorism, you
say you have 1,000 or so officers in the NYPD and
then you have the FBI that has taken the lead on
counter-terrorism. How does that work together
institutionally? In your role with Homeland Security,
how can you ensure they work as closely as they can?
Congressman King: It usually works well. There are
the natural turf battles, unfortunately, but let me make
it clear: we are light years ahead of where we were
on September 11 at every level. The FBI and the CIA
had their firewalls; you had federal bureaucracies not
sharing information; the FBI and the NYPD had an
historic difference between them. So much of that has
broken down with the joint terrorism-taskforces, with
fusion centres throughout the country. While it is
certainly not perfect, it is light years ahead of where
it was and for the most part works very well. There is
the occasional case you will read about where the FBI
says the NYPD didn’t do it right or the NYPD says
the FBI didn’t, but 95% of the time they are working
extremely closely together. I have been at joint
terrorism taskforce meetings, and when you go around
the table, you can’t tell who is FBI and who is NYPD.
Chair: Whatever the merits of Mr Bratton, only a
British citizen can be Chairman of Home Affairs and
only an American citizen can be Chairman of the
Homeland Security Committee.
Congressman King: Here we go.
Q35 Mr Winnick: Following on from what Mr
Reckless asked you, would you say there is an
ongoing debate in the United States, as in Britain, over
the balance between combating terrorism, trying to
protect our citizens from those who are determined to
slaughter as many as possible—and of course you
know what happened on 7/7; 52 totally innocent
people were slaughtered by the terrorists—and the
need to maintain our civil liberties? We have had quite
a lot of debate in the House of Commons. Would you
say that is the same as in the United States?
Congressman King: Yes, I would say it is a constant
debate. I think it is healthy. I would be more inclined
to the law enforcement side, but there are others who
are more inclined to the civil liberty side, and that
is a very healthy debate. I think that is friction, if
you will.
Mr Winnick: Giving the opposition some say.
Congressman King: Yes, and also the court systems
ultimately resolve it. Obviously, we don’t want to
create a police state in trying to stop terrorism. On the
other hand, we did have to make changes; the Patriot
Act; certain types of electronic surveillance. For
instance, there has been an unwritten rule that houses
of worship are out of bounds as far as the police are
concerned, but when you find out that the mosque can
be used for recruiting, to me you have had more police
activity, as far as surveillance on mosques, than you
would have had before because we haven’t had
situations before where houses of worship were being
used to foment crime. This is very central debate and
it is one that I can assure you is ongoing, and it is not
just Democrat versus Republican; you find people
from both parties.
Q36 Mr Winnick: I have a second question. Last
night in a lecture a former head of MI5—in fact she
was the head of MI5 during what occurred on 9/11
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and 7/7—put a good deal of emphasis on the need to
engage if possible with terrorists, to open up dialogue.
Of course she quoted inevitably the talks with the
IRA, although it may be argued that only happened
when the IRA realised they could not succeed in their
original aim. Do you feel there is any possibility that
this is a policy that should be explored?
Congressman King: No, not in the foreseeable future.
Again, without equating the IRA with Al-Qa’ida, the
IRA did have a political goal—a specific goal. At least
there was something to negotiate if you wanted to go
that route. I don’t know what Al-Qa’ida’s goal is,
other than really the destruction of western
civilisation. They want to expand their radical form of
Islam throughout the world. It is not as if they have a
particular grievance. It is not as if you can put
something on the table. I couldn’t imagine the
equivalent of a Good Friday Agreement with Al-
Qa’ida, and also I don’t see any evidence of any
reasonable people coming forward. Almost by its
nature, Al-Qa’ida rejects any type of dialogue.
Q37 Chair: But not necessarily Al-Qa’ida. There are
reports that the American Government is supporting
the creation of a type of embassy for the Taliban in
Doha. Have you seen those reports? Do you think that
kind of action in terms of foreign policy is helpful?
Congressman King: I do know that overtures are
being made to the Taliban, and I would say that there
certainly can be elements within the Taliban that could
be worked with because in many cases that is a
nationalistic movement. All of them may or may not
be influenced by a radical form of Islam. In many
cases, that is an indigenous movement within
Afghanistan. I don’t trust the Taliban, but I can see
why within an organisation like the Taliban you could
find some moderate elements to deal with. In fact, a
number of them have been turned already, so that is
much more fertile ground than Al-Qa’ida.
Chair: Dr Huppert has a quick supplementary.
Q38 Dr Huppert: You briefly mentioned the
designation “Foreign Terrorist Organization”. Do you
think that has had any effect in trying to prevent
radicalisation? How does it really work?
Congressman King: I would say there was more of
an impact from a law enforcement perspective, in that
it dries up funds; it sends a message to those who
care, who are concerned, that this is an organisation—
and we have had any number of groups declared
terrorist organisations—that the US Government has
officially declared this to be an instrument of a foreign
enemy or foreign terrorists. It definitely has an impact
as far as funding and it has an impact as far as shining
a light on these organisations, so it is part, but it is
not the final step at all. It is not so much as far as
countering radicalisation so much as it is cutting off
support for the organisation. Also for those who are
interested in our country who care what the
Government says, it is in effect our Government
officially saying that these people are dangerous and
they are allied with a foreign enemy.
Q39 Chair: Following bin Laden’s death, we have
heard what you said, that you regard the threat to the
security of the United States as being something that
is growing. Do you think as an organisation, because
of his death, there is going to be a reduction in the
influence of Al-Qa’ida?
Congressman King: I would say central Al-Qa’ida
has been dramatically weakened by bin Laden’s death
and also by the killing of so many of the top Al-
Qa’ida people. I think it is 18 out of the top 25 have
been killed. Al-Qa’ida itself, the central organisation,
is on defence. I don’t believe it has anywhere near the
equivalent power that it had back in 2001. On the
other hand, Al-Qa’ida has also morphed and
metastasised. Even before bin Laden was killed, we
had testimony before our committee from Michael
Leiter, who was then the director the National
Counterterrorism Center, who felt at that stage—this
would have been in January or February of this year—
that al-Awlaki with Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula was more of a direct threat to the United
States than bin Laden was. So you have Al-Qa’ida in
the Arabian Peninsula; you have al-Shabaab, and then
the radicalisation or recruiting attempts going on
within the country. I agree with you; I think al-
Zawahiri and central Al-Qa’ida is much diminished.
Q40 Chair: Because of the international dimension,
it is worth Western Governments possibly propping
up Governments in Yemen because they are better
than what the alternative might be if they changed. Do
you accept that proposition, or do you think that the
democratisation of the Arab countries is vital for the
progress of trying to make sure that radicalism is
brought to an end?
Congressman King: In the short run, I am very
concerned about what might happen in Yemen. I
would want us to do what we can to maintain a stable
Government over the next several years, working with
them, so we can take action against al-Awlaki and
AQAP.
Q41 Lorraine Fullbrook: Congressman, Ayman al-
Zawahiri has become the number one in Al-Qa’ida,
and was really the brains behind bin Laden. Would
you agree that Al-Qa’ida has really just become a
franchise operation now around the world?
Congressman King: To a large extent. I wouldn’t say
“just,” but yes, that is probably the best way to
describe it. That is why I said you have AQAP with
al-Awlaki. Even though al-Awlaki is not even the top
person in Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and bin
Laden wasn’t very supportive of him, it is these—if
you want to call them—splinter groups or localised
forms of Al-Qa’ida that pose the real threat to us now.
In some ways, it is better because it means they can’t
get the level of sophisticated training that Al-Qa’ida
had, for instance, on 9/11. So to that extent it is better
for us. The bad part about it is, though, that in many
cases they are under the radar screen. These are not
known actors. We are not sure who they are, so they
can have a better ability to infiltrate.
For instance, when we had the last series of attempted
attacks in the United States from terrorists who were
trained overseas—they were American citizens who
were then trained overseas—they did not have the
level of sophistication. They got into the country and
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they came very close to carrying out successful
attacks, but fortunately, because they were not as
sophisticated as they should have been, the attacks
didn’t work.
Q42 Lorraine Fullbrook: But 9/11 was a low-tech
attack. It was done initially with box cutters, so you
don’t have to be terribly sophisticated to be
successful.
Congressman King: The operation itself, to have 19
hijackers; to have that level of co-ordination; to get
the flight training; to be able to have it so
synchronised timing-wise—
Lorraine Fullbrook: That is organised; it is not
high-tech.
Congressman King: I am not saying high-tech. I am
saying sophisticated as far as the organisation, the
training and the way it was done, precisely;
unfortunately, the way it was intended to be done.
Q43 Nicola Blackwood: Given the recent political
unrest that we have seen in Northern Africa, and the
adjacent humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa,
what is your assessment of the security situation in
Northern Africa at the moment?
Congressman King: We have to be concerned. There
I don’t think Al-Qa’ida is in a dominant role, but I
think you can find Al-Qa’ida supporters who could be
in a position to pick up the pieces and take advantage.
For instance, I don’t see Al-Qa’ida being a major
force in bringing about the unrest. However, Al-
Qa’ida supporters could be the best co-ordinated on
the ground to put it together after the unrest has been
created. That is what we have to be on the lookout
for, including places like Libya. That is the extent that
you would have radical, if not terrorist, elements as
part of a future ruling structure in Libya. I don’t see
it now, but it is certainly something we have to look
for, as in Egypt we have to look for the position of
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Q44 Nicola Blackwood: What about the situation in
Somalia?
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Rashad Ali, Centri and Maajid Nawaz, Quilliam Foundation, gave evidence.
Q45 Chair: Mr Ali, Mr Nawaz, thank you very much
for coming to give evidence to the Committee. I won’t
repeat my introduction. This is the very first session
in what will be a series of hearings into the roots of
radicalism. We are very grateful that you could be
here right at the start. You have obviously had the
benefit of hearing from Congressman King, and his
testimony covers the kinds of things that the
Homeland Security Committee has been doing in the
United States.
The Committee will ask you questions. I am sure you
have been through this before, especially Mr Nawaz.
They will be addressed to both of you so feel free to
chip in whenever you think appropriate. Perhaps I can
start with you, Mr Ali. What do you think are the
main causes, the roots of radicalism?
Congressman King: I would say Somalia gets worse
by the day. There is virtually no viable central
Government in Somalia whatsoever. More and more
you are seeing a link-up between al-Shabaab,
particularly with al-Awlaki and AQAP. Somalia is
probably as close to a failed Government as you
could envision.
Could I just go back to one thing if I could? You said
about the level of sophistication. For instance, I do
know that AQAP and others are attempting to recruit
scientists; trained scientists. That is something we do
have to be on the lookout for as far as levels of
sophistication. You did see that we put out an advisory
several months ago about bombs inside bodies, which
is fairly sophisticated.
Chair: Congressman King, you have flown thousands
of miles to come to London in order to help us launch
our inquiry into the roots of violent radicalism. We
are most grateful to you. We would be very grateful
if we could receive any testimony that you and your
committee have received which would help our
Committee in our work. I think the work that you
have done has been extremely valuable in getting this
information into the public domain, and we would like
to continue our co-operation between our committees
in the future, but we know how very busy you are
and we are extremely grateful to you for coming here.
Thank you.
Congressman King: Thank you, Chairman Vaz. I
assure you we will send you everything we have,
everything we have done, everything we intend to do.
We will stay in close contact with you. I really do
appreciate the opportunity to be here today. Again,
there are no two countries more closely allied on this
issue and to the extent that our committees are the
controlling committees on this issue in our Parliament
and Congress, we should work together. We will
continue to and I really want to thank you. I also thank
all the British people for the tremendous support they
gave us after 9/1l, and also on this 10th
commemoration.
Chair: Congressman King, Mr Chairman, thank you
very much.
Rashad Ali: I think there are a number of things that
come into mind. First, I think people tend to look at
radicalism as one process.
Chair: You may have to speak up a little because of
the acoustics.
Rashad Ali: I think a number of people look at
radicalisation as a single process, going from A to B
or A to Z. From our experience over the last two
years, we have defined it as a number of pathways.
There tends to be different things that motivate
different individuals. We have put it down to four
broad strokes. One is the most obvious, which many
people speak about, which is theologically radicalised
individuals, people who embrace a very specific
Salafi-Jihadi theology that justifies acts of terrorism
and violence. There are those who we have come
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-02-2012 11:36] Job: 017436 Unit: PG01
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/017436/017436_o001_db_110913 Roots corrected.xml
Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 11
13 September 2011 Rashad Ali and Maajid Nawaz
across who don’t necessarily embrace it on theological
grounds, but they have a certain political lens by
which they view certain grievances. That shapes their
world view and this makes it easier for them to
embrace radical/religious protocols.
Q46 Chair: Did that cause you to join Hizb ut-Tahrir
when you first joined? We are very interested in
personal testimony.
Rashad Ali: Sure.
Chair: Why did you become a member of that
organisation?
Rashad Ali: With regard to Hizb ut-Tahrir, their
particular brand is a mixture of theology, ideology and
a kind of particular world view as well. So it is a
mixture of those three factors that I usually mention
that actually they have a specific ideological take; a
set of ideas regarding belief, regarding secularism,
capitalism and criticism of those things.
Chair: Is that why you joined?
Rashad Ali: A mixture of that and also the religious
motivation.
Q47 Chair: How old were you when you joined.
Rashad Ali: I was 15 when I came across Hizb ut-
Tahrir.
Chair: Mr Nawaz, would you agree with that? Would
you agree with the assessment that Mr Ali has made.
You yourself were also a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Maajid Nawaz: Yes, I would agree with that. I would
summarise it as four bullet points. I went through this
process and I think it is essentially a process that
involves an individual feeling a sense of grievance,
whether real or perceived, and thereby leading to an
identity crisis about whether one is, in my case,
British or Pakistani or both or Muslim. Those
grievances and that identity crisis are capitalised upon
by a recruiter, usually a charismatic recruiter. Finally,
that recruiter sells to the vulnerable young individual,
who in most cases is educated, as we heard previously,
an ideology and a narrative, a world view.
Q48 Chair: Is that what happened to you?
Maajid Nawaz: It is absolutely. I had many
grievances, including experiencing violent racism on
the streets of Essex as a teenager before the age of 16;
being stabbed at in the street by Combat 18; being
falsely arrested by Essex police authorities. I saw what
was happening in Bosnia. That sense of grievance,
which ordinarily one would grow out of when one
moves beyond their teenage years, was capitalised
upon by a young medical student who was also a
British-born Bangladeshi Muslim. He sold to me an
ideology and a world view that allowed me to frame
those grievances as part of the Islam versus West
narrative that Islamists, and Al-Qa’ida in particular,
are so adept at propagating.
Rashad Ali: I would just like to add that there is some
interesting research that has been done that
demonstrates that it is not necessarily grievances that
are the start point. There a number of perspectives.
One is that grievances themselves exist—the world is
full of problems—but it is often a lens or an ideology
that makes you feel certain grievances, which
exaggerate certain perspectives or even makes you
realise things that you probably wouldn’t have in the
past.
Q49 Chair: Your prison sentence when you went to
prison in Egypt, Mr Nawaz, did that make you more
radical or less radical?
Maajid Nawaz: I think, in referring to Congressman
King’s testimony, I must say that, as somebody who
has been arbitrarily arrested and detained without
charge and witnessed torture in Egypt’s jails, I would
like to state for the record that I do think water
boarding is torture and I register my objections to
anyone attempting to justify torture as an efficient or
even morally justifiable means. I note that he didn’t
define it as torture, but I do define it as torture. For
the sake of terminology, I shall say that anybody
justifying water boarding is morally on questionable
grounds.
In my own case, in Egypt’s prisons, I was forced to
watch one of my co-detainees electrocuted. I wasn’t
electrocuted myself. I was then interrogated and we
were cross-examined together and my answers were
used to further electrocute him before my eyes. That
particular individual remains—
Q50 Chair: When you say “electrocuted” do you
mean he had electrical shocks put to him?
Maajid Nawaz: On his teeth and genitalia, yes.
Q51 Chair: Did he die as a result of that?
Maajid Nawaz: He is alive still. He is a British citizen
and he remains a member of the group that we were
accused of belonging to. I think that is a very relevant
anecdote for this Committee, because I personally
wasn’t electrocuted and I spent my time in prison
studying from the original sources of Islam and
coming to a conclusion that the ideology I had
adopted, known as “Islamism”, is a modern
aberration, a twisted interpretation of Islam. But that
particular individual, as in the case with most people
who were subjected to torture in prisons, became
more extreme.
Q52 Chair: Yes. Mr Ali, do you think there is a
typical profile for those who are radicalised?
Rashad Ali: I don’t. I don’t think there is a typical
profile.
Chair: It could be anybody?
Rashad Ali: It actually could be anybody. I know that
sounds quite—
Q53 Chair: So the profile they say that it has to be a
member of the Muslim community is absolutely
wrong?
Rashad Ali: I think it is not completely off the wall
to suggest that it is easier to radicalise individuals that
already belong to a faith using a specifically religious
trajectory. However, there are many individuals that
we deal with that are converts. They are people who
are from mainstream society that have then taken on
board the religion and tend—as converts do—to have
a more zealous perspective towards religiosity,
without over-generalising, and that allows it to be
easier almost to take on a more radical, political
perspective.
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Maajid Nawaz: On the note on profiling—you and I
have discussed this before as well—the question is,
what does a Muslim look like? Of course, if you are
looking for a Muslim. Muslim is not a race. A Muslim
can be white, as in Bosnia. A Muslim can be black,
as in Nigeria. A Muslim can look like us. So a Muslim
doesn’t look like anything and therefore there is no
effective means of implementing a policy of profiling
at, for instance, airports. Also the other point to note
is that if you are looking for a devout Muslim and
therefore looking for, for example, on a man, facial
hair, or on a woman, a headscarf, then let’s keep in
mind that terrorists—and we can see the 9/11
hijackers as a typical example or specimen of them—
do everything possible to not look devout, so they can
get through the airports. Of course the Chechen Black
Widows, who are women wearing jeans and T-shirts,
were successful exactly because nobody expected
women wearing jeans and T-shirts, with their hair
flowing, to blow themselves up. So I think it can be
counterproductive to set a profile and thereby give a
warning light to terrorists of exactly who we are
looking for, so they can go about recruiting the
opposite of that profile.
Chair: Very helpful.
Q54 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would just like to pick
up on Mr Ali’s point. You started off by saying to the
Chairman that there were four pathways that you had
identified as the root causes of radicalisation. You
gave us two, one being theology and one being
through a political lens. What were the other two?
Rashad Ali: The other two typically, of the
individuals that we have dealt with in the last few
years, have been those who either have had personal
grievances. These are individuals who are either from
Pakistan, Afghanistan or Iraq who are now living
within the UK. They have had family members who
have suffered indirectly or directly as a result of
actions that are taking place in those countries. They
have very particular emotional grievances and they
don’t require a particularly political ideology or even
religion to be able to then radicalise them. They have
certain emotions that are driving them.
The other side of that is actually individuals who
have, particularly, mental health problems. It is easier
for those individuals to be then targeted, focused and
separated from their communities, their families and
the environments around them. We have seen that
both in certain instances where individuals have tried
to undertake violent acts and also in individuals who
we have come across in our work, in terms of de-
radicalisation activities that we do.
Q55 Bridget Phillipson: On the profile of those who
may be radicalised, Mr Nawaz, you touched on what
I wanted to ask you. Are we talking more that it tends
to be men as opposed to women? Is there a gender
split that has been identified there? It sometimes taken
as an unwritten assumption that we are talking about
men here, but I appreciate that it may be more
complex.
Maajid Nawaz: It is more complex. There have been
many cases of female suicide bombers, but more
numerous are female extremists who don’t necessarily
go on to become terrorists. There is absolutely no
gender imbalance there whatsoever. In fact, in
Indonesia the particular group that both Rashad and I
used to belong to has more female members than male
members. So I think the case of the Chechen Black
Widows does demonstrate it is perfectly possible for
women. In one case, there has been a grandmother in
Iraq who has been arrested attempting to blow herself
up. So I think the danger of profiling is we are telling
terrorists exactly what we are looking for, so that they
can subvert that criteria and look for somebody else.
I mean they use donkeys if they need to.
Rashad Ali: I would probably add two things. One is
that, statistically speaking, when looking at the
convictions for individuals who have either
undertaken terrorist acts or under the terrorism
legislation of the UK, it is probably about 95% to 5%
in terms of women and men, but having said that we
know that Al-Qa’ida is specifically launching and
targeting women for violent acts of radicalisation. So
we know that Al-Qa’ida specifically decided that one
of the things they are going to focus on is getting
women involved.
Q56 Bridget Phillipson: In terms of the UK,
understanding the profile—I appreciate the difficulties
of what that can lead to—and if we are talking about
predominantly men who may be involved, not so
much in the groups but in violent activity, is that part
of the way to address the problem by working with
those communities, understanding the kinds of pull
that those people we are talking about, perhaps,
particularly young men, may feel towards certain
groups or radicalisation?
Maajid Nawaz: From the work that we are doing and
the experience that we have, I think that any policy
must be fluid; it must address the concerns of the day
as they are. So as my colleague mentioned, the
majority of convicted terrorists are men but it must
also recognise that is very easy to change, so any CT
policy, or counter-terrorism policy, must be coupled
with a counter-extremism strategy that works to
subvert the future radicalisation of potential recruits,
and in that strategy it should address men and women
because of course there is no gender imbalance in the
number of women who join extremist organisations.
Rashad Ali: The only thing I would add is probably
that if you want to prioritise resources, then statistical
data is important in that regard. If you are prioritising
resources to where you are going to allocate them
then, yes, you are looking at men; you are looking at
between the ages of 25 and 38; you are looking at
those 75% who have been from an east or
subcontinent background, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
so on. From that perspective, prioritisation of
resources, I think the stats demonstrate there is this
type of profiling as such, in terms of where the
majority have come from, but it is certainly not
restricted to only addressing those people.
Q57 Mr Winnick: Would it be right to say that the
process of radicalisation starts with trying to persuade
young people, teenagers, that Muslims are being
persecuted, one way or another, particularly in many
parts of the world, that it is the Western powers—
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United States, Britain, France—who are doing their
utmost to campaign and to defeat Islam? Is that the
way in which the process works in the beginning?
Maajid Nawaz: That is certainly a crucial component
of the beginning stages of radicalisation, to convince
the young, angry person, male or female, that there is
a war against Islam going on in the world and to
incorrectly present the West as a homogenous entity.
We have heard just in this testimony that there are
even differences between America and Britain on
many of these crucial issues. The West is not a
homogenous entity, just as Muslims are not a
homogenous entity, but that simplistic narrative is
certainly a crucial element in the primary stages of
radicalisation.
Q58 Mr Winnick: When it comes to the main split,
as with Christianity divided into basically two, as I
understand it, main factions—Catholics and
Protestants—so with the Islam world as it is, Shias
and Sunnis. How is it explained away that Islam, as a
religion, is so divided and has been almost from the
very beginning, or isn’t that touched on?
Maajid Nawaz: It is touched upon. I am sure Rashad
would also like to add here something on this subject,
but I—
Mr Winnick: If you could speak up a bit.
Maajid Nawaz: It is certainly touched upon. One of
the important elements to keep in mind here is that
Islamism—the ideology briefly defined as the desire
to impose one interpretation of Islam as state law—
crosses across the Sunni/Shia divide. So when we see
Hezbollah, a religiously Shia organisation, co-
operating with Hamas, a religiously Sunni
organisation, they share Islamism as their political
ideology. We also see Iran as an Islamist state, perhaps
one of the only examples of one, propagating its
ideology and co-operating in many cases with Sunni-
based organisations.
I think there are many ways to override those sectarian
differences and they generally tend to revolve around
the political debate, and that is how they can find
common ground.
Q59 Alun Michael: I want to turn it around, in the
sense that you talked about the approaches that make
people vulnerable to being radicalised and the
attraction of a religious profile, and so on. You have
both referred to recruiters, and one imagines over a
time they would develop methodology in the way that
recruiters in any other field would do so. Can you say
what you see as the methodology that is being used?
For instance, is there a focus on approaching people
who are subject to short prison sentences? It may well
be that mental health issues arise in that sort of area.
Can you give us a feel for the methods and the targets
that are approached by—
Rashad Ali: I think there are a number of things that
we have seen happen. As an example, in the north-
west, we have seen targeting specifically of
individuals who have a drugs culture. These are
vulnerable individuals. We have seen individuals who
have been targeted that, as I mentioned, have mental
health problems. We also see within prisons a very
specific type of culture, because the prison dynamic is
very unique in that it is mainly focused around gangs,
and therefore the embracement of particular Muslim
gangs has been one of the strong ways in which
radicalisation recruitment has taken place. It is not
quite the same as violent extremism in the terrorist
sense, but it is often criminality that is justified on
religious grounds. There are probably different factors
looking at it in that way.
In terms of recruitment techniques, I think the
recruitment techniques are probably divided, in the
sense that they are often around theological
backgrounds of a specific organisation that we are
talking about. So groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, the
process that Maajid outlined in terms of looking at
grievances, identity, radicalisation, in terms of
political viewpoint, and then filling in the theology to
justify it. That is the set kind of pattern of process that
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir use.
Again, looking at Salafi-Jihadi organisations, it is
much more strictly theological. So if you look at the
internet-based websites, their process is one very
simplistic grievance in political outlook and then a
very heavy emphasis on this puritanical theology, and
this is the religious justification.
Chair: Mr Nawaz?
Maajid Nawaz: I agree with what Mr Ali said.
Q60 Alun Michael: Could I take it on from that in
terms of the reference to gang culture. How important
is that? It is an interesting one because we found in a
recent visit that in Los Angeles this was an avenue
that was being used to recruit foot soldiers. Is that
important in your experience in the UK, too?
Rashad Ali: I think what we found with prisons is
that it is a very specific social reality. In order to
survive within a prison framework, you have to
belong to a particular gang to give you that, so this is
some of the problems. On top of that, there are
structural deficiencies, which are normal and to be
expected. We have a situation now where we have
hundreds of individuals that have been convicted for
terrorism-related offences, and we have a prison guard
that is completely not capable of dealing with this,
and they shouldn’t be expected to be capable of
dealing with this, because they are very unique in
reality. They are unaware, in terms of the lack of
training and awareness of how to differentiate
between religious conversions and convictions that
happen within a prison framework, the social
dynamics of joining gangs and differentiating that and
between radical extremist political preachers who are
also placed within prisons.
Q61 Steve McCabe: You said at the beginning that
some of the groups provide an ideology and
framework for people to make sense of the grievances
and the injustices, and so it develops. How much do
you think foreign powers like Iran are deliberately
building and creating that sense?
Maajid Nawaz: I think there are certainly cases of two
particular Governments that are funding the growth of
two very different types of Muslim-based extremism
in the world. The Salafi-Jihadi brand is being funded
by one particular Government and Islamism—the
political form of this ideology—is being supported by
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the other. That has a significant impact on the growth
of these organisations around the world, and even
where they are not funding organisations, it has a
significant impact on the mood music or the
environment that is created from which these
organisations stem. That is particularly pertinent to the
Home Affairs Committee here because by comparison
we have a completely, I suppose, incomparable level
of non-funding going to the alternative counter-
message. That is a serious problem because there is
no real investment, whether from the third sector or
from Governments, that I am aware of at least—and I
run one of the main organisations in this field—going
to organisations that are attempting to promote the
counter-message.
Q62 Chair: That includes yours?
Maajid Nawaz: It does indeed.
Q63 Chair: Do you get funding from the
Government?
Maajid Nawaz: No, we don’t at the moment, and we
are struggling.
Q64 Chair: Did you get funding in the past?
Maajid Nawaz: We did until last December. Austerity
measures and many other matters that come to the—
Q65 Chair: Why did they stop your funding?
Maajid Nawaz: December 2010.
Chair: Yes, why did they stop your funding?
Maajid Nawaz: Oh, why? What we were told is a
combination of austerity measures and priorities in the
Government’s CT strategy. Now, what I would be very
interested in, again stating for the record, is the
revised Prevent Strategy that the Prime Minister has
devised, one of the key questions I have is, that is all
well on paper, but where is its implementation? That
is something I would urge the Select Committee to
look at very closely.1
Chair: We will.
Rashad Ali: Can I just come back to the question
regarding Iran for a moment?
Chair: Yes. Very quickly.
Rashad Ali: There are organisations that are operating
within the UK. One specifically is the so-called
Islamic Human Rights Commission. This is an
organisation that is funded primarily through Iranian
sources. It acts both to deflect attention away from
activities that are happening in Iran and downplay
them, but also politically to agitate so as to try and
further this narrative of: West versus Islam; the UK
has an anti-Muslim agenda. Even given the ironic
name, they have articles as to why human rights aren’t
universal. That is just one example of organisations
that are furthering the extreme narrative.
1 Note by the witness: The comments on funding were made
with regards to government grants from the Prevent strand
of funding. Quilliam did not receive any Prevent funds from
the Home Office or Foreign Office, and these are the funds
that were terminated last December. Quilliam have received
one grant from the Department for Education to fund a series
of linked projects investigating schools’ experiences of
extremism and how they are responding to the challenges
created by those experiences.
Maajid Nawaz: Very briefly, sorry, may I add that
Pakistan is a country, in particular, that suffers from
this geopolitical struggle with two Governments in
particular using Pakistan as a playground?
Q66 Chair: Which Governments?
Maajid Nawaz: If I may name them I would say Saudi
Arabia and Iran, using Pakistan as a playground for
sectarian warfare on the streets of Pakistan.
Q67 Dr Huppert: Both of you sat back and became
de-radicalised. Can you tell us a bit more about what
were the critical steps in that happening for you, and
hence what we can learn to try to encourage other
people to take the same steps?
Rashad Ali: I think for myself it was a number of
things that I think are important. First, there was a
kind of moral realisation that with regards groups like
Hizb ut-Tahrir, and all extreme Islamist groups, they
are built on an amoral framework, which is to take
away your natural sensibilities of right and wrong,
good and bad, and replace them with a very extreme
theology, which is, “There is no such thing as good
and bad; it is only what God says.” So if God says,
“This is good,” then this is good. If God says, “This
is bad,” this is bad. That, coupled with a political point
of view, you realise is quite ludicrous and unrealistic,
so the idea that we should establish a global supreme
leadership for a caliph to run the whole world at his
disposal, according to his religious proclivities, it is
not easy to convince somebody of that idea unless
it is religiously grounded, so unless it is absolutely
grounded on religion. The third thing is, as you can
probably imagine, it is only tenuously linked to
religion. When you can break the link to the religious
proclivities to say, “Hold on a second, you can be a
Muslim, you can maintain your religious convictions,
even conservative religious values, in terms of mores
and ethics. This has nothing to do with the idea that
you need to impose your brand over the whole world
through a political system. It is ahistorical.” So, once
you realise that it is ahistorical—it wasn’t even the
case in Muslim empires, which were more kind of
communalist in their outlook; they had different
religious trajectories, different religions, even had
their own courts and so on—that actually this is
something that is a modern hybrid of politics and
mediaeval theology.
Chair: Mr Nawaz?
Maajid Nawaz: Nothing to add to that.
Q68 Dr Huppert: If I may, Chair, I am just very
interested because, in the answer you have just given,
there was a very intellectual analysis. I am not sure it
gives me a comfort that I would know how to take
what you have just said and use it to persuade other
people. Could you perhaps say a little bit more about
how one could persuade other people emotionally?
Chair: Basically translate that into street language.
Rashad Ali: I think in the submission I gave I tried to
break it down. It does depend on the individual. Just
to give one example to elaborate. I had one individual
who we were working with who had again this kind
of political narrative and a religious justification for
it. So the first part of our engagement was not talking
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about theology; it was talking about the politics,
making him realise that, “Hold on a second, fine, you
are against the Iraq war. Half of Parliament, more or
less, was against the Iraq war. There was a final
speech that Tony Blair gave and then this swung the
Parliament. Actually, millions of people in Britain
marched against the Iraq war. So when you are
looking at it, it is not simplistically that all the people
are against, it is just the West who are against the
Muslims. Similarly, Tony Blair and the Government
went to war in Serbia against the Serbian Christian
Orthodox people on behalf of the Kosovans, who
were Muslims.”
Over a gradual process you start to break down the
political narrative, and if life is a bit more nuanced, it
is then easier to say and your religion is a bit more
nuanced, too. Your religion also differentiates between
those people who are anti-Muslim, anti-Islam, those
who are anti-Muslim and violent, those who just have
this ideological point of view and how do you engage
accordingly. Over a period of time, you can then build
in the theology to start addressing all the details.
Although the presentation I gave you is just to
encapsulate, these are the key things, I think when you
break it down on an individual level it really depends
on the individual, but it can be broken down
accordingly.
Q69 Lorraine Fullbrook: I have two completely
unrelated questions. Has your safety, each of you,
been in jeopardy since you left Hizb ut-Tahrir?
Maajid Nawaz: I do a lot of work in Pakistan on the
grassroots. In fact, we founded a grassroots social
movement in Pakistan called Khudi. Its aim is to
challenge extremism and promote the democratic
culture through civic engagement. In that country, we
are very worried about not just my safety but the
safety of everybody who challenges extremism. There
have been assassinations and kidnappings of very
high-profile individuals who have had the audacity to
speak out against discrimination of the minorities in
Pakistan, for example. In that country there is a
serious concern, but I must emphasise, not just of
myself, anybody who speaks out is in danger.
Q70 Lorraine Fullbrook: Have you had that in the
UK?
Maajid Nawaz: Yes, we have had threats, but I think
that, again, I would underplay the seriousness with
which threats coming from Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters
should be taken because Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a
terrorist organisation; it is an extremist organisation.
The real danger would come from those on the
peripheries who support their view. We have had
bomb threats; we have had physical intimidation. I
have been attacked; I have been punched, but again I
want to take the focus away from myself, because I
think that many others have suffered far worse.
Lorraine Fullbrook: Mr Ali?
Rashad Ali: Yes, the same.
Q71 Lorraine Fullbrook: My question follows on
from Dr Huppert’s question. Can you explain exactly
what each of your organisations do to facilitate
counter-radicalisation and what are the successful
components of that?
Maajid Nawaz: I will try and be as brief as possible
because we do quite a lot.
Chair: We have your brief of what you do, but if
you could summarise for Mrs Fullbrook that would
be great.
Maajid Nawaz: Sure. In essence, we believe that the
model that was initiated in America after 9/11, known
as neo-conservatism, is upside down. What I mean by
that is rather than bringing in a supply for democracy,
by going in with force, into Muslim majority
countries, what needs to be done is a demand for
democratic culture needs to be built on the grassroots
where the people themselves demand change. The
Arab uprisings are an early indicator of that, although
it is yet to be seen how that turns out.
On the supply side, i.e. policy, we mirror that with
policy advice given from Quilliam as a think tank. So
we have two organisations working, one addressing
the demand on the grassroots on the ground with
youth in Pakistan called Khudi, and Quilliam
addressing Government policy across the West. We
are trying to tweak both the supply, i.e. policy, and
the demand for democratic culture on the ground. That
is a one paragraph summary of what we do; there is
much more.
Q72 Chair: Mr Ali, a one paragraph summary of
yours.
Rashad Ali: Sure.
Lorraine Fullbrook: What have you found that has
worked for you as well?
Rashad Ali: In terms of the work we do, we do a
number of different things, but basically one of the
key areas of our work is de-radicalisation efforts with
prisons, probations, police, community-based
organisations, and through channel referrals. This
involves working with individuals who are either very
close to terrorist organisations, people who have been
caught up with individuals who have been monitored,
and therefore we seek to remove them from them and
engage with them and de-radicalise them, and also
work with those who are convicted of offences.
The other areas of work include research, which looks
at theological writing primarily and theological rebuts
towards extremist ideology. We also do a number of
other activities that fall under that kind of remit.
Q73 Michael Ellis: What are your views—if you can
expand on these—as to the theory that the solution to
countering radicalisation lies within the Muslim
community itself, as opposed to Governments and
organisations? For example, do you think there is a
role for non-violent extremists in working with the
Government and the Muslim community to counter
radicalisation? What do you think would be the most
effective methods of countering radicalisation?
Maajid Nawaz: In terms of radicalisation, if we
recognise that it is caused by more than just Muslims,
meaning policy affects radicalisation, whether it is
foreign or domestic. Wars affect radicalisation,
although may not be the only cause or perhaps even
the main cause, but there are factors more than just
policy, more than just ideology, more than just
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Muslims and more than just theology—then our
solution must also be as holistic as the causes are.
In that sense, it is dangerous to just look at Muslims,
though we must look at Muslims as part of the overall
strategy. I think that historically, with the UK strategy,
and the UK is far ahead of many other Governments
in this regard, that the reaction of Muslims has been
not looked at well enough, so of course there does
need to be more focus there.
With regard to the second part of your question on
non-violent extremists and their role, I think we need
a more nuanced approach to this. I think it is
dangerous for Ministers and for Government to
legitimise those who say, for example, that
homosexuals should be killed, although they don’t
take action themselves; in their Utopian state
homosexuals should be killed or that Jews are an
inferior race or that women can’t be heads of state or
that adulterers or those who have sexual intimacy
before marriage should be stoned to death. If they
aspire to these aims and they are physically recruiting
people from the armies of Muslim majority countries
to initiate coup d’état, so they can bring these aims
into power, that is not strictly terrorism but it is
certainly extremism.
Q74 Michael Ellis: You think those people with
those views should be treated as pariahs?
Maajid Nawaz: No, absolutely not.
Michael Ellis: You don’t think so?
Maajid Nawaz: Coming back to the beginning of that
sentence: nuance. What I would suggest is we need to
distinguish between counter-terrorism,
disengagement, de-radicalisation, counter-
radicalisation and integration and, if I may, what I
mean is CT is clear. Counter-terrorism is clear for
everyone, what that means. It is the actual law
enforcement operations to stop the next bomb going
off. Disengagement is to convince serving terrorists
that they should put their arms down. Now it is a
very narrow and limited objective that occurs in, for
example, cases of terrorists who are serving in prison,
to convince them simply of a ceasefire. In that context,
in a very low-profile way, it may be okay to use
extremists. I say “may”, we have to be very careful as
to who is used and we have to be very careful as to
how they are used and what level of public legitimacy
they are given.
De-radicalisation, the third element, is to convince
them to disavow the theory of violence, not just to put
down their arms—
Q75 Michael Ellis: How do we convince them of
that?
Maajid Nawaz: Again, those who are well-versed
with the extremist narrative could be utilised in this
process. They have been in Egypt; they have been in
Libya. Where I was serving time in prison in Egypt,
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the largest terrorist
organisation in that country, went through a process
of de-radicalisation. It is shocking to this day that their
literature and the literature that came from Libya in
this regard still has not been translated into English
and distributed in our prisons.
Chair: Thank you.
Rashad Ali: Can just comment on that?
Chair: Yes.
Rashad Ali: I think the differentiation of violent and
non-violent is somewhat arbitrary. As an example, we
describe groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood,
commonly they are described as “non-violent
radicals”, which is just completely false.
Q76 Chair: Is that the Muslim Brotherhood here or
in Egypt?
Rashad Ali: The idea is differentiating the
organisations and separating them as where they are.
Q77 Michael Ellis: Do you see them as one?
Rashad Ali: They are one. As an example, Hamas
in its charter describes itself as a part of the Muslim
Brotherhood. So effectively what they have done is
they separated out which activities which organs of
the same body do. We are seeing this alignment taking
place now within Egypt, with Hamas and so forth, and
some of the problems that are accruing.
Similarly, we see individuals who will be supportive
of Hamas violence in the UK. Just to give an example,
Azzam Tamimi who will quite openly speak about
why he supports suicide bombing, why he supports
the actions of Hamas, which are terrorist actions. We
are talking about killing children, women, and
targeted actions against hospitals, and so forth.
Essentially, it is not a non-violent organisation; it is
an organisation that does not believe in domestic
violence. If you like, “We want to talk about people
who don’t particularly want to kill us, but Jews in
Israel; perfectly fine. Americans in Iraq is an example;
perfectly fine,” and I don’t just mean American
soldiers, these people talk about—
Q78 Michael Ellis: So it is impossible to do business
with those people?
Rashad Ali: I think it conflicts with our laws and
statutes that dictate where terrorism is illegal abroad
and at home; it conflicts with our objectives in
context, which state very clearly we are not just
talking about domestic terrorism; we are talking about
terrorism across the world. I think on a moral basis it
is fundamentally flawed. On a strategic perspective, I
can’t see how moving somebody from not undertaking
violence here to only undertaking violence abroad;
okay, from a tactical point of view, it may lower the
risk element for domestic violence and it may contain
them but it is not de-radicalisation. They have the
same radical point of view, which leads to violence
in—
Q79 Michael Ellis: Just to go back to the initial
premise of the question. What do you think is the
solution?
Rashad Ali: I think what we have seen in our
experience is that, first of all, you have to analyse
specifically on individual cases what are the
motivating factors, what are the cognitive factors,
what are the environmental issues. On the individual
case-by-case basis, you can then develop, alongside
the administering authorities, how to engage with
those individuals, groups or organisations. That is on
the kind of grand level of de-radicalisation.
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On a societal level, we just have to define what it
means and then stick to what it means as to how we
view individuals. If we turn this around and we look
at a right wing organisation with far right, because
this is another area we work with, we would never
send in somebody like Nick Griffin or somebody from
the BNP to go and convince them that, “You know
something, these blacks, Pakistanis, Muslims, they are
really bad, but maybe undertaking some violence
against them is not a great idea. We should take power
and then once we take power we can deal with them.”
I mean that is probably not the best de-radicalisation
strategy, but, ironically, this is what is suggested.
To give one final example, when looking at some of
the literature of some of the Salafist organisations, you
have them quoting scholars, like Shaikh Uthaymin,
who say, “Britain, France and America are too strong
for us to launch Jihad against. So once we’re strong
enough, and the leadership declares jihad, then we
can.” That is not a de-radicalisation message. That, at
best, is a containment message, but you still have a
massive risk that you are containing there.
Maajid Nawaz: May I add very quickly we simply
don’t have the capacity? One of the bigger problems
to implement this is we don’t have the capacity on the
ground, or enough people that are working in this
field, for a national grassroots strategy implementing
what Mr Ali has just said, and that is one of the key
issues that this Committee should look at. Secondly, I
think another point is, as well as a lack of strategy, in
the new Prevent document there appears to be no
criteria for engagement as to who should be engaged
in this agenda, and this is an area that requires some
serious thinking.
Chair: We are coming on to that.
Q80 Nicola Blackwood: I was interested that you
said, Mr Ali, that there are four pathways to
radicalisation; theology, politics, personal grievance
and mental health issues. I believe the Communities
and Local Government Committee were of the
opinion that the previous Prevent Strategy placed too
much emphasis on theology as a pathway. I wonder if
that is your opinion. I was also interested, Mr Nawaz,
that you said that it was a particular study of the
Qur’an that de-radicalised you personally. I wonder if
your opinion is that there should be more emphasis on
other pathways for de-radicalisation and whether the
emphasis in the new Prevent Strategy is correct in
this.
Maajid Nawaz: I think there are some dangers
exploring theology as Government policy. One of
them is that we are in danger of subsidising sectarian
conflict within Muslim communities by supporting
one religious sector over another, and we need to be
aware of that. I think also, again, there is simply no
capacity in Government to understand the theology. It
simply does not exist on a capacity level.
I think that there is a way around that to avoid both
of those dangers, and that is not to address theology
insomuch as to address a pluralism within theology.
One does not need to be a qualified theologian to be
trained by those who have that knowledge to say,
“Look, what you are insisting is the only way to
interpret texts. I have it as a matter of record it isn’t
correct because here are 10 other ways to interpret
texts that are in these books that you also respect and
that are grounded in historical study from traditional
scholarly sources.” So it is simply displaying the level
of pluralism that does exist within theological contest.
But that does require training and it is not a
theological discussion. I suppose that is simply a
science of interpretation that needs to be explored.
Q81 Nicola Blackwood: Yes, but I suppose my
question is more, do you think there is too much
emphasis on a theological cause of radicalisation
rather than other causes of radicalisation within
Prevent in the new strategy?
Maajid Nawaz: I am in danger of disagreeing with
my colleague. I am not sure if he would agree, but
let’s see. I think there is too much emphasis. I think
that it was correct to shift away from theology and
focus more on political narratives, which of course
use theology to justify themselves, but I think the key
thing is the ideology and the narratives as distinct
from religious theology.
Q82 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think that the new
strategy has a better balance and is getting the
emphasis right, or do you think we are still not getting
the analysis right?
Maajid Nawaz: There is room for improvement, but it
is good to move away from theology and look towards
ideology and political narratives, of course. But there
is much room for improvement in the current
strategy.2
Nicola Blackwood: What do you think, Mr Ali?
Rashad Ali: No, I agree. In the submission I have
given, there are a number of cases where theology is
primal and there are many cases where theology acts
as a reinforcement for the political narrative. So the
political narrative comes first and then the strands of
theological justification have come to rebuild on that.
They are the two things that I think.
Similarly, I think in the de-radicalisation process,
often it can be just merely demonstrating—as Nawaz
has mentioned—that a number of alternatives, just to
demonstrate, so you don’t have to embrace this
narrow point of view, but you have to motivate
someone to abandon that narrow point of view first,
which often is the political de-radicalisation after the
ideological aspect has been moved away.
Where there is theology, though, you can’t replace it
with something else. So where it is the case if
someone has embraced a Salafi-Jihadi theology, you
have to tackle that theological strand. Should
Government be doing that? Obviously not;
Government is not in a position to be able to do so,
which is why I think in the past what Government
has done is started to embrace a certain theology as a
countermeasure. For example, the previous
Governments—the Home Office at least, if not the
Government—had taken on board a very distinct
brand of Saudi Salafism as a means of de-radicalising
Salafi-Jihadism without realising that is one half of
the theological framework of Salafi-Jihadists.
2 Note by the witness: For the sake of clarity, I was praising
the new prevent strategy’s shift away from theology and
criticising the old strategy’s emphasis on this aspect.”
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Q83 Mark Reckless: Could you explain to us what
role, if any, you believe there is for the policy of
proscription of particular organisations?
Maajid Nawaz: Yes. I have been quoted by the
previous Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in
Parliament when this question was asked of him by
the then Leader of the Opposition, Cameron—who
had promised to proscribe Hizb ut-Tahrir and has
since not done so—about proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir.
But I am glad the current PM has—
Q84 Chair: Would you remind us of the quote,
because some of us may not have been there.
Maajid Nawaz: He was asked why the Government
has not fulfilled Tony Blair’s promise to proscribe
Hizb ut-Tahrir and he responded, Mr Brown, as Prime
Minister—who was asked by David Cameron—so Mr
Brown, as Prime Minister, responded and said, “We
have taken stock of the views of people like Maajid
Nawaz, who have advised that it is counterproductive
to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, and therefore we will
not do so.” I am pleased to say the current PM has
come to this view, or seems to have come to this view,
himself and has not gone through with proscribing
Hizb ut-Tahrir in this country. I would agree that Hizb
ut-Tahrir should not be proscribed.
Q85 Chair: Sorry, has he come to this view? When
did he come to this view because, the last time he was
asked in the Commons, he said he was still of the
view. He is communicating with you?
Maajid Nawaz: I think, yes, he has.
Chair: He has?
Maajid Nawaz: Yes.
Chair: Oh right, when did he tell you this news?
Maajid Nawaz: I think that I probably quoted
something that is not on official records, at least—
Chair: That is all right; it is now. The Prime Minister
has now come to the view that Hizb ut-Tahrir should
not be banned?
Maajid Nawaz: May I retreat somewhat and say that
he is veering towards this view and is—
Chair: Veering?
Maajid Nawaz: And is inclined not to ban Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Britain, may I say as caveated as possible?
Chair: Don’t worry.
Maajid Nawaz: I am sorry?
Chair: Don’t worry; we will write to him and ask
him.
Maajid Nawaz: Yes, please do, but I have to add that
I support the ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Pakistan, and
the reason I make the difference is that in Pakistan
they are actively seeking to recruit Army officers to
overthrow the democratic regime. It is illegal to
overthrow a democratic regime via a military coup by
Pakistani law as well as international law. The
organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir inside Pakistan makes it
clear that it is their objective to instigate a military
coup, so I think there they should be proscribed.
Q86 Mark Reckless: Just to clarify briefly, please,
what is it that makes you think it is a bad thing to
proscribe this organisation?
Maajid Nawaz: Right, so I think legally and
practically it is not workable. So legally, if we were
to proscribe organisations that operate in this country
with no direct provable involvement in illegal
activities abroad, then we would have to also look at
banning the BNP just for their extremism, because
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s form of extremism, though slightly
incomparable to that of the BNP, would fit within that
category of extremism that does not directly advocate
the use of violence within Britain. So it would cause
us legal problems, but also I think practically the level
of support that this organisation has had in the UK
has been on the decline. In the early 1990s, they were
able to muster somewhere around 12,000 supporters
for a conference. This year, at their annual conference,
they struggled to gather 3,000, so they have been in
decline in this country.
Chair: Yes, Mr Ali.
Rashad Ali: If I could just add, first of all, in terms
of proscription, obviously with groups like Hizb ut-
Tahrir, there isn’t a legal basis to do so. It has been
looked at exhaustively by various other people.
Q87 Chair: But moving away from Hizb ut-Tahrir to
the whole issue of proscription, do you think this
makes people more radical when they are proscribed
or less radical?
Rashad Ali: Well, this is the point I was going to
make. I think the proscription practice we have has
been, for want of a better word, ineffective. So for
example, we had Al-Ghurabaa banned initially. Al-
Ghurabaa was the group which was part of al-
Muhajiroun. Al-Muhajiroun was not banned and then
it was banned.
Chair: Sorry, could you repeat the name of the group?
Rashad Ali: It is Al-Ghurabaa. Then we had al-
Muhajiroun banned. Al-Muhajiroun then reformed as
Islam4UK and then Islam4UK was banned. They have
now reformed as Muslims Against Crusades and there
is nothing there to ban them again.
Q88 Chair: So we need to look at the proscription
issue and see why they are banned and in what form.
Rashad Ali: I think, despite the promises of the Home
Office and the Government in the past to make sure
that they will ban them, irrelevant of the change of
name, that has not been done. The second thing is
what is probably more effective is prosecuting
individuals for violating laws. As opposed to just
merely putting a ban out, which then allows them to
reform, reshape, what we should have done is
prosecute individuals who have violated laws and
have the law be effective.
Chair: Mr Winnick and Miss Blackwood have a
quick supplementary.
Q89 Mr Winnick: Yes, on radicalisation, which I
asked you previously, but because of time, the Chair
was rather understandably keen to press on, but just
one question. Is anti-Semitism an essential element of
radicalisation—the Jewish conspiracy to take over the
world, Jews dominate and control America? Is that
absolutely essential with trying to indoctrinate people?
Maajid Nawaz: It is a key part in what I call the
narrative. The world view that is propagated is a war
between the West and Islam, and the West is defined
in most cases as being controlled by the Jews. It is a
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key part of that narrative and then Israel is put at the
pinnacle of that conspiracy. Even the Sunni/Shia
divide, by the way, is blamed on the Jews.
Q90 Nicola Blackwood: It was interesting to hear the
evidence of Congressman King that in the United
States they do not proscribe any extremist groups. I
wonder if any analysis has been done, by either of
your organisations, to look at the impact which that
has on counter-terrorism or any of the extremist
activity in the US and whether we could look at a
comparative study between the UK and the US?
Rashad Ali: I think the only conversations I have had
is with American researchers, and from their
perspective, it is just something that culturally is so
unfathomable for them to even consider banning an
organisation.
Q91 Nicola Blackwood: But does it cause more
problems for law enforcement that they cannot
proscribe organisations, because we proscribe these
organisations, but it obviously doesn’t quite work if
they reform and reform, so is it an effective means of
enforcement in the UK?
Rashad Ali: I think what they do is they will mention
organisations which they wish to proscribe, but not on
the basis of banning their ideas, but those who are
taking part in funding or organising terrorist activities.
So in the past, they have prosecuted organisations like
the Holy Land Foundation group for funding Hamas,
and what they will do is they will take legal measures,
stop their funding, disrupt their activities, and so forth.
Q92 Chair: Very quickly, 30-second answers to this
question. Who funds you now if the Government no
longer funds you, Mr Nawaz?
Maajid Nawaz: Quilliam is struggling. It is funded by
one or two non-third-sector foundations. We have had
to lay off 80% of our staff and reduce 80% of our
costs, and are currently, I must admit, inefficient.
Chair: Mr Ali?
Rashad Ali: We have private donations of individuals
who wish to support us in what we do. We also engage
in research alongside academic institutions.
Q93 Chair: In terms of radicalisation, very quickly,
is it on the increase or decrease, Mr Nawaz?
Maajid Nawaz: I think non-violent extremism is on
the increase, ie the ideology of Islamism, and in many
cases it is in danger of trying to hijack the Arab spring
in some of those countries. I think the appeal of Al
Qa’ida is on the decline, but that doesn’t necessarily
mean that it has been defeated.
Chair: Mr Ali?
Rashad Ali: I think it is on the increase, and it is not
that Al Qa’ida is on the increase, because I think as
an organisation we have fairly come to the conclusion
it is less influential, but we are having is a growth in
lone terrorism and also further radicalisation.
Chair: A brief, very quick final question from
Lorraine Fullbrook.
Lorraine Fullbrook: Thank you, Chairman, but you
asked my question about funding anyway.
Chair: Okay, excellent. Mr Nawaz, Mr Ali, thank you
very much for coming in to give evidence to help us
begin this very important inquiry. We will be in touch
with you again, and if you have any other areas you
think we should look at, please do let us know.
Thank you.
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Witness: Ali Soufan, former FBI agent and founder of the Soufan Group, gave evidence.
Q94 Chair: This is the Committee’s second session
on our inquiry into the roots of radicalism. We are
delighted to have as our witness, Mr Ali Soufan.
Thank you very much, Mr Soufan, for coming to give
evidence to this Committee.
Ali Soufan: Thank you for having me. It is a great
honour.
Chair: Mr Soufan, I understand you have just
published your book, The Black Banners: The Inside
Story of 9/11 and the War Against Al-Qaeda. We have
just had the anniversary. Looking back to the events
of 9/11, do you think the atrocities and the tragedy
could have been prevented by the Government or the
security services in the United States?
Ali Soufan: I think we definitely failed to stop Al-
Qaeda carrying out the 9/11 attack. We had a
systematic failure in information sharing. I saw that
first hand, and I think the result of that failing caused
the tragic events that took place on Tuesday 11
September 2001 and resulted in the death of 2,977
innocent souls. It also changed the world in so many
different ways. I believe that the findings of the 9/11
Commission report, the presidential commission on 9/
11 and the CIA’s own Inspector General’s report came
to the same conclusion that systematic failure in our
institutions resulted in information not being shared
among the entities that were responsible in keeping us
safe in the United States.
Q95 Chair: When the New Yorker described you as
being the closest person to stopping 9/11, is that
because of the systemic issues, or was it to do more
with the extent of radicalisation that had caused the
people to do the terrible deeds that they had done?
Ali Soufan: I think it is a combination of both, but
there is a direct connection between the team that was
investigating the USS Cole attacks in Yemen and
between the team that—[Interruption.]
Chair: Sorry. Order: could I ask that all mobile
phones be switched off, please? Thank you. Sorry,
Mr Soufan.
Ali Soufan: Yes, the team that was investigating the
USS Cole in Yemen and the information that we
generated through that investigation that could have
stopped 9/11. Just for the sake of background, we
were interrogating a person who was directly involved
in the attack on the USS Cole. He said that he went
to south-east Asia a month before the attack in the
company of one of the suicide bombers of the Cole





over there. We asked for this information to be shared.
We shared it with the intelligence community. We
asked if they were aware of anything that probably
took place in south-east Asia. The answer was no, and
on 12 September we were given information that the
two people who they met with in south-east Asia were
on board flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon.
Q96 Chair: So it was the connection between Walid
bin Attash, who was involved in the USS Cole
bombing, and Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi;
is that right?
Ali Soufan: Yes, sir.
Q97 Chair: If that information had been able to be
more forthcoming or been able to be shared—
Ali Soufan: Right, and this is also the finding. One of
the main findings of the 9/11 Commission said that if
the Central Intelligence Agency had shared this
information with the FBI team investigating the USS
Cole we could have intercepted the operation that
caused 9/11 at a very early stage. That was also the
CIA Inspector General’s own conclusions.
Q98 Chair: Indeed. Moving on to the present
situation, in the organisation that you now lead, do
you think that radicalisation is on the increase or
decrease in the United States? We received evidence
from Congressman King and a number of other
witnesses in our first session that suggested that it was
on the increase, both in the United States and in the
United Kingdom. What is your assessment?
Ali Soufan: No, I don’t see it on the increase when it
comes to communities. I see very minimal support for
violent extremism in the United States; it hardly even
exists. What is happening, however, is that we have
the home-grown terrorism, and that is not community-
related, it is more individuals who spend a lot of time
in their mother’s basement checking websites,
checking internet chatrooms, listening to sermons by
the people like Anwar al-Awlaki and others, and they
decide to do something, they decide to conduct a
terrorist attack, do a plot. They join a group that they
never met anyone from, they never go to the training
camps in Afghanistan, like used to happen a long time
before, and never get any training. It is like a lone
gunman, as we call them. Yes, we found an increase
in that specific form of terrorism, but I think we have
to be very careful in separating that from communities
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who are being increasingly radicalised. I don’t see
that—
Q99 Chair: But are there parallels between the
United States and the United Kingdom? Is it home-
grown terrorists in America as well as the United
Kingdom, or is it different?
Ali Soufan: No, I think there are some parallels. It is
also different, but there are some parallels and the
Muslim community in the United States is extremely
diverse, so you don’t have one specific element of
the community coming from one specific country. We
don’t have one specific sect that dominates the
Muslim community. You have a little bit coming from
everywhere, which makes the whole situation very
different in America.
In the United Kingdom you have a different situation.
Most of the Muslim community come from a specific
region of the world, and with that region now we have
a lot of problems. There are a few wars going on over
there, which has an impact. Somebody is channelling
grievances that have taken place among different
people in the community and trying to recruit them
for these causes. We start seeing a little bit of that
in the United States. For example, the Times Square
bomber comes from a specific region, in this instance
Pakistan, that is having problems with the United
States. The same thing with Zazi, the person who
wanted to do subway attacks in America, 11
September 2010, about a year ago. He comes from
Afghanistan. If you look at the age group of these two
individuals, they were born and lived in an America
that was very different from the America I was part
of, that I grew up under. They were teenagers when
9/11 happened, so they felt that they are living under
a cloud of suspicion. There are a lot of grievances.
Chair: We will explore some of that.
Q100 Dr Huppert: I want to ask about where this
radicalisation happens, but first, we have concentrated
so far largely on Islamist radicalisation, but to what
extent do you think that is the only or the main thing
we should look at, and to what extent are there other
forms of radicalisation we should be looking at?
Ali Soufan: I think we have to focus on where the
problem is, and for the last decade we have had a
significant number of problems that come from
ideologically motivated religious extremists. My
personal opinion as a Muslim and as an FBI agent and
a counterterrorism operative, is that these extremists
hijacked Islam before they hijacked the planes that hit
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But I think
there are other issues that we also have to focus on,
and we are starting to see that not only in Europe but
also in the United States, with white extremists groups
on the rise. You have to look at what happened in
Norway, for heaven’s sake, just recently, and we have
very similar experiences in our history in the United
States with these groups. The economic situation in
the world today, the lack of jobs, the lack of
opportunity, the harsh issues that some people and
some groups are trying to promote on immigration,
that will cause more people to be disenfranchised in
organisations, entities, communities or social groups
that we haven’t been focused on. That is what
happened in Norway. They were not looking at that
specific threat and the threat or the attack came from
a group, an entity, that they were not even expecting.
Q101 Dr Huppert: How important are different
venues for radicalisation? Mosques or other groups,
universities, prisons, the internet, how important is
each of those, and where should we be concentrating
our resources on counter-radicalisation?
Ali Soufan: Let’s talk about Al-Qaeda in general,
because most of the radicalisation stems from the
ideology that Al-Qaeda is promoting. The Al-Qaeda
that hit us on 9/11 does not exist any more. We have
a different Al-Qaeda. It moved from being chief
operator to being chief motivator. They start using the
internet, they start using chatrooms, inspirational
videos by their media arm, As-Sahab, to create the
environment that is causing some threats in the United
Kingdom, in the United States, in the West in general.
We talked a little bit about that earlier.
That makes the internet an extremely important place
to focus on. It is very difficult to monitor the internet,
but you can spend about 10 minutes online and you
can get any manual on how to make bombs, how to
create chaos, how to meet other terrorists. So the
recruitment place today is not cafes, is not in the back
alleys behind mosques, it is in chatrooms, and that
makes it very difficult to monitor. The other place that
we find breeds extremism and terrorism is prisons.
Many of the extremists or many of the leaders of
terrorist groups are today in jail, and we find every
now and then that they still have the ability to
communicate with followers and issue what they call
fatwas to their people.
Q102 Chair: While in jail?
Ali Soufan: While in jail.
Q103 Chair: In America or in this country?
Ali Soufan: I think it is both. I think when we were
talking about—
Q104 Chair: How do they communicate?
Ali Soufan: I think sometimes some lawyers do not
have the same ethical standards as other lawyers, so
they send messages through lawyers. We had the case,
for example, in the United States with the blind
sheikh, Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was issuing fatwas
from jail and giving it to his 65, 70-year-old Jewish
lawyer, for heaven’s sake, and she was sending the
fatwas to his followers to carry on his work. That
happened, that is an FBI case that has been
declassified and we can talk about it, and I can
guarantee you that the same thing is happening here
in the UK.
Chair: Thank you, we will come on to some of that.
Q105 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would just like to ask a
supplementary to your answer to Dr Huppert. Do you
think Al-Qaeda has done its job and been successful?
They have franchised the operation around the world
in different countries, so they are not really of any
significance any more; it is the franchise operators that
are significant.
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Ali Soufan: I don’t think they were successful, but I
think they were able to adapt to the security
environment. We damaged their central command in
Afghanistan, we deprived them of a territorial
sanctuary, so they moved into a different kind of Al-
Qaeda. So now with franchising Al-Qaeda, the threat
is totally different from the threat that it used to be
before.
We start seeing regional threats emerging rather than
the global jihad that was promoted by Osama bin
Laden in 1996 and continued to be the slogan of Al-
Qaeda until 9/11. Now, for example, you look into Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is actually a
result of the successes the Saudi security services had
on Al-Qaeda in the kingdom. Many Al-Qaeda
operatives escaped Saudi Arabia and went to Yemen
and joined the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen that is the
closest to bin Laden’s version of Al-Qaeda, and they
put together Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But
if you look at Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula they
have been totally focused on regional issues, on
problems in Saudi Arabia, trying to assassinate Prince
Mohammed bin Nai, trying to take cities down south,
trying to basically present themselves as part of the
wider Yemen opposition in order to hijack that
opposition for their own sake, something they did
successfully in Iraq in the Sunni triangle, and that they
continue to do successfully in the tribal areas in
Pakistan.
If you look at Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb it is
a totally different organisation. You join Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb for totally different reasons than
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. You have
remnants of Islamic extremists in Algeria that were
able to escape from Algeria down south, and they
operate on the border area with some tribal elements
in Niger, in Mauritania, in Mali, and even the way
they fund themselves is very different from Al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula. They don’t have a lot of
donations; they take hostages in order to get money.
So the reasons are very different. If you look at Al-
Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in Iraq is trying to cause
Sunni-Shia chaos and civil war in order to find money,
in order to have people in the Gulf region support
them. They are trying to present themselves as an
entity that is fighting for Sunni Islam and to protect
the Gulf from Iranian influence in Iraq.
So there are many different Al-Qaedas. That makes it
very difficult in so many ways to have one strategy to
combat Al-Qaeda. That makes us now try to focus
that we need to have regional strategies because each
area has its own incubators that create terrorism, own
economic incubators, social, political, tribal and so
forth. It is a little bit harder to combat terrorism now,
but at the same time, on the positive side, the focus is
regional, the focus is not global in nature. The idea of
a global jihad now has started to lose a lot of its
appeal, especially in the light of the Arab Spring.
Q106 Lorraine Fullbrook: Thank you very much,
Mr Soufan, for the answer to my supplementary. I
would like to ask you a bit about your organisation
that conducted a study of the de-radicalisation and the
rehabilitation of terrorists. You carried this out in a
number of countries, including the United Kingdom.
One of your report’s conclusions is that, “The state’s
own actions, inactions and reactions might be fuelling
rather than mitigating militant sentiments.” Can you
explain why you drew this conclusion, including in
particular the UK?
Ali Soufan: For every action there is a reaction, and
if you have a problem, let’s say in the United
Kingdom, with the issue of radicalism, and we don’t
create a venue for many people who can be basically
recruited by organisations, if we don’t find a way for
these grievances to be managed, for these grievances
to be expressed, to open channels between the
community and between the security services and the
Government in general, that might cause different
individuals who come over and recruit these people to
do terrorist plots down the road. So this is where
inaction can be a problem, and it is vice versa if you
have a bridge with the community—in the United
States I think more than 40% to 50% of the disrupted
plots that we have is because of the community’s
relationship with the law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, where they go there and say, “Hey, you
know what, we have a couple of guys who are
missing. We believe they went to Afghanistan or to
Pakistan. Can you find something about them?” That
helped in stopping terrorist plots.
Q107 Lorraine Fullbrook: So what have you
particularly found in terms of examples in the UK?
Ali Soufan: Another phase of the study was about
disengagement, terrorism disengagement, and we
studied it from a cross-cultural perspective. We looked
into events in south-east Asia, what the Governments
are doing or not doing in Europe and the United States
and so forth. In the UK when we did this study there
was a Prevent programme and even the Prevent
programme probably needed some tweaking but I
think it is one of the best that we saw. It was a role
model for many countries in Europe. I know it is a
role model for Sweden.
Q108 Chair: The old Prevent programme, the one
that was stopped?
Ali Soufan: Yes, the old Prevent programme. We are
trying to still look into the effect of removing the
funding, for example, or the grievances management,
and how it will affect it down the road. It is still early,
but that is something that we have to keep monitoring
and see how it will affect the overall programme.
Q109 Lorraine Fullbrook: Mr Soufan, you were
critical of the US policy of waterboarding and you
have argued against waterboarding in the past. Do you
still hold to that, given that information was acquired
from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed?
Ali Soufan: I disagree with you, ma’am. Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed never gave any information that
saved lives because of waterboarding. It is not only
me who is saying that. I know you hear politicians
talking about waterboarding and they link their
political careers to these techniques. Unfortunately,
they are wrong. I am not a politician; I am a
counterterrorism expert who had first-hand knowledge
of a lot of these kind of things. Every example that
we were given about the success of waterboarding
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was wrong. I said this in the book and in my statement
to the US Senate, which, by the way, is the only
statement under oath until today on that issue—
everybody talks but when someone asks you to raise
your right hand and talk, a lot of people escape, they
are not there any more. But that is normal, as you
guys are probably aware in your Committee.
Chair: Well, we never tried it before.
Ali Soufan: So Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did not
give any information. The CIA’s own Inspector
General conducted an investigation in 2004, because
many CIA officers and employees complained to their
agencies about the EITs. The result of the
investigation was outstanding. It said that not one
single imminent threat was stopped because of
enhanced interrogation techniques and
waterboarding—not one single imminent threat.
I was asked before about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
and the information that he gave that supposedly
stopped the plot, the Heathrow plot here in the United
Kingdom. That document from the CIA has been
declassified and you can get it on Google. It is said
immediately upon his arrest—not after 183 sessions
of waterboarding—he provided information regarding
the Heathrow plot, because he thought another Al-
Qaeda operative, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, had already
provided the information. So that information did not
come because of waterboarding, and this has been
declassified.
Chair: Thank you, that is very helpful.
Lorraine Fullbrook: Thank you.
Q110 Chair: A quick answer to this question, and it
is a guess, I know, or maybe you have information
that perhaps I think you don’t have: how long do you
think the Americans knew that Osama bin Laden was
in Pakistan before they attacked his hideaway?
Ali Soufan: I think, from what I have been gathering,
a few months. I think they knew about it maybe in the
spring or the summer before that.
Q111 Chair: How long did the Pakistani Government
know that he was there?
Ali Soufan: I don’t have any direct information about
that, but my own personal opinion is it is almost
impossible for bin Laden to be hiding in the area
where he was hiding, just yards away from the West
Point of Pakistan, and some entities in Pakistan at
least don’t know about it. I think it is kind of
impossible.
Q112 Mr Winnick: As far as the killing of bin Laden
is concerned, how do you feel that will have any
effect, arising from some of the questions that Mrs
Fullbrook asked you, over the terrorist network? Will
it have any real effect?
Ali Soufan: Yes, I think the death of bin Laden was
a mortal blow to Al-Qaeda, and Al-Qaeda was
becoming increasingly irrelevant even before bin
Laden’s death, especially in the light of the Arab
Spring. The Arab Spring made people realise that they
can change their own destiny without blowing up
embassies or taking hostages or killing innocent
people, and when they do that the West will also
support them, regardless of whether we view them as
radicals or not radicals—this is not an issue. Look at
Libya, for example, and some of the elements that
we supported in Libya, mostly former Libyan fighting
group members. That was a very strong message.
Also another thing, sir, is Al-Qaeda itself after bin
Laden is not going to be the same as before bin Laden.
Bin Laden was Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda was bin
Laden.
Q113 Mr Winnick: So it will have quite an effect?
Ali Soufan: Absolutely. Ayman al-Zawahiri is a very
dedicated individual, but I don’t believe he has the
charisma nor the story, nor the nationality, to be
honest with you. As an Egyptian, he is not going to
be able to unify the Arabian Peninsula members of
Al-Qaeda under him. Something that a lot of people
did not pay attention to, when the statement came out
from Al-Qaeda announcing that Ayman al-Zawahiri is
amir of the group, the person in charge of the group,
is that it came from “Al-Qaeda General Command”.
That is something we never saw before. That reminds
me of Palestinian groups when they used to splinter
and have “general command” assigned to a name,
which gives you an idea about where Al-Qaeda is
today.
Q114 Mr Winnick: Successive British Governments
repeatedly say that they do not approve of and do not
condone torture, and no one has suggested that British
Governments have in any way authorised torture by
British security agents. That has never been the
allegation. The allegation has been where British
security agents have been party to the extent of torture
carried out by a foreign Government, be it the United
States or otherwise, trying to extract the information
regarding possible terrorist attacks and so on and so
forth. As far as waterboarding is concerned, which the
United States does not deny in any way, shape or
form, would you consider that to be torture?
Ali Soufan: In general, if you just tell me
waterboarding, without the way it is conducted, the
rules and all the different elements to it, yes. It is
not only me who would consider waterboarding as a
technique of torture, it is the United States who
consider it a torture. We prosecuted Japanese officers,
military officers, for waterboarding US troops in
World War II, and they were executed for doing that.
US courts found it to be a crime of war, or a war
crime, the technique itself. But I think the devil
sometimes is in the detail, and that is why I believe
enhanced interrogation techniques are wrong. Also I
believe they are wrong, as you probably gathered from
my writings or from what I said today, because of
the efficacy of the programme. I don’t make a moral
argument here.
Q115 Mr Winnick: The President of the United
States made a promise before his election that
Guantanamo—and I am glad I managed to get the
word out correctly this time—would be closed. Do
you consider Guantanamo to be a stain on the United
States, the manner in which prisoners are held without
being tried in any way, a sort of concentration camp,
in effect? Apart from that, would that be helping the
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terrorists in their propaganda in trying to establish that
they are in the right?
Ali Soufan: The terrorists are going to use anything
they can use for their own propaganda, so I think we
have to be careful in what we do not to give them
ammunition, but at the same time I think we have to
do what we need to do to make our countries secure.
I think at the beginning Guantanamo Bay was very
much needed. You have a lot of people that you are
gathering in a war that is very different in nature, and
you need to basically go through the process of seeing
who are they, are they involved, do they have blood
on their hands, are they terrorists, did we get them by
mistake, and so forth. I think Guantanamo Bay was
needed as an intelligence collection place and to do
rehabilitation. Unfortunately, I think we mismanaged
Guantanamo horribly.
Q116 Mr Winnick: Should it now be closed down?
Ali Soufan: Well, you know what, it is easier said
than done. I would like Guantanamo to be closed, but
as the President himself realised, it is going to be
extremely impossible to do it.
Chair: Thank you. We accept that answer. Thank you
so much.
Q117 Michael Ellis: Mr Soufan, your report found
that some countries obviously focused their counter-
radicalisation efforts on rehabilitation, so they are
dealing with after-the-fact situations in terms of
terrorist prisoners. Here in the United Kingdom there
is a focus on those at risk of becoming offenders, so
it is before the fact. Do you have a view as to which
of those approaches is more effective?
Ali Soufan: I think rehabilitation can be before or
after. Singapore, for example, has a good programme,
where they have an extremely strong relationship with
the community and if they find individuals who are
susceptible or involved in the JI or other terrorist
groups over there they try to rehabilitate them before
they conduct any terrorist attack. However, they have
something in Singapore that we cannot have here in
the West in general, which is that they can do
detention without a crime.
Q118 Michael Ellis: They have enhanced democracy
in Singapore, don’t they?
Ali Soufan: I think you are dealing with a culture,
with a society, where culturally speaking the
population is ready to sacrifice for the sake of the
whole community—the few are ready to sacrifice. In
the West we have a different view about that. But I
think their way of life is working for them, and I think
rehabilitation can be before and after. I would like to
believe that we need to do this before. We have to be
preventive, not after the fact. I think if a terrorist
attack, God forbid, takes places it complicates matters.
It complicates matters even in building bridges with
communities, it creates a lot of other issues that we
have to deal with. I think what we find more
successful is to be preventive, to do it before the fact.
Q119 Michael Ellis: So you approve of the British
Government’s approach in dealing with those at risk
of becoming offenders?
Ali Soufan: Absolutely. This is extremely needed.
Q120 Michael Ellis: What about if and when
individuals find themselves incarcerated as terrorist
offenders, so they are in prison? What do you think is
the most effective way of de-radicalising people who
are in prison when they are in the constraints of
detention?
Ali Soufan: Well, this is probably one of the most
difficult things that a lot of people are dealing with,
especially in the West, because of the freedom of
religion that we have. You cannot tell anyone that
your version of religion is wrong and my version is
right. So this creates a lot of problems, and that is the
reason we find radicalisation is extremely difficult to
combat and is on the rise in jails. We find that not
only in the United States, not only in the United
Kingdom, but in Indonesia, for example. As part of
the QIASS study—the Qatar International Academy
for Security Studies, which did this—we went to
Indonesia and we spoke to prisoners who were in jail
and they basically told us, “Look, when we were in
jail we were given books on how to be suicide
bombers.” These books were given to them by other
radicals and they were widely available to anyone
who wants to read them. The terrorists were able to
create a network where they even find wives for
individuals if they found de-radicalisation or
disengagement is working on them, so they can suck
them back in. It is very complicated.
Q121 Michael Ellis: It is complicated, but have you
seen or heard of any techniques that you think work
in terms of de-radicalising people when they are in
prison?
Ali Soufan: Yes, I think having their families involved
works, having the community involved, not making it
just as law enforcement, Government-sponsored,
especially in that culture. Most of the people from
that specific culture are more family oriented, more
community oriented. When we saw these kind of
things in different areas around the world, like from
the Singaporean programme, to Indonesia, to different
case studies that we found, I think family is extremely
important and community is extremely important to
have them involved in this.
Q122 Nicola Blackwood: You have mentioned the
problems associated with the sensitivities of different
versions of religion and not saying that one version of
religion is acceptable. In the UK there is a debate at
the moment about whether or not there is a role for
non-violent extremists working with the Government
to counter radicalisation. I just wondered what your
views were, whether you think there is a worthwhile
distinction between violent and non-violent
extremism.
Ali Soufan: It is an excellent question, and I don’t
like the term “non-violent extremists”. I look at the
term and I try to basically tell myself, “What do we
mean by that? Do we mean that we are dealing with
just religious people, conservative religious people, or
are they really non-violent radicals?” I think we are
trying to make terms that don’t exist. I see the world
like this: I see you have violent extremists, which
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means extremists so radical that they are willing to
commit violent acts to prove a point; then you have
religious individuals who we say are radicals
because—let’s talk about Islam here, my own
religion—they have beards, they go to the mosque,
and they are very conservative, but I don’t look at
them as radicals but as just deeply religious
individuals. I think we should not isolate these people,
because they have a lot of credibility in the
community, and when you isolate people who have
credibility with the community you are marginalising
a very good asset for yourself and then we are putting
everyone in one pot, which down the road will
backfire.
So I don’t like radicals, period. I don’t believe there
are violent and non-violent radicals. I believe that
there are individuals who are willing to do bad things
and there are people who are just deeply religious and
apolitical. Now, from these conservative people,
conservative religious people, there are people who
probably don’t agree with the British foreign policy
in the Middle East, but that is fine. There are a lot of
British people also that don’t agree with that. You
know, you don’t isolate those individuals.
Q123 Nicola Blackwood: But in that case if you are
trying to prevent radicalisation in prisons, how do you
go about that without trampling on freedom of
religion?
Ali Soufan: I think you have to do a couple of things.
I think you have to realise that people like Abu Qatada
al-Filistini, for example, or Abu Hamza al-Masri—
those leaders—need to be isolated from others. We
have that system in the United States, which is more
difficult for you to do in the UK, to isolate the terrorist
radicals in the jails that are causing these problems
but at the same time dealing with people who you can
bring back. There are some people you can never
bring back, so I think there is an assessment here that
some individuals you cannot reach. They are so far
that you have to kind of be at peace that these guys
you are not going to change, but there are other people
that you can change, so you have to limit their
interaction with the radicals and also bring some
positive elements from the community, from religious
people in the community, their families, in order to
help the security service and the prisons to bring them
back to reality.
Q124 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think that there is
a role for former terrorists to be used to dissuade
potential recruits from getting involved, or do you
think that there are potential dangers in that?
Ali Soufan: No, no, absolutely. We found through the
QIASS study when we went around—and we are
doing now a counter-narrative part of the study that
will be announced next year—that the role ex-
prisoners play is extremely important, especially when
you have an individual saying, “Look, you know
what, it is not greener on the other side, believe me, I
was there. They lie to you, they do this, they do that.”
But this needs to be also in very close co-ordination,
I believe, with the security services and with the
Government. You know, you can’t just trust a guy and
say, “Okay, we’re going to give you whatever you
need, go and do it.” It needs to be a controlled
environment, but I truly believe that nobody will reach
out to these individuals more than a person who did
it when they walk that road, talk the talk, walk the
walk, and then come back and say, “Believe me, you
don’t want to go down there.”
Q125 Mark Reckless: In your experience from the
United States, what impact has the designation of
international terrorist organisation had, if any, in
mitigating or limiting radicalisation?
Ali Soufan: I don’t think it has had, to be honest with
you, from my personal opinion, an impact on the issue
of radicalisation itself. It has probably had an impact
on community relations but not on the issue of
creating more radicalisation in America or among
Muslim communities in the United States.
Q126 Mark Reckless: Would you have any advice
for us? I understand at the moment we have 47
organisations that have been proscribed, around half
of which relate to Islamic extremism in one way or
another. Do you think that is something we can build
on, or is it just the wrong approach?
Ali Soufan: No, absolutely, it is something that we
can build upon. If you have organisations that the
security services, the Government, are telling you are
actively trying to raise funds to radicalise, to recruit,
you cannot just have them operate. I think that is an
important tool to have.
Q127 Steve McCabe: Just on that point, why does it
make sense then to proscribe an organisation like the
NCRI, which is opposed to the radicalisation in Iran?
Doesn’t that actually favour the proliferation of
radicalisation if you proscribe groups who are
opposed to it?
Ali Soufan: The NCRI in Iran, you mean, Mujahedin-
e Khalq? That is the group you are talking about?
Steve McCabe: Yes.
Ali Soufan: I think from the United States when you
look at the list, we have a lot of people that probably
we are sympathetic to their causes on there. A lot of
people think that only Islamic terrorist groups are
listed on that list. No, we don’t discriminate; we have
Jewish terrorist groups, we have Iranian terrorist
groups. I think in the United States we look at an
entity and we look how they carry out their operations
and if they kill civilians in order to promote their
cause, even if we are sympathetic to the cause, we
believe that they are terrorist organisations. I think
that is the right thing to do. We will support you to
do whatever needs to be done to promote your cause
but don’t start blowing up buses and killing innocent
people that have nothing to do with anything just to
promote an idea. I think there is a line that we draw.
Q128 Chair: Do you think that Hizb ut-Tahrir should
be banned?
Ali Soufan: I think Hizb ut-Tahrir have been involved
in a lot of radical propaganda but I don’t see them
involved in terrorist attacks yet. I think it is an entity
that need to be at least monitored and in the West, I
think in many countries probably around the Middle
East will be—
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Q129 Chair: So was that a yes or no? I am not sure.
Ali Soufan: I think it is no. No, I don’t think we
should ban it now because of what I mentioned. You
can say it is freedom of speech, they haven’t been
carrying out stuff, but it needs to be monitored and
we need to be very careful on some of the ideologies
that they are trying to promote.
Q130 Chair: Can I just ask you some very quick
final questions with, if possible, brief answers? There
is a resolution going through the UN today, sponsored
by William Hague and the British Government, about
Yemen, asking for President Saleh to stand down.
Both you and I have met the President. What effect
will his going have on the issue of radicalisation? Al-
Awlaki, of course, is dead now as a result of American
action. Is there any fear that the destabilisation of
Yemen is going to result in more radicalisation and
more terrorism?
Ali Soufan: The destabilisation of Yemen will
definitely result in more radicalisation. As I mentioned
earlier, Al-Qaeda is trying to take advantage of the
situation down south and they are even trying to
rebrand themselves now. They are working under the
term Ansar al-Sharia, talking about that they are an
NGO and doing the same game plan that they did in
the Sunni triangle in Iraq, hijacking the concerns of
the wider community and trying to appear that they
are real. So that definitely—
Q131 Chair: So should he stay, in fact, because he—
Ali Soufan: President Saleh?
Chair: Yes, because he provides that stability in an
unstable Government.
Ali Soufan: I don’t think that President Saleh staying
provides stability either. He has been in power for a
long time and look at Yemen today. I think what we
have today in Yemen is a rebellion up north with the
Houthi, we have a rebellion down south based on very
legitimate concerns for the south Yemeni people, and
you also have a division in the political establishment
that helped Saleh to rule for the last 33 years.
Q132 Chair: Very helpful.
On structures, you talked about 9/11 and you said that
the structures were not there. I know you have not had
a chance to read our report, because obviously your
book has been launched. This Committee has
suggested that counterterrorism should be placed
within a national framework in the new National
Crime Agency, which of course is the case in the
United States. Do you have any views on that?
Ali Soufan: I think it is important. When you develop
a counterterrorism strategy that strategy should be
holistic. You can’t just deal with one specific issue
and not deal with the bigger policy and strategic
implications of dealing with that specific threat. So,
yes, I believe it should be co-ordinated on a national
level.
Q133 Chair: I am sure you have visited the centre
outside Washington where we now have all the desks
of all the agencies in one room. Presumably you are
pleased, that is a tremendous improvement since 9/11?
Ali Soufan: That is a tremendous improvement, but
even before 9/11 we had that in the Joint Terrorism
Task Force and the other things that were going on. I
would like to see these institutions—a building like
that, let’s call it an institution—shaping the different
institutions that exist. You can put them all in the same
room, but you need them to talk to each other and
share information.
Q134 Chair: Finally, on the Olympics, we are going
to have 500 FBI agents here next year, we understand.
You gave an interview to the Evening Standard last
night about the Olympics. Do you have any concerns
or fears about what might happen? Are we ready to
deal with this major international event?
Ali Soufan: Absolutely. I think the United Kingdom
have the utmost professional security services and law
enforcement, and I think you will be very happy with
the professionalism of the 500 FBI agents.
Chair: Mr Soufan, thank you very much for coming.
It has been extraordinarily interesting hearing your
evidence, and we may write to you again if there are
other issues that we need to explore with you.
Ali Soufan: It is a great honour to have been here.
Thank you, sir.
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Witnesses: Akeela Ahmed, Chief Executive, Muslim Youth Helpline, Alyas Karmani, Co-director, STREET
Project, and Murtaza Hassan Shaikh, Averroes Institute, gave evidence.
Q135 Chair: Ladies and gentlemen, a number of our
questions will be to all of you. Members of the
Committee will obviously want to ask each of you
questions, and it may be the same question. Please
feel free to answer them, but if you feel your
colleague may have answered them satisfactorily you
can just say so.
Can I start about the level of radicalism within the
communities, the Muslim community in particular, in
this country? Do you feel that it is on the increase, or
do you think that it has stabilised and is coming
down? Mr Karmani.
Alyas Karmani: Young Muslims are angry and more
frustrated than I have ever known. I think we have to
look at the context of the last 10 years from 2001 up
until now—the war on terror. We have had a very
polarising decade and one of repeated things that we
look for when we are working with vulnerable
individuals and with individuals that we work with
who are TACT offenders and referrals is the way that
they look at the world in terms of us and them, that
polarisation between what they see as their world
view and other people’s world view. Certainly that has
increased and we have had a very polarising decade.
For a lot of young people, their formative years have
been under increased social exclusion, a perception of
greater grievance in terms of the world, greater
Islamophobia as well, and many of our young also
have what I call one-square-mile thinking. They have
a very limited world view. They are not worldly at all,
and that accentuates this sense of grievance and sense
of dislocation and disengagement.
While they are angry and frustrated, I don’t think it is
manifesting itself in terms of violent extremism, but I
think it is important agencies like ourselves have a
role in terms of channelling that.
Q136 Chair: Sure, we will come on to that a little
later. But is the answer yes, it is on the increase but it
is not channelled into violence?
Alyas Karmani: Yes. I would say certainly the
influences, the risk factors, are very much there.
Akeela Ahmed: I work with the community and with
young people who are in emotional distress at the
Muslim Youth Helpline. We deal with around 4,000
calls a year, and there are a significant number of calls
that we are not able to deal with as well—we miss
them. Over the last year we have probably had two
calls from people who were talking about violent
extremism, so that gives the context from which I
work and what I see. In the general community there
is not an increase in terms of violent extremism and
support for that. I would say that there is a minority
there, and that is evidenced, but I would agree with
my colleague in that there are risk factors, there are
vulnerabilities that need to be dealt with, and there
are grievances that need to be heard and dealt with
as well.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: There is not much to add
to that, except to say that we don’t really know about
the manifestations of this violent extremism until they
happen. That is quite a simple thing to realise, but the
grievances and the resentment that we all consider to
be facilitating factors to in the end being violently
extreme have definitely increased, and that has come
through different perceptions of injustice, rule of law,
human rights abuses, that seem or appear to be
targeting Muslims or Islam in general. Just one final
point, on the community level in mosques and in
community organisations there is a general sentiment
that Muslims don’t see the problem themselves in
their communities. So when they see in the news or
when they see the issue of violent extremism being
raised at the political level or national level they
wonder where it actually is. It is not to say it does not
exist, but the examples are so few that people develop
a sense of paranoia and many conspiracy theories
because they themselves are not exposed to these
ideas in their own community.
Q137 Lorraine Fullbrook: I wonder if we could ask
all three of you, when you come in contact with the
minority of youths who may have grievances and you
decide they may be becoming radicalised, how do you
deal with them? Do you deal with them yourself, or
if you think they are going to be violent do you pass
that over to the police, if they are in danger of harming
themselves or other people?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: Well, our work doesn’t deal
with people who are like that. We are more concerned
with the general community at large and how the
Prevent policy has an effect on their perceptions of
how they have been dealt with. It is clear from
second-hand studying of people who have been
radicalised that they have the grievances that we are
trying to minimise through advising what Government
policy should be, but we haven’t come into actual
contact with people who are violent extremists.
Akeela Ahmed: I was just going to say that we take a
multi-agency approach, in that if we were dealing with
somebody who was suicidal and they called the
helpline and were saying that they were going to kill
themselves, we would refer them to statutory services.
We would take the same approach if somebody called
the helpline and said that they were thinking about
committing an act of terror or a violent extremist act.
We would refer them to statutory services and also to
specialist groups who deal with de-radicalisation.
Alyas Karmani: We deal with them directly ourselves.
With many of the individuals that we come into
contact with, the assessment process is quite critical.
We are talking about individuals who are generally
not hardened ideologues, and they are not imminently
going to commit acts of violence. We are talking about
highly idealistic individuals, often very vulnerable,
very confused. Through our mentoring process we
provide quite comprehensive mentoring and try to
manage that issue ourselves, and for the vast majority
of the individuals that we deal with there isn’t a need
to pursue. Our Prevent intervention works quite
effectively. However, we are very clear in terms of
our community and the constituency that we work
with that if someone is going to commit an act of
violence, a criminal act, then we have no choice but
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to go to the authorities, to go to the police and co-
operate with them in that particular matter. But
obviously that eventuality is very rare.
Q138 Nicola Blackwood: I wonder what you feel
like your working relationship is with the police. Do
you feel confident going to the police? Do you feel
that is something you can do safely, that you are not
betraying the people who are in your trust as well?
Alyas Karmani: I think we are fortunate at STREET.
We had a very good relationship with the Muslim
Contact Unit and that was really important for us, I
think, after 9/11: that we had that relationship, that we
had a line of communication, because on a lot of the
at risk issues that we work with, our young people
have no confidence in police and a range of statutory
agencies, so there is a need for an intermediate
structure. There is a need for an agency that you can
go to where you can have a very safe space for
discussion without being labelled, without being
identified as involved in criminality, and for us the
Muslim Contact Unit provided that framework.
Certainly for me, I was very concerned after 9/11, who
do I talk to about these issues, and the Muslim Contact
Unit provided that kind of framework.
Through that we were able to develop a more effective
working relationship with the police where we are
seen as equal partners in that process and we are
assertive in terms of challenging their ideas, their
analysis, and they respect and value our point of view.
So it has to be on that basis, that you are equal
partners at the table and your views are valued and
respected. Too often I have seen people who, when
they engage with the police, lack that confidence to
really assert their position, so they will become almost
appeasing or supporting a particular perspective and
that then alienates them from the community. I think
what is unique about STREET and our approach is
that we have always been very assertive in advocating
for issues but at the same time recognising that we
have to protect the public.
Q139 Steve McCabe: Are you all familiar with the
views of Rashad Ali? Yes? I ask that because he told
us in evidence to this Committee that there were four
potential pathways or strands to radicalisation, and he
identified those as theological, political, personal
grievance, and possibly mental health problems. I
think this is to all of you: I wondered if you would
agree with that analysis and, if you differed from it, if
you could say why.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: If I could answer that
question first. I think in principle we agree. In our
written submission you will see that we have quite a
simple thesis and that is, first of all, the grievance and,
second of all, a violent ideology that purports to couch
itself in Islamic principles, but the difference in
principle would be that we believe that the grievances
may stem from foreign policy, or even domestic
policy, as an enabling factor. Without that initial
enabling factor the violent ideology cannot hold—it is
redundant. A subsidiary factor to that is the perception
that there is a conflation between Islam as a religion
and indicators for violent extremism. In that sense,
from my experience, we have found that it is actually
the most devout Muslims, the ones who are more
couched in scholarly knowledge, who are least likely
to commit these acts. So that was the basic thesis. In
principle, there is some overlap but there is some
clarification.
However, in practice—I think we will come to this
later—we have to come to terms with what we mean
by grievance and what responses we have for that.
Secondly, when it comes to the political ideology, or
the violent ideology, what exactly is that and do we
believe that to be the same thing as what Mr Ali was
referring to?
Alyas Karmani: I think there are lots of frameworks
out there, and I think there is generally an agreement
that there are social emotional factors, there is a sense
of social exclusion and belonging, there are
grievances, but there are also external factors. I think
foreign policy is one of the critical ones. There has
to be a catalyst or external factors that then feed the
radicalisation—the ideology actually requires that as
its fuel. So when we have these, what I would call,
critical incidents and defining events, such as the
killing of Anwar al-Awlaki recently, then the ideology
uses that to kind of fuel radicalisation—you build on
disaffection and kind of reinforce the ideology.
Another one of the frameworks that we use is to
identify individuals in terms of where they are in
terms of theological understanding and civic
responsibilities, whether they are at a foundation,
youthful, adult or mature phase. Most individuals,
interestingly, are at that youthful stage. Their Islamic
understanding could be equated to a primary school
level. It is also abstract—they don’t really have
concrete concepts, they have an abstract idealistic
understanding. As we move up, people start having
much more of an applied, pragmatic and much more
conscious understanding of how to apply Islam within
a British context. That is the journey you have to take
individuals on, from that abstract idealistic notion to
having a much more concrete and applied response.
Q140 Nicola Blackwood: I wonder what role you
think reporting of these incidents in the media is
having as an impact, and perhaps irresponsible
reporting and perhaps Islamophobic reporting might
be a problem in fuelling radicalisation?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I think you have touched
on a very important issue. Islamophobia, whether it is
manifested in what certain people in the media say or
what the newspapers says, even what politicians say,
definitely feeds into this mass of resentment. I think
resentment and grievance has always been framed as
if it were against the foreign policy, and that definitely
is a factor, but the common denominator is not the
foreign policy but the perception, whether it is
perceived or real, that there is an attack or a targeting
or a singling out or a discriminatory attitude towards
Muslims and Islam. Islamophobia definitely feeds into
that. I think we will probably come to this question
later, but also we have to link this with the rise of the
far right and that sort of extremism.
Chair: We are coming on to that.
Alyas Karmani: Sorry, can I just add to that as well?
The end result is that people access alternative media,
so they become completely disillusioned with
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mainstream and they go to layers underneath that. A
lot of people are getting a different narrative and a
different presentation of the media as a result of their
complete lack of faith or confidence in mainstream
media.
Q141 Steve McCabe: I wanted to ask about the
situation where there seems to be a link to perhaps
mental health or even emotional distress. I wondered
what is the best way to deal with that, in terms of at
one level we are talking about a counter-radicalisation
policy, while at the other level we are talking about
health policy and counselling and treatment. How do
you determine what is the best way?
Alyas Karmani: My background is as a psychologist,
and I have about 20 years of counselling experience.
In my work, you are absolutely right, emotional and
psychological factors are critical, and it is the
assessment process. If we are always thinking about
extremist ideology, then we are just reinforcing a
particular kind of assessment and analysis of the
situation, where we are talking about emotionally
damaged individuals who have had trauma in their
lives, abuse in their lives, they are suffering from
psychosis, they are suffering from poor family
relationships, all manner of social and emotional
damage. You have to realise, ideological groups are
very sophisticated at targeting vulnerable individuals;
they know what buttons to press and how to engage
those particular individuals, and obviously someone
who has emotional distortion, that creates a cognitive
opening where the ideology feeds that. You are giving
people certainty, significance, importance, and for
someone who lacks profound self-esteem and wants
group belonging, that is often the factor.
We have often found that ideology is the last factor,
and the least prominent factor, where what we really
have is social exclusion, perceived grievance and
emotional damage, and those are what we need to
work with. So when I engage with practitioners, yes,
there is a lot in their toolkit, you could say, that they
are able to work on in terms of that emotional support.
Where it is deemed that ideology is a factor, then we
bring in the appropriate practitioner to deal with that.
In the assessment process, you need multiple
perspectives from people who understand and live
reality on the street, from people who understand it
from an emotional social point of view, a theological
point of view, as well as from a more environmental
contextual point of view.
Akeela Ahmed: Can I just add to that? At the Muslim
Youth Helpline, we deal with young British Muslims
who are dealing with a whole host of emotional and
psychological difficulties, which stem from social
exclusion, trauma and abuse. I think what we find very
effective is that we are dealing with the root causes of
issues, before somebody gets to a point where they
have been completely isolated and their only option is
to be preyed upon by an extremist. So we are dealing
with the risk at a much lower level than waiting until
somebody is at a completely disenfranchised, isolated
point and their only option is to be preyed on by an
extremist.
Q142 Alun Michael: You talked about vulnerable
individuals being targeted. We saw some evidence of
this in the United States when we visited to look at
combating of radicalisation in the States. There is a
targeting of young short-term prisoners, and very
often there is a problem, sometimes by them being
brought back into their community, back into the
family. Is this a specific issue as far as your
experience goes?
Alyas Karmani: Absolutely. We work in prisons, and
it is always there. If I give you one example: an
individual who went into Belmarsh on remand was
three cells away from Abdullah al-Faisal when he was
there. Within three days, Abdullah al-Faisal had
convinced him to undertake a martyrdom mission. He
left prison—he was acquitted of his offence—went
straight to Yemen, desperately looking for jihad,
desperately seeking a training camp. Fortunately, the
handlers there in Yemen channelled him into an
appropriate kind of madrassa, an Islamic school there,
who taught him the correct understanding and sent
him back to us, and then we worked quite intensively
with the individual. Prison most definitely is a place
where this happens. We identified that link back in
the 1990s, where individuals were converting to Islam
within prison, not necessarily that they were becoming
violent extremists, but certainly the Dar al-Harb
ideology was being inculcated in there, with people
coming out of prison, joining violent gangs and then
using that ideology to legitimate their criminality,
rather than violent extremism. My co-director, Abdul
Haqq, based his PhD on the case study of Richard
Reid, the shoe bomber, and it was the first to come
out and talk about that particular link. Again, it went
through that particular pathway.
Q143 Alun Michael: This is not the only problem,
of course, for short-term prisoners, but is it a pathway
you think is properly understood by the prison
authorities and—
Alyas Karmani: I think it varies. Each prison has its
own regime, and I think some are very open. We work
with one young offenders institute at the moment
where we have a very good working relationship with
the governor, we frequently visit, we have lots of
sessions with the inmates there. Other prisons, the
doors are completely closed, with a lack of awareness.
There is a different regime, which is much more
controlling and less engaging in terms of the prisoners
and there is less of an awareness among prison
officers as well. I remember one prison officer, talking
about some of the work of individuals, of inmates in
Belmarsh, saying that the regime in itself was
polarising and radicalising. You would have white
inmates in a cell who would be taking drugs and no
one would do anything, but as soon as two Muslims
were there praying and performing their obligation of
congregational prayer, you would have a whole
number of prison officers coming and stopping them.
The experience within prison itself can be
radicalising. If you know there are ideologues active
in prison, then that compounds the issue.
Q144 Alun Michael: That is helpful. In terms of
return to the community, do you think that the need
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for taking people back, rehabilitation, is well enough
understood within the communities?
Alyas Karmani: First, coverage is poor, so for
agencies like STREET, there isn’t national coverage
in terms of those issues. We work with probation and
we work with individuals pre-release and post-release
intensively, so they have a resettlement plan. You have
to provide what I call a legitimate holistic alternative,
otherwise the pull factors back to gangs, back to old
associations, back to familiar groups, is going to be
much stronger. Unless you provide the alternative, you
are not able to do that.
Alun Michael: Sorry, my question was whether that
is sufficiently understood by the wider community.
Alyas Karmani: I don’t think it is. Yes, I don’t think
it is.
Q145 Alun Michael: I wanted to take you back to
the issue of grievances for a moment, because you
have already dealt with the fact that there is a
difference between actual grievances and perceived
grievances, and any teenagers have anger about some
things so we understand the context of that. Do you
think enough is being done to deal with real, as
distinct from perceived, grievances? Are there things
that we ought to be doing more about?
Akeela Ahmed: I think, first of all, it is important to
look at the wider picture of youth, the experience of
being a young person in the UK at the moment. We
saw the riots over the summer and we saw that young
people clearly felt that they weren’t being heard.
Obviously there was a lot of criminality that went on,
but there was something around people not feeling
like, firstly, they were heard, and secondly, having the
tools to express their grievances in the right way and
in a positive way, and thirdly, the sense of
disempowerment and not being able to effect change
or influence what is going on in their lives and what
is affecting them. When we are dealing with young
British Muslims, we have to look at them within that
wider context.
Now, for the grievances that young British Muslims
feel, I think there are very real grievances around lack
of employment, poor access to services, and living in
overcrowded housing. There is a sense of not having
the same opportunities as other people and being
socially excluded. It is well documented that part of
the Muslim communities is socially excluded in the
UK. But I think what happens, though, is when you
don’t have the structures to deal with the real
grievances and the real issues and challenges that are
facing young people and young British Muslims, that
feeds into this perceived idea that, “It’s us against
them.”
Q146 Alun Michael: I understood that, because you
already made that point, and I think it is a very valid
one. I was trying to focus on the real grievance aspect
for a moment.
Akeela Ahmed: Okay.
Alun Michael: Anything to add?
Alyas Karmani: Well, I think civil liberties, I think
there has been a disproportionate impact in terms of
anti-terror laws on the Muslim community. It becomes
accentuated because of this insularity. It becomes
more concentrated when young men or young
Muslims sit down together and they talk about their
different experiences they have had of stop and
search, of schedule 7, of having to give DNA and so
on. If there is no counter to that, it just concentrates
those views. Then there is also the view that the way
Islamic extremism and the far right and other forms
of extremism are treated is different in society, and we
shouldn’t be treating Muslims differently or
accentuating that difference. For example, Muslims
have been charged under the Terrorism Act 2006,
whereas far-right individuals have been charged under
other legislation, although they have had great
capability to commit violent acts as well under the
Firearms or Explosives Acts rather than the 2006
Terrorism Act. So, again, that leads into a view that
there is a disproportionate treatment of Muslims
compared to other groups.
Q147 Chair: Can I just say that it is always difficult
when you have three witnesses on the panel, and we
are running a bit behind time, so can we limit our
answers?
Alyas Karmani: Yes, I will keep it short.
Chair: When you agree with your colleague, you just
have to say you agree and we can accept that.
Q148 Mr Winnick: I have one or two questions on
the domestic situation, but first of all you made
reference to foreign policy and the view that
obviously the wider community also has differences
on matters like the Iraq war and the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. The question that I want to ask you on that
aspect is simply is it ever pointed out, for example,
that in the Iranian-Iraq war, it is estimated that some
750,000 Muslims—obviously Sunnis and Shias—
were killed, which demonstrates that it is not just
Western powers as such, but Muslims fighting
Muslims as a result of two dictatorships?
Alyas Karmani: I think the fact that Muslim on
Muslim violence probably results in much more
Muslim deaths than otherwise is conveniently
overlooked, but it is also this very limited concept
around foreign policy. It is not a broader analysis that
individuals have. It is still within that idealistic
abstract. It is not complex. Even on the Palestine
issue, people don’t really have a knowledge of that
issue beyond 10 years, so if you ask them about Sabra
and Shatila in 1982, people don’t know, or beyond
that as well.
Q149 Mr Winnick: Do you consider it part of your
job to do so?
Alyas Karmani: Well, it is about making people more
worldly, and also having a more complex
understanding. It is not just a black and white issue.
There are many shades of grey in between. I think it
is important that people have a detailed understanding
of history.
Q150 Michael Ellis: You mentioned Sabra and
Shatila but I was wondering if you also try and
educate people you come into contact with on both
sides of the account, so that they are given a full
picture of what both sides believe, even if—
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Alyas Karmani: Yes, I think so. Absolutely.
Mr Winnick: Of the—
Chair: Order, Mr Winnick. If we can have a brief
answer to that question, and then we will go on to
Mr Winnick.
Alyas Karmani: I think intercultural dialogue, inter-
faith dialogue is very critical, that people have a broad
perspective and a broader world view.
Q151 Mr Winnick: My colleagues are intervening,
and why not? Can I ask you this question? How far
do the authorities look upon the three organisations as
being helpful, or are you seen simply as a way of
trying to prevent, as far as is possible, Muslim
youngsters getting engaged in any form of terrorism?
Is the attitude by the authorities helpful and positive?
Alyas Karmani: Personally, I think we have a very
good working relationship with our statutory agencies,
prison, probation, the police as well, the Youth
Offending Service. In policy terms, with the new
Government, I think there has been a bit of a
disconnection between the credibility and the
effectiveness of what we do and how they perceive it.
Chair: Thank you. We need to move on now.
Q152 Michael Ellis: You have referred to it once or
twice already in your answers, but I want to move on
to the far right. We have had, as a Committee, some
submissions obviously from various Muslim
organisations, but also from the Board of Deputies of
British Jews. The Board of Deputies reported a
personal threat felt by some Jews about the activities
of the far right in this country, but none of the Muslim
organisations that we had submissions from
apparently mentioned a feeling of personal threat from
the far right. That doesn’t mean to say it doesn’t exist,
but we have not had it reported to us, as far as I am
aware. What do you have to say about that? Do your
clients report threats from the far right?
Akeela Ahmed: If I could go first. As a helpline, we
have seen an increasing number of prank calls from
the far right.
Michael Ellis: Prank?
Akeela Ahmed: Prank calls. We always receive a
number of prank calls, people pranking the helpline,
but these have been people being Islamophobic, being
very racist, asking inappropriate questions about
Muslims and Islam in the UK, asking, “Do you want
to overtake No. 10?”—that sort of thing. We do have
reports from our callers of people experiencing racism
from far right groups.
Q153 Michael Ellis: So you have had that reported
to you?
Akeela Ahmed: Yes.
Q154 Michael Ellis: More to do with the far-right
organisation as opposed to racism per se?
Akeela Ahmed: Yes.
Q155 Michael Ellis: Do you think that the authorities
are paying adequate attention to the threat from the
far right?
Akeela Ahmed: I think there needs to be more
attention given to the far right, but I think again it
needs to be approached in the way that you would
deal with violent extremism. You need to have a
holistic approach, and to look at the root causes of
the increase of far right extremism and the economic
predisposing environment on a global level. I think all
of that needs to be looked at, the access and
opportunities that young people on the far right have,
their emotional wellbeing and employment, what have
you. All those things need to be looked at and dealt
with in the appropriate way. But I don’t think that it
should be underplayed. I think that there should be
more importance given to it.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I think until recently it
wasn’t being given appropriate attention, but that has
changed. Islamophobia is definitely on the rise, with
reports from people on housing estates, people on
public transport, people in all sorts of areas of public
life where they are feeling threatened or people are
abusing them or making comments related to their
ethnic origin or their religion. But I think recently,
especially when the events in Norway happened, there
was a realisation that these equally extreme ideas can
manifest themselves into horrendous acts of violence.
Just to give you two examples of things that have
come from the far right, which are frightening and
astonishing that they can be aired in a public forum
that could never have been entertained from a Muslim
individual. The first would be a gentleman named
Guramit Singh, who is a Sikh member of the EDL.
He gave a speech, which I recommend all of you to
go and listen to on YouTube. He made the most
offensive and most crude comments towards Muslims
and Islam in general, nothing to do with extremism or
violent radicalism, and he wasn’t charged. So maybe
the law is to blame, or the gaps in it.
The second one is when Tommy Robinson, I think his
name is, the head of the EDL, was on Newsnight, and
at the end of his interview with Jeremy Paxman, he
said, “It is only a matter of time before something like
what happened in Norway is going to happen here in
relation to Muslims if Islam isn’t dealt with as a
problem.” It is very frightening for Muslims en masse
to watch things like this and to hear things like this
and see nothing done about it, when—
Q156 Chair: What would you like to see being
done?
Michael Ellis: Well, the Prevent strategy does note
the danger from the far right, doesn’t it? The Prevent
strategy does note the danger posed by the far right,
doesn’t it?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: Yes, of course, it does deal
with it. Like I said, we have to see how the revised
strategy is implemented. The key is implementation
and how it is received by the community. I think the
old Prevent strategy, even though in principle it was
supposed to deal with right wing ideas, it didn’t,
because of this lack of faith that it will be actualised.
It was like they were just ideas, they won’t be
actualised. Not only was Tommy Robinson indirectly
threatening something similar happening but, as we
all know, there were links established between the far
right in this country and what happened in Norway
with Anders Behring Breivik.
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Q157 Chair: What would you have liked to have
seen done to Mr Robinson?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I think there is a definite
issue with the law at present when it comes to
incitement to religious hatred or religious violence,
and just to look at the EDL or to look at the DMP—
Q158 Chair: So you would like to see the law take
its course, be enforced?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: Yes. I think if the
discrimination, the incitement to religious hatred or
religious violence should be given a similar status to
incitement to racial hatred or religious—
Q159 Alun Michael: Is the question one of
consistent enforcement then?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: Yes, of course. I think it is
consistent enforcement, but also I think there is a lack
of acknowledgement or realisation of the
intersectionality of religion and race. We give race
such a high status, but the thing is if you look at what
is happening to Muslims when it comes to
Islamophobia and different statements made in public,
the essence is the same, that people who are different,
for whatever reason, are having bigoted statements
and violent statements directed at them.
Q160 Mr Clappison: I think I once a long time ago
moved an amendment to put religious incitement or
religious aggravation on the same base as racial
aggravation, and I am sure you are right in what you
say about the danger presented by the far right. We
have to be vigilant, because it might only be a very
small number, even just one person, who poses a
problem. But do you as representatives of the
community, draw assurance from the fact that the far
right, with its political parties, gets such a very small
amount of votes in this country and is so generally
despised? That must be something that gives you
some assurance.
Akeela Ahmed: I think that is reassuring, but I think
the media does play a part in providing a platform for
speakers like Tommy Robinson and Anjem Choudary.
The wider community may not be aware that the far
right are only receiving a small number of votes or
only have a small support base, because what they see
in the media is something that is a lot louder and kind
of exacerbated and giving it a really big platform.
Alyas Karmani: Just to reinforce that point. The
perception, however, is not the case. The perception
is that the far right is bigger than it is, that the
mainstream in British society holds similar views or
has sympathy for those particular views. I live in
Bradford, in inner-city Bradford, and again, our young
people are profoundly unworldly and don’t have
interaction. A young person from a Pakistani
background will grow up and not really have any
meaningful friendship with a white counterpart, and
likewise in the outer rim. So for those reasons, there
isn’t the opportunity to have interaction, exchange
and challenge.
Q161 Mr Clappison: How would you go about
tackling that sense of separation, which has been
identified in a number of places in the United
Kingdom? What more could be done?
Alyas Karmani: Well, I think good quality youth
work. I was in Sheffield yesterday with a project,
Football Unites Racism Divides, where they are
exactly doing that. They are bringing white
communities and minority ethnic communities
together through the medium of sport. But with cuts
and youth work being decimated across the country,
then one of the most important vehicles for doing that,
which is the education system and the youth services
system, the opportunities are less and less then.
Q162 Steve McCabe: You raised this point earlier
about young people having a rather narrow
experience, and you mentioned Bradford. Do you
think this holds for young Muslims across Britain, or
is it much stronger in certain parts of the country than
in other parts?
Alyas Karmani: I think it is across Britain, like in
South London, in Brixton, where STREET is based,
because I work in between West Yorkshire and
London. Likewise, you have estates where you have
postcode issues, where you have that same kind of
narrow-minded and insular approach. So no, I think it
is across cities. Some are obviously better than others.
I think where we have more mixed areas, then
generally that creates natural interaction opportunities,
but I would say in working class, deprived areas
generally there tends to be more localisation.
Q163 Steve McCabe: The white working class youth
might well be the mirror image of that?
Alyas Karmani: Absolutely. I think it is the same
reality.
Akeela Ahmed: Sorry, I just want to add that I would
say education is linked to that. It depends on how
educated and how equipped young people are. Yes,
you do get areas where there are high rates of social
deprivation and isolation, but you have individuals
who are very educated and had the right sort of
cultural upbringing.
Q164 Nicola Blackwood: I know that your
organisation, STREET, carries out a number of
activities related to training, to education,
employment. I just wondered to what extent you carry
those out as an end in themselves, or to what extent
you see those as part of efforts to discourage young
people to end up radicalised? Do you separate that out
in your mind? Do you see yourselves as an
organisation specifically to deliver those kinds of
services?
Alyas Karmani: No, I think we go further. We use
anything in our toolkit that enables us to connect and
hook up with young people. For example, we’re doing
a lot of work around sexual violence at the moment,
the reason being that our sexual relationship education
workshops were the most popular with young people,
and it provided a safe space environment for them to
talk about issues where they didn’t have any other
opportunity. That is a hook for us. In the same way,
sport, football, boxing is a hook for us to engage
young people, to connect with them, build
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relationships with them and engage them in more
complex and challenging issues.
Q165 Nicola Blackwood: But would you consider
your primary purpose to discourage the recruitment of
young people into violent extremist causes?
Alyas Karmani: I think that has been a core strand of
what we do, but I think fundamentally we see
ourselves as channelling people into positive
citizenship and into the role of being good Muslims
in British society.
Q166 Nicola Blackwood: This is to everybody. Do
you think that there is a link between unemployment,
social exclusion and violent extremism? Have you
noticed this in your research, in your incoming calls?
Akeela Ahmed: Yes, I would say that there are many
different factors that make an individual vulnerable or
predisposes them to sympathising with violent
extremism ideology. Social exclusion, unemployment,
lack of education, living in overcrowded housing, all
of these things are drivers for mental health issues,
and I think they can be drivers for somebody who
goes towards violent extremism ideology. You can’t
discount the multiplicity of factors out there, including
mental health, and you have to deal with all of them.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I would just like to add a
caveat to all this discussion. We can talk about these
social factors, unemployability, mental health, let’s
call them vulnerable people or aspects that make
people vulnerable, but we are dealing with the issue
of susceptibility to violent extremism, and these other
elements of vulnerability could lead to any sort of
criminality. When people are in this situation, they
could do anything. A mental person is susceptible to
anyone, not just someone who is trying to get him to
do something that is an act of violent extremism. It is
important to focus on what makes the one who carries
out acts of violent extremism unique from other
people. Of course these are facilitating factors. You
have to focus on the two elements that we highlight
in our written submission, which, first of all, is the
grievance they feel about their identity or their
religion being under siege, and the second is the actual
ideology or the preachers or the people who espouse
the ideology, which legitimises the targeting of
innocent civilians.
Akeela Ahmed: Could I add to that that if you focus
too narrowly, you will always be dealing with the
symptoms rather than the root causes from a
psychological perspective? We deal with the root
causes of issues and then with the symptoms that are
presented to us. You need both approaches, basically,
for a holistic approach to deal with violent extremism.
Q167 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would like to ask a
quick supplementary back to the far right before I ask
my main question. It is something that Ms Ahmed
said, and I am trying to understand what you meant
by it. You said that the community at large doesn’t
understand that the far right doesn’t have a large
political or electoral following. You are no different
from other communities, are you, Hindu or Chinese
or any other community, and is that not a case of the
community really having to inform itself, like any
other community, be they white Christians or
whoever? Is that not the case?
Akeela Ahmed: I think there is an element of that. I
think the community does need to inform itself. I
think having the capacity to do that is also lacking
somewhat among Muslim communities. I think also
it is without doubt that the Muslim communities are
concentrated upon in the media more than other
communities, than the Hindu community or the
Chinese community, and they are concentrated upon
it in a negative way. Again, it leads back to what my
colleague said: that the perception is bigger, that it is
perceived as being a lot bigger than what it is among
the community, because of that focus on the Muslim
community. There are two things. There is one about
being able to equip themselves with the right
knowledge and the tools to understand what is going
on politically and have those critical thinking tools,
and then there is also how it is just spoken about so
much more in the media and in political debates and
what have you, so people think, “Maybe this is bigger
than we are told it is.”
Q168 Lorraine Fullbrook: My constituency is in the
north-west, and we take the view very much that the
more you talk about them the more oxygen you give
to these people, so we generally don’t talk about them.
Akeela Ahmed: I think things need to be spoken
about, but in the right way, without inflaming things.
It needs to be spoken about in the right way, the
appropriate way, that doesn’t make something out to
be bigger than what it is and deals with it
appropriately.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: If I may just add. I was
going to answer this to your question earlier, but you
have asked a similar question. To the question, “Does
it reassure the Muslim community that the far right
doesn’t have that much political support?” the answer
is not at all. It doesn’t matter if they don’t have
widespread political support, and I think it is well
known—at least in the circles that I move in—that
they don’t have political support. The problem is that
a very small number of people can cause a lot of
damage, and that is what the EDL do, and it is in their
actions that they cause damage, going on rampages
through towns and different things that they do. The
second thing—
Q169 Lorraine Fullbrook: But I think that is true of
any community, though. There are always individuals
who can cause damage.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: Exactly, but the fear is not
from them getting political support, the fear is from
what they are able to do in groups of people in certain
areas at certain times, through the marches and so on.
The other element is that it might be small but it
appears to be, to all of us, increasing. The third point
is that the activities of the EDL and other groups in
the media have lifted the lid on political correctness.
It may be that individuals and the media and different
people already had these views, but before there was
some sort of taboo about it. When you see groups
operating on such an extreme agenda, then it doesn’t
seem such a big deal to say something against
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Muslims. People can say, which “They can do it, well,
it can’t be that big a deal.”
Chair: Can I just bring in Mr Clappison, because he
just wanted to come back on something?
Q170 Mr Clappison: I hope I made it sufficiently
clear I am in agreement with what you said, because
these people can be very dangerous, even though there
is a small number of them. It might only just be one
person, and they can do a tremendous amount of
damage, as we have seen. But my point was really
about the wider society, the rest of society isn’t like
that, has shown that it is not like that, and there isn’t
a sense that the Muslim community is under siege
from the wider society, although there is a problem
with these dangerous extreme individuals in small
groups.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: On that point, there is a
fear that it is increasing, it is increasing exponentially
perhaps, because of the incidents that happen to
people on a daily basis. That is the fear, but in general
when Muslims look at this, in general, yes, there is
acknowledgement of the fact that things may be
deteriorating at a small pace here, but if you compare
it to other places in Europe, and even the US, then we
are probably the best off. It is clearly the case that the
wider society doesn’t hold these views.
Q171 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would like to move on
to another subject, if I may. I would like to ask each
of you how serious you think the threat is from the
internet, mosques, prisons, universities, in providing a
forum for radicalisation.
Chair: It is a big question, but a brief answer would
be appreciated.
Alyas Karmani: I think the mosques are the least risk.
I think sometimes there is a focus on the mosque. I
think mosques are completely disconnected from
young at risk Muslims. I would say internet is
certainly the most, and prison obviously at the
moment, most of the prisons—
Q172 Chair: Sorry, what is your hierarchy?
Alyas Karmani: My hierarchy, internet most, then
prisons, then university—prison and university
similar—and mosques least. I don’t think mosques
even come on the radar.
Q173 Chair: And the madrassas, the schools?
Alyas Karmani: Even with madrassas, I think most
madrassas are really Koranic schools. I think the
biggest risk there is just poor teaching. Most people
abandoned the madrassa and the teachings of a
madrassa because, again, they don’t connect to the
world.
Q174 Chair: Can I hold it there for one second and
put Mrs Fullbrook’s question to both of you? Do you
agree with the list of four in that order, internet,
prisons, universities, mosques?
Akeela Ahmed: Yes.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: No.
Chair: No? What is your list?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I would agree with internet
at the top and then I would put prisons and then I
would have mosques and universities as the least risk,
but I would add for mosques and universities we have
to be very careful because if you place those high up
on the list then you are going to add to the resentment,
and you might add to the radicalisation process,
especially with universities. For mosques, as we made
clear in our submission, a mosque is not only the least
likely because of the devout religiosity of the place,
not only is it the least likely for radicalisation to occur,
but there is also the fear they have of being watched
and how they are performing.
Q175 Chair: Before Mrs Fullbrook comes back, Ms
Ahmed, do you agree with that list, or do you have a
different list?
Akeela Ahmed: I would agree with the list, but I
would obviously give a caveat that you have to take
each institution on a case-by-case basis.
Q176 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would just like to be
clear, this isn’t our, as in the Committee’s, list. It was
me asking you, are you, as a community, fearful of
threats from any of these entities, the internet,
universities, mosques and so on, and you said that we
need to be careful about lists. This isn’t our list; it was
asking you what your categories would be. You may
have other categories that are more important to you
than the ones I have suggested, and that is what we
are trying to find out.
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: In the formulation of policy
and when it comes to the implementation of Prevent
itself, to what extent do we focus on mosques and
universities? It could be counterproductive if we are
focusing our energies in the place that is the least
likely.
Q177 Lorraine Fullbrook: Okay, so you would
discount mosques and universities, but internet and
prisons would be the same?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I wouldn’t discount them. I
would say I wouldn’t prioritise them as much.
Q178 Lorraine Fullbrook: Are there any other
entities or organisations or institutions that you would
put on a list that would make you fearful of a threat
to radicalise young people?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: I think the internet is the
only place where there is space to operate.
Q179 Lorraine Fullbrook: There are not other
institutions you would like to add?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: If it operates anywhere else,
it has to operate undercover, but on the internet—
Q180 Chair: Would you favour the blocking of some
sites by Government?
Murtaza Hassan Shaikh: Yes, but the criteria for
blocking them has to be clear. Yes, definitely there
should be censorship of the internet. If you can
proscribe groups why would you allow their websites
to exist?
Q181 Lorraine Fullbrook: Mr Karmani, can I ask
you the same question? Is there anything else you
would like to add that we haven’t talked about?
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Alyas Karmani: Yes. Certainly I think in the urban
context, gangs are another critical group. You have
significant numbers of converts in gangs and the Dar
al-Harb ideology is obviously prevalent within those
kind of groups. So certainly we have identified that,
not just in London, but across the UK as well.
If you are thinking about banning the internet, you
have just got to provide a counter-narrative. That is
what we do at STREET, so what we do is we identify
their narrative and then you have to put an equally
effective counter-narrative, because if you ban one
site, 10 others emerge, and the sophistication of
various ideologues in terms of promoting on the
internet and through social media is highly proficient.
I saw one recent link of an Awlaki video where there
were about 50 or 60 download sites—okay, it is off
YouTube, but about 50 or 60, so censoring or
controlling the internet is very difficult. You have to
provide a counter-narrative, and one of the ways we
have tried to do that is to set up a counter-narrative
hub that proactively identifies those and provides a
counter-narrative when one emerges. We have been
doing that with a whole range of Awlaki videos as
well as other ideologues.
Lorraine Fullbrook: Thank you. It is interesting that
you have put gangs in, if you like, the list that you
would be fearful of radicalisation.
Chair: Thank you. This is the start of our journey.
We have had one session; this is the second session.
You have given us very clear and very eloquent
testimony. The question for the Committee over the
next few weeks is why do mild mannered people, for
example in a place like Leeds, who work in the
mainstream, strap bombs to themselves, end up in
Luton, then in central London and blow up British
citizens, some of whom are Muslims? I think that is
the journey that we want to take, and we want to find
out what the causes are. We have a conference in
Leicester on 13 December, where we are exploring
the issues of universities and other institutions, but if
you think of anything else that is going to be helpful
to this Committee, and we like thinking outside the
box, please write to us. Please come to the conference
in Leicester, but also please write to us with your
ideas.
We want to get to the bottom of this issue, and the
Committee is keen to have a thorough analysis of
what is going on, and at the same time, we want to
engage with the communities. I represent 10,000
Muslims in my constituency. I have 37 mosques in
Leicester East, and I can’t go to every one of them,
so through yourselves and the networks you have,
please tell them of the Committee’s work. We want to
be fair and open and transparent and we want to
produce a report that people can read that is going to
be of value to the country. Thank you all very much
for coming today.
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Witnesses: Dr Matthew Goodwin, University of Nottingham, and Mike Whine, Community Security Trust,
gave evidence.
Q182 Chair: This is the fourth session of the
Committee’s inquiry into the roots of radicalism.
Could I refer all those present to the Register of
Members’ Interests so the interests of all members of
this Committee are noted.
Good morning, Mr Whine and Dr Goodwin. Can I
start with a question to both of you about the extent of
far right extremism. Do you think it is on the increase?
Dr Goodwin: Thank you, Mr Chairman, thank you to
the Committee for inviting me along. I think when we
talk about far right extremism we need to
acknowledge that there are quite different types. At
broad level we can identify three types. We can talk
about the organised far right political parties, for
example the British National party. They contest
elections; they are registered with the Electoral
Commission. We can talk about a second type of
non-electoral forms of mobilisation such as the
English Defence League, which does not contest
elections. Then we can talk about the ultra far right,
which is more prone to violence; groups, for example,
like the Aryan Strike Force that do not contest
elections, have very small memberships and pursue
direct action tactics.
When you look collectively at this movement, then
we have seen a growth in membership particularly
over the last 10 years—parties like the BNP recruiting
approximately 12,000 to 14,000 members, the second
and third types having markedly smaller
memberships. So we have certainly seen a growth in
membership. We have also seen a growth in terms of
public support at elections, so when seen as a whole I
think this movement is becoming far more significant
in British politics, but it is also becoming far more
diversified. Ten years ago the majority of far right
groups focused explicitly on elections. Today we now
have a varied far right with groups actively avoiding
elections and pursuing more confrontational and
provocative tactics. I think that is something as well
to be noted.
Q183 Chair: Do you think that there is an organised
threat from the far right or are these individuals
acting alone?
Mike Whine: Can I just add a comment to what Dr
Goodwin said, which is that there is a shift away from
formally constituted organisations like the National
Front or the BNP to social networks—those that use
cyberspace to organise. So that is another aspect to be





that is only coming from a small number of people,
but it is a very severe threat and it is not just in the
UK. It is Europe-wide and European police forces and
their security services are reporting on this on an
annual basis. So the threat is coming from
organisations and also from individuals, who may not
be connected to organisations in a formal sense.
Q184 Chair: Is this a terrorist threat?
Mike Whine: Yes, there is indeed a terrorist threat. As
you may have read in the latest Prevent report, Britain
currently holds 17 far right activists in prison for
terrorist offences, and in some of those cases, the
plots—of course they were all foiled—were very
serious. In one case the chap was preparing a ricin
bomb, which is advanced technology. In another case,
the chap who was convicted had access to an
enormous, in fact one of the largest, collections of
firearms and explosives ever found. One should not
belittle the far right’s capacity to engage in really
serious terrorism and, if you look within Europe
generally, then there have been even more serious
cases. You may want to talk about Breivik later on.
Chair: Yes, we will be coming on to that.
Mike Whine: In 2005 there was a plot to blow up the
Swedish Parliament and kill Swedish youth, which
was foiled by the police. Another plot in Munich
would have decapitated the German Government.
Q185 Michael Ellis: Good morning, Mr Whine and
Dr Goodwin. Further to those answers, do you feel
that far right extremism should be treated as a terrorist
matter or do you feel that it could be treated as a
criminal matter—a public order type situation—and
do you think that distinction makes any difference
when one is discussing preventative strategies?
Dr Goodwin: I think I would go back to my first point
that within this very broad, diverse movement there
are very different types. Terrorist activity is terrorist
activity, and we could not consider an organisation
like the British National party or an organisation like
the English Defence League necessarily terrorist
organisations, even though individuals who have been
associated with both of those movements have been
imprisoned and associated with violence. So I think
we need to take account of the varied nature of this
movement, but also the fact that these different types
of far right extremism that we now have in Britain are
pursuing very different strategies.
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The EDL at the moment is primarily seen as a public
order issue, primarily because of its march and grow
strategy. What is less studied at the moment, I think,
is the political challenge that the English Defence
League is attempting to mobilise; that it is mobilising
support on anti-Islam, anti-Muslim platforms. By
simply branding, in this case the EDL, as a public
order issue, it might be that we are missing the
political dynamic to this. At the moment I don’t feel
that we are getting to grips with the grievances on
which the EDL explicitly are mobilising. The BNP, on
the other hand, is a formal political party that contests
elections and is losing support, both in elections and
among its own members, and can really only be
treated as an elected party.
Q186 Michael Ellis: So do you think the scale of the
threat is sufficient from far right extremism to justify
a special radicalisation strategy, a specific strategy?
Mike Whine: The issues that they are complaining
about are not necessarily the same as those that
concern other extremist groups, so they have to be
treated each as a separate case, I think. The EDL is a
public order issue at the moment. Electoral support
for the BNP and the National Front has declined
enormously in the last couple of years. But the threat
of terrorism is something that has to be treated as a
terrorist threat and therefore policing has to be
proportionate and focused on those different types of
threat. So to characterise it all as a terror threat or a
public order threat I think is not necessarily accurate.
Dr Goodwin: If I could just quickly come in there.
The issue, particularly over the last 10 years, is that
we have focused greatly on Al-Qaeda or AQ-inspired
terrorism and the Prevent agenda, and attempts to
counter radicalisation have focused mainly on Muslim
communities and this openly violent form of
extremism. I think that has left a noticeable gap and
something that needs to be addressed far more
sufficiently than it is at present, the simple reason
being that we have seen, not only in Norway but also
in the cases that Mike has just mentioned, the
potential for violence within the far right. I think even
though far right parties and movements like the EDL
are not overtly violent in their ambitions to the same
extent that AQ-inspired groups are, I would make a
case that this movement contains the potential for
violence. It gives its followers a specific set of
narratives that under certain conditions validate the
use of violence.
Mike Whine: If I can just add, I think you could see
the far right as, if you like, a recruitment pool from
which terrorism might emerge in much the same way
that extremist Islamist groups provide that reservoir
and provide the conveyor belt process that may lead
to terrorism if somebody is not diverted in one way
or another.
Q187 Steve McCabe: Dr Goodwin, you have
described supporters of the far right as being largely
less educated, working class men living in the north
and Midlands towns. Do far right extremists share the
same characteristics as those people you have
described as supporters of far right political groups?
Dr Goodwin: What we have done over the last five
years at the universities of Manchester and
Nottingham is run a series of surveys of far right
voters, for example, people who vote for the British
National party or the National Front. You have picked
up on some of the key findings, which include the
ageing base of support for these traditional far right
parties. The base of support for the BNP, for example,
is much older than the base of support for the National
Front in the 1970s. However those traditional parties
are quite different from what we might loosely term
the new far right movement, with the English Defence
League. We now know that that is drawing on a very
young, predominantly working class demographic,
which would suggest that it has more potential over
the longer term than the British National party, which
is struggling to recruit support.
However, when you look across those supporters, they
are united through a heavy preoccupation with
immigration, profound levels of concern over the
effects of immigration on British society, high levels
of dissatisfaction with all of the mainstream parties
and anxiety over the role of Islam and British Muslims
in wider society. So there are a set of motivations that
unite those supporters even if their demographics are
quite different.
In terms of far right extremists—the guys on the real
ultra end of the spectrum—not enough systematic,
longitudinal research has been done to paint an
accurate picture of who they are, how they come to
be radicalised, to what extent those pathways compare
to radicalisation into AQ-inspired groups, and to what
extent their social profile is similar to those who
become recruited into AQ groups. There simply is not
enough research in that area, either in Britain or
elsewhere in Europe.
Q188 Steve McCabe: Would that be the same in
terms of trying to understand what motivates these
people? Is there insufficient research to know the
motivation? Some of the interests are the same, as you
have said, but the motivations of extremist groups
may be different from far right, quasi political groups.
Is that fair?
Dr Goodwin: Yes. I would warn against attempting to
create a model or explanation that encompasses both
AQ-inspired terrorism and far right extremism. I
would warn against that for the simple reason that
comparing members of two very different
organisations who seem to have recruited quite
different types of supporters, in terms of their
demographics and attitudes, would lead us up an
unproductive path.
Q189 Alun Michael: You referred a moment ago to
unaddressed grievances in the radicalisation
programme. That is something that has been referred
to in relation to Islam-related terrorism and you
referred to it in terms of right-wing radicalisation.
Could you explain that a little further?
Dr Goodwin: In terms of the unresolved grievances?
Alun Michael: Yes.
Dr Goodwin: In terms of the supporters that we have
looked at, at least, they are primarily concerned about
immigration, rising ethnic and cultural diversity in
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British society and in particular the role of Islam and
the presence of Muslims in British society. Clearly, a
lot of legislative action has been taken on those issues
and a lot of work has been done in Westminster on
those issues. I think the problem is that the vast
majority of far right supporters are so dissatisfied with
mainstream parties, and so distrustful of the political
system generally that they either refuse to believe
anything is being done or they simply take the view
that what is being done is insufficient.
The reason why that is potentially significant over the
longer term is that, when we look through the
accounts of individuals like Anders Breivik, for
example, or when we interview far-right extremists,
having done so over the course of about five years,
you get a sense from a lot of these supporters that
when they perceive that mainstream parties are not
doing enough on these specific issues they start to
search for alternative actions and strategies. In
Breivik’s case it was a sense that the radical right wing
Norwegian Progress party was not making sufficient
progress on immigration and the presence of Islam in
Norwegian society. Also in the British case we can
similarly see very high levels of dissatisfaction among
far right supporters. So it is not the case that these
grievances are unresolved. It is also a sense that they
just don’t have enough faith in extreme politicians
and parties.
Q190 Alun Michael: I am sorry, perhaps I was not
clear enough. I thought you were referring to
grievances. There are three separate things, aren’t
there? There are grievances that may relate to
something genuine—poverty, social exclusion, for
instance. There is what I would describe as opinion
not shared, if the majority view in the country does
not share the opinion. The third thing is ideology.
Could you separate out the extent to which each of
those is important in the categories that you refer to?
Dr Goodwin: Sure, yes. Mike wants to come in as
well. It is very difficult because I would also add into
that mix perceived grievances, that the supporters of
the far right may not necessarily—
Alun Michael: I thought that came into the second
category, an opinion that is not shared.
Dr Goodwin: Right. It is not a typology that is
familiar to me. It is not something that I would like
to try and pigeonhole some of my research into, but
the thing I would focus on is that, for supporters of
the far right, it is not only direct grievances that are
motivating their commitment to this movement, it is
also perceived grievances. They might not be shared
by sections of the mainstream, if we want to call it
the mainstream, but these perceived grievances,
particularly around the perceived threat from
immigration and the perceived threat from Islam, are
consistently emerging as the most powerful predictors
of who supports this movement.
Q191 Alun Michael: Yes, I am sorry, but what I am
trying to get at is that, if somebody is poor or
unemployed or whatever there are specific
measurements that can indicate whether there is a
problem. If there is a perception of things, which
might not be shared by wider—it is not pigeonholing,
it is trying to get to some sort of definition of what you
are saying. Those are both different things to ideology,
aren’t they?
Mike Whine: They are, but I am not sure that the
factors you mentioned such as poverty are really
important within these two sets—far right extremism
and—
Q192 Alun Michael: If I may, I was picking up the
word “grievance” that was used by both of you and
trying to ask what was behind that.
Mike Whine: Well, certainly both sets promote a
grievance strand very strongly and, as you have heard,
the grievance within the far right, and particularly
among these populist, extremist parties like the EDL,
is that Government is failing by allowing mass
immigration and so on. That is a different sort of
grievance from that promoted by Islamists and by
Jihadi terrorists, which is that Muslims are oppressed,
that the West or Christians or Jews are out to defeat
Islam. In this way they oblige and legitimise violence,
but the grievance strand is really quite strong there
and possibly even stronger. I would suggest, although
it is just a feeling rather than having direct evidence,
that it is possibly even a stronger element within their
radicalisation than it is within the far right.
Q193 Nicola Blackwood: You mentioned, Dr
Goodwin, that there has not been sufficient research
to identify exactly who is being radicalised within the
far right. Mr Whine, you recognise that perhaps there
is a move towards social media as a location for
recruitment. In our evidence so far there has been a
suggestion that the prime fora for Islamist recruitment
are the internet and prisons, with perhaps universities
also being a location. So I wonder if you have found
any specific fora that are locations for radicalisation
in the far right.
Mike Whine: Facebook is one, but there are any
number of far right sites that tend to be
trans-European rather than just UK, associated with
Blood & Honour and groups like that, through which
events are organised and people exchange ideas. So,
yes, there are specific ones pertaining to the far right
just as there are to Jihadi terrorists.
Dr Goodwin: I would also add that the internet is
absolutely key but not the complete story. Referring
back to those different types of far right extremism,
I would, again, warn against trying to describe this
movement as a movement. It is very varied, but
parties like the BNP would focus heavily around
physical meetings. Groups like the English Defence
League would focus heavily around demonstrations
and rallies and also online activity, in particular where
you have their supporters going only to a small
number of websites for their news and information,
so-called narrow casting, and not having any other
sources of news and information to dilute that. But
then with the ultra extreme right wing and the smaller
groups that I mentioned, you might put more emphasis
on, for example, music concerts, across Europe with
the pan-European skinhead music scene. So, different
fora across different movements.
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Q194 Nicola Blackwood: Are you of the view that
attempts to control online radicalisation would be
realistic, given the nature of the networks that are
available?
Mike Whine: No, it is totally unrealistic. The internet
is just too big. What you can do, of course, is monitor
it and issue takedown notices if material is broadcast
that contravenes legislation or incites hatred, and that
happens and it happens regularly. It can be monitored
and there are Government agencies and police units
that deal with this so that they can use it for
intelligence gathering. But to control it, no, the
internet is just too big to control.
Q195 Nicola Blackwood: What about specific
institutions? You have mentioned the music scene, but
with our evidence on Islamism we have had specific
comments about universities, mosques and prisons
being particular locations for recruitment. Are there
equivalent institutions for the far right?
Dr Goodwin: Again, there is not really enough
research that has been done in Britain or elsewhere in
Europe. Having done the vast majority of research on
individual recruitment to the far right myself, I am
painfully aware of the inadequacy of that literature
and that evidence base.
It is also quite difficult to compare these two types of
movements. On the university campus, for example,
Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism among some sections, a
small section of a particular population within a
university, may be seen as more legitimate than far
right extremism that, on the whole, particularly in its
white supremacist forms, is heavily stigmatised in
wider society and is not really seen as something that
is necessarily latched on to a legitimate grievance.
I would warn against trying to find a location where
radicalisation takes place on the far right. What I
would focus on is the extent to which, unlike in
previous years, far right organisations are more
actively attempting to connect with citizens, whether
online or offline. Compared to in the 1990s and 1980s,
they are now far more active. They have a far more
developed internet presence than many mainstream
political parties. So that supply side is something that
deserves greater attention.
Mike Whine: If I could add, there is lots of evidence
that Schengen, which has allowed free movement
within Europe, and the internet combined have
facilitated co-operation and liaison across Europe by
far right small extremist groups. They meet
continuously and some of the rock concerts are a
venue for them to meet and plan, and there are reports
by European Security Services that talk very
specifically about these venues being used to
exchange ideas and to plan activity. So you have seen
events organised by small far right groups in Europe
that have transferred from one country to another
because of that facility.
In terms of Islamist recruitment, then certainly the
internet is very important, and universities are
important. Prisons, well, certainly there is evidence of
radicalisation in prisons, but when you move on to
terrorism you have to have human intervention. There
is perhaps one case, that of Roshanara Choudhry,
someone who was completely radicalised on the
internet, and there doesn’t appear to have been human
intervention. In all other cases, somebody intervened
to say, “You’ve been radicalised, now let’s take you
on and this is how you make a bomb” or “This is
your target”. Normally you need human intervention
as well.
Q196 Nicola Blackwood: You are not aware of far
right radicalisation within prisons specifically.
Mike Whine: I’m not aware of it, no.
Dr Goodwin: I wouldn’t be surprised if it takes place
but I wouldn’t identify it as a major arena of
radicalisation.
Q197 Nicola Blackwood: Is it just that we haven’t
been looking into it?
Dr Goodwin: Possibly.
Q198 Chair: Your league table would be No. 1, the
internet; No. 2, events, rock concerts; No. 3—
Dr Goodwin: For the far right, yes.
Chair: Yes. No. 3 would be universities. Is that No.
3?
Dr Goodwin: Not the universities for the far right, no.
Mike Whine: It’s meetings, international meetings.
Q199 Chair: If we were to go on to try and find some
of these websites, what key words would you type in
to find them?
Dr Goodwin: If I was doing some research on
exploring links and things I would be looking at—
would you like specific websites?
Chair: Yes.
Dr Goodwin: I would be looking at forums like
Stormfront. I would be looking, if I was interested in
the European scene, at Gates of Vienna. I might be
looking at the Brussels Journal. These were both
visited by Anders Breivik, for example. I might be
looking at Four Freedoms.
Mike Whine: There was, a few weeks ago, an
international far right rock concert to which people
were going from all over Europe and that had a
website. It was passed on to the police because it was
thought that people from Britain might be going to
that. Whether they did or not, I don’t know, that is not
my area. But certainly that was a website that
advertised those and I can pass it on to the Committee
in due course. I have not brought it with me.
Q200 Chair: Yes, that would be very helpful. But
this sounds a little esoteric. You need to know
somebody who knows that these websites exist, but if
I was typing in a keyword and I had just started to get
involved in this area, what would the words be?
Mike Whine: No, I think you wouldn’t get very far.
Some of these are passworded sites as well. So just
googling rock concert would not get you very far.
Chair: Is not enough.
Mike Whine: As you heard, Stormfront and similar
far right internet websites might provide an
introduction, but often this goes on a much narrower
basis, one-to-one or one-to-several passage of
information.
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Q201 Lorraine Fullbrook: Can I ask, have you done
any research into the gang culture in the far right
recruitment process and how much that plays a part
in it?
Mike Whine: Something that is common to both types
of extremism and terrorism is what the American
academic, Marc Sageman, called the “bunch of guys”
paradigm, which is the socialisation process within a
small group that can produce terrorism. In other
words, a small group of people sort of egg each other
on and it is not really gang culture, it is social
interaction within a small arena.
Dr Goodwin: But those arenas can be incredibly
varied. I can remember interviewing some of the most
active supporters of the far right who were heavily
involved in their residents’ association. This is by no
means something that is anchored in youth gangs;
perhaps more so maybe in the United States, where
that is more of an issue, and particularly among
sections of the militia right, where that perhaps is
more at play. But in Britain of all the people I have
interviewed over the years I have not met one who
was open about being a member of a gang or made a
reference to being a gang member.
Q202 Mr Winnick: Mass murders were carried out
in Norway. There have been reports that far right
extremists in Britain had links with the mass murderer.
Can you give us any information whether such links
existed?
Mike Whine: The links seem to have been mostly in
Breivik’s head rather than in any other way. He was a
Facebook friend of EDL, it is believed. He said he
had come to Britain to an EDL demonstration, but
there is no hard evidence.
Mr Winnick: He had come to Britain?
Mike Whine: Yes, but there is no hard evidence he
actually did. Others may have it but I have not seen
it. Breivik was shunned by Norwegian and Swedish
far right groups because they thought the things he
was saying were going too far. He was very much a
one-off, a lone wolf, if you like.
Q203 Mr Winnick: Do you consider that there could
be in other European countries, including our own,
almost a repeat of extreme right wing elements like
him?
Mike Whine: Absolutely, much more so. I mentioned
earlier that Breivik’s case was a copycat of a plot in
Sweden, where a small group of Nazis planned to
bomb the Swedish Parliament and kill young people.
Their plot was foiled by the Swedish police. A
German plot to blow up the re-opening of the Munich
synagogue, which was attended by Johannes Rau, the
Federal President, and half the German Cabinet,
would have decapitated the German Government. The
European Security Services’ annual reports and the
Europol annual report, which looks at terrorism, report
all of these on an annual basis. There are any number
of plots that are far more serious than we have seen
in this country.
Q204 Mr Winnick: You have already referred to the
17 people in prison for far right activities, who clearly
were a great danger to the country.
Q205 Dr Goodwin: If I could add just two quick
points. Prior to Norway, both the London
Metropolitan Police and also the Department for
Homeland Security had warned of an increasingly
violent turn within their respective far right cultures.
If we go back to the Copeland bombings in London
or if we think about Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma,
the far right has consistently demonstrated an ability
to enact mass violence. But one point I would like to
add is the need to take more seriously the potential
for a spiral of violence between different forms of
extremism. What I mean by that is something that we
have not seen since Northern Ireland, which is the
potential for far right extremisms to enact violence
or confrontation against, for example, an AQ-inspired
group, to bomb a mosque or something of that nature
and then for that action to be retaliated. It wouldn’t
really take too long for a spiral of violence to emerge.
Before Norway I think that would have been
dismissed as alarmist and speculative, but having seen
a noticeable shift in far right blogs over the last five
years, a shift towards more confrontation, more
provocation and the cases that Mike mentioned of
individuals who have been arrested planning acts of
terrorism, I think these all point towards the
conclusion that the far right is becoming far more
confrontational and willing to engage in violence.
Q206 Mr Winnick: Mr Whine, I wonder if I could
ask you this question in light of your involvement
over many years, including at present, with the Jewish
community. When one passes synagogues and Jewish
schools and the rest, it is quite obvious that security
measures are taken—there are guards and the rest—
which I wouldn’t have thought would have occurred
from, say, 1945 to the 1960s or the early 1970s,
though I could be wrong. Do you believe there is a
particular danger to the Jewish community and from
where?
Mike Whine: It is not me, it is Governments who
know that there is a particular danger to Jewish
communities and their institutions. I published a book
recently on terrorism against Jewish communities
around the world and we were able to find 427 cases
of terrorist plots against Jewish communities, many of
which had been foiled, but a lot of which had not
been. The threat comes from different directions
and—
Mr Winnick: That is what I mean, not just from one.
Mike Whine: It is not just from one. Probably the
greatest threat is from the global Jihad movement, that
is AQ and its followers and affiliates, and a number
of plots have been foiled in Europe in the last 12
months by Al-Qaeda against synagogues, and also in
America. That is the biggest threat, and they have
bombed synagogues in Tunisia and in Morocco and
carried out any number of successful terrorist attacks
around the world against Jewish institutions. That is
the first area of threat.
The second is from Iran and its surrogates, and again
a number of successful terrorist attacks against
synagogues and Jewish institutions by Hezbollah,
several by Iran itself—by the Government, who have
a history of carrying out acts of terrorism against their
perceived enemies. The third is from the far right. In
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the 1960s and 1970s there were also attacks from the
far left. One thinks of Action Directe in France and
the fighting communist cells in Belgium. They
attacked synagogues.
Q207 Steve McCabe: I wondered, if we go back to
that for a second, in the case of attacks by Jihadists or
Hezbollah, how much are those attacks really directed
at the State of Israel and Jewish synagogues or
whatever used as a proxy, whereas in the case of the
far right it must be a different type of attack? Is that
fair?
Mike Whine: No, it is not. Let me explain. In the
minds of certainly the Islamist groups and Iran, there
is no difference between Israel and its institutions and
Jews and their institutions. There are any number of
quotes I could give, which are published in this book,
from leading Al-Qaeda ideologues where they talk
specifically about attacking Jewish institutions and
Jews. It is not for them an attack against Israel, it is
an attack against Jews and their institutions.
The far right is much less subtle. It is against Jews or
Muslims or, in the case of some recent cases of far
right terrorism, it is against the State and the
institutions of the State. But certainly the threat is very
real from these different directions against Jewish
communities and it is understood by Governments and
that is why Governments encourage security against
synagogues and indeed assist Jewish communities to
organise that security.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Sir Norman Bettison, ACPO Lead for Prevent Policing, and Assistant Chief Constable John
Wright, ACPO National Prevent Coordinator, gave evidence.
Q210 Chair: Sir Norman and Mr Wright, first of all
my apologies for keeping you waiting to give
evidence. Can I start, Sir Norman, with the deep
condolences of this Committee to the family of Mark
Goodlad, and indeed to your police force, for the
tragedy that occurred on 24 October. For this young
police officer to die on the hard shoulder in Wakefield
must have been a terrible tragedy and it shows the
huge amount of work and sacrifice that our police
officers do on a daily basis on behalf of the people of
this country.
Sir Norman Bettison: I appreciate that. It shows the
dangers, not just in dealing with criminality and
terrorism but also in providing general support to the
public and keeping them safe.
Chair: Indeed. Please pass on our condolences to his
family.
Sir Norman Bettison: Thank you very much indeed.
Q211 Chair: There is probably no other policeman
in the country who has as much experience on these
matters as you have. I think that when you last spoke
about the threat of Al-Qaeda you said that the big
bad wolf was still Al-Qaeda but that the police were
knocking over right wing extremists quite regularly. If
you were to weigh up where the threat is coming from
at the moment, what would the balance be?
Q208 Mr Clappison: The attacks can come out of
the blue and they are indiscriminate against Jewish
individuals, Jewish groups, Jewish communities.
Mike Whine: Indeed, and in fact I would add
something else, which is that when there is tension in
the Middle East, either between Israel and its
neighbours or tension generally, you see the overspill
against Jewish communities, and that is measurable.
When, for example, Israel went into Gaza a couple of
years ago there was a spike in anti-Semitic incidents
in the UK.
Q209 Mr Clappison: Yes, and there was an attack as
well, a few years ago now, against a Jewish
community centre in Argentina. Is that not right?
Mike Whine: It was a devastating attack against the
AMIA building in Buenos Aires, which killed 95
people. That came directly from the Iranian
Government, but they used local surrogates.
Chair: Dr Goodwin, Mr Whine, thank you very much
for coming to give evidence to us. Obviously our
inquiry is ongoing. We have a major conference in
Leicester on 13 December.
Mike Whine: We are aware, yes.
Chair: If you are able to come along and join us that
would be wonderful, but also if you have other
information that is going to be helpful to the
Committee that we haven’t raised today with you,
please do let us have it and your books would be
gratefully received. Thank you very much.
Sir Norman Bettison: The truthful answer is that the
threat can arise from either end of the spectrum. I
will speak in shorthand about issues that the previous
witnesses have much more experience than me to
comment on, but it seems to me that the right wing
terrorist—if I can focus on that person rather than the
EDL affiliate or BNP supporter—still operates as a
lone wolf and beneath the radar, to some extent,
whereas the Al-Qaeda-inspired threat usually has, but
does not exclusively have, some third-party
intervention in terms of encouragement or a supply
line of material or know-how. As I said, not
exclusively because we remember Nicky Reilly and
Andrew Ibrahim, who were pretty much self-starters.
The reason why I talk about it in those terms is that
to apportion the threat is a fool’s errand because today
or tomorrow it could be from either end of the
spectrum and then that end of the spectrum, would
seem to have some ascendancy. Actually the threat is
there at both ends of the spectrum, but they are
different in structural terms and in terms of their
connectivity to a wider cause.
Q212 Chair: In February 2010 you said that the
Government’s plan to tackle violent extremism would
take 20 years to bear fruit. I think your words were
these, “I think it is a generation of treatment to prevent
the infection spreading and I think that it will take us
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20 years”. That is a very long time. Why is it going
to take so long?
Sir Norman Bettison: I still believe that. I see it as
not a threat from an organisation. At international
conferences, there are other states under other
jurisdictions who believe that the assassination of
Osama bin Laden and al-Awlaki is the way of
defeating the threat that we face. My belief is that the
Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism has created an
atmosphere. If I follow the sort of infection theme
through, it has created a set of germs that spread and
that morph into other things and infect the minds and
the culture. What is required is not a new law
enforcement effort to defeat those who represent the
current threat but a sort of all-Government approach,
including education, local authority, and youth
outreach workers, to challenge the prevailing
messages of hatred that might infect people for many
more years to come.
What I was trying to do was call to arms a whole-
Government approach to deal with someone who
might be a terrorist 10 years from now by challenging
views, challenging attitudes, challenging ideas at a
school level. I have to say that is not a job for the
police. What I am not proposing is that the police
ought to go around policing ideology, but somebody
ought to be challenging inappropriate attitudes and
behaviour.
Q213 Chair: Three of the 7/7 London bombers came
from West Yorkshire.
Sir Norman Bettison: All four were born there and
three still lived there.
Q214 Chair: You obviously looked at the reports and
you have considered what happened and presumably
the mistakes that were made in not preventing them
from doing what they were doing. Do you think that
we now know what action to take in order to prevent
such activity? Have we learnt the mistakes?
Sir Norman Bettison: I think we have learned good
practice. That is not the same as could it ever happen
again, could the person go beneath the radar or go
unchallenged in the way that the four 7/7 bombers
were. I think that could still happen, but we have
learned good practice. Let me just take one of those,
Hasib Hussain, an 18-year-old who blew up the
number 30 bus that we all remember the graphic
images of. There were questions about poverty and
deprivation being at the root of radicalisation. He
came from a very successful family. He was third
generation, British born, his brothers were very
successful in business. He was very integrated, played
sport to a high standard with multi-race and multi-
faith teams, he was a model pupil at his secondary
school and had no previous convictions, so nothing
really for the police to get a handle on—
Chair: But he had been writing in his exercise
books that—
Sir Norman Bettison: I was just coming to that point.
He’d been writing in his exercise books for a number
of years about the glory of Al-Qaeda. What we have
learned since that time is that if there is a challenge,
if there is an intervention—and in a formal sense that
is done through the work of the Channel scheme, but
intervention has informal manifestations as well as
formal ones—if people are challenged, if the school,
if parents, if other interveners are employed and go to
work, the challenge can cause people to step back
from the edge of extremism that might become violent
extremism that might become terrorism.
Q215 Michael Ellis: Good afternoon, Sir Norman
and Mr Wright. We have heard of some conflicting
evidence about the impact of Prevent policing on
relations between the police and the Muslim
communities, so I would like to ask your view on the
impact of policing on the relations between the police
and Muslim communities.
Sir Norman Bettison: My view is it has been more
positive than harmful. The person I would lean on to
make that case in a more objective way than I could
is Professor Martin Innes of Cardiff university, who
was commissioned by the Government in 2010 to
revisit a piece of work that he did immediately after
the 7/7 bombings. He looked at the level of
community engagement, the sense of belonging that
Muslim communities felt and the impact that the 7/7
bombings had had on the relationship between police
and communities and Government and communities.
He returned to that work in 2010–2011 and I was just
looking for one of the quotes from that. He said:
“Compared to the first study, new research found that
Prevent policing has matured and evolved in terms of
processes and practices. A greater awareness of risks
and vulnerabilities and increased capacity and
capability to respond proactively, reactively to the
risks, threats and vulnerabilities and the community
reactions to Prevent policing are much more complex
and much more positive than much media and
political rhetoric would suggest.”
Q216 Michael Ellis: So you are generally happy with
the situation as far as the Prevent policing strategy
is concerned?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes.
Q217 Michael Ellis: Thank you. Have you employed
any lessons learned from British experience in
Northern Ireland to inform Prevent policing
strategies?
Sir Norman Bettison: We are working with our
colleagues in PSNI on the development of the Prevent
agenda because they have a great deal of experience
of community engagement and community
intervention. I will give one example of an informal
link. Before I do that I ought to say, in direct answer
to your question, that while we have compared notes
neither side believes that there is much to learn about
the nature and the manifestation of the problems that
we face. They are different in nature.
Q218 Michael Ellis: Are you referring to the
sectarianism?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes. What we did very locally
is that when EDL were due to visit Bradford, which
had the potential of being inflammatory and possibly
leading to disorder, we had two lines of preparation.
One was to prepare for the event and the
consequences that might flow from it; the other was
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to prepare the community. We went to our colleagues
in Northern Ireland to learn about the work that they
have done in the marching season, in terms of
working with the community and giving information
and reassurance. We employed some of the tactics that
we brought back from Northern Ireland. So there are
specific opportunities, but generically they don’t
mesh.
Q219 Michael Ellis: Just briefly, there has been a
decision to discontinue some funding, in light of the
economic situation, of counter-terrorism intelligence
officers from the Prevent budget. What do you have
to say about that? Do you support the Government
in that?
Sir Norman Bettison: What I have always said is that
we will be successful in Prevent policing only when
it is mainstreamed. Currently 258 specific posts are
funded around the police forces of England and
Wales, compared to 132,000, so it is not significant.
Michael Ellis: No.
Sir Norman Bettison: Counter-terrorism intelligence
was a specific label that we gave to a type of work.
Actually the label got in the way because it sounded
as though counter-terrorism intelligence officers, who
wore a uniform and worked in the community, were
somehow spying. So we dropped the term and
morphed and merged the activity. But does Prevent
policing rely on those 258 funded posts? I don’t think
it does. It is a handy pump-priming, but we have to
mainstream the business of prevention.
Chair: Thank you. Mr Wright, please feel free to chip
in. I know you may feel that the questions are not
being directed towards you but if you want to add
anything please feel free to do so.
Q220 Mr Clappison: Do you have any contact with
the EDL themselves about these marches? How do
they respond to concerns that people naturally have
about the inflammatory nature of their matches and
the police time that is wasted as a result of them?
Sir Norman Bettison: That is their purpose. I believe
their purpose is to be provocative. So, yes, we are in
touch. It has absolutely no effect in terms of
ameliorating their behaviour.
Q221 Alun Michael: On the Prevent element, you
talked about mainstreaming and you said that the
work—you have referred to Professor Innes’ work in
showing its effectiveness—needs to be mainstreamed.
Can I just be clear, is it being mainstreamed?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes, it is.
Q222 Alun Michael: Are you satisfied that the police
forces that are involved with this activity are well in
place with that mainstreaming?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes, for my part. I am in the
fourth largest police force in the country, but what
goes on in my police force is replicated elsewhere.
Prevent policing relies upon neighbourhood policing.
Q223 Alun Michael: So the work will continue, but
perhaps the label does not?
Sir Norman Bettison: Exactly.
Alun Michael: Mr Wright was nodding at that point.
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: Yes, absolutely.
The work that goes on in West Yorkshire is replicated
across the whole of England and Wales. I personally
visit neighbourhood policing teams throughout the
country. They are briefed on some of the signs they
ought to be looking for, and on who to speak to within
communities to make sure we have communication,
and we go out and check that that is the case. Having
specific, designated officers does reiterate and reinvent
the issue time and time again, because neighbourhood
policing officers have a whole host of concerns on
their day-to-day business so it is extremely important
that they get up-to-date intelligence and they also get
an up-to-date route to channel their concerns back into
policing organisations.
Q224 Alun Michael: Going to a less clear title, you
referred to the Channel programme. When I saw that
initially I was not sure whether it referred to Kent or
the Bristol Channel, but there we go. Do officers have
the ability and the knowledge to be able to identify
those at risk of radicalisation, and is that programme
working satisfactorily in your view?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes, it is. It started off as a
pilot programme, rolled out to 12 police forces in the
country that are at particular risk. It is about to be
rolled out in January 2012 to every police force in the
country. There have been, in the last three years, over
1,500 referrals to the Channel programme. Over 50%
of those have come from police officers, but a large
minority of about 40% have come from other areas—
schools, youth outreach, health and so on. It is a
phenomenally successful scheme in that what we do
is consider at a multi-agency level what the most
appropriate interventions are, given the behaviour that
has been exhibited, and what we will do is monitor to
make sure that the interventions have been successful.
Thus far not one of the 1,500 people that have been
intervened with have been arrested for any terrorist-
related offence.
Q225 Alun Michael: This identification is not easy.
The two young men from Cardiff who recently ended
up on the border between Kenya and Somalia, and
thank God have been returned safely, were regarded
by those who knew them best, as well as by the
relevant agencies, as very unlikely candidates for this
sort of activity. So identification is not easy, is it?
Sir Norman Bettison: No, it is not. There are some
things such as travel, particularly if it is out of the
ordinary to exotic parts of the world, that trigger a
suspicion. Growing isolation from family and friends
or a new-found group of friends who conduct their
friendship in secret are all things that we talk about
with Muslim communities around the country. We
undertake some very successful tabletop exercises
with communities in general, to get them to
understand what to look for.
Q226 Alun Michael: You referred specifically there
to Muslim groups and, in the information that we were
given up to the end of 2010 the faith of 67% of the
Channel referrals was recorded as Muslim, with 26%
“not known” and 7% as “other”. To what extent does
Channel then work on faith-based interventions?
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Assistant Chief Constable Wright: Can I just come
back to your earlier point? I think it is an important
distinction. Channel is designed for those people who
are at risk of crossing over to violent extremism. You
gave an example. We are talking about Prevent here.
There is obviously a whole host of capability when
people travel abroad and pose a much more serious
risk to national security. I think that is an important
point. It is based on risk, so we will have people
referred to us through the multi-agency panel. They
are all assessed on the risk they pose. Whether that is
Islamic extremism or right wing extremism, they go
through that risk assessment process.
Q227 Alun Michael: Yes, I am sorry, but I was
asking to what extent you used faith-based
interventions. For instance, I heard one of the imams
in Cardiff very recently talk in a very clear way to a
large number of people about how to make the
distinction between the messages of Islam and the
distortion of the messages of Islam. That sort of work
is a part of the solution, is it not?
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: It is.
Alun Michael: That is why I was asking whether that
is an explicit part of the strategy.
Sir Norman Bettison: It is an explicit example of
referral routes that can be taken.
Q228 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would like to ask you
both about the future of Prevent funding, or Prevent
policing. The Government has said that the Office for
Security and Counter-Terrorism and the police must
stop funding what is termed extremist organisations.
Do you share the Government’s concerns about this?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes, and we also share the
Government policy. I quite understand that it is
unacceptable to spend taxpayers’ money on
organisations or on people who have expressed views
that seem to be at odds with the values of the general
populace. However, I need to say that we will work
sometimes—not funding—with people who might
have unpalatable and unacceptable views, so long as
they are not criminal views, as a credible route to
connecting with younger people.
Q229 Lorraine Fullbrook: Who would be an
example in that category?
Sir Norman Bettison: There are people who have
been to the edge of terrorism and violent extremism.
I think the Committee has already heard from the
Quilliam organisation. Quilliam makes no secret of
the fact that the people who lead that foundation are
people who have gone through Hizb ut-Tahrir and
other experiences to the edges of terrorism and have
come back. People like that, and for Quilliam read a
dozen other people who volunteer their services, who
have made that journey and come back, are very
powerful intermediaries. We use similar people in the
drugs arena. We have even used similar people in
child exploitation arenas. People who have made the
journey but come back seem to have more to offer in
stopping people making the journey in the first place.
But we do accept the Government policy that there
must be no funding of organisations that either are
extremist or have leaders who have expressed
extremist views.
Q230 Lorraine Fullbrook: Mr Wright, would you
share the Government’s stand?
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: I totally support
what Sir Norman has had to say, so I don’t think there
is anything additional to offer. We have conveyed that
message to all forces throughout the country.
Q231 Mr Clappison: We have taken evidence
already that the main fora for Islamic radicalisation
are the internet and prisons; that a significant amount
of radicalisation is taking place through universities,
but less than on the internet and in prisons. Would you
agree with that general broad-brush categorisation?
Sir Norman Bettison: I would agree that they are all
relevant. I think it would be a mistake to see them as
being the exclusive or predominant domains that you
have to examine.
Q232 Mr Clappison: You mean there is some
interaction between them and other sources as well?
Sir Norman Bettison: There are. The internet does
seem to feature in most, if not all, of the route to
radicalisation.
Q233 Mr Clappison: You have the Counter-
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which has been
making progress. Can you give us an idea of what
further progress remains to be made in this area?
Sir Norman Bettison: It is a pebble thrown into the
World Wide Web ocean, frankly. It consists of a dozen
or so officers. It has only been in operation since 2010.
There have been 2,025 referrals to date. About 10%
of those, just shy of 200, have led to websites or web
pages being taken down, almost exclusively
voluntarily once we have pointed out that they have
come pretty close to a section 58 or section 2 offence
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. So it is
successful.
Interestingly, you were talking about Breivik with the
previous witnesses. We have looked at Breivik’s
manifesto. He is a Norwegian national, but a UK
national putting that manifesto out in the UK, would
come very close to crossing, probably cross, the
threshold of committing a criminal offence under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act. So if that had been
referred into us as part of the 2,025 we would have
investigated who was posting these things and
whether we could take it down so it was not an
influence on others. I think that the referral site needs
greater publicity and, of course, the greater the
publicity about the site and what the unit can achieve,
the more the capability and the capacity to respond.
Mr Clappison: To inform about what is going on.
That is very helpful.
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: Can I just add a
couple of points?
Mr Clappison: Yes, please do.
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: On your first
point, I think it is unhelpful to try and prioritise all of
those routes into radicalisation because they do vary
over time and some are much more influential at
certain times. In relation to the internet, as Sir Norman
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-02-2012 11:36] Job: 017436 Unit: PG03
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/017436/017436_o003_db_111101 Roots corrected.xml
Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 45
1 November 2011 Sir Norman Bettison and Assistant Chief Constable John Wright
has said, we see the use of the internet in most of our
investigations and it is an area that I have no doubt
will feature more and more. You asked what more we
can do. I think there is a need for greater collaboration
with academia to learn best practice, and with internet
companies because they tend to have the most up-to-
date technology, and also for international co-
operation. Most of these websites are hosted outside
the UK jurisdiction so international co-operation is
extremely important. So if there are areas this
Committee would like to recommend, particularly
with the internet taking it forward, they will be the
three key priorities.
Q234 Mr Clappison: On a slightly different point,
we also had a memorandum from the Federation of
Student Islamic Societies talking about the effect of
activities on campus and the effect of relationships
with the police and the security services. What are
your feelings on that? Do you think there is room for
improvement in working with them?
Sir Norman Bettison: That concern does not match
my personal experience. In Bradford, Leeds and
Huddersfield, we have uniformed officers who are
permanently attached to each campus and they speak
at Freshers’ Fair; they have a broad remit. They talk
about dangers generally—safeguarding—but they also
build relationships with student unions and with the
faculty to ensure that they are in a position to spot
radical extremism in any guise, wherever it happens.
Q235 Mr Clappison: I am only putting to you the
evidence we have received from them by way of a
memorandum. That suggests to me perhaps they need
to get in touch with you and have a discussion with
you. Have you had an approach from them? It is the
Federation of Student Islamic Societies.
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: Yes, we tend to go
through the National Union of Students, but we have
got very strong relationships with a lot of universities.
It is not a universal picture throughout the country,
but I could give you some very good examples. The
Universities of Derby and Northampton recently have
been very engaged, and have taken products that we
have produced to have discussions with students.
Q236 Mr Clappison: If a representative of a
students’ society came to you and wanted to have a
discussion, you would be willing?
Sir Norman Bettison: Yes, absolutely.
Assistant Chief Constable Wright: Yes.
Q237 Chair: Before you go, Sir Norman, as you
know there is a proposed new landscape of policing.
I am not sure whether you have had the opportunity
of seeing the Committee’s last report into the new
landscape when we suggested that counter-terrorism
should be something that should be taken out of the
Met’s jurisdiction and placed in the new National
Crime Agency. You talked about the need to make
sure that these issues were mainstreamed. What is
your view on that?
Sir Norman Bettison: My general view is that the
current infrastructure and network that has been built
since 2005 is very robust and very effective. It has the
advantage of local ownership and a local focus,
coupled with national co-ordination. So what I would
like to say, dodging the question, is that whatever we
come up with must enhance national co-ordination. I
think that is the whole purpose behind the question
raised by the Committee, but it also must keep, in my
professional view, some local ownership. For
example, at the moment the Met is significant in terms
of the national co-ordination and yet there are four
CTUs—counter-terrorism units—in key parts of the
country that maintain in their own way, through their
own tentacles, a connection with every individual
police force and local authority district. I think that
that is important and I worry about a shift to the Met
or to the National Crime Agency damaging that.
Chair: Sir Norman, thank you very much. Mr Wright,
thank you very much. I am sorry to have delayed you.
We will no doubt be in touch with you again.
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Witnesses: Professor Geoff Petts, Universities UK, and Nabil Ahmed, President, Federation of Student Islamic
Societies, gave evidence.
Q238 Chair: Mr Ahmed, Professor Petts, thank you
very much for coming to give evidence to the
Committee today as part of the Committee’s ongoing
inquiry into the roots of radicalism. I ask all those
present to refer to the Register of Members’ Financial
Interests, where the interests of Members are noted.
I start with a general question about universities to
both of you. Is it more likely that, if you go to
university, you are radicalised as a result of that
experience?
Professor Petts: Clearly that is a very key question.
We acknowledge the threat, but we do not see
evidence to support that, I am pleased to say. We are
all very aware that, in an environment where we have
a very large cohort of young, potentially vulnerable
people, there is a threat, and we are very alert to that
threat. We are acutely aware of our responsibility to
those young people.
Nabil Ahmed: Good morning. I would like to thank
the Committee for inviting us here today.
As the national democratic body for Muslim students,
we are on the ground. We feel, see and understand
what is happening on the ground, but we have also
engaged on this issue of campus extremism. We held
a conference on campus extremism just a few months
ago, which provided me with some of the views here
today.
There are various myths surrounding the issue of
campus extremism. There is far too much
sensationalism and insufficient evidence or expertise
in this wider discussion. I disagree with the notion
that you put forth, Chairman. There is a notion that
campuses are hotbeds of extremism, which is
unfounded in the expertise and experience of the
sector and the experience of students. There is a
notion that, just because these people who have gone
on to become terrorists went to university, in some
way those two things are connected—the evidence
suggests not. There was an independent inquiry, for
example, into the case of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, who went to UCL, which showed that
he was not actually radicalised at university.
Q239 Chair: Do you agree with the Government that
some extremist organisations target universities with
the aim of recruiting students to support their cause?
The Government is quite clear in its Prevent strategy





Professor Petts: Certainly. Again, I would argue that
the evidence we have is largely circumstantial. We
recognise a very strong responsibility to all these
people. The university is a place where young people
are exposed to a wide range of views and opinions,
and as academics, we want to encourage them to be
exposed to those views and to challenge those views.
Q240 Chair: Sure, but are groups going in there to
try and expose them in a different direction?
Professor Petts: That is always a threat, but we are
responsible institutions, and it is our responsibility to
ensure that we have practical protocols in place to
ensure that those groups that step across the line are
not allowed into our institutions.
Q241 Chair: How do you find them? Do you have
secret lecturers—secret policemen—who do that?
Professor Petts: I am from the university of
Westminster, and maybe a little context here would
be helpful. We are a metropolitan and cosmopolitan
institution in the west end of London. We have
students from 157 different countries. It is a diverse
community. We are not a simple campus that we can
put a brick wall around. We encourage people to
engage with us, but we have put in place a very
detailed set of protocols and procedures to ensure that
the engagement with these big issues—and we want
to encourage our students to engage with these issues,
because we believe that the educational process will
actually, to put it crudely, turn people off some of
these ideas and certainly not encourage them to
engage. We have a detailed process in place and we
check all organisations that wish to become engaged
with our students, and we draw a line.
To give you an example, I believe that we are one of
the few universities in the country where, in the last
year, we actually said no on one occasion, and we
engaged with an organisation on another occasion to
change the programme of events to ensure that our
students were not exposed to radical extremism.
Q242 Chair: In the last year, the university of
Westminster, with people from about 170 different
countries, has only said no to one organisation.
Professor Petts: One organisation. With another
organisation, we had a discussion and changed the
programme to ensure we were confident about it.
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Q243 Chair: Mr Ahmed, the Home Secretary has
criticised your organisation for failing to challenge
extremism sufficiently. Why have you not challenged
it in the way that the Home Secretary thinks you
should?
Nabil Ahmed: I disagree with the Home Secretary’s
comments here. I think her approach has bought into
the sensationalism surrounding this discourse. Our
organisation—the democratic national body of
Muslim students—has continued to engage with the
past three Universities Ministers, security experts, and
universities on the issue of campus extremism. In fact,
I pointed to the lack of research and evidence on this
very issue. Together with the last Government, we
initiated research into not only the welfare of Muslim
students, but issues of extremism. Unfortunately,
when this Government came into place, that research
was cancelled.
Further to that, we held this conference on the issue
of campus extremism, and the voice from the sector
was different to what was coming from our Home
Secretary. We very much believed, if I may say so,
that universities are this very special place in society
where status quos can be challenged and where ideas
can be built, within the scope of the law. It is very
important to protect that.
Q244 Chair: Do you have examples of extremist
groups who go to universities and target them with
the specific desire to recruit students to their cause, or
do you have no examples of that?
Nabil Ahmed: What I am saying here is that we have
to be specific about what we mean by extremist.
Q245 Chair: You be specific; what do you mean by
extremist?
Nabil Ahmed: Absolutely. If we have people who are
willing to cross the line of the law, whether it be issues
relating to incitement to hatred, or incitement to
violence, we have laws for that, and I will be the first
to report those people to the police.
Q246 Chair: Have you come across evidence of
that?
Nabil Ahmed: I have not actually.
Q247 Chair: You have come across no evidence that
any organisation has gone to any university where
your organisation exists to recruit people for an
extremist cause.
Nabil Ahmed: Where these cases should happen,
these are matters for the police. What is our role—
Q248 Chair: You have no evidence—we understand
the police responsibility, but you have no evidence.
Nabil Ahmed: There is no evidence to suggest that
there is recruitment, but that should not stop us—we
shouldn’t bury our heads in the sand. What we should
be doing is saying, “How can ideas be challenged on
campus in the first place?”
Chair: Yes, we understand.
Nabil Ahmed: If I may, Chairman, that is where I
believe that Islamic societies—
Chair: We will come on to that, Mr Ahmed, but the
answer to my question is that you can come here with
no evidence that any organisations are targeting
students in order to recruit them to their cause.
Nabil Ahmed: To be specific in my answer, I have not
come across organisations, in my experience,
recruiting to people who are going to cross the line of
the law, no.
Q249 Steve McCabe: Professor Petts, can you tell
me what is happening with the “Freedom of speech
on campus” proposals? You talked about your own
university, but in terms of implementation across the
country could you give us a brief update on the
progress that has been made?
Professor Petts: Thank you very much for asking that
question and thank you for, in doing so,
acknowledging the important step that Universities
UK has made in undertaking this project and
producing this report because one of the points that
arose from this was the genuine engagement across
the country of the majority of institutions in this issue.
From my perspective, if I may just divert for a
moment, it is an issue around location. In London the
biggest threat that I see is not on campus. It is the fact
that small groups of students in London can get
together very easily with small groups of students in
other institutions in London because of the number of
institutions in close proximity. Four students in
Aberystwyth, with all respect to Aberystwyth, might
be rather isolated. Four students in Westminster can
talk to four students at SOAS or four students at
King’s College very, very easily. So there is that issue
around the institutions within their region which is a
big issue that is picked up by the Prevent strategy.
That is a very positive move.
Specifically on freedom of speech, we are required
under the Education Acts to engage in freedom of
speech and that involves identifying where the
boundaries to freedom of speech are in relation to all
the other responsibilities that we have relating to
harassment, public order offences and so on and so
forth—providing a safe environment. What this report
has done is refocus institutions’ minds on how we
deliver practically freedom of speech in an
environment that is safe and fair to all people.
Q250 Chair: That is helpful. If you circulate copies
we should be most grateful. Mr Ahmed, do you have
anything to add?
Nabil Ahmed: I would add to that by reiterating from
the outset, beyond this issue of extremism, the
important role that universities hold in generating
ideas and thoughts. The other extension of freedom of
expression is that it enables radical ideas to be debated
and challenged on campus as well. If I could extend
to your earlier question Chairman, about beyond the
remit of the law, I have debated with people on
campus who use anti-Muslim rhetoric or anti whatever
it may be rhetoric, but that is within the framework of
the law. I think that is very important to preserve so
that ideas can be challenged in the first place.
The second thing I would add is the recent comments
by the Deputy Prime Minister and also the Home
Secretary, who cancelled, for example, our event—
an aspiration careers event with Muslim students; she
refused to engage with Muslim students when we
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invited her to our conference so that she could discuss
these issues—and the cancellation of the research we
initiated under the last Government. These examples
show that, despite our continued engagement with
security experts and with the Government, the
Government’s attitude is that they are not willing to
engage with students on the ground but also not
willing properly to research and evidence these very
issues. That is a real concern for us.
Chair: Thank you that is very helpful.
Q251 Dr Huppert: We talked quite a bit about
Islamist radicalisation but, as I think you touched on,
that is not the only direction of radicalisation that can
happen. I should be interested to know whether you
would have similar comments about other radical
groups—the far right or whatever we may be talking
about—and also comments on some of the no
platform ideas that have been floating around for some
of those groups.
Professor Petts: I go back long enough to remember
animal rights issues, which I guess is the one issue
where most institutions have had most experience in
the longer term. Clearly the whole issue about violent
radicalisation is of particular concern and extends well
beyond any particular issue there. But let us identify
that violent radicalisation is different from the
development of radical ideas by young people. Violent
radicalisation is a particular threat to everybody and
we are very aware of that. Freedom of speech really
addresses the boundary between freedom of speech to
debate an issue and incitement to commit. That really
is the important development we have made in the
university sector in addressing where that boundary is.
Nabil Ahmed: If I may add to that, I am actually very
much in agreement with the professor’s comments
here in relation to radical discussions about animal
rights or whatever it may be. They too exist on
campus. I think there has been a disproportionate and
unfair focus on Muslim students, and I think this
attitude is actually quite unhelpful, especially when
we consider that we want all members of society to
be able to contribute properly, rather than pushing
them and segregating them in the first place.
I want to say as well to this Committee that I think
this discourse needs us to realise and remember when
we were students. Students wake up in the morning
thinking about their lectures and their careers. They
do not wake up in the morning thinking, “I am going
to go and stop some terrorists today,” and other such
things. This discourse needs some reality checks as to
what is actually happening on the ground in relation
to students.
Q252 Michael Ellis: Mr Ahmed, you have made
some rather partisan points in relation to the Home
Secretary, and you have alleged that the Government
do not have any policies to deal with the issues, which
I would clearly suggest is nonsense, but I want to ask
you something specific. It is not just the Home
Secretary whom you have been rather keen to criticise
this morning. I am looking at an oversight report by
Lord Carlile, who—I think I am right in saying—
worked extensively with the previous Government on
matters not unconnected to this. He states in the report
that “there is evidence too that The Federation of
Student Islamic Societies [FOSIS] could and should
do more to ensure that extremists will be no part of
any platform with which it is associated, alongside
demonstrating that it rejects extremism.” Do you
accept that the federation could and should do more?
Are you doing anything to demonstrate that you do
indeed reject extremism, or do you disagree with Lord
Carlile as well?
Nabil Ahmed: Thank you for the question, actually.
Our organisation has continued to denounce and
condemn extremism. We are a 50-year-old democratic
Muslim organisation and that is not an issue for us.
Q253 Michael Ellis: If you would just answer the
question, please, because Lord Carlile does not agree
with you. He says in his report that you have not, so
can you please tell me your answer?
Nabil Ahmed: Absolutely. We disagree with the
comments made here. Extremism is no part of our
work. Our work is to do with charity, with
engagement between different faiths, with leadership
projects and so on and forth. I need to add to, if I
may, to finish my answer, that I did not say that the
Government have no policies on the issues, rather that
the approach has to be based upon research and
freedom of expression on campuses, so that ideas
actually can be challenged. It must also be one that
engages with Muslim groups on campus, which
provide a definitive mainstream on campus through
which ideas can actually be challenged. You asked
about our work on this issue. I will reiterate it again
for the benefit of the Committee and the public here.
Chair: Briefly.
Q254 Michael Ellis: Even more briefly than the
Chairman expects. I would just like you to tell us how
you demonstrate that you reject extremism, because
that seems to be a fundamental concern of Lord
Carlile. How do you reject extremism?
Nabil Ahmed: We have continued in our statements
and in our work to condemn extremism. It seems like
quite a loaded and unfair question to actually question
that in the first place. Let me add to that. I hope that
our work—whether it be a conference on tackling
campus extremism, which included Government
security experts and universities, whether it be our
research on this issue, whether it be actually providing
these definitive mainstreams on campus, through
which extremism can be challenged, or whether it be
our engagement with the Government on this issue—
provides sufficient basis to say not only that we are
doing enough, but also that the Government could
learn from the higher education sector about how
extremism can and should be dealt with.
Q255 Michael Ellis: So what advice do you give
your members in relation to engaging with extremist
organisations? Do you give any advice to your
members if they come to you on that subject or even
if they do not come to you?
Nabil Ahmed: I will give you an example. I am a
member of this, so I can perhaps relate to this first
hand. I have personally debated with people. Whether
it be with anti-Muslim, quite fierce political views on
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campus, our encouragement is one that both engages
with people on campus and debates with real critical
discussion the serious issues. That is our approach, as
opposed to isolating groups.
Chair: Thank you, Mr Ahmed. That is very helpful
indeed.
Q256 Mr Winnick: I have one or two questions on
extremism. If someone comes along to a meeting and
argues that according to their interpretation of Islam—
I speak as a lifelong atheist, but we know all religions
have extremists—stoning to death is perfectly justified
for adultery and homosexuality, would you consider
that extremist?
Nabil Ahmed: We had a speaker last week at one of
our events. He noted the importance of respect for
homosexuals. That is what our speakers are actually
speaking about. That was just a few days ago. Radical
ideas, again. Let us step away from the myths and
into reality.
Q257 Mr Winnick: We can have respect for
homosexuals, heterosexuals, all kinds of sexuals. The
point is that if someone came along and said, unlike
the speaker you mentioned, that those who engaged in
adultery or homosexuality—to repeat myself—should
be stoned to death in a perfect Islamic society, would
you consider that to be extremist?
Nabil Ahmed: I consider that that is not really
relevant to our work today and something that needs
to be challenged and criticised.
Q258 Mr Winnick: Yes or no?
Chair: Mr Ahmed, please answer Mr Winnick’s
question.
Nabil Ahmed: Personally I consider that an extreme
view relating to Britain today. It is an idea that needs
to be discussed and challenged, as with anything. I ask
the Committee again really to look at the questions it
is asking, and turn to the reality of campuses. This
sort of rhetoric and discussion does not actually
engage and reflect the realities on the ground in
campuses.
Q259 Mr Winnick: That is your opinion. One other
question if I may. Say someone comes along—and
they may have done—and says that the systematic
extermination of millions of people due to their racial
origin during the Second World War, the holocaust, is
a lie, a hoax, a Jewish conspiracy to take over the
world and so on, would you consider that to be
extremist?
Nabil Ahmed: Yes, I consider that not only to be
extreme but hurtful to my Jewish brothers and sisters.
It was not only Jews who were targeted during the
world wars; there were Muslims and many others.
Let’s remember that. Again, I ask the Committee to
turn to the reality. Some of this rhetoric is distinctly
unhelpful. This is why I ask the Committee to
ensure—
Q260 Mr Winnick: What rhetoric? Those who argue
of holocaust denial—you are saying that is unhelpful?
Nabil Ahmed: I think it is unhelpful and needs to be
debated and challenged. Of course it does.
Chair: I can assure you the Committee is engaging
with students on campuses. We have a conference at
De Montfort University on 13 December. I hope you
and colleagues will come and participate in that
engagement. We are not just holding sessions in
Westminster.
Q261 Mr Clappison: A quick question: can I clarify
what you said a moment ago regarding gay people? If
you heard somebody advocating extremist views of
intolerance, including violence, against gay people,
you would condemn that. Yes or no?
Nabil Ahmed: The law is very clear on these issues
and we stick to the law, of course. Violence against
homosexuals? It seems such an obvious question, that
violence against homosexuals is something that
should be condemned. Of course, that is against the
law. Incitement to hatred and incitement to violence?
Chair: Order. We can only have one person asking
the question and one person answering at a time.
Q262 Mr Clappison: You would condemn that
yourself, yes or no?
Nabil Ahmed: Yes. Incitement to hatred or violence
against any group is against the law. Of course, it
should not only be condemned, but be a matter for
referral to the police. It is such a simple thing.
Q263 Lorraine Fullbrook: I would like to ask
Professor Petts about the Prevent strategy and how it
should be put into action in the university sector. The
National Union of Students has argued that there is
insufficient guidance available to universities to
enable them to work alongside Government to
mitigate the threat of radicalisation. Would you agree
with that? What specific information would be useful
and in what form?
Professor Petts: Prevent is a very important strategy.
We are particularly pleased with the revised version,
which has removed what we felt was an unhelpful
specific reference to Muslims in the original version.
The current version of Prevent focuses on the regional
agenda and looks at sharing best practice and
guidance, and is very helpful. I know from a survey
undertaken by Universities UK that the vast majority
of institutions has signed up wholeheartedly to the
Prevent strategy. It is also important because it
encourages universities to engage with their
communities, the police and the security authorities.
That engagement is how we collectively understand
and evaluate a threat. The Prevent agenda has re-
catalysed universities’ contributions to seeking
practical solutions to these real problems.
Chair: Mr Ahmed, as briefly as you can.
Nabil Ahmed: As final comments, I would say the
following: yes, the approach needs to move forward
in taking the issue of campus extremism seriously, but
based on evidence and firm research, which does not
exist at the moment. I ask the Committee to consider
that engagement with Muslim students on the ground
should happen and should not be ignored or criticised,
because that sends out a distinctly unhelpful message.
Research projects should be considered, but you
should also consider the great work, despite all the
challenges, that Muslim students continue to do on the
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ground, whether it is raising hundreds of thousands of
pounds in charitable work, better careers and so much
more. You are all very welcome to any of our events
as first-hand witnesses.
Chair: We all have a constituency interest. We all
have Muslims within our constituencies, including
Muslim students, so we are all able to engage on this,
especially Nicola Blackwood, who must have a lot of
students in Oxford.
Q264 Nicola Blackwood: Professor Petts, it is good
to hear Universities UK welcoming the role of
universities in Prevent and in combating the threat of
radicalisation at universities, but there was initially
some concern about the practicalities of how this
would work. Could you give the Committee some idea
of how you think this might work in practice? In
particular I wonder whether it would be tutors,
pastoral staff or administrative staff. Who would be
engaged in making sure that the oversight is working
properly? What kind of guidance are you thinking
about providing to universities on how to implement
some of the proposals in Prevent?
Professor Petts: Recognising the time, I will give you
a few quick bullet points.
The regional agenda is the key. Universities UK is
made up of a large number of organisations of
different size, shape and location, and they each
require a different answer to your particular question.
In my own institution, we have a team of four
individuals who are responsible for ensuring that we
have the right protocols in place, that staff are aware
of those protocols and that students are aware of those
protocols through the student charter, which explains
to students their responsibilities to each other and the
staff’s responsibilities to them. It is very much a
personal development process framed around clear
guidelines through these protocols.
Q265 Dr Huppert: There were some comments on
the improvements to the Prevent strategy. Would
either of you want further changes to the Prevent
strategy? If so, what exactly would be on your wish
list?
Professor Petts: The current Prevent strategy is
relatively new. We are engaging with all academic
institutions, communities outside our institutions, the
police and other authorities. There is a lot of learning
to do, and Universities UK is ensuring that there are
appropriate forums for the universities to get together
to learn from each other. We have a long way to go,
but I have been very impressed by the commitment of
my colleagues to this agenda.
Nabil Ahmed: I present the same thoughts to you as
I did to the Home Office when I met them on this
security issue.
My brief five-point plan is as follows. First, there
needs to be serious evidence-based research on this
issue—cancelling research will not help. Secondly,
freedom of expression is crucial to challenging ideas
on campus and it must be upheld. Thirdly, groups such
as Islamic societies are, and have been shown to be,
part of the solution to building a definitive mainstream
on campus that challenges ideas. Fourthly, we have
the law, which must be upheld and stuck to—that is
our line. Finally, engage with Muslim students and all
students, their societies and democratic
representatives on the ground. We need to view
Muslim students like all students, not through the lens
of security. Dame Stella Rimington, the former head
of MI5, said that there has been this politicisation of
our national security discourse. I think that that has
very much fed into this discourse here today. Let’s
view students as human beings who wake up in the
morning, want to go to their lectures, want better
careers and so forth, not through the lens of security,
because I think that this all together will provide us
with a more definitive, accurate and effective means
of challenging extremism.
Chair: Thank you, Mr Ahmed. I assure you that we
on this Committee do treat students as human beings.
Some of us have children who are students and
therefore we are well aware of what students have to
go through. I also assure you that we are going to De
Montfort university on 13 December. We would like
to see as many universities and as many students there
as possible to engage with the Committee in our
report. We will not be publishing our report until we
have got the widest possible view. If there is anything
that you have missed out today that you feel will be
helpful to the Committee, please write to the
Committee and we will follow it up.
We are most grateful to both of you for coming here
and for giving us your views on this very important
issue. Thank you very much.
Nabil Ahmed: Thank you.
Professor Petts: Thank you.
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Witnesses: Michael Spurr, Chief Executive Officer, Richard Pickering, Head of Security Group, and
Ahtsham Ali, Muslim Adviser, National Offender Management Service, gave evidence.
Q266 Chair: Mr Pickering, Mr Spurr and Mr Ali,
thank you very much for coming in to give evidence
to us today. This is our ongoing inquiry into the roots
of radicalism. As you may know, on Monday,
members of the Committee will be trying to get into
Belmarsh prison to see some of your people, and we
look forward to speaking to some of the inmates.
There has been criticism in the media that inmates
such as Abu Hamza are using the opportunity of being
in prisons to radicalise other prisoners through their
sermons. Do you have any evidence of that?
Michael Spurr: We have some evidence of individual
prisoners who may have attempted to say things or
have indicated views that could attract people to a
radical cause. We have a population in prison who are
there because they are criminal and who would see
themselves as being alienated; therefore, there is an
issue about authority. They are therefore a vulnerable
population for radicalisation, but actually, we work
very hard to address that threat, as we work hard to
address a whole range of threats that we face in
prisons. This is one of them, and one we take
seriously.
Q267 Chair: But how would you know? Presumably,
terrorist offenders will have the ability to meet other
terrorist offenders once inside prisons. How would
you know what they are saying to one another?
Michael Spurr: You cannot know what everyone is
saying to anyone else at every moment of the day, but
we have appropriate systems to gather intelligence.
People talk about what is going on—not just prisoners
in direct conversation with one another, but other
prisoners who hear things within an establishment. We
gather intelligence. We try and identify behaviours
that indicate potential for radicalisation or for other
criminal behaviour within a prison. We encourage
staff and have supported them with awareness training
of the types of behaviour, language and material that
might indicate there is a potential risk. We expect
them to identify those behaviours, to report them, and
then we look to manage the individuals. That is our
approach.
Q268 Chair: You said in the Prison Service Journal,
“That is a major issue for us in terms of how Muslims
feel they are perceived…by society and how they are
managed in prison.” Is it management of the whole





you think are particularly vulnerable to being
influenced by radical preachers?
Michael Spurr: I think both issues are important. We
have 12% of the prison population who are Muslim.
We know from the thematic review undertaken by Her
Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons in 2010 that they
feel more alienated than the rest of the population.
That was what I was referring to. We are very clear
that faith is a positive within prison potentially for
people to change, and we support people of all faiths
in practising their faith.
Q269 Chair: Do you think it is on the increase or
decrease?
Michael Spurr: Is what on the increase or decrease?
Chair: Radicalisation in prisons.
Michael Spurr: It is difficult to say whether it is on
the increase or decrease. Actual evidence of people
who have been radicalised in prison is very hard to
ascertain. We are managing the threat of that. I have
no evidence that it is on the increase. I am very
conscious that there is a genuine threat; that is why
we take action to address that threat.
Q270 Nicola Blackwood: It would be helpful for the
Committee to understand in which prisons and under
what conditions terrorist prisoners are held; which
offenders are classed as international; which are
Northern Ireland-related; and which are domestic-
related.
Michael Spurr: We hold terrorist prisoners in a range
of prisons. We risk-assess individuals rather than
determine that all terrorists will be held in a particular
prison or location. We risk-assess individuals and we
manage them with regard to their risk. The majority
of those who are in prison for terrorist-related
activities are managed within the high-security estate,
because we recognise that their risk is significant. Our
policy in the high-security estate for the majority of
prisoners who require conditions of high security is to
disperse them around five high-security prisons.
Terrorists are generally dispersed and managed within
that population.
However, if we had evidence of individual risk or
attempts to radicalise or create disorder in the
establishment, we would respond to that and we could
manage individuals in tighter security, for example, in
periods of segregation or in close supervision centres,
which have particularly high levels of security. Some
individuals will be managed in such centres because
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-02-2012 11:36] Job: 017436 Unit: PG05
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/017436/017436_o005_db_111122 Roots corrected.xml
Ev 52 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence
22 November 2011 Michael Spurr, Richard Pickering and Ahtsham Ali
they pose particular threats to order or the operation
of prisons, or the potential for wider radicalisation.
We look at individuals. You will see in Belmarsh, if
you go on Monday—
Chair: We are going.
Michael Spurr: Indeed; I understand that you are
doing that. You will see that there are main prison
wings, and there are smaller units, and we manage
people depending on their risk, within the range of
options available to us.
Q271 Nicola Blackwood: I wonder if you could give
us an example of how you would monitor an
individual terrorist prisoner, so that you would pick
up on their potential for radicalising other prisoners.
Would you do spot checks? Would you be checking
the cell? What exactly would be the process that you
would go through?
Michael Spurr: There are a number of things. There
are some things that we would do routinely with all
prisoners, which would include cell searches and
general searching of individuals, in order to maintain
the security of the establishment. Those who are in
prison for terrorist offences would be identified and
known to staff, because of the nature of their offences.
We expect staff to monitor their behaviour routinely
when they are operating on wings and engaging with
prisoners. We expect them to submit security
information reports about anything they see that could
potentially indicate a concern. We would monitor on
that basis. We would review that intelligence at
security meetings and share that with police and then
receive any intelligence that they might have.
Q272 Nicola Blackwood: Is there special guidance
or a special procedure that you would use for this? Is
there some standard way in which you would ensure
that you protected the rest of the prison population, or
do you just put in place a specific procedure for each
individual prisoner?
Michael Spurr: We have standard procedures for
monitoring intelligence and managing security, which
are applied differentially to the risk for individual
prisoners. We expect staff to report security
information about a whole range of things, such as
drug use and risk of escape. We specifically highlight
extremism and radicalisation as something that we
would expect staff to report on.
Q273 Dr Huppert: To follow up on that, what
training do you give police officers on what signs of
radicalisation to identify? You will be aware that there
has been criticism of that by Peter Neumann and
various others. What signs do they look for?
Michael Spurr: Prison officers, you mean?
Dr Huppert: Yes.
Michael Spurr: We have some basic awareness
training when staff are first recruited. We offer some
basic awareness workshops to staff who are already in
post. They focus on a range of things around
behaviours, presentation, how prisoners present, how
they challenge, how they might challenge—for
example, imams, and how they operate. They are also
looking at how prisoners might indicate through their
language a lack of acceptance of accepted norms, how
their attitude might be towards—if we were looking
at al-Qaeda related terrorism—the west, or what their
attitude is to general news items and what type of
material they might be quoting or looking at or
seeking to get access to.
We would focus on the types of relationships that
individuals were looking to foster. Are there particular
terrorism-related offenders, for example, who are
singling out the more vulnerable in the population and
looking to get close to them in a grooming style?
What is their relationship with higher-end criminal
offenders? We ask staff to be conscious of that. We
ask them to look at the types of behaviour that have
been expressed. A lot of behaviour may well be
criminal behaviour. There is criminal behaviour in
prisons, there are hierarchies, there are attempts to
subvert authority, and there are issues around how
people gain status in prison. We look at that behaviour
and what the implications of that behaviour are.
Obviously, we also look at factual things, such as
levels of violence and, where violence occurs, what
links back to other prisoners in how the violence
appears to have been orchestrated.
Q274 Dr Huppert: That is more encouraging than I
have seen it described elsewhere. The flip side is what
training prison officers get in counter-radicalisation to
try to deal with that. Do all officers get training and,
if so, what is it?
Michael Spurr: In terms of counter-radicalisation, our
premise is that one of the first things that we have to
do is address the negative impacts of prison, which
might reinforce alienation and anti-authority views.
The whole decency agenda for us—treating people
fairly and equally, so as not to alienate the Muslim
population, for example—is critical in trying to
counter someone who is vulnerable to an anti-
authority message. We start with that premise.
We have a whole range of things that we are
developing to tackle individuals and counter radical
views. We have been working on an extremist risk-
guidance assessment, which we have now established
and shared with the police. It has been used both
externally and internally. It works through 22 risk
factors that we want to work on with people who are
exhibiting extremist views. We have developed
interventions called healthy identity interventions—
there is a foundation and a plus level—which we have
piloted and are now about to roll out to all terrorist
offenders over the next 12 months in custody and the
community. We are looking to adapt those
interventions to be used also with people who are at
risk of becoming radicalised.
Q275 Dr Huppert: So this is for terrorist offenders
and people who may be at risk?
Michael Spurr: Yes.
Q276 Dr Huppert: Identified how?
Michael Spurr: For terrorist offenders, through
offence, and then for those who are at risk, through
intelligence and the engagement that we have with
individual offenders within establishments in the way
that I have described.
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Chair: Nicola Blackwood had a supplementary to the
previous question.
Q277 Nicola Blackwood: You mentioned in an
earlier answer that there was very little research into
radicalisation within prisons, but I wonder, from that
research, what conditions you felt led to radicalisation.
Is it overcrowding or certain social or psychological
factors? What is your assessment from your
experience within the prison system? Mr Pickering or
Mr Ali may want to come in on that.
Michael Spurr: Yes, of course. I do not think it is so
much things like overcrowding. I would refer back to
my earlier answer. I do think it is about the potential
for individuals who are incarcerated and who
therefore feel anti-authority to have negative
perceptions of society reinforced while they are in
prison and for people to be manipulated because they
are vulnerable in prison. They are looking for support
from others. They are looking in terms of their own
safety. Prisons have always had gang formations and
attempts to operate and survive within prisons. There
is a prison dynamic around that, which could lead to
people who are already criminal moving towards
accepting a more radicalising philosophy. That is what
I think the risk is. In terms of evidence, what we have
seen is that that makes prisons a potential risk for
radicalisation, and we need to counter that in the way
that we operate.
Q278 Chair: Yes. I think that is the purpose of the
inquiry.
Mr Ali, very few of the guards in prison would speak
Urdu or Arabic.
Ahtsham Ali: That is correct.
Q279 Chair: So how would they pick up all this
information and all the wonderful things that Mr Spurr
is talking about? How would they know what they
were saying?
Ahtsham Ali: Within the prison population itself,
Urdu or Arabic are not common languages. It is
mainly English, so the officers will pick that up.
Q280 Chair: Do you mean that Abu Hamza would
give his sermon in English? He would not give it in
Arabic?
Ahtsham Ali: Sorry?
Chair: Would Abu Hamza speak Arabic if he was
giving a sermon?
Ahtsham Ali: He would not be giving a sermon in
prison.
Q281 Chair: But if he was dealing with other
people?
Ahtsham Ali: He would probably be speaking in
Arabic, but when he speaks in Arabic most of the
congregation will not understand the Arabic. All our
Muslim chaplains, when they give their sermons, they
will do so in English with a little bit of Arabic that is
part of the whole sermon anyway, but the rest of the
message—the core message—will be in English and
has to be, because English is the language of the
majority of the congregation.
Chair: Thank you. Mark Reckless.
Q282 Mark Reckless: How do prison officers
distinguish between the moderate Muslim convert and
the potentially radicalised individual?
Michael Spurr: That is obviously something that is
difficult and complex. It is one of the reasons why we
have actually promoted much greater involvement of
imams in the way we operate within prisons. As I said
earlier, we absolutely accept and see faith as
something that is positive, and our aim therefore is to
start from that premise. We now have imams across
the estate who are able to support the staff and who
are able to support prisoners who are seeking faith.
Many prisoners who are Muslims in prison are
Muslims because they are looking for fellowship, for
brotherhood, for safety, for belonging and all of the
things that bring people to faith. That is equally true
for Christians in prison as well. When you are at your
lowest, people seek ways to find a way of belonging,
and that is true. We are focused on the use of imams
to support that and to support staff to understand the
faith and the differences between people who might
be moderate and exploring their faith and those who
are trying to drive unrealistic and unfair—
Q283 Mark Reckless: I wonder if I can ask Mr Ali,
who may have been about to respond in any event,
whether he finds that his imams carry credibility with
Muslims—converted or otherwise—in prison, given
the structure for their appointment by prisons, albeit
with your involvement and advice?
Ahtsham Ali: Yes, very much so. One of the signs for
a Muslim chaplain in prison to watch out for is if a
prisoner is refusing to pray behind him or whatever.
That could be an indicator that something is going on.
He could then explore it further and go to speak to
him one to one. Your earlier question about moderate
Muslims is quite key. Moderate according to whom?
It might be officers on a wing. It is important that we
get this right, that we look at the signs for
radicalisation and that we do not confuse them with
the indicators of good, pious behaviour. Obviously, an
officer on the wing might see someone praying five
times a day and think that that is extreme. Or they
might notice that someone’s beard has lengthened. An
undue pressure from officers or more monitoring
might lead that individual to go more towards the
radicalising philosophy. It is important to make sure
that officers know what to look for. If they do not
know, they should get expert help within the
establishment from the Muslim chaplain.
Richard Pickering: If I might come in on that point.
Just to reiterate the point that Ahtsham was making,
we try not to take a siloed approach to this. We talk
in terms of security departments working jointly with
the multi-faith chaplaincy. Answering your earlier
question about how you distinguish types of
behaviour, we would make it understood that one of
the sources of advice would be the Muslim chaplain
or, alternatively, the seconded police officer. We have
a range of sources of information to get behind what
is being reported.
Q284 Mark Reckless: What do you say to the
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
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and Political Violence, which suggests that you have
not provided effective guidance on this issue?
Richard Pickering: I have discussed Peter Neumann’s
book with him and that was right at its time. It is now
some time since Peter wrote that book and we have
had further conversations with him. I would not speak
for him, but what I would say is that since 2009–10
when he was doing the background work for this and
since 2010 when it was published, we have made
significant advances, not least in the areas of training
and of interventions.
Chair: Thank you very much. Lorraine Fullbrook.
Q285 Lorraine Fullbrook: Just following on from
that, I should like to ask a bit more about the role of
imams in prisons. Until about the last 10 years or so,
imams in prison were regarded with some suspicion.
That changed, and it was realised that imams could be
extremely effective in helping to combat
radicalisation. How do you ensure that extremist
imams are not brought into prison roles?
Ahtsham Ali: All recruitment for employed Muslim
chaplains has to take place through myself. I have to
be present at every single recruitment board and I
have been present at every board for the past eight
years since I have been in post. Each individual has
to have credible qualifications through seminaries,
although there are different seminaries. The problem
is that we do not have a set-up like the Anglican
Church, with ordination and so on. We have different
mechanisms for getting knowledgeable people—
imams. I check all the qualifications of the
individuals. I double check them as well. I have a
database of about 200 imams who currently work for
the Prison Service, both sessional and employed.
Many of them will have been to the same seminaries
as the new candidate, so I double check with them
and ask, “Has this candidate been there and studied
there?” Following that, they have a rigorous extended
interview system. They give a sermon, which has to
be in English. They do a role play and then an
interview. After, there is security vetting for each
chaplain who comes into prison, irrespective of faith.
I am confident that that particular aspect is well taken
care of.
Q286 Lorraine Fullbrook: Thank you, Mr Ali, that
was very interesting. The International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation has been referred to. It has
been suggested that imams should not be regarded as
the panacea for the problems of radicalisation in
prison. Do you agree with that?
Ahtsham Ali: Yes, I do. There are many factors. One
of them is a theological issue, but there are other
factors. I am glad that the interventions we have look
at psychology, placement and various other factors.
Michael Spurr: That is absolutely right. Imams are
important in prisons for the wider issue of supporting
the Muslim faith. But imams alone are not the answer,
from our perspective, to dealing with people who are
potentially vulnerable to radicalisation. I have already
described some of the other measures that we take,
which are absolutely equally important.
Q287 Lorraine Fullbrook: That really brings me on
to the wider range of Islamic schools of thought. Do
you think that if prisoners had more access to imams
representing those wider schools of thought, they
would be less vulnerable to radicalisation?
Ahtsham Ali: I do not think so. I think that on the
whole we are reasonably cohesive in terms of
denominational issues. Attendance at Friday prayers
in some establishments is as high as 95% of Muslim
prisoners. On the whole, the majority will consider an
imam from a different denomination to them as an
imam. But yes, there are a few nuances and, as I have
said, one of the indicators is that you have a
prisoner—we have had this happen—who refuses to
pray behind an imam. These are very rare occasions,
but we then go and find out what the problem is, what
the issues are, why not and so on. It might be an issue,
in some cases, of denominational difference, or it
might be that they say “You are Government imams”,
which is, I think, the point you raised earlier.
Q288 Mr Winnick: Those responsible for the
atrocities of 7/7 and 9/11 in the States obviously
believed that they would go into paradise as a result
of mass murder. How far is it possible from a religious
point of view to persuade those who take their religion
too seriously—religious fanatics or near-fanatics in all
religions—to say that, far from guaranteeing paradise,
mass murder is a terrible sin? How far is that possible
from the Islamic religious stream?
Ahtsham Ali: It is very clear, and it very clearly can
be demonstrated. That is part of the remit of the
theological countering of this extremist narrative. You
do not go to paradise by doing a wrong, even if you,
in your mind, think it’s a right, because justice is
paramount. You cannot kill an individual—an
innocent person. The issue about paradise within the
Islamic context and theologically is there in a battle
situation—a legitimate, just war pursued and
authorised at state level. It is there, and what
extremists do is pick at it and pervert it to include
what Osama bin Laden said in his fatwa, that all
American civilians are targets. He opened it up to any
innocent person being killed which, if you look
classically, is absolutely not there in our theology at
all.
Q289 Mr Winnick: It is argued that part of the
difficulty is that the Saudi Arabian strand of Islam is
so conservative, rigid and dogmatic that it does, in an
indirect way if you like, help potential mass
murderers. Do you agree?
Ahtsham Ali: I think that if you look at the extremist
or terrorist prisoners right across the globe, many of
them started off in that denominational background,
but I have to say that that denomination in itself is not
extremist in that sense. Salafist and Wahhabi scholars
will equally argue that the taking of an innocent life
is absolutely against the core of Islam. To what extent
that denomination plays a role is an interesting
question, and sometimes I think to myself that we
need a plethora of denominational approaches. Some
individuals might be more easily persuaded by
someone from a particular denomination than
someone else.
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Chair: Thank you. Michael Ellis.
Q290 Michael Ellis: Gentlemen, looking at Professor
Neumann’s report, and this follows on somewhat from
Mr Winnick’s question that made reference to Saudi
Arabia, there are recommendations that prison
services should be more ambitious in promoting
positive influences inside prison, and also be more
innovative in their approaches. I am referring now to
the practices in Egyptian prisons, and we have read
something about Saudi Arabian prisons, in terms of
the positive influences that they try to instil inside
prison as a means of de-radicalisation. Presumably,
they are having to deal with greater numbers than us
within their prison system. I am not suggesting for a
moment that their prison system is flawless, because
it certainly isn’t. But they have methods of
deradicalising people that are innovative and
somewhat more ambitious than ours. Do you have any
comment to make about that?
Michael Spurr: I’ll start; Mr Pickering may want to
say something else. The first thing is that we are aware
of the work that is being done in those countries;
indeed, we have looked at that very carefully.
Q291 Chair: Which countries?
Michael Spurr: In Saudi Arabia, for example, and
previously, Yemen and elsewhere. In terms of our
view in determining how to address the issues here,
you’ve got to look at the culture and the experience
of people who are in our prisons in England and
Wales. That’s what we’ve done. We’ve developed
interventions that reflect their experience to try to
address the whole issue about motivation to act in an
extremist way. I don’t think that is any lack of
ambition; I think it’s an appropriate and proper
application of what is required to deal with the issues
that those individuals are posing here. So that’s what
we’ve done. We’ve spent some time looking at and
developing what I think are internationally forward-
leading programmes to address motivation for
extremism.
Q292 Michael Ellis: As far as the innovative
approach is concerned, there is the general
rehabilitative approach that we tend to adopt in
English prisons in terms of all criminal offending, in
the form of education, work experience and so on. Do
you feel—I invite any of you to comment—that
terrorist prisoners require a more tailored approach?
Chair: Mr Ali?
Michael Ellis: Mr Pickering was going to say
something.
Richard Pickering: By all means. It has to be tailored
to the individual in all circumstances. I think it’s
difficult to talk in terms of a blanket approach.
Returning to your first question, absolutely we
understand the approaches that have been adopted in
other jurisdictions and Administrations. We have
worked with international colleagues in developing
the packages that we think are appropriate to our
population.
Q293 Michael Ellis: So you are talking to others?
Richard Pickering: Yes, absolutely. Again, in terms
of whether they need a different sort of intervention
that is tailored to their specific requirements, yes, I
think we’re beginning to develop those specific new
interventions, which are available not just necessarily
to terrorist offenders but to the people with the
mindset that perhaps leads them to offend in that
fashion.
Michael Ellis: I think Mr Ali wanted to come in.
Chair: Please be as brief as possible.
Ahtsham Ali: We have a programme at the end of
December in which we will look at sharing good
practice. We’ve got imams coming from different
countries, organised by the FCO and jointly with us,
to share good practice and how they do it.
Chair: Mr Michael has a final question.
Q294 Alun Michael: Yes. Obviously there is the
issue of the release, first of terrorist offenders and
secondly of people whom you believe might have
been radicalised during their time in prison. How does
the prison service interact with the probation service
at the local level, in making the connections both with
families and the community to which people are
returning? I get the impression, from speaking to the
local services, that you have gone back to a much
better link to community level in recent times? Is
that correct?
Michael Spurr: I think that that is true. All the
terrorist offenders would come out under multi-
agency protection panel arrangements, which, by their
very nature, require interaction between all the
relevant agencies—the police, prison and probation—
on the release arrangements, the support that the
individual gets and the licence conditions that they
will operate under.
Q295 Alun Michael: Could I ask Mr Ali in
particular, is that a question of looking at the attitudes
of families in relation to people who have offended,
and perhaps the way in which they can be
reintegrated?
Ahtsham Ali: It is, but that’s not my specialist area.
Once they go past the prison gate and into the
community, the probation service—
Q296 Alun Michael: Sure. We did have one witness
who suggested that perhaps when someone has
offended, it is a particular issue for Muslim families
to reconnect.
Ahtsham Ali: Often, probation officers and authorities
will ask, what particular mosques individuals can go
to for help with family reintegration. I’ll signpost
them to some imams. I know that there are various
Muslim community organisations that are helping
reintegration.
Richard Pickering: On the second part of your
question, which was about the non-terrorist offenders
who have potentially been exposed to radicalising
influences in prison, that is part of the picture that
would be shared with the multi-agency public
protection partners, so that movement between prison
and the community is as seamless as possible.
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Q297 Chair: Mr Spurr, the Committee will be
visiting Belmarsh on Monday, as I said at the
beginning. We are told that it will take 45 minutes to
get in. I hope that it does not take 45 minutes to get
out, because, since we cannot bring the witnesses to
the Committee, we would obviously like to spend as
much time as possible talking to some of the inmates
there. So anything that you can do as head of the
service to make our arrival and departure as smooth
as possible would help. We would like to leave at the
end, by the way.
Michael Spurr: I will do my best. We obviously have
to go through appropriate security arrangements,
given the type of prison it is, but we will make it as
swift as we can—both in and out.
Chair: Indeed. We may well write to you, because
you have raised a number of points. Even though your
evidence has been very full, it still remains the case
that the Home Secretary is clear that radicalisation
goes on and you are not clear whether we are winning
the battle against radicalisation, although you have
imaginative schemes by which you challenge what is
going on. We may well write to you again before the
end of the inquiry. Thank you very much for coming.
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Witness: Charles Farr, Director General, Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office, gave
evidence.
Q298 Chair: Mr Farr, thank you very much for














Q299 Chair: Excellent. Can I begin then by asking
you a question about the extent of radicalism in the
UK? Is it on the increase? Is it on the decrease? Are
we winning the war against radicalism or is this just
£2 billion, or whatever it is, of public money and we
don’t really know outcomes?
Charles Farr: As you know, I have to preface that by
saying that statistics on this are hard to develop and
hard to come to. However, if we look at the CLG-
sponsored Community Attitude Survey and we
compare the most recent batch of statistics with those
from several years ago, we have seen that sympathy
for violent extremism is declining rather than
increasing. I am told by the people who are expert in
these matters that that decrease is statistically
significant, although clearly—because as you know,
Chairman, we are talking about one or two
percentages here and there—it is risky to read too
much into it. I would add immediately, of course, that
you don’t quite know why those figures have fallen,
and I certainly would not presume that it is because
we are running a Prevent Strategy.
Q300 Chair: Yes. So you cannot give us any figures?
Charles Farr: I can give you—
Chair: Give us some figures; let us feel as if we have
got something out of this private session, since it is
private—that you are giving us some information.
Charles Farr: The figures are public and we quoted
them in the Prevent Strategy, ********************
********************************************
********************************************
So if we ask the question, “Is violent extremism
always or often right?” then across the UK population,
as a whole, about 1% of people will answer, “Yes.” If
Mark Reckless
Mr David Winnick
you ask the question, “Is it sometimes right?” then
obviously you will get a higher number, somewhere
in the region of 5% or 6%. If you poll an age group—
16 to 19—the number who would answer
“sometimes” or “always” goes up together to nearer
20%. In other words, there is a very striking
correlation between age and sympathy for violent
extremism, which I don’t think surprises us but it is
worth noting anyway. Of course there is a degree of
sensitivity about this, as you will appreciate, but if you
look at the responses of different faith groups there are
slight variations, but not particularly significant ones,
between Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Hindu; those
variations are not nearly as great as the variation
between different age groups.
Q301 Chair: So, if you are looking at the fora where
radicalisation takes place—in our inquiry we basically
ask people for their top five—what would be your top
five? We have universities, prisons and so on. If you
were giving us a top five, what would they be?
Charles Farr: I am going to be rather pedantic, and I
apologise for that. In our experience, most
radicalisation does not take place in fora at all; it takes
place in private premises, simply because the people
who are doing the radicalising are now much more
aware of the activities that we are conducting, which
you are investigating, than was the case two or three
years ago when, as they saw it, it was much more
possible to conduct radicalisation in the margins of
religious institutions: mosques, madrassas, and
others, and—
Q302 Chair: It used to be the madrassas, now it is
in the privacy of people’s homes, is it?
Charles Farr: I think there has been a trend. I would
not be quite specific with that, but I think there has
been a trend towards much greater use of private
venues, simply because for obvious reasons they feel
that they are much more secure. If we leave that to
one side, I think we can continue to see some
radicalisation going on in religious institutions but it
is a very small percentage of the total number that we
have in this country, certainly no more than 1% or 2%.
We can see some radicalisation of course conducted
on the internet, sometimes by those institutions
operating in the electronic space. We can see some
related activity going on in higher and further
education, but it is not specifically terrorist-related; it
is about cultivating people into a world of non-violent
extremism. We can see some activity going on in
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charitable organisations, often with the pretext of
raising funds to be sent overseas for good works, for
example to Pakistan or indeed Bangladesh.
I think I would mention those, but I would emphasise
that most of the really significant work does not
happen in those areas, or if it does happen there it
rapidly migrates into a private house where people are
brought together, usually under the excuse of there
being a faith-based meeting, and the discussion
rapidly develops into something much more about
terrorism and the legitimacy of violence.
Q303 Dr Huppert: You are giving us fascinating
evidence, and you did not mention jails, which is,
interestingly enough, where we were yesterday.
It would be interesting to get the full breakdown
of the figures you were giving about support for
violent radicalisation, because I would be interested
in exactly what the questions were and exactly what
that says.
Charles Farr: Yes.
Dr Huppert: One question that immediately occurs
to me: you said that all faith groups were fairly similar
to each other—I am interested to explore that a bit
more—and did you look at people who don’t have a
faith group who are humanists, was that higher or
lower and how does that fit in?
Charles Farr: That is a good question. People were
asked to identify themselves, if they chose to do so,
by their faith group. Off the top of my head, I certainly
don’t know how many people chose not to respond to
that question but it will be in the data.
Dr Huppert: But it would be really fascinating
statistically to see the full breakdown.
Q304 Michael Ellis: Yes, I am also interested in that.
But your analysis of the situation is that in that 16 to
19 age range there wasn’t an awful lot of difference
between a Christian 19-year old or a Sikh one and a
Muslim one, in terms of their radicalisation.
Charles Farr: If you look at the percentages, both for
the population as a whole and for the 16 to 19 age
group, Muslims respond more positively to questions
about violent extremism than do Christians. However,
I think I am right in saying—and again I would ask
you to check the data that we send you—that you can
get Hindus or Sikhs responding more positively even
than Muslim communities, so there is some
variation.1 However, I come back to the point that
the variation between faith communities within age
brackets is not nearly as different or as significant as
1 The witness later clarified that “responding positively” meant
answering yes to the question “Is violent extremism always
or often right?” or “Is it sometimes right?”
the variation between those age brackets
themselves.2
Q305 Michael Ellis: On the point that the Chairman
asked you about the fora and you indicating that it
happens mainly at home, that begs the question, what
are the main ways by which these radicalised or at-
risk individuals come to your attention or come to the
authorities’ attention? If a lot of this is happening in
the home, presumably this is parental influence and
the like.
Charles Farr: Yes.
Michael Ellis: How do you find these people are
coming to your attention in the first instance?
Charles Farr: Statistically, if we look at the sources
of the referrals to the Channel programme, which I
imagine you are familiar with—the programme to
support vulnerable people—the three main sources are
from educational institutes, health and policing.
Sometimes of course parents have phoned policing, so
it is an indirect reference; sometimes friends have, but
those are the three main routes that people are referred
into the Channel programme.
In each case there is obviously a distinction to be
made between where the radicalisation takes place and
where it is most obtrusively demonstrated, and “the
where”, as I have suggested already, is private;
fundamentally private houses, private venues. The
radicalisation of course does make itself felt much
more widely.
Michael Ellis: It comes to the authorities’ attention
through public scenarios, like policing, health and
the like.
Charles Farr: Yes.
Q306 Michael Ellis: Do you perceive there to be a
lack of clarity in what drives radicalisation, and if so
does that inhibit the authorities in the action that they
can take?
Charles Farr: We would always like to know more,
but my view is that over the past few years, based on
intelligence, polling, surveying, academic work,
consultation with other international colleagues in
Europe and elsewhere, I think we have a fairly good
idea about what is driving radicalisation. There are
still questions to be asked—the comparative influence
of the internet and face-to-face meetings of course.
But there is a great deal of data there fortunately,
********************************************
2 The witness later clarified that, according to the survey, from
April 2009-March 2010 (unpublished data), 3% of Muslims
thought it was 'always' or 'often right' to use violent
extremism in Britain to protest against things they judged to
be very unfair or unjust compared to 1% of Christians and
1% of those with no religion. While 6% of Christians said
violent extremism was 'always/often right' or 'sometimes
right, sometimes wrong', a higher proportion of Hindus
(15%) Muslims (12%) and those with no religion (10%)
chose one of these responses. Other analysis conducted by
CLG researchers on survey data from April 2009—
December 2009 (published data) showed that people with no
religion were the only group that were significantly different
from Christians once age, income, social class and other
factors were taken into account. This tells us that while
Muslims and Hindus are, as a group, less likely than
Christians to reject violent extremism, the differences may
be explained by their younger age profile and/!
or socioeconomic profile.
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Michael Ellis: Thank you.
Q307 Mark Reckless: Do the developments in the
Prevent Strategy reflect the changing nature of the
terrorist threat?
Charles Farr: To some degree. I think last year, when
the Government broadened CONTEST—and thus
Prevent too—to deal with all forms of extremism and
terrorism, that certainly reflected the re-emergence of
a very significant terrorist threat in Northern Ireland,
which you are well aware of, and our growing concern
with the extreme right wing. Of course, it made no
sense to have a terrorist strategy in general, or a
Prevent Strategy in particular, focused on one
particular type of terrorism. So yes, I think the change
in threat in Northern Ireland and in the extreme right
did and has determined the range of Prevent work.
Q308 Mark Reckless: I don’t know if it is fair to
characterise that in this way, but my impression is that
there have been shifts in the extent to which the rent
or derivatives of that strategy is focused on simply
violent extremism and narrowly rooting it out where
there is a particular threat, or the extent to which it
has been a broad engagement of softer community
integration–type projects. Have the developments and
shifts in that reflected a change in the terrorist threat
or a change in our analysis of what is the best way to
deal with the terrorist threat?
Charles Farr: The latter rather than the former.
Q309 Mark Reckless: On Northern Ireland, could I
ask whether the drivers of radicalisation are different
than they were before the Good Friday Agreement,
and if so, in what way?
Charles Farr: Not fundamentally, no. I would also
argue, by the way, that I think the drivers are
comparable in type but not in detail to those for
Islamist-related terrorism or even for the extreme right
wing. In other words, there is an ideological
component, which is important, but there is a lot about
personal vulnerabilities that drives people into the
arms of terrorist organisations.
Q310 Mr Winnick: The difference in Northern
Ireland is surely, and always has been, that it is not
done in the name of the Catholic faith. The fact that
the overwhelming majority are Catholics is neither
here nor there because they always claim that it is
not sectarian, although we know from time to time
Protestants were murdered, but of course there were
Catholics and vice versa. Before the atrocities in
Norway, would it not be correct to say there was less
emphasis on the extreme right and that, since Norway,
it has been demonstrated that extreme rightist
elements are quite as willing as Islamists to take lives?
Charles Farr: I think I would take issue with your
last statement. It is certainly the case that there is a
strong extreme right group or groups in this country,
significant numbers of people who would subscribe to
extreme right wing views. However, we don’t see
such a tendency for people who hold those views to
drift into the world of terrorism. Extreme right
terrorism in this country is and remains rare, and there
are no extreme right wing terrorist organisations
operating here in the way that we may have seen in
some other countries overseas.
Q311 Mr Winnick: Yes, but a memo from Mike
Whine—who obviously you know and the work that
he has done—has made reference to the latest
organisation, the EDL, and says that in fact it could
be far more of a danger than previous Fascist hooligan
groups. You don’t accept that?
Charles Farr: I certainly accept that EDL is a
significant organisation and, of course, that it is deeply
troubling in many respects and can cause great harm.
Q312 Mr Winnick: Is it more prone to violence than
other Fascist groups?
Charles Farr: I am less convinced about that.
Mr Winnick: You are or not?
Charles Farr: I am less convinced about that. I am
not for one moment excusing EDL, but it is wrong to
characterise it as an organisation that is sympathetic
towards or remotely interested in engaging in
terrorism because, as far as we know, there is no
evidence for that. It doesn’t make it any less difficult
to deal with. It is very difficult to deal with and very
challenging, but I think we look at it in that way.
Q313 Mr Winnick: We are dealing with the
challenge of Islamists who are willing to cause untold
misery, mass murder and the rest, 7/7, and what they
attempted a fortnight afterwards. In the 1930s, against
Fascism, efforts were made to persuade people by
various means of what was happening in Nazi
Germany. Certainly the left were very vocal, and those
on the right were very vocal about the terror in Stalin’s
Russia, and in the 1950s the Foreign Office had a
special unit, did they not, to combat Communist
ideas?
When we were in Belmarsh yesterday I spoke to a
very articulate Muslim who is not a preacher in any
way; he is being held or charged with theft but is very
articulate as a Muslim—there is no doubt about that—
and possibly could be dangerous; who knows? I said,
if Britain is involved in trying to do its utmost to
undermine Islam—leaving aside the fact that up and
down this country there are mosques everywhere, like
there are Sikh and Hindu temples, and in the past so
many synagogues because of the growing Jewish
community in the beginning of the 20th century
onwards—why did we go to war because of what was
happening to Muslims in Kosovo? He was very
hesitant to agree that that was done for Muslims. How
far can this be pushed—that, far from being anti-
Muslim, this is a country where Muslims have
complete freedom, far more so than in most countries
in the world, and moreover that we actually went to
war for the reasons I have stated?
Charles Farr: I don’t have any doubt that the view
that we are conducting a war on Islam, not a war on
terrorism, has been a very significant reason why
people have gravitated and drifted into terrorist
activities—
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Mr Winnick: Iraq and Afghanistan.
Charles Farr: All sorts of incidents and episodes are
used to justify that claim, including of course Iraq and
Afghanistan but also on a much more tactical local
level; actually counter-terrorism legislation itself is
felt to provide evidence that what we are dealing with,
or what we are engaged in, is the persecution,
humiliation and subjugation of Islam and Muslims,
not counter-terrorist operations. It must be part of our
work to challenge that, and there are all sorts of ways
that can be done. Kosovo is one example. I would
argue that Libya more recently is another. There are
repeated instances where we have intervened to save
Muslim lives overseas for the best of motives.
Getting that message across to people like the man
you met yesterday, and to a group of people who
would rarely read the media that we would normally
work with, is very challenging. That is part of the
work of the Research, Information and
Communications Unit, which you have been aware of.
It is part of the job of RICU to get that message
through outlets, which can and will be read by our
target audience.
Q314 Alun Michael: I take your point, mentioned
earlier, that we seem to have moved to a situation
where radicalisation takes place in private, where one
Muslim leader in my constituency said, “The biggest
problem is Sheikh Google” but there are two aspects,
aren’t there? One is the evidence, which David has
just been probing—how can we counter any evidence
that appears to bolster a terrorist ideology?—but the
other is the ideology itself.
The Prevent Strategy criticises the Research,
Information and Communications Unit, that part of
the Home Office, for using language that risks
“removing the ideological component which it should
be the purpose of that unit to address”. What are you
doing to combat the ideology, to challenge and try to
undermine a persuasive ideology?
Charles Farr: Perhaps I could just say very briefly
what was behind that remark in the appraisal of the
strategy. In its early days, RICU had done a lot of
polling in communities in this country about the
language that those communities felt worked best in
describing counter-terrorism. Many communities
wanted terrorists to be described as criminals because,
fundamentally, that is how they preferred to see them,
and using the language of terrorism-as-criminality
meant that they were more prepared to engage in
counter-terrorist activity. However, the problem about
that is of course that criminals aren’t fundamentally
ideological. So the language of criminality, although
useful in one respect, risked taking people’s eyes off
the ideological challenge that we face. That is the
background.
As to what we are doing now—
Q315 Alun Michael: So it is meant to be a balance
of, on the one hand, trying to downgrade the
attractiveness by linking it with criminality but also
challenging the ideology?
Charles Farr: Correct, and I think we are trying to
find that balance.
RICU’s job in challenging ideology is important for
the whole Prevent Strategy and it is done in this
country and overseas. The starting point must be to
understand the ideology that we are trying to
challenge and who is pushing that ideology out. The
individuals are as important as the message. We need
to begin by looking at the key texts or the key
websites, or both, which vulnerable people are looking
at and absorbing and using as part of the radicalisation
process. For example, Anwar al-Awlaki—now dead,
but recently the head of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula based in Yemen—
********************************************
*************. He lived here for many years; he
lived in the States as well. Understanding what he said
and what his writings claimed is the starting point for
counter-ideological work. Once you have understood
the message, you then need to work out who is best
placed to refute it. In general, we are not the right
people to try to do so. We don’t have the theological
expertise. Even if we did have the theological
expertise we don’t always have the channels to push
it out.
Q316 Alun Michael: So who are the right people?
Charles Farr: We will go to people in communities,
perhaps someone working at your local mosque,
whose knowledge about al-Awlaki—and about why
al-Awlaki’s writings make no sense—will be far
greater than ours and, critically, who will be then able
to develop a counter-message and push it out using
his own resources.
Q317 Alun Michael: I am pleased to say that,
certainly in my constituency, imams are being much
clearer and much more robust in that sort of way.
However, one of the problems suggested—and I think
Mike Whine made this comment—is that it is totally
unrealistic to attempt to control online radicalisation.
On the other hand, we saw during the riots this
summer that social networks, rather than being all
bad, needed to be used constructively by the police
and others. So, is it realistic to try to counter the
online issues, and if so, how do you do that?
Charles Farr: It is possible to engage on the internet
in debate and challenge, and that is part of the
ideological work that we ***********************
**************. However, on the internet that policy
will not suffice on its own. You have to supplement it
by attempts to remove those websites that seem to be
most active in encouraging people to turn to violence.
We have a unit here in the police force whose job it
is to monitor websites, identify those that are
particularly pernicious and, where the content is
judged to be inappropriate, talk to the service
providers about whether they really want to be hosting
a website like that.
Q318 Alun Michael: Is your priority to tackle the
bad or to encourage the good to drive out the bad, if
you understand what I mean?
Charles Farr: You have to do both, very simply. You
have to tackle the bad directly where it is so
egregious—either because it is breaking the law or on
the edge of it—that really encouraging the good is not
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of itself going to suffice. But encouraging the good
and engendering that debate is also part of the
strategy.
Q319 Dr Huppert: In terms of dealing with
websites, I can understand the processes for dealing
with illegal material. What sort of reaction do you get
in various countries when you collect the material and
you say, “This is a perfectly legal website but we
would rather you didn’t host it”?
Charles Farr: First of all, of course, every internet
service provider has acceptable behaviour codes for
use on their systems. So having that conversation,
even where the website is operating in a broadly legal
space, is not unusual for them. Governments all
around the world have those conversations with ISPs
every day,3 and the public will very often make their
own representations to ISPs about particularly
unacceptable content that may still be legal on
websites around the world. But of course the answer
to your question is that it varies.
In the United States, which hosts a very significant
number of violent extremist websites, the First
Amendment largely protects those websites and that
is one of the reasons why they are there. Sometimes
the service providers will look at the website and
decide that they don’t want to be hosting it, but it will
be for acceptable use reasons not because they are
necessarily breaking the law because, of course, the
First Amendment itself gives great privilege to free
speech. So it depends, but I would emphasise that
having that conversation with ISPs is not regarded as
being particularly out of the ordinary.
Q320 Chair: One of the things we picked up
yesterday was the lack of a cohesive thread that links
the Prison Service, the police, and what happens after
people leave prison. It was interesting to hear from
the Governor of Belmarsh. We had a very good visit
yesterday, as Mr Winnick has indicated. In a sense, he
said that the Prison Service has had to fight its way to
the top table; they have valuable information that they
can give to the CT command in the Met, and no doubt
that is passed on to you. Everyone is doing their job,
but it appears to some extent—I am exaggerating here
because he did not use these words—that everyone is
in their silos.
Tracking people who leave prison and end up in
Afghanistan—you no doubt saw the article in The
Times about the two British citizens who were killed
by American drones in Afghanistan. At some stage
they must have been known to the authorities in this
country, otherwise why do we have such a
sophisticated service and so much money being spent
on it? In particular, the UK Border Agency does not
seem to be involved in any of this. If somebody leaves
the country or somebody enters the country, with the
sophisticated system that we have, someone who you
are interested in—“you” in a general sense—surely
we ought to know about it? Good people are doing
good work but it does not seem to be joined up.
3 The witness later clarified that HMG refrains from these
conversations except where they consider that the material
would be illegal in the UK.
Charles Farr: Obviously I would be disappointed if
that was the case. We fund out of Home Office grants
a considerable effort by both NOMS, who you have
spoken to, and the police to develop **************
*************** prison interventions around
Prevent. It has been a significant investment over the
past two or three years. It is in every high security
prison around the country and it is rapidly extending
into other prisons as well, even where there are no
tagged offenders. It is true that they use different
databases and slightly different reporting systems but
they are collocated, they are sitting in the same area,
they are talking to each other—
Chair: Sitting in which area? Where?
Charles Farr: Inside the prison.
Chair: In the prison; I see.
Charles Farr: Talking to each other and, as far as I
can tell, liaising regularly and constructively. I think
it is much better than it was three years ago.
If I may add on the release method, serious prisoners
go through the MAPPA process, in the same way as
everyone else. There are some differences, namely the
Security Service is involved in the MAPPA process.
We have looked at the MAPPA process because it is
particularly critical now that quite a lot of prisoners
are coming out quite quickly. We believe that it still
holds good and does what it wants and needs to do. If
you have found something different then, obviously,
we will look at that very closely because it is a really
important point for us at the moment.
Q321 Chair: For example, when did you last have a
conversation, when did you last attend a round table
meeting with the head of security, the head of UK
border force at UKBA? Let us leave aside all the
problems of Brodie Clark and the difficulties that we
have there; I do not want you to get involved in that,
I assure you. But UKBA is critical, is it not, because
it is people entering and leaving the country. I think
of someone like Raed Salah. The Home Secretary
signs an order, gives it to UKBA; they don’t serve it.
The guy enters the country, and he is giving a lecture
in Birmingham while the Home Secretary is on her
feet telling a colleague of ours that she does not know
where he is. This is a £2 billion service that can’t find
one man.
Charles Farr: You have seen the report of the Raed
Salah case.
Chair: Yes.
Charles Farr: I will not attempt to—
Chair: It is administrative stuff; all Sir Denis
O’Connor’s talk is admin. Where are the spies in all
this? Surely somebody would know. Don’t we talk
to the Israelis? Aren’t they watching who is leaving
their country?
Charles Farr: Raed Salah, of course, was not a
terrorist.
Chair: No, I understand that, but he was banned by
the Home Secretary.
Charles Farr: That is true. I am not seeking to defend
the way in which he entered the country. But if I can
reassure you, we work closely with UKBA to ensure
that we have an effective system for identifying who
is coming into this country, not just when they arrive
at borders but before they get on the plane, and that
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we have mechanisms in place for getting them off that
plane so the plane doesn’t even take off.
Q322 Chair: But clearly it does not work, as shown
in the Raed Salah case.
Charles Farr: You are dealing with very large
numbers of people and unfortunately, in that particular
case the system let us down. However, I do continue
to believe that much of the system has great integrity
and delivers day-to-day important results for us. Yes,
that was a slip-up and I am certainly not excusing it
and I am not underplaying its importance. The fact
that he wasn’t a terrorist was fortunate for us; he could
have been, and that is a big problem. We must ensure
that it does not happen again.
Q323 Mark Reckless: Could you follow up one
specific concern that was raised with us at Belmarsh
yesterday, about co-ordination and exchange of
information? As you say, they are going to
considerable effort to prevent radicalisation within
prison, but we are told they are handicapped in doing
that by not knowing what happens to people
afterwards. They do their best to identify the people
at risk in prison and alert you to those, but it is very
hard for them to do that if they don’t have the
feedback loop of who has become a terrorist or come
to your attention after they have come out of prison.
Can you ensure that that information goes back to
them on prisoners who have been in any particular
prison, so they can feed that in to their identification
process?
Charles Farr: That is a good point. If it is not
happening—and I take your word that it is not—then
we must ensure it does. There is no reason why it
should not.
Q324 Mr Winnick: I know that you are not in the
business of predicting the future, and I think I can
say, bearing in mind my age, Islamist terrorism will
certainly outlast me. In so far as you can look into the
future, would you say that we are dealing with an
acute threat for the next half century, bearing in mind
that communism—until the collapse of the Soviet
Union—is no longer a threat in any real sense? It
lasted 70-odd years. Fascism was destroyed because
of the Second World War—world fascism, at least.
What is your view about this threat?
Charles Farr: I am more optimistic than that. Over
the past year we have seen significant changes in the
terrorist threat—significant developments in the
Middle East and the Arab world, which have impacted
on the threat in broadly positive ways. Al-Qaeda is no
longer the organisation it was. It is at its weakest state
since 9/11, and it is possible to talk of the demise of
parts of Al-Qaeda in a way that we could not have
done if we had been having this conversation even a
year ago. I think opinion is changing in the Muslim
majority world as well, generally, against terrorism
and against terrorist organisations. I am not quite as
pessimistic as you may be and I certainly don’t think
in 50-year terms.
Q325 Chair: Can we move to proscription before we
move to universities. Why is the Prime Minister’s
wish that Hizb ut-Tahrir—why are they not banned?
He believes this is a terrorist organisation. There is
evidence to support this. You are sitting at the hub of
all this; presumably you are the person who goes and
sees him, as you are in the next few minutes. He must
be pretty annoyed and frustrated that an organisation
that he thinks ought to be banned has not been banned.
Charles Farr: As you well know, the test for













Q326 Chair: Why is the LTTE still banned in the UK
when they don’t operate here, when the leader of the
LTTE was assassinated in Sri Lanka? It has been
wiped out as a force in Sri Lanka, yet members of the
Tamil community can’t get together in a meeting in
Croydon without members of the Security Service
questioning whether they are involved in LTTE
activity. They have never been involved in terrorist
activity in this country, have they? Why are they still
on the list?
Charles Farr: I can’t comment in detail about LTTE
members here, but the relationship between people
sympathetic to LTTE in this country and terrorist
activity in Sri Lanka has been qualitatively completely
different from the relationship between
********************************************
****
Chair: How, when there has never been a terrorist
outrage here from the LTTE?
Charles Farr: No, terrorist activity in Sri Lanka.
Chair: But it doesn’t exist in Sri Lanka any more; it
has been wiped out.
Charles Farr: No, I said in the past the relationship
has been—
Chair: Why are they still on the proscription list?
Charles Farr: That is a list that allows for people to
be reviewed. It is open to others to put that case. I am
not aware that they have done so and I entirely accept
that we should do it ourselves.
Q327 Chair: One of the problems about the list, as
the Mujahideen showed when they took us to court—
“us” meaning the British Government and the British
people, and so on—and they won and they had to be
de-proscribed, this proscription stuff, as Professor
Clive Walker has stated, really does need to be looked
at very carefully. There is a list in somebody’s
cupboard. It is not in your cupboard. Whose cupboard
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Q328 Chair: How often do you look at this list?
Charles Farr: It is looked at regularly and we are
constantly—
Q329 Chair: Did nobody realise that the LTTE no
longer exists?
Charles Farr: The question is not so much what the
LTTE may or may not be doing in Sri Lanka but what
people in this country, associates of LTTE, are doing
now.
Chair: But it does not exist in this country.
Charles Farr: But of course we will go away and
have a look at LTTE again and come back to you and
let you know what we find.
Q330 Chair: Are you saying that the LTTE operates
in the United Kingdom?
Charles Farr: I can’t comment. I don’t know in
enough detail. I can’t comment on that.
Q331 Chair: Clive Walker, having done his study,
says that the problem with proscription is that the
group simply change their name; it is an endemic
weakness in the proscription mechanism. How would
you respond to that?
Charles Farr: It is certainly true that groups that are
proscribed change their name. That doesn’t mean to
say that you can’t prosecute people under the
proscription law. That is one of the fundamental
reasons. We have prosecuted 30 people since 9/11.
We have convicted nearly 20 of proscription–related
offences. For me, that is one of the key tests of
whether it is being effective. Yes, it is weak because
people can change names. No, it is not toothless
because you can still convict on the basis of
proscription.
Q332 Dr Huppert: If I remember correctly, you said
that in universities you do not find violent
radicalisation, you find non-violent radicalisation. Am
I remembering correctly?
Charles Farr: What do you mean by that?
Dr Huppert: I was trying to draw a distinction about
activity in universities, on which I know you have
taken evidence from UUK already.
Charles Farr: We are concerned about the activity of
non-violent extremist organisations in some
universities, by no means all, certainly not most.
Q333 Dr Huppert: When you say “non-violent
extremists”, do you mean the students who have
occupied a lecture theatre in Cambridge for the last
week?
Charles Farr: No.
Q334 Dr Huppert: What is your definition of “non-
violent extremist”?
Charles Farr: As set out in the Prevent Strategy. In
other words, people who are speaking regularly
against core UK values and whose ideology
incidentally is also shared with terrorist organisations
or by terrorist organisations. We are concerned about
the activities of such people, not because they are
illegal—they are not—but because they appear to go
unchallenged. They are set up in a particularly
systematic way and they appear very deliberately, and
in a very well organised way, to target universities
with significant numbers of Muslim students. We are
not asking for that activity to be banned but we are
asking it to be challenged and for there to be a degree
of balance, which at present in certain areas seems to
us to be lacking. That is a very different thing from
saying that terrorists themselves are active in our
universities, recruiting people directly into terrorist
organisations. We did not say that in the Prevent
Review and it is not our view. It may happen, it may
have happened, but it is certainly not so extensive that
we can generalise about it.
Q335 Dr Huppert: What challenge do you envisage
happening? What is it that you would like to see? Is
it about debates, is it about—
Charles Farr: Yes. It is about ensuring a broad
spectrum of speakers rather than a consistent series of
speakers representing one particular point of view. It
is about ensuring that it is open to everyone and it is
not, in effect, a closed meeting, which is what many
of them are. It is about, in some cases, ensuring that
there is more than one speaker speaking, so that
people hear a varied and broad range of views rather
than simply one.
Q336 Mr Winnick: Mr Farr, I will be the devil’s
advocate for the moment. On apartheid, you would
not, for one moment, have suggested there should
have been a different viewpoint to outright
condemnation—at least, I hope not—of the notorious
regime that existed in South Africa. If someone comes
along, be it SOAS and the rest, and condemns Israeli
occupation in the occupied territories (I am being
devil’s advocate; I am totally opposed to Israeli
policies in the occupied territories, and the rest) is it
really necessary to have a balanced view—someone
coming along and saying, “The justification for what
Israel is doing is so and so, and so and so”?
The grey area is the difference between
condemnation—this is just one example, and SOAS
has been very much in the news over this—of Israeli
policy, even questioning the existence of Israel, which
is not an illegitimate point of view, although it is one
which I don’t happen to share, and the slide into anti-
Semitism, which various students from abroad have
been accused of, perhaps with every justification. That
issue is a rather delicate balancing act and, of course,
if you want to engage in anti-Semitism, the Palestinian
cause is the easy one. Disguising it as being pro-
Palestinian—
Chair: I am sorry, Mr Winnick: what is your
question?
Mr Winnick: Is this not a very difficult and grey
area?
Charles Farr: I would not for one moment have
thought that we should balance an anti-apartheid
speaker with one representing the South African
regime. The anti-apartheid movement was not an
extremist organisation—quite the opposite, actually.
Nor have we ever suggested, nor would we ever
suggest, that a speaker talking about Israel, Palestine,
in itself, should be balanced by anyone else. The issue
is that if a speaker—and this is happening around us—
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attends a university and repeatedly talks about the fact
that we are waging a war on Islam—going back to the
earlier question—I think, and more importantly the
Government thinks, that it is no more than sensible
and legitimate to have a balancing point of view. We
are only talking about circumstances where extremists













































Q339 Mark Reckless: Are you able to identify
individuals returning from terrorist training camps
abroad, and if so, what do we then do about it?
Charles Farr: *******************************
************************** Generally speaking,
someone who comes back from a terrorist training
camp overseas is not a person that we want in a
Prevent programme. He or, more rarely, she would be
a target for the Security Service or for the police and
would go on their target priority list, in the same way
as anyone else engaged in terrorist-related activities.
Q340 Mark Reckless: Are you aware that in Doha
there is, we understand, a programme that purports to
be able to de-radicalise people? What is your
assessment of that programme? Is that something
we—
Charles Farr: There are de-radicalisation
programmes in most countries in the Muslim majority
world, Saudi Arabia being perhaps the best known
example. There is one in Doha, there was even one in
Yemen and there are others. I think some of those are
very effective in the context of the particular state in
which they are working, but they are much less
applicable to the state in this country and to the
powers that we find ourselves with and, indeed, the
expertise that we have. In other words, they are geared
to Muslim majority countries where theologians can
interact in a very regular and consistent manner with
people in prison and where very significant
resources—much greater than in this country—can be
devoted to that task.
Q341 Mark Reckless: There is no argument for
setting up something similar in this country?
Charles Farr: I think we have set up something
similar. I would argue that Channel is our response or
counterpart to the programmes that you have heard
about in Doha or that run in Saudi Arabia. We
exchange notes with those programmes. We have
interacted; we sponsored visits by NOMS to those
other countries to ensure that we were getting the
lessons from them. So like for like? No, I don’t think
we can produce something identical but we can do
things that are similar.
Q342 Dr Huppert: Very briefly, I would like to
understand a bit more about how some of the changes
have happened since the Prevent Strategy. In
particular, I understand there are a number of delivery
organisations that have lost funding because they are
now deemed to be too extremist to be funded. I think
one of the examples is STREET and various others.
Is the reason for this to do with how they are
perceived to be extremists? How many groups do you
think there are who will withdraw funding? What do
you think the effects of that will be?
Charles Farr: First of all, let me be clear: the groups
have had funding withdrawn for all sorts of reasons,
of which being extremist is not actually the principal
one. Some groups have had funding withdrawn
because Ministers felt, based on the information we
provided them, that they didn’t offer value for money,
that they simply weren’t addressing the issue in a way
that was justified or that justified the amount of
taxpayers’ money that was going on them. Some of
the groups have had their funding withdrawn because
we weren’t quite sure where they stood on certain key
issues or certain key principles. It wasn’t that they
were extremist; it was just that there was felt to be
some ambiguity about their views on issues that were
important, such as the role of women. So groups have
had their funding withdrawn for a variety of reasons.
As an overall percentage of the groups that we have
supported, the number that have had their funding
withdrawn is quite small and I am completely
confident that other organisations will be available to
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take their place and that we will get more value from
the future investments that we are going to be making.
Q343 Dr Huppert: Local authorities give out some
of this money. Do you give them guidance about this?
Is there just a switch from national funding to local
funding?
Charles Farr: No. There is quite a stringent system
of approvals, partly because we can hold information
that is not available to them so they have to refer
things back to us. We do scrutinise and we will stop
funding if we think it is obviously in danger of going
to the wrong people.
Q344 Dr Huppert: It would be clear that it was you
stopping it rather than the local authority having to
come up with a reason?
Charles Farr: Yes.
Q345 Dr Huppert: If you are unclear on people’s
key principles, does that have any other effects?
Would the police still work with them? Does it have
any other issues other than the funding that they get?
Charles Farr: The police would often want to work
with organisations for operational reasons and it is
recognised that they should continue to do so. We
would not want the police to be funding those
organisations because that would appear to create an
inconsistency between central government, policing
and possibly local authorities.
Q346 Chair: A final question about co-ordination; I
go back to this tracking and to my concerns. We knew
about Sheik Salah because he was giving a lecture in
Birmingham; it was very open. If somebody arrived
in this country and ended up in somebody’s house in,
say, Leicestershire, we would not know about it if they
were not publicly making their statements. No doubt
you have been to America, you have no doubt seen
what I saw when I went there, which is the centre that
was set up after 9/11 where you have the FBI and the
CIA and everybody in the same room. We know this
happens at the NCA. Obviously you are going to the
National Security Council shortly where everyone
gets together, briefs the Prime Minister, the
politicians—
Charles Farr: I am late for it, but—
Chair: I am sorry, we will be very quick. Do we need
something similar where everyone can sit in the same
room? Because what we have seen is lots of good
people do good work—and no doubt you are doing
good work, Mr Farr, because you are at the very
forefront of the fight against extremism and terrorism,
and we are very grateful for what you and your
colleagues do—but it is all kind of separate. Should
we all be together in one command centre?
Charles Farr: We do have the National Border
Targeting Centre in Manchester whose job it is to
ensure that our warnings indexes are operational. In
other words, so that we can identify in advance if
someone is trying to come into this country who has
been put on a warnings index by one of the agencies
that is operating here. I think NBTC, which the
Americans have been to and we have been to their
centre, is a very effective organisation. It is a separate
subject about where it should go in the NCA, and that
is an interesting—
Chair: Maybe it would be helpful if the Committee
came to visit. If you could set that up that would be
great.
Charles Farr: Yes, glad to.
Chair: I am sorry to delay you, but please give our
regards to the Prime Minister.
Mr Winnick: No. We will have to vote on that one.
Charles Farr: I don’t think I dare.
Chair: Tell him you were detained on very important
business. But thank you very much for coming. We
are very grateful, as usual. Thank you, Mr Farr, we
are most grateful.
Charles Farr: We will give you the data on the
survey.
Chair: Please. Thank you very much.
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Witnesses: Jamie Bartlett, Demos, Hannah Stuart, Henry Jackson Society, and Professor Peter Neumann,
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, gave evidence.
Q347 Chair: This is a further session in the
Committee’s inquiry into the roots of radicalism. Mr
Bartlett, Mr Neumann, Ms Stuart, thank you very
much for coming to give evidence. I hope you have
been following our evidence sessions so far.
Following you we will be having evidence from
David Anderson, QC, and then the Minister will be
coming to give evidence to us.
Perhaps I could start with a general question about
what appears to the Committee to be a lack of hard
evidence about the process of radicalism. Starting
with you, Mr Bartlett, and then we will move on to
the other witnesses, can you throw any light on this
lack of evidence that seems to puzzle the Committee?
Mr Bartlett: There is a combination of reasons, I
think. Firstly—
Chair: I think you will need to speak up.
Mr Bartlett: Sorry, I have a bit of a cold as well. I
think there are a number of reasons for that. Firstly, it
is obviously quite difficult to generate primary
evidence on a subject like this. Research subjects are
not always so forthcoming in talking to academia or
to think-tankers or to Government, and therefore it
can be quite difficult to generate what is really
required, which is a lot of in-depth research evidence
into what these people think, their journey through
their lives and so on. The second problem is that a lot
of the research on this has been very theoretical. There
has been a lot of modelling about different processes
of radicalisation that has not really been based, partly
for the reasons I just set out, on firm evidence.
There is a third issue here, which is that we are talking
about, essentially, a very complicated personal
journey. It is research that can be done by social
sciences and humanities that are notoriously difficult,
and weak in many ways, at generating very solid,
trustworthy evidence bases. There is not really any
way of getting around that. We use the language of
science but we are essentially using humanities to try
to understand this and oftentimes we do not
acknowledge the weakness in the evidence base that
we have. So I think that is an extremely dangerous
and worrying problem. I would be very interested to
know that you are taking care to be aware of the sort
of evidence that you are willing to accept because a
lot of what you will probably hear is based on
anecdotal information that, as a social scientist,
includes an incredible number of weaknesses about
making generalisations.
If I may just make a final point, what we need when




understand it is to understand all those individuals
who may have shared many of the similar underlying
background demographics or attitudes or experiences
in their lives but did not go on to commit acts of
violence or did not get involved in very problematic
types of extremism. That requires a far greater
evidence base. What we tend to do at the moment is
make assumptions based on the very small sample that
we have of individuals that have gone on to commit
acts of terrorism. To truly understand what is driving
it, we would need to compare those against a far
greater dataset of individuals that did not.
Q348 Chair: Professor Neumann, could you also
address the issue about whether or not current
Government policy on Prevent has taken on board the
research that you and others have undertaken in
answering my initial question about the apparent lack
of hard evidence?
Professor Neumann: Yes, Chairman, I think you are
absolutely right. There is not as much evidence as in
other fields of the social sciences. However, I would
say, slightly disagreeing with my colleague here, that
there are a number of studies that are drawing on
substantial amounts of empirical evidence now. In
fact, if you read across the different models and
theories that are empirically based you see recurring
themes. There is the theme of grievance, crisis,
conflict; there is the theme of ideology that people
have been touched by that takes a grievance and
channels it into a particular direction; and there is, of
course, the theme of mobilisation—the influence of
radicalisers or small groups of people who radicalise
collectively. I would describe them as ingredients of
the process of radicalisation. I agree we do not know
absolutely everything about how these ingredients fit
together, how to cook the recipe. We don’t have the
recipe but we may have the ingredients.
Ms Stuart: I would only add that yes, I think in this
area the work that we did that was cited by the Prevent
Review drew on 138 convictions for Islamism-
inspired terrorism between 1999 and 2010. So,
compared to other types of crime, we are talking about
an incredibly small evidence base. Just from those
numbers, it would be incredibly difficult to draw
something that you would call hard evidence. I would
say again that the Intelligence and Security Committee
inquiry into 7/7 did say that they were disappointed
that what they called “such a simple, yet essential,
piece of the evidence base”—the successful
conviction of terrorists and basic information about
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their background, where they grew up, their
education—did not exist. That was something that we
did, which, as you say, is not hard evidence to
describe the drivers of radicalisation but it at least
gives you the basic background information of people
who have been convicted in this country.
Q349 Chair: Yes. A quick answer from each of you,
starting with you, Ms Stuart: is it on the increase or
decrease? I understand why we can’t have hard facts,
but you are in the field, you are in this area. Would
you say it was increasing or decreasing?
Ms Stuart: Do you mean radicalisation? I think it is
difficult to answer. Certainly we are not seeing a drop
in convictions of Islamism-inspired terrorism in this
country. There was a peak between 2005 and 2007 but
there has not been a significant drop. Also there have
been a number of plots thwarted recently that did not
result in convictions but were ended a different way
by, say, deportation. I would say that the level of
radicalism has been fairly consistent, if not increasing,
from the 1990s.
Professor Neumann: I would say it is definitely on
the decrease. The reason for saying that is not by
looking at convictions necessarily but by looking at
extremist organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-
Muhajiroun, which were able to mobilise hundreds if
not thousands of people in the late 1990s and now
are able to mobilise maybe 100. So there is a very
significant decrease.
Chair: That is a very significant decrease. Mr Bartlett,
up or down?
Mr Bartlett: I agree, I think probably down or
stabilising. I think there is potentially a growth in
some types of non-violent extremism, particularly
Salafi groups, and there are obviously potentially
types of increases in other types. We are talking here
predominantly about Islamic extremism but, as I am
sure you are all aware, other types of extremism
appear to be on the increase. Part of that may be what
Professor Eatwell calls cumulative, that groups feed
off each other. Classic examples are the English
Defence League and Hizb ut-Tahrir, who require each
other’s presence in order to justify their continuing
existence and just continually spur each other on.
Q350 Dr Huppert: If I could comment on Mr
Bartlett’s criticisms of taking anecdata, and we would
be very grateful if any of you do want to give us more
evidence later in written form to justify things that
you say. May I first ask all of you—I think we are
now going from Mr Bartlett to the right—how do you
respond to the Prevent Review and the new Prevent
Strategy?
Mr Bartlett: I broadly welcomed the review. My
original understanding of how I believed the review
was going to go was that there would be a much
clearer distinction than there was between violent
terrorist activity and non-violent extremism, which at
times appeared to be slightly confused when the final
document came out. In principle the idea that counter-
terrorism is the work of the Home Office and that is
a security-related issue, and there are other types of
extremism that are a concern but not necessarily a
security one, is the right one. I think in respect of
where ideology plays a role, that is where I was less
certain, but overall I think it was an improvement on
the last one.
Professor Neumann: First of all, it is very good
because it now addresses different kinds of extremism.
Precisely because of what Jamie just said, we do have
a problem of different kinds of extremism feeding off
each other and that is now being addressed. Secondly,
it more clearly separates counter-radicalisation and
Prevent on the one hand from counter-terrorism on
the other hand. It should be more difficult, at least in
principle, to make the accusation that counter-
radicalisation Prevent is about spying on
communities, because it is more clearly separated. I
do also—and that is my final point—in principle
welcome the idea that you are no longer funding
groups that are fundamentally opposed to the British
constitution, if you want.
Ms Stuart: I would agree and broadly I also
welcomed the review. What was particularly good was
that even just in the foreword it was spelt out—we
have had these kind of vague ideas about what our
values are as a society and in the first paragraph it
spelt out universal human rights, equality before the
law, democracy and full participation in our society.
The review also consistently said that the Government
would no longer engage with or fund groups that fail
to support these values. It is the first time we have
had them defined. I know that some people would
consider that maybe a knee-jerk or a right-wing
reaction, and I would completely disagree. I think it
is quite progressive; it respects the boundaries of our
law. The review continually states that the
Government will seek to uphold freedom of speech
but that it is also vital to challenge apologists for
terrorism. I think, very simply, it is saying that if
groups run counter to these values, if they are
engaging in activities that break our discrimination
laws, then they have the right to exist, they have the
right to say what they want to say, but they do not
have the right to use a public platform, to have public
money, or to be engaged with by Government. I think
that was very important.
Q351 Dr Huppert: You have all indicated, I think,
that you support the focus on looking at explicitly
non-violent extremism as well as violent extremism.
How far down the chain do you think that should
continue? What counts as extremism? How radical
does something have to be to cross that threshold?
Ms Stuart: I think it is spelt out in those four
statements, universal human rights, equality before the
law, democracy. It is not saying that you can’t exist or
you don’t have the right to have those views. It is
certainly not saying, for example, you don’t have the
right or the Government won’t fund you if you
disagree with foreign policy, but I think it is saying
that if, as an organisation or as a university student
union that is now a charity, you are going to
consistently put people on a platform who break, for
example, discrimination laws against homosexuals
then you should not be surprised if your money and
your state legitimacy is withdrawn. I think that is the
right thing to do.
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Professor Neumann: I broadly agree. I think that the
ultimate test to apply is to ask, does a particular group
broadly support the constitutional form of
government, democracy, human rights, and is it
unambiguous about violence? If it fails these tests
then surely, while it should be allowed to exist and
under freedom of speech they should be able to
express their opinions, it should not be funded and
empowered by the state.
Mr Bartlett: I slightly disagree. Firstly, I think it is
obviously very difficult for the Government to defeat
extremism, non-violent extremism. It is difficult to
know where to start, it is difficult to know who to
fund, and I think personally to defeat non-violent
extremism the best way is probably funding projects
that are not about extremism, that bring communities
together for completely unrelated reasons to
extremism. Secondly, my slight concern about the
focus on not working with non-violent extremists is
that there may be occasions particularly where the
police do believe that working with these groups has
a very clear and definite security benefit. So I think it
is important to distinguish between those types of
tactical alliances or tactical information sharing and
the broader effort to empower Muslim communities
or to put particular groups up as spokespeople for
Muslim communities. That was part of the problem
over the last four or five years—that we were dealing
with new organisations that were arriving and
springing up rather quickly. People did not know what
they stood for very well and local authorities found it
difficult to know precisely who to fund and who not
to fund. I think improvements have been made but if
it comes to a situation where groups that are doing
very good and documented work in preventing
terrorist activity are accused of being extremists, for
whatever reason and from whoever, and that money is
then withdrawn that could be a problem for
everybody.
Q352 Mr Winnick: Mr Bartlett, one thing is certain:
that the so-called English Defence League does not
receive any Government money, but you have done a
study, presumably the first study, of this organisation.
Is it driven by hatred of Islam?
Mr Bartlett: The group is an interesting one for a
number of reasons. It is predominantly online, most
of its activity takes place online, and only a very small
proportion of its support base goes out and
demonstrates, which is what everybody sees on the
news. You have individuals there who are genuinely
concerned that Sharia law is being introduced, or is
going to be introduced—is on the verge of being
introduced in the UK. They care greatly about human
rights and individual freedom and they believe that
these things are under attack. Part of the reason they
believe that is because they consume media that seems
to tell them that is the case. But equally it draws other
people who are known neo-Nazis, who are well
documented, experienced BNP voters and members
and people who are coming in.
The problem with the English Defence League is that
there is no formal membership base. There is no way
of controlling who joins the marches and who joins
the groups online. As a result, you have a very wide
array of people, some of whom are certainly driven
by hatred of Islam, some of whom are driven by a
desire to protect English values, which they see as
under threat, some of whom have concerns about their
local housing, or are unemployed and angry about
immigration. So it is a very interesting group and I
think it is going to be characteristic of a number of
groups that will emerge in the future.
Q353 Mr Winnick: If it draws in the sort of people
that you are saying, it must inevitably be not only, first
and foremost, anti-Islam but also anti-Semitic, even if
one or two people who are Jewish are in it.
Mr Bartlett: There may be individuals there,
particularly in the beginning of the English Defence
League when they were attracting well known neo-
Nazi groups, which they eventually expelled. There
were some early anti-Semitic individuals involved but
more recently they have tried to form various alliances
with Jewish groups. They say they are on the side of
Jewish groups. They have a Jewish wing in the
English Defence League and they have a number of
Jewish members. Certainly the official ideology of the
group is not anti-Semitic.
Q354 Mr Winnick: Ms Stuart, what is your attitude
toward extremist, non-terrorist organisations like the
organisation we have just mentioned?
Ms Stuart: Do you mean Hizb ut-Tahrir?
Mr Winnick: The so-called English Defence League.
Ms Stuart: I am not an expert on the English Defence
League in any way but I do see them as an aggressive
reaction perhaps to the group Al-Muhajiroun more so
than Hizb ut-Tahrir. There tend to be a lot of EDL
marches and protests countering Al-Muhajiroun
activity. I think one of the first instances was in Luton.
But, again, I am not an expert on the EDL.
Q355 Mr Winnick: I am not suggesting you are an
expert, but do I take it that the society that you are
associated with, the Henry Jackson Society, totally
condemns it?
Ms Stuart: Yes, of course.
Q356 Mr Winnick: Mr Neumann, it could be a
pretty wide-ranging answer but, briefly, what should
be the main emphasis of the British Government’s
policy in dealing with organisations that are not
terrorist but have extreme views and extreme activities
in some respects?
Professor Neumann: I strongly believe that, first of
all, not all of the organisations need to be banned, and
maybe this is something that we are going to talk
about later on.
Chair: Yes, we are.
Professor Neumann: Not all of these organisations
need to be banned but equally they should not
necessarily be empowered. I don’t think either the
English Defence League or an equivalent organisation
on the Islamist side should be given Government
money or they should be graced with Ministers’
presence at their conferences. However, they should
be critically engaged and they should be challenged.
Their arguments should be addressed because these
arguments clearly play a role in certain circles. What
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I would hope the new Prevent policy is going to bring
is a more challenging attitude towards extremist
attitudes, not banning groups but confronting the
arguments.
Q357 Mr Winnick: Ms Stuart, does your
organisation accept that once you start, as with anti-
Semitism—and we know what that led to over 2,000
years—the hatred generated against Islam—as we
know, only a tiny minority of that faith engage in
terrorism and extremism, certainly in this country—
inevitably leads to the kind of horror that we saw in
Norway? That unless you stamp on it, as anti-
Semitism was never stamped on effectively prior to
1945, anti-Islam will lead to the kind of atrocities as
in Norway?
Ms Stuart: I think that is a big concern, yes. Certainly,
I think we need to stamp down on groups like the
EDL but, as Peter was saying, not necessarily by
banning them, except perhaps banning marches in
certain circumstances where we feel that is going to
be a threat to public order, but by critically
challenging them. For example, Jamie was just saying
that one of their beliefs is what they perceive as an
increasing level of Sharia in this country. Well, I think
the Government need to be very clear that the law on
Sharia since the 1996 Arbitration Act has been exactly
the same: you can use Sharia in a court of arbitration
and that is it. There is no creeping Sharia-isation in
this country. Their fears are unfounded and they
should be engaged with and told very firmly that that
is the case. These myths do need to be dispelled
because what we saw in Norway, I would argue, is
that when people feel that their main political parties
or their normal avenues for protest or engagement are
not open to them or are not receptive to their ideas
they will seek even further radicalisation, like the
situation in Norway.
Q358 Steve McCabe: I wanted to ask if we are a bit
confused or ambivalent about our attitudes to the
EDL. If we follow Mr Bartlett’s line, some of the
concerns of some of their adherents—housing, local
services—are legitimate. You say you don’t want
them banned and you don’t want them to have public
money, but every time we permit them to demonstrate
in the centre of Birmingham they are consuming huge
volumes of public resource that could be better spent.
Don’t we have to be clear what we saying? Either
there is a legitimate strand that we should develop or
we should see this as unacceptable, but we seem to be
stuck in the middle, paying for them indirectly.
Professor Neumann: Yes, and what I was referring to
was direct Government funding, as happened with
some Islamist groups in the past. But I completely
agree with you, of course one has to consider also
indirect funding or support for these groups. I just
think on the general question it is probably not
possible, nor is it effective, to ban these groups in the
sense that the people and the ideas behind them will
not necessarily go away.
Q359 Alun Michael: Mr Bartlett said that a lot of
the activity—I think he said the majority of the
activity—of the English Defence League is online,
which implies that there is more reach of their ideas
beyond the numbers that we see in the demonstrations
that take place. Could you give us some idea of the
respective volumes of engagement there?
Mr Bartlett: I ran a survey of 1,500 members of their
Facebook group, and their Facebook group is central
to the organisation. They are one of the few
organisations that was founded post Facebook and it
is really critical as a way of organising, proselytising,
recruiting. Their Facebook group size has shrunk
recently. It was between 70,000 and 100,000; that
collapsed. The site was, I think, probably hacked into,
and they are building their membership base back up
to, I think, currently between 30,000 and 40,000. A
number of those people are trolls; they are people that
don’t really like the group. They are there
intentionally to sow discord or they are journalists or
researchers like us. I estimate that around 25,000 to
35,000 members of the English Defence League that
would consider themselves members are active online,
of whom only about a fifth have been on national
demonstrations; their activity is diversifying quite
quickly. They are doing a lot more local activity, legal
challenges, but the majority of it still takes place
online. As you will have seen, they have never really
managed to get more than 2,000 people to a march or
a demonstration and that broadly bears out the
research that I did. I don’t think that is increasing at
all. It is not going to get much bigger than that.
Q360 Alun Michael: That is very helpful. Thanks
very much. If there is more on that, I think it would
be of interest to us. Hannah Stuart, in your submission
you say that there was no reduction in Al-Muhajiroun
involvement in terrorism following their proscription
in 2010, but you also say the proscription of al-
Shabaab and Tehrik-e-Taliban is likely to be effective.
How do you reconcile those two statements?
Ms Stuart: It is because when a group is proscribed
there are a number of offences that are then relevant
to them and from our study of previous terrorism
offences there were a number of convictions for
people who were raising money for proscribed
organisations or sending weapons to groups in
Pakistan or in Afghanistan or seeking to travel to go
to terrorist training camps. With the proscription of al-
Shabaab and Tehrik-e-Taliban that means that those
offences are now open to British citizens that intend
to do that, and I think that will have a good effect on
our counter-terrorism measures.
Q361 Alun Michael: What is the basis for that?
Ms Stuart: There have been individuals who have
previously funded al-Shabaab who have been on trial
in this country for other related terrorist offences and
a conviction was not secured even though the
individual did admit to funding al-Shabaab. Now that
group is proscribed, were a similar situation to arise
that would result in a conviction. But I think
something that also strengthens the state would be the
fact that there have previously been individuals who
have attempted to travel, particularly to Somalia, and
because the group was not proscribed the Government
had no choice but to put them under control order.
Obviously control orders are a very controversial part
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of our counter-terrorism mechanisms and are not an
ideal option. They can result in quite genuine
grievances because individuals are put under control
order but not given a fair trial whereas with, say, al-
Shabaab being proscribed, were an individual
intending to travel to a training camp there, they could
have a fair trial under our terrorism legislation.
Q362 Alun Michael: You also say you are concerned
that prohibition of Hizb ut-Tahrir would, and I quote,
“Possibly give unnecessary legitimacy to their West
versus Islam, West anti-Islam world view”. Do you
think there is a danger that proscription may be
effective from a law enforcement perspective but
more risky from a radicalisation viewpoint?
Ms Stuart: I don’t think it would be particularly
effective from a law enforcement view either, simply
because it is very difficult with groups to define who
is and who is not a member. Also, some of the
offences like attending a meeting, those often happen
in individuals’ homes or, for example, back rooms in
mosques that would allow that to happen, and so from
a law enforcement point of view it would be very
difficult to secure those offences. But I think more
worrying would be the giving of legitimacy. Hizb ut-
Tahrir is quite an unusual group in that generally it
has not had much support from any other Islamist or
Muslim organisation in this country but after 7/7,
when Tony Blair first said that he was looking into
possibly proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-
Muhajiroun, there was a noticeable swell of support
from Islamist organisations for Hizb ut-Tahrir and
they were presenting Tony Blair’s proposals as part of
an ongoing oppression against Muslims rather than a
genuine investigation into whether a group ought to
be proscribed or not. That was a kind of knee-jerk
reaction and I feel that if Hizb ut-Tahrir were to be
proscribed we would see that more.
Q363 Alun Michael: Could I ask the other two
witnesses to comment on those points, please?
Professor Neumann: I think that proscriptions are
usually most effective if you have organisations that
have some sort of formal organisation, that have bank
accounts, that have offices. These things can be
banned and made more difficult by the law. But when
we are talking about organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir
and Al-Muhajiroun they don’t have many of these
formal structures anyway. So the expectations in terms
of proscribing these organisations should be very
limited. I think it can be a useful tool in terms of
disrupting a group’s activities, in terms of keeping
them off balance, in terms of keeping them
preoccupied with themselves; in that sense it perhaps
does make sense. But one should not expect too much
in terms of a tangible impact when you are dealing
with an organisation that does not have much of a
structure, does not have money in bank accounts, does
not rent offices in the first place.
Mr Bartlett: Yes, of course it is a question of personal
philosophy; never forget that. Just a couple of quick
points. I do think that having the Sword of Damocles
constantly hanging over groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir has
been quite helpful in forcing them to moderate in
many respects. Certainly over the last decade they
have become more moderate and they may continue
to do so. I do not believe, even though I am not in
favour of proscription, that proscribing groups would
give justification to the concept that the West is at war
with Islam or some of these individuals because I
think they have plenty of evidence that they believe
already justifies that assertion.
Q364 Chair: The Prime Minister is very much in
favour of banning Hizb ut-Tahrir. He would not just
be saying this for fun, would he? He must have
legitimate concerns about it. You are saying that when
a political statement is made of that kind, similarly
with Tony Blair, just the threat of that is enough to try
and get people to be more moderate or to moderate
their behaviour?
Mr Bartlett: I think so, and I think it has. Over the
last five or six years particularly, the Government have
been trying to ban the group, looking for ways to ban
the group, spending a lot of time peering into what
they have been doing with far greater scrutiny, and I
know that has—
Q365 Chair: That is just as effective or perhaps even
more effective?
Mr Bartlett: I think it is something that needs to be
factored in. It is very difficult to weigh the different
measures of effectiveness of things like that.
Ms Stuart: I would disagree with that. I did a study
on Hizb ut-Tahrir and after Tony Blair said what he
said, on the group’s British website I think there were
something like 285 different postings of various
fatwas or press releases, many of which explicitly
called for violence.
Q366 Chair: As a result of the statement or before
the statement?
Ms Stuart: No, this is before. After Tony Blair’s
statement, the majority of stuff came off the website.
There were about 30 postings, none of which called
for violence. After that they have been very careful
publicly about what they have said, but I have spoken
to former members who were still involved with the
organisation following 2005 who say that the group
deliberately adopted a “keep your ideology in your
heart” strategy where their views were not moderated
but their public promotion was.
Chair: Professor, very quickly because we have to
move on.
Professor Neumann: Just reinforcing that, I think
they have become more careful. I think there is very
little evidence that suggests that they have genuinely
moderated.
Mr Bartlett: That is quite important, though, because
it means they are less able to spread and share their
message beyond the existing members.
Q367 Chair: But does it not push them
underground, Professor?
Professor Neumann: I think organisations like Hizb
ut-Tahrir already organise a lot like conspiratorial
movements. I don’t think it will make a big difference
in that respect.
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Q368 Nicola Blackwood: One of the findings of the
Prevent Review was that universities are a particular
locus for the radicalisation of vulnerable young people
and that universities themselves should be playing a
role in trying to prevent this. But we have received
evidence from Universities UK and also the
Federation of Student Islamic Societies who claim
that, while they recognise that they do have a duty to
try and manage the risks, there is no hard evidence to
suggest that violent organisations do target students. I
wonder if you could respond to that, perhaps starting
with Jamie Bartlett.
Mr Bartlett: My understanding is that universities had
traditionally been quite a hotbed, particularly for Hizb
ut-Tahrir, partly because of the belief, and I think it is
borne out by evidence, that one of the root causes here
is a sense of failed aspirations. People who thought
they would do much better in life than they did see
that the doors of opportunity are closed to them as a
result of their religion or their ethnicity and that is a
particularly fertile breeding ground when you
combine that with the sort of genuine radicalism that
you have when you are a young person. Plus some of
the technical skills that people have in engineering
are, for obvious reasons, quite appealing. So I think
historically that has been the case and I think,
Hannah—you will know better than me—your work
shows that quite a high proportion of people have
been to university, although I think that has fallen over
the last three or four years in particular.
Q369 Nicola Blackwood: What about your work on
EDL and other groups—has that shown a similar
propensity to target universities or not?
Mr Bartlett: No.
Professor Neumann: We did a study in 2007 for the
European Commission and we came to the conclusion
that, like prisons or like the internet, universities were
places of vulnerability. They are places of
vulnerability because you get people of a certain age,
often away from home for the first time, often feeling
quite lost and often experiencing a sort of crisis of
identity and so on. That makes it easy for extremist
groups to pick them up and to say to them, “Come
along to our meeting, we are like you”. Of course, as
Hannah’s centre has documented, there have been a
lot of cases of people who were radicalised as a result
of going to university. I am not doing myself any
favours here because I am working for a university,
but I do think that university administrations have
been a little bit complacent about this in the past.
Ms Stuart: Our study of the convictions over the last
11 years did show that 30% of individuals involved in
Islamism-related terrorism in the UK had at some
point been at university, whether they had graduated
or not. Now, that does not claim a causal connection;
it is just simply stating of facts. I do understand that
a group like FOSIS that purports to represent Muslim
students will seek to respond whenever there is a
media focus on Muslim students and terrorism, and
there is at times. I can understand that but I think that
they are lax in their duty because it is almost a knee-
jerk reaction where they say there has never been a
case of an ISOC member involved in terrorism, there
is no problem with radicalisation whatsoever, and that
is simply not true. Abdulmutallab this year was the
fifth senior member of a UK-based ISOC to be
convicted for dangerous Islamist terrorist acts.1
I think it is not just about the admittedly very small
number of Muslim students who have gone on to
commit terrorist acts but it is about the atmosphere
that is created sometimes on campus by Islamic
societies or other organisations who consistently
invite a certain type of speaker that does not reflect
the plurality of Islam in this country. They are often
very narrow, politicised speakers, proponents of
Hamas for example, or even Anwar Al-Awlaki.2 In
2009 there was a university in London that invited
him via a video link to address their ISOC annual
conference.
As Peter said, this is often people’s first time away
from home. If you are a Muslim student, you have
come to university, you have joined the Islamic
Society, and in the work we did a couple of years ago
most people said they joined just to meet like-minded
people, to engage in charity. So you join for that
reason and if the culmination of your ISOC year is to
have a lecture from Anwar Al-Awlaki that simply is
not good enough. It has been pointed out to student
unions, to ISOC representatives and to university
vice-chancellors for a number of years and there does
seem to be a level of complacency, or I am not sure
if it is an unwillingness to act. I understand it is very
difficult because these things are right on the
boundaries of freedom of speech and security but I
don’t think enough is being done.
Chair: Thank you. I cut you all short here because
time is short but if there is anything else you want to
add on universities in particular we are very keen to
know about this. The Committee is holding a
conference next Tuesday at De Montfort in Leicester
on this very subject, so any additional information
would be gratefully received.
Q370 Michael Ellis: Professor Neumann, if I could
ask you first of all, the Government have made some
progress, I would suggest to you, in connection with
tackling online radicalisation. There is a report that
you did called “Countering Online Radicalisation”
published a couple of years ago. Do you think the
Government have taken your recommendations from
your report on board?
Professor Neumann: I think some of the
recommendations were taken on board, not all of
them. One of our recommendations was to bring
strategic prosecutions—not necessarily taking down
websites but to prosecute the people who are
producing the content for the websites. That has
happened, to some extent. There is also a mechanism
that the Government have introduced for deciding
what kind of content should be taken down and that
has also been done. Most importantly, we believe that
there is no technical solution to this problem and that
1 The witness later clarified that, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
was a former UCL student and ISOC president who was
convicted in the US in October 2011 for a failed bomb attack
on a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day 2009.
2 The witness later clarified that, Anwar al-Awlaki was a
former spiritual leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
who was killed in a US drone attack in Yemen in September
2011.
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this problem needs to be addressed differently, and the
Government have followed us there. It is very
important to remember—and this is where I think the
Government can do more—the internet is the
indispensable infrastructure of the 21st century. It is
nearly 100% in private hands, so the most profitable
way for any Government to address this problem is to
bring political pressure, in some cases, to bear on
internet providers—big internet companies who are
hosting extremist videos in places like YouTube,
Google, Facebook.
Q371 Michael Ellis: Don’t the Government already
do that?
Professor Neumann: They do that to some extent but
they could do it more consistently. I believe that, for
example, all the measures that have been taken by
YouTube to clean up its act have always been in
response to political pressure, both from the United
States and the United Kingdom. So it is very
important that the Government keep that going.
Q372 Michael Ellis: Many of these internet service
providers have acceptable behaviour codes, so even
where there is not a breach in the law of the country
where they may be host they can use these acceptable
behaviour codes to take down these offensive websites
if it is brought to their attention.
Professor Neumann: Absolutely. This is not about
freedom of speech. All these websites, whether it is
YouTube or Facebook, have their own rules. They
have acceptable behaviours. They all say, “We are
against hate speech” and they are very effective in
removing sexual content or copyright content. Why
can they not be equally effective at removing, for
example, extremist Islamist or extremist right-wing
content? Primarily, I believe it is because it is not in
their commercial interest and that is why it is so
important that politicians and Governments bring
political pressure to bear so that these companies
understand it is important.
Q373 Michael Ellis: Further to that, what does your
research indicate is the role of the internet in far right
and Al-Qaeda radicalisation—perhaps to Mr Bartlett
as well on that? How important do you think the
internet is?
Professor Neumann: I think it is becoming
increasingly important because it is becoming
increasingly important for all of us. There are three
key functions: firstly, disseminating extremist content,
imagery, video; secondly, it allows extremists to find
each other and network; and thirdly, it can of course
create a virtual echo chamber where quite extreme
views are becoming normalised because very extreme
people are allowed to interact with each other. All
these functions are quite problematic.
Mr Bartlett: Those points are absolutely accurate. I
would just add a couple more. The essential
balkanisation of media content, which means people
are able to access an incredible array of information
now, some of it very good and accurate, some of it
very bad, means that people are always able to find
information that seems to corroborate their existing
world view, whether it is that Sharia law is on the
verge of taking over the UK or that the Jews were
behind 9/11 or whatever it happens to be, and that can
be quickly shared and push the group in an
increasingly polarised direction. That is one thing.
The second thing is that there is alongside, as I said,
this accurate, quality, niche journalism and good
information at least an equal amount of
misinformation, propaganda, lies and the rest of it. It
is very difficult for young people to be able to
negotiate that. A lot of the information that looks very
trustworthy and accurate—and people tend to go on
aesthetics of websites—is absolutely bogus but we are
not taught this in schools because it has happened so
quickly. People are not being taught in school how to
critically evaluate internet-based content and I think
that is one of the biggest weaknesses that we face at
the moment. We learn about how libraries work or
whatever but as soon as the kids come out of school
it is YouTube and it is Facebook and it is link sharing
and it is LinkedIn and it is Twitter, but none of that
stuff is being taught and I think that needs to be done.
Q374 Michael Ellis: Did you want to add anything,
Ms Stuart?
Ms Stuart: I would only add that I think the internet
is of growing importance simply because of increased
counter-terrorism surveillance techniques and the
concerns about the rise of what we call lone wolf
terrorism. I think there have been cases since 2008,
2009 and 2010 that all bear that out. That is all I
would add.
Q375 Steve McCabe: This question is really for Mr
Neumann and it is specifically about prisons. The
National Offender Management Service say that
prison policy on radicalisation has moved on
considerably from your report in, I think it was, 2010.
Are they right to say that?
Professor Neumann: When we published our report,
NOMS was just starting to implement its strategy on
countering extremism in prisons and I understand that
a lot of the measures that were started then are now
being implemented and that is a good thing. I do give
them credit for following a lot of the
recommendations that we made in our report and also
for taking a lot of criticism on board. So I do believe
that they have got the emphasis right. They emphasise
staff training, they emphasise aftercare for prisoners,
providing mainstream-based services. This is all very
positive, but it is very important that committees like
yours continue to monitor whether all these good
intentions are translated into practice. For now it
seems to be the case but it is very important to stay
on the case.
Q376 Steve McCabe: Some of the evidence we have
received seems to suggest there is very little
radicalisation in prison. Is that a fair assumption?
Professor Neumann: I think it is very difficult to say
and that is partly because organisations like NOMS,
but also prison services in other countries, are not very
forthcoming with numbers. So whatever number you
read in reports, it is all plucked out of thin air; no one
quite knows how many people radicalise in prisons.
A lot of the examples that are always being given
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for prison radicalisation—like Richard Reid, the shoe
bomber, who converted to Islam in prison but
radicalised at Brixton mosque outside of prison—are
not examples of prison radicalisation. If there is one
request I would have of NOMS it would be to publish
figures on this because no one quite knows.
Steve McCabe: That is very helpful.
Q377 Chair: We also found when we went to
Belmarsh and spoke with Abu Hamza and the
governor that there was no tracking system. Once
people had left prison, nobody really knew what
happened to them and that kind of joined-up approach
was extremely important.
Professor Neumann: That is precisely because of
people like Richard Reid who are coming out of
Examination of Witness
Witness: David Anderson, QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation, gave evidence.
Q378 Chair: Mr Anderson, thank you very much for
coming today. I begin by congratulating you on your
appointment and welcoming you most warmly to your
post. We ought really to have had you before the
Committee before today but I am afraid our agenda
has become very crowded indeed. But we are most
grateful to you for coming today. We will be seeing
you more regularly than once a year once we get into
the swing of things.
You know what this inquiry is about and we are very
keen to ask you a number of questions. I would like
to start on the question of proscription. The
Government are quite clear they believe that
proscription is a way of disrupting organisations and
preventing activity that is harmful. You have said that
proscription has the ability to disrupt harmful
organisations and to change behaviours. You were
very clear that you believe that this is the proper
approach in certain circumstances. Do you agree that
Hizb ut-Tahrir should be proscribed—should be one
of the 47 organisations or perhaps should become the
48th organisation to be proscribed?
Mr Anderson: You have thrown me in at the deep
end, Chairman. No, I have never sought to make the
case for the proscription of Hizb ut-Tahrir, nor would
I necessarily accept that proscription is effective in
every case. I think there are a number of very different
types of groups that are proscribed and one rather
rough and ready way of examining when proscription
might be effective might be to look at the people who
are most upset about it happening. From my
perspective, in terms of the people I have spoken to
and the people who have been very keen to speak to
me, you are talking about people, for example, in the
Kurdish community, Tamils, you are talking about
people in the Baluch community, perhaps also
Sikhs—in other words, people who may have
sympathy with groups that have been proscribed
largely because they represent a terrorist threat to
other Governments, rather than because of the fact
that they represent a threat to the United Kingdom
Government or to UK nationals abroad. It is pretty
clear to me that in cases such as that, proscription
prison and who are often feeling lost and who may be
vulnerable not inside prison but when they come out
of it. That is why it is so important to have aftercare
provisions that work.
Chair: Mr Bartlett, Professor Neumann, Ms Stuart,
you have given us fascinating evidence today. We
could carry on questioning you all morning but I am
afraid we have other witnesses. If we have missed out
anything, please feel free to write to us. We are hoping
to conclude this report very shortly. Equally, if you
would like to come to Leicester next Tuesday we
would be very happy to have you contribute to one of
the sessions in the afternoon. Thank you very much
for coming.
does have an effect. Whether it is a good effect or a
bad effect depends on where you are standing. I am
not just thinking about prosecutions, which have
always been relatively infrequent and which in very
recent years have been almost non-existent, since
2008, although, incidentally, I would not bank on that
necessarily continuing.
Q379 Chair: Let’s stick with Hizb ut-Tahrir for a
moment. Two serving Prime Ministers have said that
they would like to ban this organisation, and therefore
they must have evidence to support this view rather
than just get up one morning and decide, “We would
like to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir”. Are you saying that just
the mere mention—we have heard evidence, and you
were sitting at the back, you heard what was being
said—of a possible ban is almost as good as a ban in
some cases because people then take care as to what
they put on websites and how they approach this
subject? Surely if David Cameron and Tony Blair
believe these are organisations that ought to be
proscribed, they ought to be proscribed?
Mr Anderson: My reading of the counter-terrorism
review that this Government undertook when they
came into office was that, yes, they were certainly
considering that but that they took the view,
reluctantly or otherwise, that in order to achieve that
you would probably have to amend the law because
organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and what one
might call its mirror image, the English Defence
League, probably don’t go so far as to encourage
terrorism in the sense that the Act requires. So you
would need to extend the law in order to be able to
proscribe it.
Q380 Chair: But you don’t think it should be
banned?
Mr Anderson: I think it is a very slippery slope. I
don’t have a public position on whether Hizb ut-Tahrir
should be banned or not, but from what I know of the
organisation I think it would be very difficult to ban
it under the existing law. You have just heard from the
Henry Jackson Society, and you will have seen their
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very detailed report of 2009 concluding last year, that
concluded that it would be counterproductive and
ultimately undesirable to ban them.
Q381 Chair: I have here the list of proscribed
terrorist organisations that I have just obtained and on
there—you have mentioned the Tamils—is the LTTE.
The LTTE have never operated in the United
Kingdom. I don’t recognise many of these names. I
have heard of some of them, but I know the LTTE
because I have a number of Tamils in my
constituency. Now, they have never operated in the
UK. They have been basically finished off by the Sri
Lankan Government; the leader has been killed. Why
does that remain on the list, for example? Shouldn’t
somebody be looking at this list on a regular basis and
saying, “Well, in this particular case the group has
never operated here, doesn’t exist any more. Should it
be banned?”
Mr Anderson: I entirely agree, Chairman, with the
thrust of your question, as you will know if you have
read my report. Of course there are reviews. Every
organisation on the list is reviewed administratively
every year but, because there is no necessary
parliamentary input or judicial input and because
listing doesn’t lapse unless it is specifically renewed,
as is the case, for example, under the Terrorist Asset-
Freezing etc. Act 2010, it is very difficult to see why
a Minister would ever want to take the initiative and
de-proscribe any organisation at all. In fact no
Minister since 2000 has done that in relation to any
organisation. The only one that has been de-
proscribed—
Q382 Chair: Do you think there ought to be a
mechanism to allow some organisations, should they
feel that they need to challenge the decision outside
the courts—because, of course, there is a legal method
of doing this—to, for example, petition Parliament
about it, or should there be a new method of trying to
get the Government to focus on some of these
organisations?
Mr Anderson: I think something needs to be done.
You might have seen in my report there is a reference
to “difficult cases”, which is a term of art in this
world. As I understand a difficult case, what it means
is a case in which the statutory test for proscription is,
at least arguably, not satisfied but it is very difficult to
know what to do about it because you might
embarrass a foreign Government or open Pandora’s
box on Northern Ireland or whatever it might be. So
at the end of the day the history of the last 10 years
shows nothing happens in relation to these.
The suggestion I made in my report I thought was
rather a modest suggestion. My understanding is it is
being considered but what the outcome of that
consideration will be I don’t know. It is that these
proscriptions should be time limited, rather like asset
freezes under the 2010 Act—you could say rather like
TPIMs under the forthcoming TPIM legislation—with
the result that if after two years, or whatever it is, if
the Minister decides that he really wants to renew the
listing, he will have to come before Parliament with
some good reasons why. It seems to me that, apart
from anything else, that would make things easier for
the Minister, because if he is under pressure from a
foreign Government to retain the listing of some
organisation that appears not to have been active for
years, he could say, “I am sorry, I would love to help
you but—”
Q383 Chair: Is that where the push comes from? In
effect it is not domestic pressure, it is the Government
of Sri Lanka or one of the Arab Governments that
are on to the Foreign Secretary to say, “This should
be banned”?
Mr Anderson: Certainly not in every case but, as I
said in my report, some of these organisations are
listed, at least partly, in order to please foreign
Governments. I have no doubt about that at all.
Q384 Dr Huppert: I welcome you rather belatedly
to your role and wish you good luck in managing to
avoid going native and keep your independence. It is
a challenge. As I understand it, no non-Irish domestic
group has ever been proscribed at all. Is that correct
and why do you think that is? Does that say, as the
Chair was suggesting, that it is really just that foreign
Governments drive the proscription process?
Mr Anderson: No, I don’t think it is just driven by
foreign Governments. For example, I would be very
surprised if the proscription of Al-Muhajiroun was
driven by foreign Governments. Anjem Choudary’s
perspective is largely a UK perspective. The reason
one usually sees for domestic groups not being
proscribed is that these far right organisations in
particular just are not of the size or degree of
organisation of some of the organisations that are
proscribed. I do wonder—and this might be worth
exploring with the Minister—whether there may also
be a disconnect in terms of the civil servants
concerned with this matter. It is something one sees
at the Home Office. It is something one sees at the
Crown Prosecution Service. There will be a terrorist
department, as it were, but far right extremism is in a
slightly different box. Everyone accepts that it can, if
it is violent, meet the statutory definition of terrorism
but it is not always looked at by the same people or
at the same time. So it may be that there is an element
of that.
Q385 Dr Huppert: I think that is very helpful and I
am interested in your description that it is a question
of size and degree of the organisation. You argue the
far right ones don’t have that. Are you persuaded that
all of the international groups on the list do have that
level of size or degree? Do you think we are applying
a balanced effect? If not, why not?
Mr Anderson: No. If one took something like the Abu
Nidal Organisation, for example, I am not persuaded.
I don’t know whether it exists or how big it is but it
is certainly not very big. So, no, I wouldn’t say they
were all large organisations.
Q386 Dr Huppert: So we are being inconsistent in
our application of the proscription rules?
Mr Anderson: Well, possibly. I am not an expert on
these far right groups and I can well understand that
with the English Defence League you are looking at
something like Hizb ut-Tahrir where arguably they
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have been careful enough not to infringe the current
statutory test. If you are looking at something like,
say, the Aryan Strike Force, which is probably a rather
more overtly violent organisation—two members of it
were convicted last year, as you will know, of the
Ricin plot—there one may be in that territory. But you
would still have to ask, “Is that a sensible thing to do
or are we just looking at half a dozen people here,
proscribing whom is simply going to give them a
status that they don’t currently possess?”
Q387 Nicola Blackwood: I wanted to ask you about
the glorification sections of the Terrorism Act. Since
that Act in 2006, groups who glorify terrorism have
also been eligible for proscription. I wondered if you
had any concerns whether the definition of
glorification has any risks for free speech and whether
that definition is too broad or vague. There were some
concerns at the time.
Mr Anderson: I think when it originally came to
Parliament after 7/7 there certainly were such
concerns and there were questions about whether you
could speak approvingly of Robert the Bruce or
Nelson Mandela without glorifying terrorism. It seems
to me that Parliament went quite a long way towards
neutralising that particular risk by adding that it is
only glorification if you are encouraging people to
emulate that behaviour in the present or in the future.
That is a test that is common both to section 1 and
section 2 of the 2006 Act where you have the criminal
offences. It is also common to the proscription
condition.
I have read Professor Walker’s evidence, and I have
the very highest regard for Professor Walker; indeed
he does, on a very part-time basis, operate as my
special adviser. He points out—it is perhaps a
lawyer’s point—that there is a very subtle difference
in the way in which glorification comes in, section 1
and 2 on the one hand, where it is limited only to the
indirect encouragement of terrorism, and under
proscription, on the other, where it is available to
prove direct encouragement of terrorism. I can see the
inconsistency. Whether it has much practical
importance, I am not so sure. It seems to me if you
are going to have, as a criminal offence, the
encouragement of terrorism or the dissemination of
terrorist material under section 1 and section 2, it is at
least logical that an organisation that promotes such
activity should itself be a proscribed organisation.
Q388 Nicola Blackwood: Do you have any concerns
also about the problems where the words of an
individual, perhaps glorifying terrorism under the
definitions and which we would all agree would be
inciting violence, would then be attributed to the
group and would result in a proscription, which would
perhaps be considered to be disproportionate?
Mr Anderson: I can’t say I have observed that
problem in practice. With Hizb ut-Tahrir for example,
those who would like to see it proscribed will
sometimes put together scrapbooks of things that
individuals all over the world who have at one time
or another claimed some connection with Hizb ut-
Tahrir have said, but it has not resulted in the case
being made out for the proscription of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
So it is a real danger. But I believe the danger is
anticipated in section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and
in practice I am not aware of problems that it has
caused.
Q389 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think there is a
need to clarify section 3 in order to avoid this or do
you think that in practice the precedent has removed
that need?
Mr Anderson: Section 1 and section 2 of the 2006
Act are difficult, and this is a difficult section too. One
is always wary of these very widely worded statutory
powers because a great deal of emphasis is placed on
the good sense of prosecutors and, in this case, the
good sense of Ministers in deciding how to use those
powers. I think all one can say is that I haven’t seen
evidence of abuse at this stage.
Q390 Mr Winnick: In no way reflecting on your
position, Mr Anderson, you are well known as a
leading lawyer and so on—and you are wondering
what I am now going to ask you—did the appointment
come out of the blue, so to speak?
Mr Anderson: It came completely out of the blue. I
could tell you how it happened if you are interested
but time may be short.
Q391 Mr Winnick: One or two questions. You never
hesitated in taking up the appointment?
Mr Anderson: It was indicated that a speedy answer
would be appreciated and I said if I was the sort of
person who would jump to that particular command
then I was not the sort of independent person they
needed to do the job, so I took my time. But, having
thought about it, I accepted.
Q392 Mr Winnick: And why not. Can I ask you
about your position? Your predecessor, equally
distinguished—to some extent what Mr Huppert asked
you about going native—without in any way
criticising him as such, it is a free country, involved
himself in the controversy over pre-charge detention,
make it clear either 90 days or just leave it to the
court. Is it your intention to give opinion that really is
a matter for Parliament?
Mr Anderson: My predecessor was already a
politician and I am not a politician. I have never had
any political involvement and I don’t see it as part
of my role to get into politics or to fancy myself as
a politician.
Q393 Mr Winnick: I think that answers the question.
Just one other question that is not related to your
appointment, which I think I would be right in saying
the Committee welcomes. On the question of
changing names arising from banning, is there any
real purpose in banning unless it is absolutely
essential, because if an organisation is banned then
presumably it changes its name within a matter of
hours or days and we are back to square one?
Mr Anderson: I would not be quite as negative as that
about it. There are some organisations, of course, that
have a lot of what might in another context be called
brand equity. Something as resonant as the UVF or
the Red Hand Commando or the IRA is a very
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powerful brand and it is not simply going to rename
itself and re-form under another guise. I suspect the
problem, so far at least, has been limited to Al-
Muhajiroun and its various aliases, and I think there
is an element probably of delight in outwitting the
Government by dissolving one organisation and
forming another as soon as it is proscribed. I can see
the risk that the Government would look foolish by
that happening. But I don’t think that is a reason for
not doing it. I think at least by doing it that way one
prevents those organisations from building up a brand
equity of their own, because if they can’t use the name
any more they have to find a new one.
The other thing to remember is that it is provided in
the Act itself that if you can establish in a court that
the organisation that someone is a part of is in
substance the same as an organisation that is
proscribed, all the consequences of proscription must
follow.
Mr Winnick: So it is a safeguard.
Q394 Alun Michael: As my colleague David
Winnick has raised the issue of your predecessor’s
comments on the 90-day requirement, my memory of
that is that his comment was that any number of days
was problematic and that an unjustified detention of a
couple of days could be unduly onerous. So it was not
about the 90 days in the political decision, it was
about the legal problems involved with that process.
In such circumstances, as a lawyer, would you feel
able to comment on proposals, either in favour of
them, against them or in pointing out difficulties?
Mr Anderson: I think we last saw each other at the
Joint Committee that existed in order to consider these
matters. What I said to the Joint Committee was that
when Sue Hemming, perhaps the most experienced
counter-terrorism prosecutor in Europe, says that she
can’t envisage a case that would require more than 28
days I could see no argument whatsoever for allowing
more than 28 days. So that was my starting point.
Q395 Alun Michael: But your predecessor’s point
was that the use within any existing number of days
also needs to be looked at very much on the basis of
what is the evidence and therefore to follow the
evidence because detention is onerous unless it is
well justified.
Mr Anderson: Yes.
Q396 Alun Michael: Could you explain what you
see as the main problems with the de-proscription
process, what you have recommended and what the
Government have indicated about their planned
response?
Mr Anderson: The problem is that nobody ever gets
de-proscribed. One group has been de-proscribed and
that was a well-funded group that went to the expense
of a seven-day hearing in front of the Proscribed
Organisations Appeal Commission, special advocates,
expert witnesses brought in from Iran, a full-dress
hearing and at the end of the day for them a
satisfactory result, although even that went up to the
Court of Appeal. I am quite sure it must have cost
hundreds of thousands of pounds—how many
hundreds of thousands I would not like to say. What
is needed is a way of ensuring that pointless or
redundant listings can be removed at an earlier stage.
I think there are various ways of doing that. The way
I suggested is that a sunset clause be put on any listing
so that it expires within, say, two years unless the
Minister is prepared to come to Parliament with the
evidence for renewing it. My sense is that would
operate quite effectively in concentrating the
Minister’s mind and perhaps emboldening the
Minister, in a case where a foreign Government might
like the idea of the proscription but we can’t see that
it satisfies the test any more, to bite the bullet and
aloow the proscription to lapse. In terms of what the
Government—
Q397 Alun Michael: Are you sure it would work as
intended? When you look at previous sunset clauses
there has tended to be, irrespective of Government, a
whipped vote to maintain what has become the status
quo. I am thinking of things like terrorist legislation
in relation to Northern Ireland.
Mr Anderson: Perhaps unusually for a lawyer, I am
saying you don’t need the courts to do this, you can
trust Parliament to do a good job and you can trust
the Minister to feel suitably intimidated by the thought
of bringing a bad case to Parliament. I very much
hope that is the case. If that is not the case one could
easily imagine a more lawyerly solution. One could
say that every time it is proposed to renew a
proscription the matter must be brought before a court
that will sift the evidence, no doubt hear some of it in
secret, no doubt hear witnesses from some of these
foreign countries, and then pronounce on what the
group is doing and whether the belief advanced by the
Secretary of State is a reasonable one. Indeed, that
may be quite close to what Professor Walker is
suggesting . There is certainly work for lawyers and
as a lawyer one accepts there is obviously a self-
interest in these sorts of procedures.
Q398 Alun Michael: It has quite often been
suggested that we sometimes get muddled about
procedures—indeed, that was one of the issues before
the Joint Committee that you referred to earlier—and
ask lawyers to take decisions that are essentially
political and ask politicians to take decisions on the
granular detail of legislation that, if they are legally
qualified, is a coincidence to the role of the MP rather
than a part of it. Can I probe a little more deeply as
to why you think this is—
Mr Anderson: Yes, I very much agree. I think this is
a borderline case between a case where it is
appropriate for the courts and appropriate for
Parliament to provide the safeguard. I think the reason
why Parliament does have a role here is that if you
look at the five factors that were identified in 2000 as
informing the discretion to proscribe, the fifth of them
is the need to support other members of the
international community in the global fight against
terrorism. My impression is that that is not just a
makeweight; that is probably one of the more
important of the five factors. I could understand why
Parliament would want to have a view on that, always
aware, of course, that there is the backstop of an
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application to POAC if it can ever be got off the
ground.
Q399 Mr Winnick: Without raking up too much—
and I am probably responsible for raking up some of
the past controversy—for the record, your predecessor
did defend the 90 days and then argued some months
afterwards that it should be left simply to the court.
So should you want to look up the records and see
what should perhaps be avoided, it might do some
good.
Mr Anderson: I hope it is clear I am not expressing
any view of my predecessor other than that he did a
very distinguished job for a very long time.
Mr Winnick: I understand that. I am sure.
Chair: We will go and look up the record.
Q400 Michael Ellis: Mr Anderson, rather belated
congratulations on your appointment earlier this year.
On the review that this Government have undertaken
of counter-terrorism powers and the subsequent
legislation—I am thinking of replacing control orders
and restrictions on the ability of police to stop and
search without suspicion and the like—do you have
any evidence that suggests that this legislation has
mitigated a sense of grievance that is apparently felt
by some members of the Muslim community?
Mr Anderson: My impression of the measures that
cause grievance, at least the ones that I am told about
time after time, is that section 44, the stop and search
power, certainly used to be in that category. One might
infer from the fact that it is not used any more that it
no longer fuels grievance, though needless to say it is
not the sort of thing people necessarily volunteer
when you talk to them. But it was a power that was
used, I think, almost a million times and not a single
conviction for a terrorist offence resulted. Talking to
the police now it is quite rare to find a police officer
who says, “Yes, I wish we had section 44 back again.”
It seems to have gone with rather little—
Michael Ellis: Is there—
Mr Anderson: The other one is Schedule 7 because
that also, of course, affects a huge number of people.
You see the figure for 80,000 a year, 60,000 a year,
whatever it is, actually examined at ports but, of
course, that is dwarfed by the number of people who
are taken aside at a port and asked a few questions. I
hear a lot about that from minority ethnic
communities.
In terms of control orders, and the power to detain for
14 or 28 days—I suspect—and there will be others
who know more about this than me—these matters
were never a major source of radicalisation in the first
place. They affect so few people that they were not
really a rallying point in the way that perhaps
internment was in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.
Q401 Michael Ellis: Of the remaining powers, is
there one that stands out that you hear and feel is
causing most resentment in these affected
communities?
Mr Anderson: I think Schedule 7 needs a review, and
I said that in my report, even though it is a useful
power. It is very unlike section 44 in that respect.
Q402 Michael Ellis: Don’t most countries retain
some stop and search powers—or stop and question
powers, I should say—at their ports and airports
similar, if not even more stringent, than ours in the
UK?
Mr Anderson: Of course countries in the Schengen
area can do very much less than we can, at least at
their internal European borders, and for many of those
countries internal European borders are largely what
they have. So in that sense, perhaps, we do stick out
a bit. The power to stop and examine people at ports
is a very useful one. But I think there are a number of
problems with Schedule 7 and one of them, frankly,
is database quality. One finds blameless pillars of the
community being stopped time after time after time
again. One can only assume that it must be on the
basis that there is some duff information somewhere
in the system that is not being cleaned out quickly
enough.
Q403 Chair: What kind of co-operation are you
getting with Charles Farr and the office that he heads?
If you ask for information, do you get it readily?
Mr Anderson: I do. I find everybody very willing to
talk, and I have not so far been refused a document
that I have asked for. It doesn’t always mean that I
know the right document to ask for, but the ones I
have asked for I have always been shown. I think they
know that if I am not shown a document I will record
that fact in my next report to Parliament.
Q404 Chair: In respect of the recent case of Raed
Salah, you had some comments to make to the effect
that the border will never be absolutely secure, there
is always the risk that someone who has been banned
by the Home Secretary, notwithstanding measures that
have been taken, will end up coming into this country.
Is that what you said, or have I misquoted you?
Mr Anderson: Yes. I was asked by a journalist what
the impact of the border control row was on terrorism,
and I think one of the points I made is that regrettably
zero risk is not attainable and, indeed, it is probably
not even a very sensible objective. Jonathan Evans,
the Director of MI5, said as much in a public talk last
autumn, where he said that to go down the route of
pursuing zero risk was counter-productive and would
lead to a misallocation of resources.
Q405 Chair: Would you expect to be doing more of
these independent reports? We know you have the
power to present a report to Parliament on a case like
Raed Salah, which was given to HMIC to deal with,
Her Majesty’s Inspectors. Would you be in a position
to take on individual cases of that kind? Is that part
of your remit?
Mr Anderson: As you know, I am on my own. I don’t
have a staff or an office, and where there are other
reviewers, or inspectors, be it John Vine of UKBA or
the HMIC, I think it would not only be tactless but a
very poor use of my resources to try and duplicate
ground that they are already covering. But I would
very much hope to do more snapshot reports, yes.
Q406 Chair: But if you had those resources to do
the work on this very crucial issue of monitoring and
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reporting as an independent person, would you value
those additional resources to do that? I am not saying
you have come here with a begging bowl. This is my
suggestion to you. In order to do your work more
effectively, would it be helpful if you had an office
like John Vine, maybe not as big as John Vine’s office
but a capacity to be supported in the work that you
do? This is still a very hot issue in Parliament and
among the public.
Mr Anderson: Yes. I have always been self-employed,
I have always done everything on my own, I have
always stood behind every word I have written, so
those are my instincts and my desire is to make a go
of this job, doing it as well as I can on my own,
making my own judgments and standing or falling by
them. I am conscious, of course, of the budgetary
position as well as my own instincts when I say that.
But there may come a point where the job is simply
too big for one person. It has already got quite a lot
bigger, even since I took it over, because I now have
the asset-freezing function, and I have a report on that
coming out shortly. I will also have to do reports on
Examination of Witness
Witness: James Brokenshire, MP, Minister for Crime and Security, Home Office, gave evidence.
Q408 Chair: Minister, thank you very much for
coming to give evidence to the Committee, and can I
begin by thanking you most warmly for agreeing to
speak at the Committee’s conference in Leicester next
week? We look forward very much to your keynote
address.
I start with a general question about the Prevent
Strategy and the information that we have picked up.
We obviously know that you are extremely busy, you
can’t read every single bit of evidence that a Select
Committee has received, but we have picked up
information that suggests that the traditional methods
of radicalisation, such as prisons and universities,
have given way to radicalisation in the home, that this
is something that happens, in a sense, offline where
people have a focus on it, though it may obviously be
online on the internet. Is that your impression as well?
Is some of this generally happening not in the
traditional areas that we might expect but in the
privacy of people’s homes?
Mr Brokenshire: I think, as you will appreciate, Mr
Chairman, this whole concept of radicalisation is a
process and not an event. It is something that we
underline quite clearly, and therefore looking at areas
of vulnerability, either in individuals and also
potentially areas, places where radicalisation can take
place, I think we are detecting a change in behaviour,
and that it is maybe partly drawn by the use of the
Terrorism Act legislation and the radicalisation taking
place outside of public areas, in people’s homes, in
more discreet areas. There is no simple picture that
we can provide in connection with this. This is
complex in terms of pathways and how individuals
are different. If you look at things like the internet,
that can be a factor but it normally would have some
sort of personal contact to buttress or support that, but
not always. So it is a complex picture that we are
people who are detained for more than 14 days, if
there are any, and under the Coroners and Justice Act
2009 I will have a completely new function about
people in detention places in Northern Ireland and in
Paddington Green and elsewhere.
Q407 Chair: As you say, there is an international
dimension to all this. You can’t be expected to be an
expert in every single country.
Mr Anderson: One can do a certain amount by
reading but there comes a time when, for example, a
week in the Netherlands or a week in the United States
or a week in Canada just to get to the bottom of how
they do things there would be extremely useful.
Chair: Indeed. Mr Anderson, on behalf of the
Committee may we wish you well in your new post?
Sorry that it has taken so long to have you before us,
but we will see you again in the not too distant future.
Mr Anderson: I look forward to that. Thank you very
much indeed.
Chair: Thank you very much.
having that greater understanding of now and how
some of this radicalisation is taking place outside of
those public spaces.
Q409 Chair: Do you think it is on the increase?
Mr Brokenshire: I think it is difficult to say that it is
on the increase. Certainly the evidence that we have
seen is that if you look at the number of people who
have said in connection with, for example, the
Citizenship Survey that in some way they support
some sort of violent action to support their beliefs or
their value set, it is a very, very small number. I think
it was around 1% on the last Citizenship Survey. So I
wouldn’t say that I detect that there is some increase.
It is assessing whether there are different communities
that we are looking at.
Q410 Chair: So it is not on the increase?
Mr Brokenshire: I am not detecting that there is an
increase in the overall numbers.
Q411 Chair: So is it on the decrease or is it
stabilised?
Mr Brokenshire: I would say it is stable.
Q412 Chair: Is it an embarrassment for the Home
Office that the Prime Minister wants to ban Hizb ut-
Tahrir? He made that very clear as Leader of the
Opposition, but it remains the case that what he
regards as a terrorist organisation is still functioning
without a ban. When he sees you at all these meetings,
does he come up to you and say, “James, why is this
not banned? I have been calling for this for two
years”?
Mr Winnick: He knows his name, does he?
Mr Brokenshire: As you will appreciate, Mr
Chairman, we don’t give a running commentary on
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organisations that may or may not be being considered
for proscription.
Q413 Chair: No, but he has made a public statement,
not a running commentary. He has said he wants this
banned.
Mr Brokenshire: Well, we don’t have a running
commentary because, as you will appreciate, Mr
Chairman, there is the law in relation to proscription
that does exist, and therefore the relevant statutory test
that needs to be applied in that way, and clearly—
Chair: So that is the problem?
Mr Brokenshire:—we will always ensure that the law
is applied.
Q414 Chair: Well, of course. So the Prime Minister
has said he wants it banned. Tony Blair said he wants
Hizb ut-Tahrir banned. We don’t wish for a running
commentary, because we have a public commentary
from the Prime Minister. The Home Office’s view is,
“Sorry, we can’t do it because it doesn’t come within
the law. We are not able to do it.” Is that basically
the answer?
Mr Brokenshire: In terms of analysing any
organisation and whether it should be proscribed or
not, as this Committee will recognise the Home
Secretary has to satisfy the statutory tests under the
Terrorism Act 2000, which is having evidence that an
organisation is concerned in terrorism. Therefore it is
within that statutory framework that the Home
Secretary will operate, rightly, within the framework
of the law, and therefore it is in the application of the
law that this obviously operates and the decisions that
are taken.
Q415 Chair: So the Prime Minister would like Hizb
ut-Tahrir banned, but the Home Secretary is not
satisfied that the tests have been met?
Mr Brokenshire: As I say, I am not going to comment
on individual organisations, but what I say is that
any—
Q416 Chair: No, of course I am asking you to
comment on it because the Prime Minister has
mentioned this. It has been a source of our questions
during this session. Is the fact that it is not banned
that it has not achieved the tests necessary for the law?
Mr Brokenshire: I think that if an organisation—
Q417 Chair: Would you like to see it banned?
Mr Brokenshire: We keep organisations under close
review, and Hizb ut-Tahrir is an organisation that has
been identified as causing concern with potential links
of some individuals who have been former members
who have gone on to commit terrorist activity. But
clearly the law provides the rules in terms of whether
an organisation should be proscribed or not, and
therefore Hizb ut-Tahrir has not been proscribed, in
essence, while we continue to monitor, because of the
requirements of the law.
Q418 Chair: That is very helpful. We have a list of
the 47 organisations that have been proscribed. We
have heard from the Independent Reviewer just now
about what he feels should be an amendment to the
law. How often would you see this list and how often
would Ministers review the 47? We have seen no
organisations that have been de-proscribed. I used an
example of the LTTE, which has never operated in the
UK, as far as we can see, and has been completely
destroyed by the Sri Lankan Government; that is what
they claim anyway. Why, for example, does the LTTE
still remain on the list?
Mr Brokenshire: All organisations that have been
proscribed are kept under regular review. There is a
Proscription Working Group, and in relation to the
LTTE this was last considered by the cross-
Government Proscription Working Group in May of
this year, and the group concluded that the
organisation remained concerned in terrorism and the
proscription should be maintained. That was the
assessment of the working group at that time. So there
are regular reviews of organisations that are
proscribed, but I am mindful of the recommendations
of the Independent Reviewer, who you have heard just
give evidence, and his suggestions on timelines and
whether there should be a specified period. The Home
Secretary has made clear that we will consider very
carefully the recommendation that the Independent
Reviewer has put forward in that regard.
Chair: Excellent, thank you.
Q419 Nicola Blackwood: The Prevent Review drew
a close connection, I think, between non-violent
extremism and violent extremism, which resulted in
some changes of funding decisions, but it also decided
to draw a greater distinction between dealing with
non-violent extremism in the DCLG and dealing with
terrorism in the Home Office as a result of some
concerns about Prevent being seen as spy activities
and so on. Could you explain how those two strands
of thought came about a little bit?
Mr Brokenshire: I think that there was a lot of careful
consideration as to where Prevent and broader
integration strategies sat alongside each other. Our
analysis—and this was something that came out
through the consultation very strongly—was the
perception that combining Prevent and work on
cohesion created the impression that the Government
were supporting cohesion projects only for security
reasons, only for counter-terrorism reasons. In some
ways this was, I think, leading to confusion, and so we
would find that by combining the two that the wider
integration work may not be effective because it
would be seen from the prism of counter-terrorism,
and indeed, from a Prevent perspective, if it is then
channelled through broader cohesion funding, might
not achieve its objectives in relation to stopping
terrorist incidents. So it was felt very clearly that
separating them was important so that there was
greater focus in relation to the work of Prevent
stopping terrorism, and then the broader work in
relation to integration, led by the Department for
Communities and Local Government, on the
community cohesion and integration issues in that
way. But they do sit alongside each other. I wouldn’t
say that they are separated in terms of a big gap
between them, but they are alongside rather than
overlapping and being confused in that sense, and I
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think that having that greater clarity aids the delivery
of both of those objectives.
Q420 Nicola Blackwood: One of the concerns that
was reported by the previous Communities and Local
Government Committee was that there was poor
communication between Departments on Prevent
work under the previous Prevent Strategy, and
obviously there will be work between Departments on
this new Prevent strategy. I wonder if there are some
new working patterns that will be put in place to try
and improve working between Departments on this.
Mr Brokenshire: I have certainly met with colleagues
from the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills and the Department of Health, and those
Departments are charged with the responsibility for
their various different workings. The Department for
Education also has its roles and responsibilities in
connection with schools. We are very clear of the need
for good join-up across Government and I believe that
that is what is being achieved, recognising the clear
Prevent objectives, but how they need to be responded
to and reflected within those different Departments as
well. So, for example, the Department of Health has
just published guidance to healthcare professionals in
terms of how Prevent operates, how it fits within the
broad safeguarding arena, because so much of this is
about safeguarding vulnerability, picking up on those
factors that may point to vulnerability and people
being exploited in that way. So I think we are seeing
this much broader connection between the work of the
Home Office as well as other Departments in this
arena.
Q421 Nicola Blackwood: Does the National Security
Council have any role in co-ordination for this?
Mr Brokenshire: The National Security Council has
ultimate oversight over the delivery of the content, of
which Prevent is one pillar of the overall strategy. So,
yes, the National Security Council does have ultimate
oversight and then the Prevent board sits underneath
that in terms of monitoring the performance and the
objectives.
Q422 Nicola Blackwood: One of the particular areas
of concern that I have, representing a university seat,
is the role of universities in Prevent, and you
mentioned the Department for Education and the
Department of Health. I wonder if you have been
meeting with higher education colleagues to discuss
the response of universities to some of their
responsibilities within Prevent?
Mr Brokenshire: Of course, and I have met with
David Willetts in relation to this, and the role that
universities play as a potential area where
radicalisation may occur. Radicalisation may take
place off campus in more private areas, but it is
recognised that this is a location where there are
potential risks and potential opportunities for
intervening to stop radicalisation progressing,
recognising that I think around a third, around 30%
of those who have been convicted of terrorist-related
offences for Al-Qaeda Islamist-related terrorism have
been through universities, and so it is looking at it in
that connection.
Q423 Nicola Blackwood: We have received
evidence from Universities UK and other student
societies that, while they recognise that they have a
duty to manage risk, they don’t believe that there is
much hard evidence that violent groups target
universities. Is that the standard response that you
have had from universities or has there been a more
positive response from universities to the proposals
within Prevent?
Mr Brokenshire: What I can say is that I think there
has been some good work that has been under way in
higher education and further education colleges, with
further guidance. The NUS, I think, has produced,
with support from Prevent, some very good guidance
on identifying potential issues—the risk associated,
for example, with external speakers and providing
training—how that can be best operated. So there is
continual dialogue. I think that there is more work to
be done in that arena, but I think that there is also
the recognition of universities and colleges being a
potential area of risk, of—as I have already
highlighted—the proportion of those who have been
convicted of these types of offences having passed
through universities. But as I have said, it is not a
simple picture. There are different areas, different
locations, different vulnerabilities, but I think it is
right that the Prevent Strategy picks up on those
potential locations, spaces where radicalisation may
occur, whether that be universities or healthcare
settings or other settings as well, and that we seek to
address this important issue in that context.
Q424 Michael Ellis: Minister, can I just ask you
about Channel, which as you know is a multi-agency
programme co-ordinated by the police and set up to
identify and help and protect people who are at risk
of radicalisation and provide support for them. The
Prevent Review states that the Government are
considering possible changes to the governance of
Channel, but it doesn’t elaborate further. I would like
to ask you about the funding decisions concerning this
Channel organisation, because at the moment, as I
understand it, funding decisions about Channel
providers are taken by the Office for Security and
Counter-Terrorism.
Mr Brokenshire: Yes.
Michael Ellis: Do you think that there is some
rationale in devolving those decisions to local police
on the ground who might, after all, know
organisations and the communities they serve better
than the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism,
Minister?
Mr Brokenshire: The Channel project, as I think you
will be aware, Mr Ellis, is where there are referrals
from different organisations, whether that be
education, whether that be health, whether that be the
police themselves, where elements of vulnerability
linked to pathways to terrorism have been identified,
and therefore referrals for interventions that may
obviously stop and prevent that progress. I think
Channel has been a very successful programme to
date and what we want to do is to ensure that that is
harnessed further. Channel is currently funded in 12
police force areas, and all of these areas have
interventions provided by statutory partners. In
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addition, there are eight community intervention
providers based in three force areas, in London, in the
West Midlands and also in Derbyshire. I suppose in
that way there is the funding that is provided to police
force areas, and so there is decision-making that is
taken in that way. So I wouldn’t characterise it as
micromanagement in that sort of top-down sense, that
there is that devolution in that way.
Q425 Michael Ellis: You don’t think it is over-
centralised?
Mr Brokenshire: No, I don’t think it is. What we are
focused on is ensuring that, for example, referrals to
Channel are appropriate. We are seeking to, for
example, introduce a new case management system to
better handle the referrals once they are made, and
also ensure that vulnerability itself isn’t then confused
with perhaps some sort of indication of terrorism, and
simply because a person is vulnerable or is showing
factors of vulnerability, that does not mean
automatically that they are in need of support or in
need of assistance from the Channel providers. So if
I look at the indicators, these include opinions
expressed, such as support for violence and terrorism,
possession of materials that support extremism,
including online material, behavioural changes, such
as withdrawal from family and peers, and personal
history, such as claims of involvement in extremist
organisations. So there are indicators that are there,
and I think it is ensuring that those are understood and
people are using professional judgment on the
referrals so that, again, it is working in the appropriate
way, that the support services are there and also the
referrals are as appropriate as can be.
Q426 Michael Ellis: So the changes that are
envisaged to the governance of Channel are ones
along those lines in terms of making it more efficient
and working better?
Mr Brokenshire: Yes. Obviously we are looking very
much at the principles of the new Prevent strategy,
how we may address variation of performance perhaps
between regions as well, and also the extension of
providing coverage across the rest of England and
Wales, and the Channel co-ordinators are going to be
focused on the 25 priority areas, but how their
expertise can be available to all areas through regional
co-ordination of their activities. So it is about how we
can reach out and use the expertise that is there in a
further advanced way.
Q427 Mr Winnick: I want to ask you very briefly—
because I am trying to get into a Westminster Hall
debate on police closures, but we won’t go into that
at the moment—about two or three years ago the head
of MI5 said there were 2,000 individuals in Britain
who could present a danger to the security of our
country. Would you stand by that particular figure or
around it now, Minister?
Mr Brokenshire: You are right, the Director General
of the Security Service said in 2007 that there was a
number of around 2,000. I think that this does give a
sense of the scale of the number of individuals in the
UK who currently act in support of violent extremist
ideology, and so I think that what—
Q428 Mr Winnick: The figure hasn’t changed
much?
Mr Brokenshire: I think it is very difficult to be
precise. I think in many ways, coming back to the
question—
Q429 Chair: Well, 2,000 sounds very precise to me.
It even has a round figure at the end.
Mr Brokenshire: It is a round number, I agree with
you, Mr Chairman. But I think that in many ways,
coming back to the Chair’s question to me earlier on,
it does give a sense of the scale and nature of the
challenge that is there, and the number that was
indicated by the Director General four years ago now
is, I think, a good indication of the continuing
challenge that we face.
Q430 Alun Michael: It is a fairly obvious point that
the views of UK foreign policy have on occasions
been a driver of disillusionment, and sometimes that
leads to radicalisation. On the other hand, we have
had a number of things, like the British Government
support for ordinary Muslims in the Arab Spring, and
we have seen the campaign in Libya. Is there any
evidence that that has led to a more positive image
among disaffected British Muslims?
Mr Brokenshire: I think you are right, Mr Michael,
to fasten on this. As you were asking the question, I
was just looking at the Prevent strategy and the
propositions that are perhaps used in the narrative by
Al-Qaeda and how they claim that obviously the West
is at war with Islam and that Muslims in Western
countries cannot associate or link with non-Muslims
in a democratic process. Therefore, I think foreign
policy is relevant in this context, very relevant, and
what we have sought to do is very much externally to
project a positive image of British Muslims overseas.
There has been a programme of visits by prominent
British Muslims to Muslim majority countries and
countries with a significant Muslim minority to again
paint that clear picture and to challenge
misconceptions as to the reality of life.
Q431 Alun Michael: I think that is true, but if you
look at the intervention in Bosnia, for instance, very
much a situation in which there was defence of the
rights of the lives of individual Muslims, that didn’t
seem to act as a counterbalance to some of the other
events. Do we need to learn lessons about the way we
portray what we do abroad to a domestic audience?
Mr Brokenshire: I think that is one part of it, the
projection externally, but again there is the important
part of the outreach work on challenging
misconceptions and perceptions here. I was quite
struck by an example of some work that is being
undertaken on organising for the MOD to brief the
Pashtun community in Birmingham ahead of the
deployment to Afghanistan to explain what their
purpose and role and function was, to again challenge
potential misconceptions as to what their activity was
for. I think that it is through elements like that that we
can seek to challenge, that we can seek to address this
narrative of the West in some way having some
conflicts against Islam, which is wholly false. It is not
the case and I utterly reject that. I think the
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programmes have been well received, but we need to
continue to make that challenge, to continue to
address that narrative that points in that different
direction, that in many ways the terrorist organisations
feed upon to radicalise and to support their activity,
which is why I think that whole piece of work within
Prevent is just so essential.
Q432 Alun Michael: Another thing on to which they
can latch, of course, is the way that the newspapers
and the media cover international events and
international policy, which can range from the gung-
ho to the very narrow in terms of the agenda being
dealt with. That is presumably a challenge for
Ministers as well, isn’t it? Do you think it is
appropriate for the Government perhaps to encourage
reporting that is a little more objective, shall we say?
Mr Brokenshire: I think there are obviously other
inquiries and investigations in relation to press and
other items at the moment, but I think that it is
incumbent on us as Ministers to do all we can to
challenge that narrative, to challenge that perception
across Government and use opportunities where we
can to do that. In many ways the inquiry that you are
holding is an important way for Government, and
other participants and other organisations as well, to
underline what the programme is about, which is
providing safety to all communities in this country,
and challenge some of that narrative that might
otherwise suggest that that isn’t the case.
Q433 Chair: Thank you. Two quick questions about
things that have happened in the last 24 hours. One is
that the Olympic security bill has now reached £1
billion. That is £7 an hour for the whole of the
Olympic period. As Security Minister, are you
confident that that is enough or do you need more?
Mr Brokenshire: Mr Chairman, we are confident with
the work that has been ongoing in relation to the
Olympic security plan, that this is now being tested
and there are exercises that are ongoing to ensure that
this will deliver the safe and secure Games that we
are committed to. We are confident that the overall
plan can be delivered within the £9.3 billion overall
envelope for the Olympics. Yes, there have been
changes and the NAO report this morning underlines
that and the briefing that was provided by colleagues
in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
yesterday. I think that that is as a consequence of the
development of that work, development of the
planning around individual events, and I think it
shows the real work that has gone in around all of this.
Q434 Chair: Yes, but is it still the case that the
Metropolitan Police would like a little bit more time
and more officers before you remove the relocation
powers in TPIMs? Have they asked you for more
time?
Mr Brokenshire: I have seen a letter that Bernard
Hogan-Howe, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police, has sent to the Committee underlining that
there was a request to extend the time period to 42
days from 28 days to manage the Christmas period, to
aid the transition to TPIMs from control orders, which
we acceded to. I think the Commissioner also
underlines that the Metropolitan Police have received
all of the financial support that they had requested and
have made clear that effective arrangements will be in
place to transition from control orders to TPIMs when
the new regime comes into effect.
Q435 Chair: Finally, you made a speech yesterday
to missing people when you talked about the
difficulties that families face with the loss of some
200,000 people going missing every year, which is
an astonishing figure. Do we know how many of the
200,000 are children?
Mr Brokenshire: Of the 200,000, it is around two-
thirds that represent children. It is in many ways why
I was very clear about the need to support our work,
why we felt that CEOP going into the National Crime
Agency would be strengthened there, how the Missing
Persons Bureau will now also sit within the NCA and
I think that will strengthen activity here. As you may
well be aware, CEOP launched some very practical
guidance, a new website yesterday, to be able to help
direct those loved ones who are left behind to know
where to get help and guidance, as well as the
educational programme that CEOP do so well on child
protection and how that now will be extended to
missing as well.
Q436 Chair: We accept all that and the structural
changes, which we support for the moment, that
CEOP should go into the NCA, but are you confident
that individual police forces—that is where the
problem seems to be—are going to react quickly
enough when a parent rings and says, “My child has
gone missing”?
Mr Brokenshire: There are a number of things that
we are doing around this. One of the commitments in
the strategy that was launched yesterday was in
relation to loved ones, that they should be signposted
and directed to support, which I think is an important
step, and we are now taking that forward with ACPO
in terms of implementation. One other element that is
contained in there was the urgent work that CEOP are
undertaking around child rescue alerts and the missing
kids website. I think they are facilities that are there
that for whatever reason have not been harnessed
effectively to date, they have not really been used that
much, and I want to understand properly how we can
harness them, because if you have a young person
who disappears then sometimes getting that message
out quite quickly is important.
But the other important factor that has become quite
clear over the course of the last few months is young
runaways who run away regularly, that you don’t
know where they have gone, that that may be a pointer
to child exploitation, either that they are running away
from exploitation or, sadly, that they may be running
towards exploitation. Therefore, the missing strategy
does complement and fit alongside the separate
strategy on child sexual exploitation, recognising that
missing can be a very important element in identifying
that exploitation may be taking place, and also why
ACPO are piloting two schemes in two parts of the
country at the moment to better respond to reports of
missing, to better risk-assess vulnerability. I think
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there are a number of important practical factors as
well as the strategy that fits in from that.
Chair: We will look at this again. Before Mr Winnick
runs away to save his police station, he has a very
quick supplementary on that.
Q437 Mr Winnick: Minister, are you satisfied that
the police are sufficiently strengthened in being able
to deal with what is described as honour killings, the
very opposite of the report that has recently come out,
of people—particularly females, not exclusively—
being brutalised and indeed, as we know only too
well, murdered as a result of refusing to agree to what
is required of them in terms of marriage?
Chair: This is a big subject, but a very brief answer
and we will pursue it later.
Mr Brokenshire: Hate crime is something that we do
take extraordinarily seriously and I have certainly
been appalled by some of the shocking cases that we
have seen over a number of years. It is something that
my colleague, Lynne Featherstone, is taking forward
with her responsibilities in relation to hate crime and
violence against women and girls, but please be
assured—
Mr Winnick: So-called honour crimes.
Mr Brokenshire: Yes. I appreciate the important
distinction in relation to honour crime, that certain
communities are more affected, and that shining a
light on some of this is a challenge in its own right.
That is something that we are cognisant of and that
the Home Office is taking forward.
Chair: We will have Lynne Featherstone before us.
Minister, thank you very much.
Mr Brokenshire: Thank you very much, Mr
Chairman.
Chair: We look forward to seeing you next week in
Leicester.
Mr Brokenshire: I look forward to it.
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Witnesses: Ian Paisley Jr MP, Democratic Unionist Party, Mike Whine, Christian Cullen, Imam Sikander
Pathan, Feltham, Young Offenders Institution Dr Richard Hall, De Montfort University, gave evidence.
Q438 Chair: May I call this conference and the
Committee to order? We are now in the formal
session, so when we hear from people, what they say
will be put down as evidence to the Committee and
the only people who can ask questions will be
members of the Committee. We are going to start by
going through each of the workshops and we have five
minutes from each of the rapporteurs to tell us what
was discussed there and then there will be questions
from members of the Committee to those who have
participated. We start with workshop1, chaired by
Patrick Mercer on Northern Ireland. Can the
rapporteur tell us what the conclusions were?
Ian Paisley: First of all, our group obviously had
three main presentations, with one from Sarah, which
dealt with Irish and Muslim terrorism and did a
comparison study. Brian Gormley made a presentation
and talked about the human rights-based approach to
addressing all forms of terrorism, and I talked about
balance. We concluded that the media use of
Muslim—in terms of labelling people as Muslim
terrorists or Protestant terrorists or Catholic
terrorists—can be and is extremely damaging. The
example of Northern Ireland was described and how
it could be a shining example of how you address
radicalism and get rid of the problems that
radicalism causes.
Human rights abuses by any section of society—
whether it is the state or individuals—ought to be
investigated and apologised for. The visit by Her
Majesty the Queen marked a watershed moment in
how both the Republic and Northern Ireland viewed
each other and that has opened a gate on how Ireland
can mark some of its forthcoming anniversaries over
the next 10 years. An example involving the President
of Ireland was also cited as a very positive example
for dealing with bringing communities together.
Nowadays, engagement with communities is much
more likely than it was at the height of the Irish
terrorism campaign. Local work on the Prevent
strategy and work on community cohesion is
incredibly difficult to reconcile—and this was a very
important point made by one of the members of the
Committee—as the Government has to be careful that
it has raised expectations to a particular level and then
followed through with massive support and the
encouragement to deliver what the community has
asked for and what it wants, and that includes
community trust. But all of that has to be set against
a background that all is not solved in Northern
Ireland, there is ongoing balance, there is on-going,
indeed, extreme terrorism still operating and one of
the biggest threats in our society still comes from
Alun Michael
Irish-based terrorism groups that are not affected by
the Prevent strategy.
Q439 Chair: Thank you, that was very helpful.
Could Mike Whine give us the report from his
workshop on the far-right?
Michael Whine: We began with a presentation by Dr
Matthew Feldman from Northampton University who
began by saying that in his opinion it is a propitious
time for the far-right in that it is reconfiguring. He
then asked what exactly do we mean by the far-right
and what type of threat is it that we are facing that
comes from them? He made the point that there are
other groups that are far more extreme than the EDL,
such as the Aryan Strike Force, four members of
which have been convicted of various acts of
preparation for terrorism, including the building of a
ricin bomb, which suggested that the far-right has a
capacity for terrorism and that it appears to be
growing.
He mentioned the danger of lone wolf attacks and that
he himself had advised the CPS on a couple of cases
which involved far-right terrorism. His last point was
that there is a development towards what he refers to
as broadband terrorism—in other words, the use of
the internet both to radicalise and to exchange
information among people within the far-right and that
as the 21st century progresses, this is a problem that
is likely to get worse.
My own presentation looked at the threat of terrorism
from the far-right to the Jewish community, and I
made the point that the primary focus of the far-right
in Britain is not the Jewish community but rather the
Muslim community. Jews do face a very real threat
of terrorism but it comes primarily from global Jihad
movements and from the Iranians and their surrogates.
But, nevertheless, there had been 17 people convicted
of terrorism charges in the UK and I also mentioned
the Aryan Strike Force which was believed to have
been targeting the Jewish community, as was David
Copeland, who it was subsequently discovered after
his arrest, in addition to targeting the Asian, black and
LGBT communities, may also have been planning to
attack the Jewish community.
I ended with some notes. There are some points about
what the Jewish community is doing to protect
themselves against terrorism in terms of strengthening
and hardening potential targets within the community,
partly with Government financial assistance and partly
funded by ourselves.
Gerry Gable, giving Searchlight’s presentation, began
by mentioning the book on far-right terrorism that had
been commissioned by John Denham when he was
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Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government and suggesting that Parliament requires a
committee that focuses on racism and extremism. In
particular, he also felt that the police have been
downplaying its evidence to the Home Affairs
Committee in terms of a threat from the far-right and
went on to talk about the connections that are
gradually emerging between the EDL, its
membership, some of its leaders and the people that
have been funding it—as shown by The Sunday Times
article two days ago—and also the fact that across
Europe there are increasing contacts between far-right
activists, including the group known as the Doner
Bombers in Germany who had this reign of terrorist
attacks in Germany over a number of years, who may
possibly also have been travelling to Scandinavia.
Professor Nigel Copsey’s presentation looked at the
EDL itself and he asked, “Do we include the EDL in
our assessment from the far-right?” He made the point
that the Prevent strategy had made no mention of the
EDL, but an examination of its website would suggest
that it has some liberal humanistic ideologies but in
fact its press releases and its activities on the streets
suggest otherwise. In particular its concentration on
the white ethnic element of the culture that it is
purportedly defending places it very firmly within a
far-right ideology.
He also made the point that while the EDL’s official
line is that terrorism can never be excused—
particularly in reference to Anders Breivik in
Norway—the comments on its Facebook site suggest
that there are a number of EDL supporters who
expressed support for his actions. The targets of the
EDL are particularly the Muslim community and left-
wing anti-racist organisations and that there is a
danger of a spiralling of violence, with each side
working the other up into ever more violent positions.
There were a number of questions which I will leave
for the moment.
Q440 Chair: Thank you very much, Mike. The third
workshop was on the police and it was chaired by
Alun Michael. I invite Christian Cullen to report on it.
Mr Cullen: Our workshop asked what are the key
challenges facing the police in delivering Prevent?
Chief Constable Cole from the Leicestershire
Constabulary started us off, suggesting that although
the threat level is substantial there have been recent
events. There is, for example, a very mixed
demography in Leicester, which is a perfect
microcosm and the perfect place to be holding this
particular debate. There is the reputation or legacy
around the brand of Prevent and there is the issue of
community suspicion and stereotyping. People are
looking for something which might be AQ or far-right
et cetera, and there is this challenge of who actually
owns what. Police are task-driven but they are still
the enforcement agency, so perhaps should they be
Prevent? There is the political buy-in aspect whereby
for some people this is difficult, which can hinder
development of wider partnership.
One case of good practice is where individuals, who
are identified as vulnerable under Prevent, are dealt
with through the same vulnerability assessments and
interventions as those vulnerable in other ways. The
point was made that day-to-day interactions with the
police are the way in which trust is built, but there
remains the question of how we ensure that
intelligence brought back to the station by community
police officers is used effectively? There are indeed
community safety partnerships but the question is how
will we be affected by introduction of police? For
example, they won’t be vetted but what can we share
with them?
We followed on with that with Dr Colin Roberts from
Cardiff University, who discussed the numerous
policy analyses of Prevent. He suggested that there
are far too few fieldwork studies, and this is
something that he considered ought to increase. He
identified two types of Prevent police engagements:
we have internal engagement with other police and
security services staff who are not visible to the public
but are covert; we then have the external engagement
with the public. The level of resistance from the
Muslim community should not be overstated and he
believes it has been deliberately overstated.
Muslim attitudes to police are broadly comparable
with the general population. Young Muslim men have
slightly lower confidence; older Muslim women also
have the same because of exposure of their sons to
Prevent policing, quite often. How is the concept of
being a suspect in the community played out? It is
real. The Birmingham spy cameras removal is one
example and their removal was just as serious as their
original inception.
The police face difficulty in getting intelligence
through other means however, and it does not mean
that communities will not talk to the police, even if
the relationship is strained. There are many examples
of community work with police that do not make the
media and it is also important to assess how the police
organise themselves. Seeing the Muslim community
as one single entity is obviously wrong. Police officers
should be chosen for this work based on their skill sets
rather than their job title. Replacing tick-box quantity
assessment of community engagement exercises with
qualitative assessment was one particular
recommendation. Police have to understand when it
may be of national risk to the individuals when
providing information whereby a relationship of trust
is to develop. That trust is absolutely key and must
be preserved.
There are a number of key investments to make.
Skilled natural communicators must be out there as
much as possible. The remaining value of those
connections has to be clear, and a signposting of how
those connections remain and are continued has to be
created. At the moment we feel it is quite an
ambiguous process. This needs to be a management
decision that the police are not the only relevant party
in town. It needs to be a protective element that is
initiated by police. They need to be mobilised and
initiated through the community itself. The
community must be made to feel that they are their
own stakeholders and are investing in their own
future.
Then it was the turn of SIRS Consultancy, my
company, and all four of us spoke incredibly quickly
to squeeze ourselves in there and we identified a
number of key issues. Firstly, we looked at the police
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national database as a solution and not just the
problem that it has been rumoured to be. In addition,
we looked at regional fusion centres in some detail
and we suggested they should be adopted to improve
intelligence sharing and they would be a bottom-up
process rather than top-down, which is something that
has occurred in America, which has shown itself to be
quite successful, but we believe that it is the way in
which there could be holistic solutions and holistic is
obviously the word of the day.
Q441 Chair: Thank you, that is very helpful. Could
I have the fourth workshop on prisons, which was
chaired by Khalid Mahmood.
Imam Sikander Pathan: We talked on how to
counteract the radicalisation in prisons with myself,
Imam Sikhander Pathan and Professor Peter Neumann
from the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation, and from Centri we had Rashad Ali.
We summarised everything into bullet points and we
first talked about the population. About 12% of the
prisoners are Muslims, according to the stats of 2010.
Of these only 0.1% are tracked offenders. AQ are the
largest single group, but not forgetting we also have
animal rights activists, right-wing extremists and
others that the prison service holds.
Occasionally the men are faced at a very low
emotional point and when they come to the prisons
they don’t claim to be from a specific faith
community, due to the embarrassment that they have
caused their faith community. We talked about gangs
and the fact that particular types of religious culture
emerge in the prisons which are used to justify
offending. We also said that some cases of radical
rhetoric cannot be challenged. However, there was
also a belief that gangs are formed in the community
and then it is the individual or the gang members that
are convicted then brought into the prison, and
chaplains and prison officers and many staff do quite
a lot of mediation with the people affiliated with gangs
in the outside community.
We talked in particular about chaplaincy, where the
place of worship—the mosque, the church or where
the Sikhs or the Hindus would pray—would only be
one area and prisoners from different gangs will need
to get together, so there’s a lot of mediation that
chaplaincy does. Talking on faith in the prison, as
much as it is looked at as a negative we also looked
at it as a positive, because in solitude there is time for
reflection and prisoners come closer to their faith and
that is the time when we really need to educate them
and guide them about their faith. So their faith should
not be frowned upon; it is the faith that will help
remove any misunderstanding about the faith.
Then we talked about the chaplains that come from
the faith communities or those Muslims that are
working with the Government. It is interesting where
the community would sometimes disown those people
that are working with the Government, and people in
the Government or the police would question the trust
and the honesty of the Muslims that are working with
them, so it is really the “damned if you do, damned if
you don’t” syndrome.
We talked about the de-radicalisation and the fact that
Government-sanctioned interventions focus on
containment but that more radical approaches
challenge the individual and seek to understand their
viewpoint. On prisoner-based radicalisation there was
a discussion: as much as there is a clear potential
problem in principle, there is no reliable or hard
evidence that this exists. From what one of the people
from our group—a youth worker—was saying, it
seems like there was a bigger problem in the youth
clubs than there is in the prison service.
There was also a discussion that no one should record
and publish the figures of those prisoners that are
radicalised. Then followed a conversation about it
being a social process and being a radical is not an
event. One of the speakers talked of four main areas;
the outcome of the first was that there really is no
agreed definition of an extremist, so it is very difficult
to put people down just because they are practising
their faith.
There was a discussion where the speaker talked about
the four main areas that a prison should cover. First, of
course, prisons should be decent orderly places which
should not be overcrowded, which makes recognising
radicalisation a bit easier when the prison populations
are stable and the staff have the ability to work with
all the prisoners. The second one we talked about was
training and educating the frontline staff to help them
differentiate between a person who becomes close to
faith and starts growing a beard or expressing the need
to perform the five daily prayers and to understand
behaviours which cannot be misunderstood. Then
there was discussion on the third point. From the main
faith providers we should ensure that there is cover so
that there is an ability to educate the people of the
right path of their faith. The fourth point the speaker
made was about a decent aftercare: when the prisoners
are in prison they receive a lot of care and support but
when they go back in the community there’s a lack of
resettlement projects or community-led projects that
would help them keep on the straight and narrow.
Q442 Chair: Thank you, that is very helpful. Could
I move on to the final workshop, chaired by Dr Julian
Huppert, which was the universities’ workshop.
Mr Hall: We spoke about university as a crucial site
for discussion and that it is stuck inside a broader
political context, so we had three brief talks. I spoke
about trying to reconnect more deeply to the radical
historical tradition of the university as a site for the
discussion of what is legitimate, what is marginalised
and about power and how we might learn from current
student occupations.
We had an intervention from Gordon Head, who
spoke about the role of social media and about
technology, in particular about how technologies for
interception, technologies for the managing or
monitoring are available but need to be defined. We
need socio-cultural rules to be discussed in that space.
Hannah Stewart spoke on trying to connect us to a
global space, a global set of conditions and
interpretations and labels and provide us with some
evidence from work that had been done across UK
campuses around those who had already committed to
violent radicalisation and those who are radicalised at
universities and those who are attracted and influenced
and therefore became violent beyond the university
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and what might be done in that space in the balance
of civil liberties and security.
Some of the solutions that emerged were around how
we work and live and do our work within university in
public—we do that very explicitly in public and we do
not outsource solutions beyond the institutions, so we
engage with a range of communities in trying to find
solutions; how we might engage with technologies in
order to define the rules for their application and how
we might, therefore, come to some broad sense of
understanding of what is appropriate in terms of
monitoring extremism. Also, there needs to be some
realism about what universities can do and what is
achievable within the context of the rule of law.
Some of the questions from the floor were particularly
interesting in connecting into that socio-cultural
understanding of how universities would enable us to
contest definitions and labels of who will be labelled as
an extremist or a radical, and how that would enable us
to move beyond sensationalism. We heard very specific
points made about how we can engage with how our
students are thinking and feeling while they are at
university. Is radicalisation simply synonymous with
Islam and Muslims, and whose word becomes law and
how do we contest that? Who is scrutinised? It is easier
to scrutinise some communities than others and how is
technology then to be used, for whom is it being used
and why? Finally, how do we work on the responsibility
of the university and its duty of care to manage risk and
to manage its broader engagements with a set of
communities in order that it might become more
resilient?
Chair: Thank you. Alun Michael has a question.
Q443 Alun Michael: This is probably more a
comment. I am a little concerned that we heard the
presentations and certainly in my group there was a
very interesting discussion; they were very good
presentations, but the discussion went on to different
territory. So, for instance—I make no apologies for
saying this because I have spent the whole of my career
trying to build partnership—but the idea of a fusion
centre is an American response to an American
problem. I have seen the one in Los Angeles, which is
the second most important in the US, and it is very
impressive but it is suited to its circumstances and I am
not sure that transplanting is the right approach.
There was the comment about communities feeling that
they have ownership and, of course, feeling only really
follows on genuinely having ownership, so there is a
challenge there. The Chief Constable suggested that
sometimes the police response is about structure and
science, or at least having the appearance of being
structured and science—that was my addition to what
he said—when this is really about organic and art. The
key is shared ownership, connection, communication,
confidence—which has to be mutual confidence—and
at the end of the day it comes down to relationships.
So I suppose my question back to the wider conference
would be “Is it right that relationships are the things that
are at the core of all of this and how do we build the
right relationships, the right listening, the right
understanding in order to achieve the right mutual
confidence?”
Chair: Yes. Pete was very helpful in his presentation
this morning. I don’t know if he is still here but he talked
about the use of the word “prevent”. I feel very strongly,
having sat through a great deal of evidence over the last
three months, that we should just get rid of this word
and instead call it “engage”. If we engage with
communities it is better than preventing. How can we—
as the Reverend Jackson said in his address—stop
people doing things? It is very difficult to do so.
Q444 Dr Huppert: I think we need to find a word that
means engage that starts with a P, if I understand the
naming system correctly but—
Chair: I don’t think we should go there.
Dr Huppert: I do not envy the rapporteurs having to
summarise fairly large wide-ranging discussions into a
short presentation but I am going to make it even harder
for them. Ultimately, we are going to have to come up
with a few, hopefully short, crisp recommendations for
what we think the Government ought to do, and I would
be really grateful to hear from the five rapporteurs what
are the two short things that you think are the key things
that we should be taking out, so that we know what to
say? I realise this is getting us to digest even further.
Mr Paisley: I think the P, apart from Paisley, is
partnership—a partnership approach. That has been the
lesson that I think we learned in Northern Ireland; that
it is about a true partnership with the community and
the community being regarded as an element of the
partnership or being key partners in the partnership with
policing and the police, a partnership with them. In
terms of getting down to your main questions, I think
one of the key issues is that there is still an awful lot of
work left to do. We have the strategy; a lot of people
feel that they do not understand how it works in their
community yet; they feel disengaged from it, but the
strategy has to come from the grassroots up, to a large
degree. The sooner we get to that point where there is a
grassroots engagement with it and they feel ownership
of it, then and only then, will it really start to work in a
functioning way and in a practical way and in the
partnership way that we probably all aspire to.
Chair: Thank you very much. What is going to
happen now is that everything that everyone has
said—in the workshops and at this session—we are
going to note, as part of our inquiry. We are going to
produce a report, probably in January of next year.
Our timetable was slightly skewed because of the riots
in August; we made the decision to have an inquiry
into the riots, the Prime Minister then asked us to
produce the report as quickly as possible, so we have
that report. We also have another inquiry into the
UKBA going on, so our agenda has been taken in a
different direction since we started this inquiry, but we
hope to conclude very shortly and we will have a
report by the end of January. I have just been
reminded if the reporters/rapporteurs—are we allowed
to use French words these days, I’m not sure? If the
rapporteurs could let us have their notes of what was
discussed, that would be extremely helpful.
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Written evidence
Written evidence submitted by the Home Office
This paper sets out the Home Office evidence to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the roots of
violent radicalisation.
The concept of radicalisation underpins the new Prevent strategy, which was recently published following
an extensive review. Prevent will address all forms of terrorism, including Al Qa’ida related terrorism, extreme
right wing terrorism and terrorism linked to domestic extremism, according to the threat posed to our national
security. The allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. At present the greatest threat
to the UK is from Al Qa’ida and the groups and individuals that share the ideology associated with it.
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is responsible for dealing with the threat from Northern Ireland-
related terrorism in Northern Ireland. Prevent does not deal directly with the threat from Northern Ireland-
related terrorism but many of the issues dealt with under Prevent are relevant to countering this threat. We
continue to co-operate closely with the devolved administration in Northern Ireland which is responsible for
most relevant policy areas.
In our response to the committee areas of interest we have drawn from the review and use terms as defined
in the new Prevent strategy.
In the first section we have summarised the major drivers of radicalisation, based on the available research
and intelligence. Much of this knowledge is based on Al Qa’ida influenced individuals and groups but also
draws from what is known about other types of violence, including other form of terrorism, gang activity
and cults.
In the second section, we consider the sectors and institutions identified by the committee as places where
radicalisation may take place. The third section describes the Prevent strategy and how it is being implemented.
The last section sets out the process for proscribing terrorist groups. This was considered recently as part of
the Home Secretary’s review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers. This section also notes the work being
taken forward by the Department for Communities and Local Government on integration, which is relevant to
groups that are not involved in terrorism but nevertheless give cause for concern.
Section 1
Major drivers and risk factors for recruitment to terrorist movements
1.1 All terrorist groups need to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. The Prevent strategy is based on
our understanding of radicalisation processes and the factors that encourage individuals to support terrorism
and engage in terrorist related activity.
1.2 Recent academic, intelligence and social research work has illuminated the drivers of radicalisation; the
characteristics of those people who have been radicalised and who have joined terrorist groups; and the
pathways that may lead individuals into support for, and participation in, terrorist acts.
1.3 There is no standard profile of a terrorist and no single pathway or route that an individual takes to
becoming involved in a terrorist organisation. Not all drivers will play a role in every instance of radicalisation.
Rather, drivers and risk factors appear to be inter-connected and mutually reinforcing but exert influence on
individuals to varying extents.
1.4 The recent Prevent review found that our earlier analysis of the key drivers of and risk factors for
recruitment to Al Qa’ida-related terrorist movements in this country remains largely valid. The three key drivers
for Al Qa’ida-related terrorism in this country are outlined below.
(a) Ideology and ideologues
1.5 Central to the development of any movement or group is the construction of an ideological framework
and its promotion. Ideology offers a coherent set of ideas that can provide the basis for organised political
action. Ideology may also serve to bring coherence to activity in the absence of leadership or a command
structure.
1.6 Ideology is a key driver of radicalisation. People who accept and are motivated by an ideology which
states that violence is an acceptable course of action are more likely to engage in terrorism-related activity.
People who come to believe in such an ideology may be not only willing to kill but also to sacrifice their own
lives. Challenging that ideology is therefore an essential part of a preventative counter-terrorism programme.
1.7 Some terrorist groups, such as Al Qa’ida, use religion as both a basis for their ideology and as a means
of justifying their actions. Understanding the connection between ideology and theology and how the first can
masquerade as the second is important.
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1.8 Ideology depends on ideologues, people who promote that ideology and encourage others to subscribe
to it. Who the ideologues are (their background and life history) and how they behave is as central to their
appeal as what they say. Challenging ideology also means identifying such people, ensuring they cannot take
advantage of the freedoms in this country to promote their messages without debate or rebuttal, prosecuting
them where they have broken the law and restricting their access to this country where appropriate.
(b) Individual vulnerability
1.9 Radicalisation is a process not an event. Specific personal characteristics, exposure to terrorist ideology
and local circumstances can combine to create individual vulnerability to radicalisation.
1.10 Personal vulnerabilities can include uncertainty about identity, a weak sense of belonging in this country,
underachievement in education and employment; social isolation; and underdeveloped or confused religious
understanding. Involvement in crime can also expose individuals to radicalising influences. However, these
factors are not definitive nor always present—individuals who do not have these vulnerabilities have also
engaged in terrorism.
1.11 Programmes to support individuals to resist and reverse radicalisation have been developed in this
country and overseas. These are comparatively new and their effectiveness has not yet been verified.
1.12 Radicalisation is also a social process, prevalent in small groups—it is about “who you know” as well
as “who you are”. Group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination can encourage individuals to regard violence
as a legitimate response to perceived injustice. Through group dynamics and strong interpersonal bonds these
views can become progressively more extreme and violent.
(c) Sectors and institutions where radicalisation takes place
1.13 In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and
those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge.
1.14 Prisons, faith institutions, higher and further educational establishments (including universities) and the
internet are all sectors identified in the Prevent strategy. Each institution and sector needs to be assessed in its
own right. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government-funded but have
considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run (but still may be subject to Government
regulation).
1.15 The role played by sectors and institutions is considered within Section 2 of this paper.
Northern Irish terrorism and extreme right wing terrorism
1.16 There is evidence that elements of the drivers outlined above are also present within other forms
of terrorism.
1.17 Historically, the principle threat from terrorist organisations in the UK came from Northern Ireland-
related terrorist groups. This declined following implementation of the 1998 Belfast (“Good Friday”) agreement
but has increased significantly over the past two year. Ideology is a key driver for recruitment to and support
for Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups may justify terrorism
using the constitutional position of Ireland and in particular the ongoing British presence in Ireland.
1.18 Extreme right-wing terrorism has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism
associated with Al Qa’ida. Seventeen people are serving sentences in this country for terrorism-related offences
who are known to be associated with extreme right-wing groups. Extreme right-wing terrorism may be driven
by a supremacist ideology, which sanctions the use of extreme violence as a response to perceived social
injustice and dysfunction.
Section 2
Prisons, religious premises, universities and the internet as settings for radicalisation
Prisons
2.1 We know that some people who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related offences, and
some who have been convicted for non-terrorism-related offences but have previously been associated with
extremist or terrorist networks, have sought to radicalise and recruit other prisoners. The extent to which these
efforts are successful and the extent to which radicalisation and recruitment that take place in prison endures
beyond the confines of the prison environment is not yet clear.
2.2 Prisons hold high profile and influential TACT offenders, some with a track record and continuing
intention of radicalisation and recruitment. As of 30 September 2010, there were 116 prisoners held in relation
to terrorism or terrorism related offences.
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2.3 Prisons also hold individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation. Would-be radicalisers may seek
support for their ideology or to strengthen their personal influence through bullying or other means. This may
include attempting to impose their distorted version of Islam on vulnerable individuals.
2.4 The formation of temporary and opportunistic alliances between offenders is a commonly observed
behaviour in prisons, and not necessarily indicative of radicalisation. Prisoners may form alliances as a coping
mechanism, protection from bullying, or to create hierarchies and power bases.
2.5 The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) has already undertaken action in prisons to address
radicalisation, including training of prison staff about violent extremism. Information and intelligence gathering
and sharing is now better able to identify the challenges posed by terrorist and extremist prisoners, including
radicalisation. NOMS has developed three interventions to support staff work with radicalised offenders. Two
interventions address issues of identity and motivation. The third targets beliefs and ideologies related to Al
Qa’ida influenced terrorism. Chaplains, who operate in a multi-faith, multi-disciplinary, context are important
in providing authoritative spiritual and pastoral support to prisoners and have received significant support and
training in addressing the risks posed by extremism and radicalisation.
Religious premises
2.6 Faith institutions and organisations can play a key role in challenging ideology that purports to provide
theological justification for terrorism. They will often have authority and credibility not available to
Government. They can provide more specific and direct challenge to those who claim religious expertise and
use what appear to be religious arguments to draw others into terrorism. They can also play a wider and no
less vital role in helping create a society which recognises the rights and the contributions of different faith
groups, endorses tolerance and the rule of law and encourages participation and interaction. People who
subscribe to these values and principles are unlikely to turn to terrorism.
2.7 Mosques have faced a particular challenge from organisations whose views we now associate with Al
Qa’ida. Such groups have tried to infiltrate mosques in this country and sometimes even to set up mosques of
their own. Where that has not been possible—very often because mosques have resisted these efforts—
individual extremist preachers have sought to develop what amounts to their own “brand” of Islam. Some have
created extremist organisations and institutions to disseminate their views.
2.8 Since 2005, the police and local authorities have sought a much closer (albeit low profile) dialogue with
mosques and their governing bodies and, in many cases, also with the national or regional faith groups of
which they are members. The police now talk regularly to mosques in a way that was rare before 2005,
advising about the terrorist threat and taking advice on the perspectives of the local community.
2.9 Community resistance has also reduced the open operation of radical preachers: this is encouraging.
Some extremist preachers have been arrested and prosecuted; others are awaiting deportation or have been
refused entry to this country.
2.10 Few mosques now openly and knowingly promote extremist or terrorist views. In some areas, groups
and individuals continue their attempts to subvert mosques, to use them for extremist purposes or to encourage
violence and to raise funds for groups in this country or overseas engaged in terrorist-related activity.
Elsewhere, activity has been displaced to areas and venues which are less public and, in particular, to study
groups which operate in private premises or on the internet.
Universities
2.11 Universities and colleges have an important role to play in Prevent, particularly in ensuring balanced
debate as well as freedom of speech. They also have a clear responsibility to exercise their duty of care and to
protect the welfare of their students. We have seen that people may be radicalised at different points in their
life. Whether radicalisation occurs on campus or elsewhere, staff in higher and further education institutions
can identify and offer support to people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism.
2.12 Universities and colleges promote and facilitate the exchange of opinion and ideas, and enable debate
as well as learning. Although there has been no systematic attempt to recruit or radicalise people in full-time
education in this country, universities and colleges can offer opportunities for radicalisation.
2.13 These institutions are attended by large numbers of young people who may be distanced from their
familiar support networks at a time of personal development, search for identity and increased independence.
2.14 There is evidence that in the past some extremist organisations have targeted specific universities and
colleges with the objective of radicalising and recruiting students. The Al Muhajiroun organisation, which has
now been proscribed under counter-terrorism legislation, is one example. Some groups, notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
continue to operate within the law but give cause for concern.
2.15 Some extremist preachers from this country and from overseas, not connected to specific extremist
groups, have also sought repeatedly to reach out to selected universities and to Muslim students.
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2.16 There is evidence to suggest that some people associated with some Islamic student societies have
facilitated this activity and that it has largely gone unchallenged. Five former senior members of university
Islamic Societies have been convicted of terrorism-related offences.
2.17 Action already taken by universities to address radicalisation includes the provision of advice, guidance
and support to help institutions manage the risk of radicalisation on campus. Guidance for all higher education
institutions was issued in 2008 in conjunction with the police, the Home Office and the National Union of
Students. The Department for Business Innovation and Science (BIS) has supported a number of projects
designed to help key members of staff to identify vulnerability when they see it and offer appropriate support.
The Internet
2.18 The internet has enabled a wider range of terrorist organisations to reach a much larger audience with
a broader and more dynamic series of messages and narratives. It encourages interaction and facilitates
recruitment.
2.19 The internet plays a role in terms of sustaining and reinforcing terrorist ideological messages and
enabling individuals to find and communicate with like-minded individuals and groups.
2.20 The role of the internet in the radicalisation process remains the subject of debate. Apart from a small
number of cases, real world interaction is still the most important factor in the radicalisation process. But, to
some extent, the internet mirrors the dynamics of a social group, producing an environment where extreme
views and ideas receive encouragement and support.
2.21 Action already taken in this area to address radicalisation includes the launch of a Counter-Terrorism
Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU)—a dedicated police unit intended to assess and investigate internet-based
content which may be illegal under UK law and to take appropriate action against it, whether through the
criminal justice system or by making representations to internet service providers. The CTIRU has removed
material from the internet on 156 occasions over the last 15 months.
Other important settings
2.22 In addition to the settings identified by the committee inquiry brief, we consider the health services,
higher and further education colleges and schools to be important sectors where there are risks of radicalisation
or opportunities to prevent it.




3.1 The Prevent strategy is firmly rooted in our understanding of radicalisation and of the settings and spaces
where radicalisation can take place.
3.2 Prevent is part of our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The aim is to stop people becoming terrorists
or supporting terrorism.
3.3 Prevent will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to
our national security. This includes Al Qa’ida related terrorism, extreme right wing terrorism and terrorism
linked to domestic extremism. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will continue to be devoted
to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa’ida, its affiliates or related groups.
3.4 The three objectives of the Prevent strategy are:
— Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those that promote it.
— Protecting vulnerable people.
— Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.
3.5 The new strategy has a broader scope—addressing all forms of terrorism—but also a tighter focus on
the most at risk people and places. Prevent is a national programme but will be prioritised at local level
according to the risks we face. Twenty five areas have been selected as the focus of local Prevent work.
Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those that promote it
3.6 The Prevent strategy sets out the Government’s approach to challenging terrorist ideology and those you
promote it. Terrorist ideology has a number of components—theological, political and social. Government can
take the lead in some of these areas. In others, Government is better placed to facilitate work by communities
in this country and overseas.
3.7 We will take action against people who have broken the law and who glorify violence, excluding people
who wish to come to this country to promote violence or extremist views. We will ensure that extremists do
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not take advantage of public spaces and that their activities are restricted. We will publicly challenge people
who for too long have been able to get away with propaganda activity here.
3.8 Much of our work will focus on challenging ideology within local areas and key sectors and institutions.
It will aim to enable those on the frontline to challenge terrorist ideology more effectively.
3.9 We will support the efforts of theologians, academics and communities by providing information on the
texts which are being used to radicalise people in this country.
3.10 We will work to increase the confidence of civil society activists to challenge online extremist content
effectively and to provide credible alternatives and ensure robust application of the unacceptable behaviors
exclusion criteria, taking steps to improve the processes that support identification and assessment of potential
exclusion cases and the implementation of decisions to exclude foreign nationals where it is in the public
interest.
Protecting vulnerable people
3.11 Preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are identified assessed and
offered appropriate support is central to Prevent.
3.12 Future developments in this area will build on the previous work with vulnerable people, including
Channel—the existing multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of
radicalisation.
3.13 Channel currently operates across 12 police force areas. During the coming year we will implement a
new delivery model which will provide all local areas with access to Channel capability. This will allow for
national coverage with greater flexibility to respond to varying levels of threat.
3.14 There will be no change in how the process is delivered: Channel will continue to operate on a
partnership model with risk assessment and the development of support packages being led by local multi-
agency panels. But we will ensure that in future all individual cases go through Channel and are subject to
more consistent case management.
3.15 Channel resources will be allocated according to level of risk. Areas of higher risk will have dedicated
resources; areas of lower risk will have access to Channel on a needs basis.
Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation
3.16 Work is already underway with Government departments and other bodies to develop the national
programmes with the key sectors and institutions identified by the committee. These programmes will support
the development of local Prevent delivery plans in the 25 priority areas. Examples of the steps being taken at
national level within each sector are set out below.
Prisons
3.17 NOMS will continue to develop, commission and significantly upscale targeted counter radicalisation
and de-radicalisation interventions based on risk assessment to address extremist offending and radicalisation,
in cooperation with partner agencies. Training and support will be provided to operational staff to help them
distinguish recognisable criminal behaviours from genuine radicalisation; and to confidently and appropriately
report, challenge and intervene in cases where behaviours are linked to violent extremism and radicalisation.
Faith institutions and organisations
3.18 OSCT will engage with faith organisations and leaders to encourage them to play a full role in local
Prevent groups and support such organisations in reaching out to vulnerable people. We will seek dialogue on
security issues and, where appropriate, support capacity-building. We will take law enforcement action when
faith groups or other organisations support terrorism and ensure that when they are expressing views we regard
as extremist those views are subject to challenge and debate.
Universities and colleges
3.19 BIS will work with universities and colleges to help them better understand the risk of radicalisation on
and off campus and to secure wider and more consistent support from institutions where there is most concern.
Internet
3.20 OSCT will take forward the recently reviewed the programme of activities to reduce assess to harmful
content online in specific sectors and premises, such as schools and other public buildings; and ensure action is
taken to remove unlawful content, working closely with the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU).
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Schools
3.21 DfE will establish a set of standards for teachers which clarify obligations regarding extremism. DfE
will also introduce a range of measures to safeguard children and young people in England from extremists
and extremist views in schools.
Health
3.22 DH will provide clearer guidance and procedures for healthcare managers and workers on how to
identify cases of radicalisation and also how to refer such individuals, supported by awareness raising and the
provision of tailored training products.
3.23 The new Prevent strategy includes a fuller description of the actions and measures being taken across
key sectors and institutions in support of this agenda.
Improving performance management, evaluation and value for money
3.24 The OSCT Prevent Unit is responsible for delivery of the Prevent strategy. The Unit has taken
significant steps to address concerns in the Prevent Review about performance monitoring, evaluation and
value for money.
3.25 Home Office project and programme management (PPM) tools and techniques are in place. We have
introduced project charters for Prevent projects, detailing project aims and objectives, key deliverables and
milestones, benefits, risks, interdependencies, costs and resources. This process is improving the quality of
project data and management information, and is mandatory for all Prevent projects in 2011–12.
3.26 A Prevent Knowledge Team is being established and will include social scientists who are professionally
overseen by the Government Social Research (GSR) service. Prevent research and evaluation adheres to good
evaluation methodology consistent with the HM Treasury’s Magenta book, and all research and evaluation
designs are quality assured through GSR before commissioning.
3.27 Prevent progress and performance will also be assessed according to the principles of the Government’s
Public Service Transparency Framework (PSTF) and appropriate Prevent input and impact indicators are
under development.
Section 4
Operation and impact of the current process for proscribing terrorist groups
4.1 The Home Affairs Committee are considering the operation and impact of the current process for
proscribing terrorist groups. The framework set out below is complemented by work to challenge extremism
and promote integration being led by the Department for Communities and Local Government.
Proscription
4.2 As set out in the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary can proscribe any organisation which she
believes “is concerned in terrorism”. An organisation “is concerned in terrorism” if it commits or participates
in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism (including unlawful glorification)
or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.
4.3 If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary must consider whether, as a matter of discretion, the
organisation should be proscribed on policy grounds. The five policy criteria, which were announced during
the passage of the 2000 Act, are:
— the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities;
— the specific threat that it poses to the UK;
— the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas;
— the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and
— the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against
terrorism.
4.4 New candidates for proscription are considered by a cross-Government group, which also reviews all
currently proscribed organisations on a rolling annual basis and makes recommendations to the Home Secretary.
Parliament decides whether to agree any changes to the list of proscribed organisations by approving an
affirmative order. The organisation or any person affected by its proscription can make an application to the
Home Secretary for deproscription, with a right of appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission.
4.5 Proscribed organisations are outlawed in the UK. It is a criminal offence to be a member of a proscribed
organisation, to provide support (financial or otherwise) for one or to wear the uniform of a proscribed
organisation. Between 2001 and March 2010, 31 people were charged with proscription-related offences in
Great Britain, and 15 convicted.
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4.6 Forty seven international terrorist organisations are proscribed in the UK in addition to 14 organisations
related to Northern Ireland. The most recent proscription order was made in January 2011 against Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan—a prolific terrorist organisation which has carried out a high number of mass casualty attacks
in Pakistan and threatens British and allied interests overseas.
4.7 Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist organisations are not tolerated in the UK and deters
them from operating here. Although many proscribed organisations operate mainly overseas, proscription is
also used to ban organisations such as Al Muhajiroun which promote, encourage and glorify terrorism in
the UK.
4.8 The Home Secretary’s review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers (the outcome of which was
announced to Parliament in January) carefully considered whether to extend the scope of the proscription
regime (or other legislation) to ban groups which espouse or incite violence or hatred. The review concluded
that such a change would “have unintended consequences for the basic principles of freedom of expression”
and that the focus for tackling these groups should continue to be the use of existing laws, including public
order and hate crime legislation, and work to tackle intolerance and non-violent extremism.
Tackling groups that stay within the law
4.9 A significant challenge is groups which are not acting illegally but still give rise to concern. We will
encourage participation in shared interests across communities and target our efforts where most needed. We
will not fund or meet any groups where it is not in the public interest to do so.
4.10 Tackling domestic extremism depends on a successful and distinct approach to integration. Groups
which are not proscribed and act within the law may still give cause for concern. In these cases, they will be
challenged as part of the Government’s work to tackle extremism.
4.11 Consideration of the Government’s engagement (including funding) with groups who do not believe in
universal human rights, equality of all before the law, democracy and integration, is led by the Department of
Communities and Local Government with input from across Government.
4.12 We will continue to work closely with communities facing the most significant threats in order to
marginalise all types of extremists. In developing our approach to integration, we will also be looking at what
more we can do to tackle extremists and intolerance.
July 2011
Joint written evidence submitted by the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Community
Security Trust
1. This submission is made by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the representative body of the Jewish
community in the UK, and the Community Security Trust, which provides defence and security advice for
the community.
We have given written and oral evidence to previous inquiries by the Home Affairs and other select
committees on terrorism and related issues.
2. In making this submission and for the sake of brevity, we do not explain basic concepts but assume
knowledge of them. Nor do we provide references for the points made, but they are available on request.
Executive Summary
3. Jewish communities are the potential victims of terrorism twice over: as members of the general public
we are at risk in the same way as others; as Jews, we are especially targeted by Islamist and far right terrorists.
4. We have pointed out in our other submissions that previous counter terrorism strategies have failed to
recognise that non violent Islamists and Salafi jihadi terrorists have broadly the same ultimate aims; they differ
only on the means by which they seek to attain their goals.
All strands of government must consolidate their stand against political and religious extremism and their
link to violent extremism.
5. The long term activities of some Islamist organisations, which hitherto have been regarded as moderate
and representative, have created a climate whereby radical Islamism is regarded as normative in the UK.
6. Universities should accept their duty of care to all students, and provide better oversight of
radicalisation within.
Drivers and Risk Factors
7. The recruitment drivers for Islamism, Irish dissident republicanism and domestic extremism are not
necessarily the same, although they may share common characteristics.
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8. Islamism is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to return the Muslim world to the state that its followers
believe existed at the time of the Prophet. It teaches that for Muslims, and ultimately, the rest of the world, the
only form of governance is Shariah law. It promotes conflict within the Muslim world, by alleging that Muslim
states or governments are insufficiently Muslim, and at the same time routinely avows that the world is against
Islam. It thereby encourages a reactionary attitude among those it seeks to influence.
9. Islamism is successfully penetrating hitherto moderate or non-Islamist Muslim communities, driven in the
case of the UK, by the presence of individuals and organisations that promote the ideologies of the Jamaat e
Islami, Ikhwan al Islami and Tablighi Jamaat.
However, at the same time, support for terrorism is not widespread and may be diminishing, especially as
the majority of victims of its terrorism have been other Muslims.
10. Islamists and jihadists seek similar long term aims: the former pursue these through political and cultural
activity; the latter through violence. A democracy must embrace and permit wide political debate, but when
radicalisation promotes or encourages violence, it is criminal activity.
11. The UK has provided refuge to Islamist political and religious activists including Salafi leaders and
former Afghan War fighters who were unable to return home.
All have used the freedoms that the UK affords to advance their beliefs. Small but significant numbers of
British Muslims visiting the Middle East and South East Asia have trained in terrorist camps and returned to
the UK to carry out terrorist attacks here, and to recruit others, thereby pursuing Abu Musab Al Suri’s strategy
of decentralised global jihad.
12. All the opposition trends within Muslim-majority countries are active within the UK, and have their
supporters here.
Among the most active groups are Al Muhajiroun and its successor groups, members of which have become
terrorists; Hizb ut Tahrir, which advocates the return of the Caliphate; and Tablighi Jamaat, a pietistic and
secessionist evangelical movement. The latter two organisations maintain administrative and communication
centres in the UK.
13. Increasingly, planned terrorist operations are made possible through the use of radical Islamist “starter
cells” not directly linked to Al Qaeda’s core leadership, although material discovered after the assassination of
Osama Bin Laden suggests that he continued to play a central role in strategy and operations even after 2001.
Jihadi terrorism has for the most part, been characterised by amateurishness and sometimes, incompetence.
14. The conveyor belt process of radicalisation is a group process, in which both social dynamics (Marc
Sageman’s “bunch of guys” analogy) and the Internet play an important part, but it is the physical intervention
of terrorist recruiters that turn radical Muslims, who are not generally well versed in Islamic theology, and
may include converts and the socially isolated, into terrorists.
15. The UK Muslim community is therefore the target for many radicalising forces, although only a small
number support or engage in terrorism. The focus of Prevent counter terrorism efforts should therefore be to
combat non violent radicalisation.
16. Irish dissident republicanism disavows the peace process, aims to disrupt normalisation and foment
instability. As with Islamists, negotiation is not feasible. They have the intention and capability to undertake
attacks in Northern Ireland and the UK mainland, and the dissolution of the Provisional IRA and the retirement
of many police officers after the Good Friday Agreement, created political and practical space, and a skills gap
within the law enforcement and security establishments.
The current dissident groups favour tactical and intermittent use of terrorism rather than a return to the wide-
scale terrorism employed during the “Troubles”.
The continuing segregation of the Protestant and Catholic communities, including the walls that separate
them in the main cities, and separate schooling, maintain the distrust, although they may impart a sense of
security in the short term. However, the reduction in government spending in an economy which relies to a
large extent on state spending will exacerbate the high levels of deprivation and unemployment.
17. Domestic extremists now are mainly extreme right wing activists: animal rights and environmental
violent extremists are numerically insignificant and the ideologies they promote attract few supporters, although
there is widespread support for the (non violent) concerns they promote. They primarily pose a public order,
rather than a terrorist, threat.
18. Seventeen far right activists are currently serving prison sentences for acts of terrorism. Their plots
involved the use of military explosives, biological warfare and firearms, indicating a capability not hitherto
used by Islamist terrorism in the UK.
Far right terrorists have not received terrorism training, in the UK or abroad, nor do they currently aspire to
conduct large-scale terrorist operations.
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There is a European dimension to far right violence insofar as known extremists maintain strong ideological
and organisational connections abroad, which are facilitated by the Internet and the ease of European travel.
The Jewish community is particularly concerned by far right terrorism. It was the target of the plots in a
significant minority of the cases referred to above.
The Jewish community is also concerned by the emergence of the English Defence League, and notes its
increasingly racist and violent statements.
The government should be better equipped to understand the reason for the EDL’s popularity and do more
to combat it.
Relative Importance of Prisons, Criminal Networks, Religious Premises and Universities
19. Research, including that commissioned by the Home Office, shows that Muslims in British prisons often
suffer from profound discrimination, yet it is also known that radicalisation is carried out in prisons and that
the oversight and regulatory regime has hitherto been weak. We note the statement in June 2011 by the National
Association of Probation Officers, that up to 70 convicted terrorists are due to be released from jail over the next
12 months and that high risk convicts will require intensive supervision, putting huge pressure on resources. We
also note the statement by the Director of the Security Service that some of those due to be released are likely
to return to terrorist activities.
20. The US Congress Homeland Security Committee hearings on “The Threat of Muslim-American
Radicalization in US Prisons” in June 2011, heard evidence that some Muslim prison chaplains preached radical
interpretations of Islam, but in only a few cases of radicalisation within prisons had former inmates committed
terrorist acts on their release.
21. In 1997, the Committee of Vice Chancellors, since renamed Universities UK, drew attention to the
malign activities of religious extremists in its Report on Extremism and Intolerance on Campus, but the lessons
have not been learned. Indeed, on occasion, today’s university heads have sought to avoid responsibility for
the intimidation suffered by Jewish and other students, on the grounds of free speech.
22. Reports by the Union of Jewish Students and others have highlighted the malign effect that anti Israel
and anti Zionist campaigners have on their lives and freedom to speak, and that universities provide an arena
for radicalisation. We have accordingly cooperated in several substantive reviews on recruitment by extremist
groups within British universities and colleges.
Since 1989, approximately 70 British students have been involved in terrorist attacks around the world. This
includes carrying out, or attempting to carry out attacks as well as planning or preparing attacks.
Recent examples include Waheed Zahman (transatlantic bomb plot), a student at London Metropolitan
University, and Umar Farok Abdulmutalab (Christmas Day bomb plot), a student at University College London.
23. The Board of Deputies and CST have raised these concerns on numerous occasions and have held
meetings with university vice chancellors, as well as Universities UK. In early June 2011, the President of the
Board of Deputies wrote to all UK university heads. These concerns have recently been discussed with both
secretaries of state concerned with education.
24. It is clear to us that oversight by universities and protection for all university students has been weak.
Proscription
25. The proscription regime serves several purposes. It allows society to define the parameters of
unacceptable activity or support for terrorism; it demonstrates support for allies who may be targeted by
terrorist groups that maintain fundraising or other infrastructures in the UK; it allows the investigation of covert
financing and support structures for terrorist groups.
It has to be accepted however, that banned organisations can evade the proscription regime by, for example,
changing names or establishing parallel infrastructures.
26. The Al Muhajiroun successor groups continue activity despite successive proscriptions. Islam4UK as
well as Al Muhajiroun itself, were banned in 2010, and two other offshoots, Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect
had previously been banned. However, in late 2010, the core of activists formed two more groups, Call2Islam
and Muslims Against Crusades, which continue their activities.
27. In 1995, the United States designated the Union for Good umbrella network as a Foreign Terrorist
Organisation. Its UK member, Interpal, was designated by the United States as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist Organisation in 2003. Despite successive investigations by the Charities Commission, it continues in
operation, albeit under some restrictions as to where it sends the charitable funds it raises in the UK. However,
in recent years, the Union for Good has established parallel structures, which operate in the UK.
28. The Pakistan based Lashkar e Taiba terrorist group, proscribed by Pakistan in 2002 and by the United
Nations in 2008, now raises charitable funds through its parent body, Jamaat ud Dawah, which is not
proscribed, including within the UK.
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29. It should be noted that UK registered charities which fund terrorist groups abroad potentially commit
offences under the Terrorism Act (2000) and the Charities Act 2006. Additionally, they deprive the Exchequer
of revenue.
30. We believe therefore that supervision of the proscription regime needs to be strengthened. In particular,
the Charities Commission, which has on occasion admitted its inability to do no more than supervise charities’
governance, needs to be significantly strengthened and required to investigate to a higher standard. To do so
will require adequate resourcing.
Preventative Approaches
31. As noted in our submission to the Home Office Prevent Review in January 2011, the focus of preventative
approaches must be on combating radicalisation, and should not concern itself with enhancing social cohesion
or encouraging community growth. Confusion between these different aims led to justifiable criticism of the
Prevent strategy.
32. Government should continue its search for workable, practical and affordable strategies to engage with
and counter radical Islamism, without demonising Muslim communities. This requires a thorough
understanding of the ideology of Islamism.
Within the Prevent context, funding for all organisations must be contingent upon agreed and monitored
criteria for combating extremism. This was not the case under earlier Prevent models. It is appreciated that
local authorities may not have the knowledge or capacity to check the ideologies of those to whom they are
giving money. This should be the work of specialised central government agencies.
33. On occasion, some Muslim communities disagree with aspects of British foreign policy, and allege that
it is motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment. There should therefore be clarity that policy is conducted in the
interests of the UK as a whole, and not to promote or undermine any religious or ethnic minority. Grievances
should be answered by government in the same manner as any other, by reference to parliament, the democratic
process and the rule of law.
34. Recent empirical research suggests that the institutionalisation of Prevent policing has addressed
“individual and community level risks in a predictive and pre-emptive fashion”, and distils traditional counter-
terrorism policing with best practice derived from neighbourhood policing. It also notes that the policies have
matured and evolved in terms of key processes and practices; that there is greater awareness of the key risks,
threats and vulnerabilities but that it has increased capacity and capability to respond proactively and reactively
to the risks, threats and vulnerabilities.
Recommendations
35. The government should supervise more closely out of school hours instruction and independent religious
schools within all communities to ensure they conform to the National Curriculum.
36. OSCT need better oversight and control of Prevent spending. Organisations should not receive funding
unless they can demonstrate their moderate views and positive benefit to society as a whole.
37. The government must communicate security and foreign policies more effectively, demonstrate support
for its allies, and rebut the grievance claims that are frequently a basis for Islamism.
38. The government must continue to exclude foreign nationals, including EU nationals, who promote
violence or hatred.
39. Groups which declare that they oppose violence in the UK, but support violence abroad, must be opposed
more effectively.
40. The government’s surveillance regime must focus more closely on activists who radicalise and recruit
for terrorism, while maintaining its general oversight of Islamist organisations, but not target minority
communities as a whole.
41. Universities and schools must understand that extremists seek to influence young people, and counter
them, while supporting free speech, and demonstrating a duty of care for all students.
42. In addition to promoting democracy and freedom of speech, publicly and privately funded schools
especially, should seek to impart a sense of belonging, and tolerance and understanding of other religions.
43. The Charities Commission should be given enhanced investigatory powers to investigate the end use of
money raised by UK based charities.
44. The government should recognise that the English Defence League acts as a radicalising force and threat
to community cohesion, and should not be treated as an ad hoc public order issue.
July 2011
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Supplementary evidence submitted by the Community Security Trust
1. This is the second submission by the Community Security Trust, made in response to the Committee
Members’ request for further information following Michael Whine’s oral testimony on 1 November 2011.
2. We are asked for our views on the following:
— Whether the Government is placing appropriate emphasis on tackling the threat from the far
right; where and how the police and other agencies should focus their efforts.
— How much of a danger foreign individuals preaching extremist messages pose to the UK, and
whether the UK’s proscription and exclusion regime are effective.
3. The far right poses different, but interconnected threats. They are:
— from far right extremist political parties, of neo-Nazi origin, such as the British National Party
(BNP) and National Front (NF);
— from Populist Extremist Parties (PEPs), such as the English Defence League (EDL); and
— from far-right terrorists.
4. The BNP, the largest far-right political party, has lost considerable support over the past two years. This
can be seen in a number of ways.
For example, by its reduction in electoral activity. In May 2011, it stood 323 candidates in the local elections,
compared with 739 candidates in 2010, and 877 candidates for the same seats in 2007.
In the 2010 local elections, the BNP lost almost half their sitting councillors nationally and were wiped out
in their former stronghold of Barking and Dagenham.
In the May 2010 general election, the BNP stood 338 candidates in England, Scotland and Wales, the highest
number ever put forward in a general election by a far-right party. This was a significant increase on the 119
BNP candidates in the 2005 general election.
Overall, the BNP polled 563,743 votes nationally, or 1.9% of the national vote, and an increase on the
192,746 votes they polled in the 2005 general election.
However, the average BNP vote fell from 4.2% in 2005 to 3.7% in 2010, and only 71 of their 338 candidates
retained their deposits, whereas in 2005, 34 of their 119 candidates had retained their deposits.
In neither general election were any BNP candidates elected.1
Members are increasingly disenchanted by BNP leader Nick Griffin’s impetuous and autocratic leadership,
and as a consequence are leaving for other groups.
In the May 2011 local elections, 36 former BNP candidates stood for a range of other smaller groups,
including the National Front, England First Party, Democratic Nationalists, English Peoples Party, British
Peoples Party and as Independents.2
Other candidates have since defected from the BNP to these smaller parties.
In June 2011, Griffin faced a strongly supported leadership challenge from Andrew Brons, the other BNP
member elected to the European Parliament.
Some of its loss of support may be ascribed to a move away from public activity such as demonstrations, to
political activity, for which it has little capacity or experienced personnel.
Media publicity about the number of BNP members and leaders who have been convicted of crimes in
recent years is growing. This, together with reports of the possibility of bankruptcy proceedings and criminal
prosecutions of one or more leaders for failing to submit accounts, is harming their organisational capacity.
5. Populist Extremist Parties (PEPs) or Far-Right Social Movements are not new in Europe, but the English
Defence League was only established in 2009, and therefore the phenomenon is comparatively new in the UK.
The government and the police still have much to learn therefore about what motivates its members, and
how they operate.
1 Elections Report, Thursday 6 May 2010, Community Security Trust, London.
2 Elections Report, Thursday 5 May 2011, Community Security Trust, London.
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Four recently published reports shed some light. They are:
The EDL—Britain’s “New Far Right” Social Movement;3
Inside the EDL—populist politics in a digital age;4
The New Face of Digital Populism;5
Right Response—Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe.6
6.The authors of these reports agree on some key findings about the EDL, which may be summarised
as follows:
— The overriding grievance of EDL members is over continued immigration into the UK, and
particularly Muslim immigration.
— EDL supporters express growing dissatisfaction with government and its ability to improve the
economic situation.
— EDL supporters are significantly more likely to hold pessimistic views about their economic
prospects than non-EDL members.
— EDL supporters are “ultra-patriotic”, and some may disavow racist ideologies.
— While the BNP is the most popular political party amongst EDL supporters, the majority of
members state that they are democrats.
— EDL supporters are, for the most part, 18–24 year old males.
7. The reports note that the EDL has no political programme, and few self-declared leaders. Its main activity
is the holding of street demonstrations and marches, which are organised via Facebook and other social media.
These may be used to intimidate Muslim communities and their institutions, or to protest against Muslim
and Islamist public activities. They are often violent, and print and electronic media reports refer to their racist
chanting and the giving of Nazi salutes by some members.
The EDL has Afro Caribbean, Hindu, Sikh and Jewish members, but they constitute a tiny and insignificant
minority, although their presence has allowed the leadership to disavow racism.
One EDL sub- group, the NE Infidels, is however more openly racist and violent. (see Appendix 1).
Although some leaders and members have also been members of the BNP, the EDL is most accurately
understood as a new populist social movement, rather than a traditional political party or group of the far-right.
The threat that it poses is, at the moment, to public order, and beyond that to community cohesion.
8. The Swedish academic, Dr Tore Bjorgo, who has studied Europe’s far-right movements for over twenty
five years, noted in 1995 that increasing support for xenophobic and far-right parties enabled the growth of
militant neo-Nazi organisations and networks which target asylum seekers and visible minorities in Europe.
He further observed that groups perceived as “right wing” or “racist” frequently turned out to have no
connections with extreme political organisations, and had only a rudimentary idea of any ideology.
He suggested that theirs “is an anger against perceived outsiders, or the state, which could take a violent
path”.7
This analysis, and that of the four recent reports referred to above, supports the view that within Europe as
a whole, there is a growing political reaction to continued migration, and especially Muslim migration, which
is perceived as a challenge to European culture. This may arise because of genuine concern over the future
rather than as a by-product of racist or neo-Nazi ideology.
9. In 2007, the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) Report published by Europol, noted that:
“Although violent acts perpetrated by right-wing extremists may appear mainly sporadic and
situational, right-wing extremist activities are organised and transnational’. Also that ‘Right-wing
violence is partly driven by the agenda of their perceived opponents”.
In 2008, the TE-SAT report noted that “Activities from right-wing extremist groups are increasing”, and in
2009 that “several right-wing extremists were acting alone without links to an extremist organisation” and that
“Individual members of the WPM (White Power Movement) scene have exhibited their readiness to use
violence, threats or coercion to reach their political goals. In 2010, it observed that ‘far right activists are
engaging in paramilitary training in EU Member States … and that individuals who act alone continue to pose
a threat”, and in 2011, that “right wing extremist groups are becoming more professional in their
manifestations” and that they “still pose a threat in EU Member States”.8
3 The EDL—Britain’s “New Far Right” Social Movement, Dr Paul Jackson, Radicalism and New Media Research Group,
University of Northampton, Northampton, 2011.
4 Inside the EDL—Populist Politics in a Digital Age, Jamie Bartlett and Mark Littler, DEMOS, London, 2011.
5 The New Face of Digital Populism, Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell and Mark Littler, DEMOS, London, 2011.
6 Right Response—Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe, Matthew Goodwin, Chatham House, London,
2011.
7 Tore Bjorgo, Terror from the Extreme Right, Frank Cass, London, 1995.
8 EU Terrorism and Situation (TE-SAT) Report, Europol, The Hague, Netherlands, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011.
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The ACPO National Community Tension Team noted in 2008, with reference to far-right terrorism in the
UK, that:
“The unorganised nature of such activity makes it difficult to police but individuals within known
Right Wing Extremist groups are the subject of covert operations locally, regionally and nationally”
and that “Lone Wolf operatives in the UK have primarily targeted Muslims whereas there is more
evidence of an anti-Semitic focus in continental Europe”.9
9. An important underlying philosophy for right-wing terrorism is that of “leaderless resistance” as proposed
by an American Ku Klux Klan leader Louis Beam, in his online journal, The Seditionist, and the messages
contained in the novels of National Alliance founder, William Pierce, writing under the name of Andrew
McDonald. In The Turner Diaries, Pierce depicted a violent revolution in the USA that leads to the overthrow
of the federal government, and the extermination of all Jews and non-Whites. His other book, Hunter, describes
a campaign of targeted assassinations of couples in inter-racial marriages and civil rights activists carried out
by a Vietnam War veteran who gets drawn into a white supremacist group planning insurrection.10
These two novels were a formative influence on both Timothy McVeigh, who bombed the Alfred P Murrah
Federal Government Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and David Copeland, the London Nail Bomber
in 1999.
The philosophy proposes that individuals, or small groups, who are radicalised act out their beliefs without
either participating in the political movement itself or without being part of a command structure.
10. Within Europe, parallel ideological developments included those promoted by the American-born Francis
Parker Yockey, author of Imperium, who campaigned for a transatlantic and trans-European alliance; Jean
Thiriart, a Belgian former Nazi collaborator, who established the Jeune Europe Movement, and who advocated
abandoning the trappings of Nazism and who campaigned for a wider European collaboration from the Atlantic
to the Urals; and Povl Riis Knudsen and Michael Kuhnen who adopted elements of leftist theory into their
violent far-right ideologies. Kuhnen was among the earliest far-right terrorists in Europe, who was convicted
in 1979 of organising an armed assault on a NATO establishment.
11. Targets for far-right terrorists have been Muslim communities, state institutions and Jewish communities.
It is no coincidence that the Norwegian Anders Breivik bombed the Norwegian Prime Minister’s Office in
Oslo. He had been preceded by a Swedish neo-Nazi group, who in 2005, planned to bomb the Swedish
Parliament and murder large numbers of young people. The four members of the Kameradenschaft-Sud, a neo
Nazi group, were convicted of a plot to bomb the rededication ceremony of a synagogue in Munich in 2003
which was to have been attended by the German federal president, Johannes Rau and members of the Cabinet.
Had the plot succeeded, the German government would have been decapitated.
12. Far-right political parties and groups provide the arena in which radicalisation occurs, even if the number
who go on to commit acts of terrorism has remained small. But there is little public support for terrorism, and
interdiction of plots by effective law enforcement counterterrorist operations has resulted in a number of
significant arrests and convictions in the UK and elsewhere in Europe.
The number of far-right activists who plot acts of terrorism may be small, but the latest version of Prevent
refers to 17 far right activists convicted of terrorist offences.
It is worth noting that, while the far right activists convicted of terrorist offences in the UK mostly followed
a traditional neo-Nazi ideology, Breivik presented an ideological worldview more reflective of the attitudes of
Europe’s new PEPs.
Far right terrorism is committed by very small groups and lone operators or “Lone Wolves”.
Far right groups lack cohesion, and have a low degree of overall coordination, but it should be noted that
support for their views has risen historically in times of high unemployment and economic distress.
13. The police should focus their efforts on the specific nature of the far right and the different threats that
each grouping presents. The BNP and the smaller extremist political groups may revert to street activities such
as demonstrations or even violence. The EDL, for the present, presents a public order threat, although their
activities should be continuously scrutinised for evidence of any move toward violence. Recent statements by
some members suggest a shift towards more openly violent, and anti-state rhetoric. (Appendix 2)
The police should be on the alert for evidence of individuals and small groups moving towards violence
and terrorism.
A more pro active policing policy of the EDL is now apparent. The arrest of EDL supporters by the
Metropolitan Police Service on 11 November in the Whitehall area to forestall violent clashes with Islamists
is evidence of this, as is the re-configuration of the specific police units that monitor domestic extremism.
9 Lone Wolves Briefing Document, NCTT, Association of Chief Police Officers, London, April 2008.
10 The Turner Diaries, Andrew Macdonald, National Vanguard Books, Arlington, VA; 1978; Hunter, Andrew Macdonald, National
Vanguard Books, Arlington, VA, 1989.
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14. Radicalisation occurs via a variety of methods, of which the influences of foreign preachers is one.
Others may be via the Internet and video tapes and cassettes. In all known cases, however, with the possible
exception of Roshonara Choudhry, there was also some human intervention. In other words, the intervention
and guidance of a mentor is normally required to turn someone who has been radicalised into a potential
terrorist.
Foreign preachers and extremist activists are known to have had a radicalising effect on some British
Muslims.
Among the more prominent have been:
Abdullah el-Faisal (aka Sheikh Faisal, born Trevor William Forest) who was sentenced to nine
years imprisonment in 2003, for soliciting to murder and incitement to racial hatred, of which
he served four years before being deported to Jamaica. Between 1991 and 1993, he preached
at the Brixton Mosque before being dismissed because of his radical views.
Mohammed Sidique Khan and Germaine Lindsay, two of the 7 July bombers, were known to
possess copies of Faisal’s tapes, and are believed to have been radicalised by them.
Abu Qatada al-Filistini (aka Abu Omar, born Omar Mahmoud Othman), a Jordanian national
deported from Kuwait for radical activities who arrived in the UK in 1993. He was arrested in
2002 and, despite a succession of appeals, remains in prison pending his deportation. He was
convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court in 2000 for involvement in ‘The Millenium
conspiracy’, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He is listed as an al Qaeda affiliate by the
United Nations Security Council, and was described in testimony given in February 2001 in a
New York court as a member of al Qaeda’s “Fatwa Committee”.
He was a known associate, and influence on, terrorists convicted in the British and US courts,
including Zacarias Moussaoui, Rachid Ramda, Nizar Trabelsi, Richard Reid and Abdullah el-
Faisal.
Abu Hamza al-Masri (born Mustafa Kamel Mustafa) an Egyptian national who came to the UK
in 1979 and was arrested in 2004. In 2006, he was convicted of various terrorism and public
order offences and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. His appeal against an extradition
request to the USA has been the subject of a lengthy appeal process.
Together with the ‘Supporters of Sharia’ group, which he founded and led, al-Masri took control
of the North London Central Mosque at Finsbury Park, and used this as a base to preach violent
jihad, until ejected following a legal challenge by the Charity Commission in 2003.
Omar Bakri Mohammed (born Omar Bakri Fostock) a Syrian national developed the Islamist
political party Hizb ut Tahrir in the UK between 1986 and 1996, following which he established
Al-Muhajiroun, which worked to re-establish the Muslim caliphate (like all other Islamist
groups) and supported terrorism.
Mohammed is among the most significant preachers of extremism, and reliable media reports
note that several terrorists were radicalised by meeting him, including Mohammed Naeem Noor
Khan, Bilal Mohammed and Asif Hanif.
He remains active from his home in Lebanon, to which he fled in 2005.
Sheikh Anwar Al Awlaqi a Yemeni American engineer and educator, the operations leader of
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular, is regarded as one of the originators of the contemporary
anti Western jihadi movement. He was assassinated by US forces in Yemen, in September 2011.
While living in the UK between 2002 and 2004, he may have radicalised people who went on
to commit acts of terrorism, but both before 2002 and after 2004, he is known to have had a
radicalising influence on some of the 9/11 bombers, Roshonaura Choudri, who attempted to
murder Steven Timms MP, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutalab, the ‘Underpants bomber’.
Numerous other Islamist preachers have been convicted of incitement and or terrorism offences,
and an extensive list of these, and those they are known to have influenced and who went on
to commit terrorist offences in the UK and abroad, has been published in Islamist Terrorism.11
15. acial, religious and other forms of hatred against minority groups is increasing in Europe. Economic and
political strains in societies have historically led to tension, and in many cases a search for scapegoats on
whom to blame societies’ troubles. Historically this has often been the Jews, but other contemporary victim
groups may include Muslims, Roma and Sinti.
Inter-governmental human rights agencies have commented on this in increasingly alarming terms in recent
years.
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has noted that:
“9 of the 12 (EU) Member States which collect sufficient criminal justice data on racist crime
experienced an upward trend in recorded racist crime”12
11 Islamist Terrorism—The British Connections, The Henry Jackson Society, London, 2011.
12 Annual Report 2010, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, p 36, Vienna, 2011.
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The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recently noted that: ‘the
Committee expressed its concerns—often continuing from previous observations—about the prevalence of
violent racist incidents in several States.’ It went on to list EU Member States where it had particular concerns
about racist violence.13
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe recently noted that ‘The OSCE has long recognised
the thret to international security posed by racism, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance … Hate crimes
do not happen in a vacuum. Participating States have acknowledged that “hate crimes can be fuelled by
racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda” and have repeatedly expressed their concern regarding” racist,
xenophobic and discriminatory public discourse.”14
16. It is clear that the presence of foreign extremist preachers and political activists can have a significant
radicalising effect on some UK citizens. As a consequence of their activities, UK citizens have gone on to
commit acts of terrorism here and abroad.
If the government is to take its role of protecting society, and of combating hatred against sexual, religious
and racial minorities seriously, it should seek to bar the presence of foreign extremists.
The views of those excluded ranges widely, but the exclusion process has been used judiciously over the
years, and individual exclusions are reviewed in order to determine if those excluded no longer present a threat.
It is right that the Home Secretary, acting on advice, should have the power to exclude those whose presence
here is not conducive to the public good, but the strengthened powers, provided by the Prevent Strategy, are
both also proportionate and necessary.
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
The English Defence League published following statement on 17 November on its Facebook page.
A screenshot of the EDL’s statement is displayed below:
13 Protection Against Racial Discrimination in Europe, Europe Regional Report, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights. P 25, Geneva, 2011.
14 Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region—Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2010, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights, Warsaw, November 2011.
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Transcript
In the last 66 years we as a nation, as a race have had our national identity stolen from us by politicians
who have forced us to accept multiculturalism. They have and still are practicing cultural genocide on their
own people, despite warnings that we will not accept it. They have forced us to accept the dilution of our
heritage and history by the implementation of laws which will stop us from rising up, even if that’s just to
voice an opinion.
Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving us of our integrity as distinct peoples, or of our cultural
values or ethnic identities. Any form of population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or
undermining any of the rights of the native or indigenous people. Any form of assimilation or integration by
other cultures or ways of life imposed on us by legislative, administrative or other measures is cultural
genocide.
And unless we find our backbone and stand up to the ones who are committing crimes against the English
people we shall continue to be subjected to slavery by a British elite aided by outside influences whose only
intention is to destroy us from within and wipe us out as a race.
Written evidence submitted by the Federation of Student Islamic Societies
Introduction
1. The focus of our response is in relation to the terms of reference of the inquiry concerning the impact that
counter-terrorism (CT) activities are having on communities, in this case on university campuses and students.
2. Understanding the process of radicalisation is still in infancy and, as ever, we reiterate calls for an open
and critical debate into the causes and drivers of terrorism. We also reiterate the need for such a debate to be
evidence-based and one which steers clear of the sensationalist and ideologically motivated claims made over
recent years. It is important that this debate seeks a cross-party consensus on violent radicalisation and brings
together a range of terrorism experts and university stakeholders including senior university management,
students’ unions and the students themselves.
3. We begin by emphasising the fact that there is still no evidence to suggest that universities are “hotbeds
of extremism” or any terrorist related activities. Therefore, where any incidents may occur that involve alumni
of British universities, this is in no way representative of university campuses and their students as a whole,
particularly given that over two-thirds of those convicted of the terrorism-related offences in question had not
even been to a British university.15
4. Nonetheless in March 2011, FOSIS, in conjunction with UCL Union Islamic Society, held the “Radical
Thinking” Conference to explore the discourses surrounding freedom of speech and extremism on campus, to
hear grassroots experiences and generate informed debate.16 In doing so the conference brought together
various stakeholders from senior university management, academia, students’ unions, the security sector and
ordinary university students. The fact that Muslim students and staff from higher education institutions across
Britain engaged so enthusiastically with the event shows how open minded and mature both Muslim and non-
Muslim students are and it shows how they are taking the lead in addressing these issues.
5. Freedom of expression is a key pillar of British society and one which sets us above authoritarian regimes
across the world. At a time when people around the world are fighting for freedom of expression and greater
control over their own destiny, it has never been more important to reaffirm our values of open debate and free
speech. Universities play an important and leading role in upholding our core values by continuing to provide
a platform for constructive debate and positive change; therefore they should be supported and not undermined
or made to feel that their autonomy and reputation is threatened.
The Prevent Strategy
6. From the start, the Prevent strategy has been viewed with a great deal of suspicion. This is unsurprising
given that a disproportionate focus has been on policing even though it has always claimed to seek positive
engagement with communities. The revised Prevent strategy threatens to exacerbate this perception as made
clear throughout the document, eg:
11.28—“…policing has a central role to play…”
11.29—“…policing has a key role in the delivery of aspects of all three of the objectives set out…”
7. The revised strategy document reveals that the Prevent budget for 2010–11 is £37 million with £24 million
being devoted to policing.17
15 Paragraph 5.30 of the revised Prevent strategy. Available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary
16 FOSIS press release for Radical Thinking Conference:
http://media.fosis.org.uk/press-releases/1317-fosis-and-uclu-islamic-society-to-hold-radical-thinking-conference
17 See paragraphs 11.33–11.34 of the revised Prevent strategy.
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8. Whilst there may be a sincere intention to engage with communities constructively, we believe that this
continues to confuse Pursue with Prevent and that any positive partnership will be strongly undermined by the
strategy’s overwhelming focus on policing. If the Government wishes the Prevent strategy to be successful
then there must be a greater focus on empowering citizens and giving them open platforms for positive
engagement and debate, such as that facilitated by universities, rather than on yet another police-led initiative.
9. We are also concerned at the evident targeting of the Muslim population, in a manner that could constitute
spying. These concerns are summarised succinctly in the following paragraph from a report by the Guardian
Newspaper:18
“The government programme aimed at preventing Muslims from being lured into violent extremism
is being used to gather intelligence about innocent people who are not suspected of involvement in
terrorism, the Guardian has learned.
The information the authorities are trying to find out includes political and religious views,
information on mental health, sexual activity and associates, and other sensitive information,
according to documents seen by the Guardian.”
10. The previous regime allocated funding to local authorities based on their Muslim population exceeding
2,000 which sent the dangerous and erroneous message that the risk and likelihood of terrorism was directly
linked to the number of Muslims residing within a local authority. This was investigated by an inquiry carried
out by the previous Communities and Local Government Select Committee into the Prevent strategy. Their
final report stated: “any programme which focuses on a single community risks alienating that community, and
ignores the fact that no section of a population exists in isolation from others.”19 This also applies to the
student population or subsections of it.
11. The revised strategy states that “simple demographics will not be used as the basis for prioritising
Prevent work”.20 This is to be welcomed but we remain concerned over what new indicators will be used to
allocate Prevent funding to local authorities. The revised strategy does not make clear what these indicators
are and this will only fuel speculation about whether or not this Government has moved away from the
destructive approach of the previous Government. All indicators should be based on credible intelligence and
adopt an evidence-based approach to measuring success.
12. We are gravely concerned over the impact the revised strategy will have on freedom of expression on
campuses across the UK. All higher education stakeholders, including the Government, universities, students’
unions and FOSIS are obliged by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights to allow the
expression of opinions as long as they do not compromise public safety. Universities play a key role in
challenging prevalent “wisdom” as well as debating and researching controversial topics. The “values-led”
approach to the revised strategy risks harming legitimate grievances being aired on campuses and could have
a significant damage on intellectual debate and research as well as the international reputation of British
universities.
13. In relation to students’ unions, guidance from the Charities Commission clearly states:
“Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 requires universities and colleges to take such steps
as are reasonably practicable to ensure freedom of speech within the law for students, employees and
visiting speakers. This involves seeing that the use of premises (including students’ union premises) is
not denied to anyone because of their beliefs or politics.”21
14. The report by the previous CLG Select Committee specifically recommended that, “holding extreme
views is not illegal and Prevent should clearly focus on violent extremism” and that “no organisation- unless
proscribed- should be excluded from debate and discussions”.22 FOSIS supports this position as the most
effective way of challenging extremist and terrorist ideas rather than causing them to go underground or
hardening their views by proscribing groups.
15. University campuses provide one of the best places to challenge extremist views. Even where these
views do not exist on a particular campus, open and transparent debates provide the safe and conducive
environment for people to air legitimate grievances, debate with people from various socio-political
backgrounds, have their own views challenged and become engaged in mainstream socio-political campaigns;
thus preventing people from taking the path of violent extremism in the first place. This point appears to be
acknowledged by the revised strategy, where paragraph 10.56 states that “universities and colleges promote
and facilitate the exchange of opinion and ideas as well as learning”. Having acknowledged this, we hope
that the Government will translate this into a practical approach towards university and college campuses.
16. Furthermore, the Local Government Association, in evidence for the previous CLG Select Committee’s
inquiry, stated that “Government needs to be more confident in its dealings with those with whom it does not
18 Vikram Dodd (2009) “Government anti-terrorism strategy ‘spies’ on innocent”. Data on politics, sexual activity and religion
gathered by government. The Guardian Newspaper, 16 October 2009.
19 Page 62, paragraph 168,”Preventing Violent Extremism”, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, House of Commons Communities
and Local Government Select Committee.
20 See paragraph 11.15 of the revised Prevent Strategy.
21 Students’ Union: A Guide (OG 48 C3)
http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/About_us/OGs/g048c003.aspx
22 Page 41, point 98, above report.
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agree, especially when they have broad support from within communities or in academic circles.”23 University
campuses have mastered this approach towards debate and discussion and should remain supported in this
regard.
17. There has been a haphazard approach in the way that counter-terrorism officers approach university
students and staff, both on and off campuses, often resulting in a deeply negative student experience, a
breakdown in police-community trust and strains what is usually a very positive relationship between many
universities and their students.
18. The heavy handedness of counter-terrorism activities experienced so far by students from counter
terrorism activities has already resulted in students and staff viewing the police with suspicion.
19. It seems clear that counter-terrorism officers are under-trained and under-prepared. They are often
unaware of the campus culture that exists and how different each campus is to another. It is unsurprising then
that counter-terrorism officers, particularly those with no recent experience of higher education, seem to be
overwhelmed by the vibrancy of campus life and are therefore unable to adapt to university life and/or misjudge
certain behaviours on campus as posing a threat to national security. For example, terms such as “radical”
carries a negative connotation in the security world and is interpreted by them as meaning the process by which
people come to support or carry acts of terrorism. However, on campus, this term is often applied to anyone
who challenges the status-quo and is able to think creatively about problems and solutions and may or may
not use forms of direct (but non criminal) action to arrive at a solution, eg demonstrations, “occupations”,
petitions, etc. In fact, being “radical” is usually deemed to be a positive characteristic and academic staff on
campuses across the UK self-define as being “radical” due to holding views uncommon in wider society. Also,
it is only natural that students play devil’s advocate or experience with ideas. Student may, as part of this
natural academic process, become particularly challenging but this process should not be confused with
violent radicalisation.
20. Heavy-handed approaches to students, like that of the police investigation into the Detroit bomb incident
in December 2009 where, contrary to the wishes of the students, the police sought the membership data of the
entire Islamic Society of the students’ union without a warrant left many students, who were previously open
minded and willing to talk to the police, feeling “betrayed” or criminalised by the lack of respect shown to
them by the police.
21. In this case, many students felt that the police went beyond what could be deemed reasonable by their
obtaining of all membership data, even the data of students who had never met the alleged bomber- including
those who either studied at a separate institute to the main UCL campus or those who started university the
year after Umar Farouk AbdulMuttallab had graduated. In particular, there remain huge concerns over whether
the police are sharing that data with security services around the world and the dangers that this association to
the incident would pose to the lives of international students, many of whom come from countries with poor
humanitarian rights records.24
22. Finally, where students and staff have in the past been approached by counter-terrorism officers, this has
often been without them knowing of their identity and many have felt that those officers were attempting to
recruit them or solicit information from them about their colleagues. This has led to feelings of insecurity and
being targeted.
23. What this shows is how many students are not automatically or ideologically against the police but that
there are certain standards expected from the police which they must be abide by but so far remain to be seen.
24. Pressuring students and staff into becoming informants or making them feel targeted is no way to counter
terrorism. Resources used for such activities are better invested perusing real terrorists.
25. Finally, some students and their student societies, notably Islamic societies, are unfortunately only ever
approached by police officers when in relation to counter-terrorism and not on issues that ordinary students
feel are more relevant to them or the issues they face on a daily basis such as Islamophobia. This has meant
that students feel that they are seen from the prism of counter-terrorism and this does nothing to break down
existing barriers.
26. In light of the points we have made in our submission, FOSIS proposes the following recommendations
to ensure a more constructive implementation of the Government’s revised Prevent strategy.
Recommendations:
27. The Government adopts an open, evidence-based approach to addressing the causes of violent
radicalisation.
28. The autonomy of universities as places of free speech and expression should be preserved.
29. A quality impact assessment should be conducted, looking at the impact that the revised strategy will
have on the quality of education and free speech.
23 Page 229, Ev 149, above report.
24 Robert Verkaik (2010). “CIA given details of British Muslim students”. The Independent Newspaper. 01.04.2010.
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30. For the purposes of transparency and avoiding further suspicion, the Government should publish the new
indicators that will be used to allocate and evaluate Prevent funding, based on an evidence-based approach.
31. The Home Office should ensure that counter-terrorism officers are correctly trained to adapt to campus
life and avoid heavy-handed approaches.
32. Officers should only take the proper channels of communications (ie meet students, student societies,
university management openly and to clearly identify themselves) and avoid any actions that constitute
“spying”.
33. Local police forces should speak to students and help them to address issues more relevant to their
everyday lives, beyond counter-terrorism, to repair the damaged relationship with communities.
34. In the spirit of engagement sought by all stakeholders on the issue of violent radicalisation, FOSIS should
be a member of the independent board being created to look at local implementation of the Prevent strategy.
July 2011
Written evidence submitted by The Henry Jackson Society
Summary
— 30% of individuals involved in Islamist-related terrorism in the UK (1999–2010) were educated to
degree level or higher.
— There is evidence of students being radicalised on UK campuses or meeting individuals who facilitate
their involvement in terrorism.
— Proscription of Tehrik-e-Taliban and al-Shabaab will strengthen the state’s ability stop individuals
raising money or sending weapons to the groups or travelling abroad with the intention of training
and fighting for them.
— Proscription of al-Muhajiroun is ineffective: the group’s activities and online presence continues as
has members’ involvement in Islamism-inspired terrorism.
— Proscription of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not viable under current anti-terrorism legislation and would likely
prove impractical and ineffective.
— The Henry Jackson Society welcomes the Prevent Review’s effort to seriously engage with the threat
posed by Islamist organisations which run counter to British values.
— There are internal inconsistencies in the review regarding the future role of the Mosques and Imams
National Advisory Board, the Charity Commission and Ofsted, who are not fit for Prevent-related
purposes.
1. The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) is a London-based think-tank founded on the global promotion of the
rule of law, liberal democracy and civil rights. Through its 2011 merger with the Centre for Social Cohesion
(CSC), HJS research includes the study of Islamism-related terrorism and campus radicalisation in the UK.
Universities
2. A significant number of students and graduates from UK universities have committed acts of terrorism or
have been convicted for terrorism related offences, in the UK and abroad. HJS’s Islamist Terrorism; The British
Connections25 shows that 30% of individuals involved in Islamist-related terrorism in the UK were educated
to degree level or higher. Of these, 21 studied at a UK university; 16 were graduates; three were postgraduate
students and one had achieved a postgraduate qualification.
3. A 2008 CSC survey, Islam on Campus, discovered that students who are active in their university Islamic
society (ISOC) were twice as likely as non-members to hold extreme views, including that killing in the name
of their religion is justified. At least four individuals involved in acts of terrorism in the UK were senior ISOC
members. Kafeel Ahmed of the Glasgow airport suicide attack was on the executive of Queen’s University
Belfast ISOC. Waseem Mughal, convicted of inciting murder for terrorist purposes, ran the University of
Leicester ISOC website. Yassin Nassari, convicted of possession for terrorist purposes, was president of the
University of Westminster Harrow campus ISOC. Waheed Zaman, convicted for his role in the transatlantic
liquid bomb plot was formerly the president of London Metropolitan University’s ISOC.
4. In a number of terrorism cases the individuals were either radicalised on campus or met individuals there
who facilitated their involvement in terrorism. Omar Sharif, a suicide bomber in Tel Aviv in 2003, was
radicalised during his first year at King’s College London after he attended Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) meetings on
campus. Anthony Garcia, convicted for his role in the 2004 “fertiliser” bomb plot, attended religious talks in
the late 1990s at the University of East London ISOC, and became radicalised after seeing a video at the ISOC
showing alleged atrocities in Kashmir. He went on to join al-Muhajiroun.
5. Other individuals met facilitators of terrorism at university. Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, convicted for his
role in Dhiren Barot’s 2004 “dirty bomb” plot, was studying at Brunel University and met Barot in the
25 The first edition published by the CSC in 2010 was cited in the Prevent Review.
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university’s prayer room, despite the fact that Barot had fraudulently enrolled. Brunel University was further
implicated by Omar Khyam, the head of the fertiliser bomb plot cell, in surveillance tapes after an associate
was recorded asking him, “How many brothers are there active in this country? How many are actually planning
things, and doing them here?” Khyam responded with: “There’s a lot of people who agree with it now,
especially at, you know, Brunel University at Friday prayer. There, yeah, just blatant bro, in the sermon in
front of hundreds of students bro. And you could see that people were like, they were agreeing with everything
you know.”
6. While cases such as these are relatively isolated, the conditions which allow for them to occur are not.
Muslim students are increasingly being exposed to an intolerant, politicised, and in some cases violent,
interpretation of their faith with extremist speakers regularly invited to address students on UK campuses.
Since 7/7 a wide range of Islamist speakers have either regularly addressed students, or have been otherwise
promoted by ISOCs. In the vast majority of cases, these guests are given open and unchallenged platforms,
and are presented as mainstream representatives of Islam. Speakers include supporters of the proscribed terrorist
group Hamas and members of HT (despite a National Union of Students (NUS) ban) as well as those who:
publicly support armed jihad and the Taliban; warn Muslims not to integrate into western societies; promote
domestic violence and; advocate the destruction of Israel.26
Proscription
7. Somalia’s al-Shabaab was proscribed in March 2010 and Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban in January 2011.
The proscription of these organisations, both linked to al-Qaeda and based in volatile states of concern to UK
counter-terrorism efforts—will likely be effective. Proscription strengthens the state’s ability to safeguard
against individuals raising money and sending weapons to the groups or travelling to Pakistan or Somalia with
the intention of training and fighting for the groups. Aside from membership, offences that can now be
specifically applied are: fundraising for terrorist purposes; engaging in conduct with the intention of assisting in
the commission of acts of terrorism; and attendance at or conspiracy to attend a place used for terrorist training.
8. Al-Muhajiroun (AM) disbanded in October 2004. After the 7/7 London bombings, founder Omar Bakri
Mohammed fled the UK and leading members reformed under successor groups, al-Ghurabaa (AG), Saved
Sect (SS) and later Ahl us-Sunnah wal Jamma’ah (ASWJ). AG and SS were proscribed in July 2006 for
glorifying terrorism. Leading members of ASWJ were convicted of terrorism-related offences in April 2008.
Following their release in May 2009, AM re-launched under the leadership of Anjem Choudary. AM (aka
Islam4UK) was proscribed in January 2010. Proscription appears to have had little effect on the group’s
activities, its online presence or its connections to Islamism-inspired terrorism in the UK. AM operates as
Muslims Against Crusades under the leadership of Anjem Choudary.27 Islamist Terrorism shows AM’s
connections to all Islamism-inspired terrorism in the UK between 1999 and 2010. AM is the most prevalent
proscribed organisation, linked to 18% of all offences. Members of AM or individuals with known links were
involved in offences relating to: the 2004 “fertiliser bomb” plot; membership of al-Qaeda; terrorist fundraising;
soliciting or inciting murder; arson; racial hatred; and harassment. There was no decline in AM involvement
following the 2010 proscription: five members were convicted of public order offences that year.
9. HT is a revolutionary Islamist party that ideologically legitimises acts of terrorism. However, since the
Terrorism Act 2006, HT does not appear to have explicitly and publicly supported suicide bombings or terrorist
organisations. Any government wishing to proscribe HT would have to amend current terrorism legislation, as
prohibiting the glorification of terrorism is not retroactive. While proscription would send a strong message, it
would likely prove impractical and ineffective. Furthermore, it could engender strong opposition and possibly
give unnecessary legitimacy to HT’s West vs. Islam worldview.28
Appropriateness of Current Approaches and Organisations
10. HJS welcomes the government’s Prevent Review, in particular the efforts to seriously engage with the
threat posed by Islamist organisations which run counter to British values. Importantly, the Review
unequivocally defines what those values are: “universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and
full participation in our society”. The Review affirms that it will no longer engage with or fund groups that
fail to support these values. It also clearly identifies the problem of Islamist ideology as one that “sets Muslim
against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges
and legitimises violence in its defence”. However, there are internal inconsistencies, specifically regarding the
future role of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), the Charity Commission and Ofsted.
11. The Prevent Review recommends that MINAB be involved in training faith leaders to tackle extremism.
MINAB is an alliance of four Muslim groups, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Muslim Association
of Britain (MAB), British Muslim Forum and al-Khoei Foundation, who have directly appointed 16 of the 50
26 For information on all of the above see Radical Islam on UK Campuses: A Comprehensive List of Extremist Speakers at UK
Universities, The Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010 available at
http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1292336866_1.pdf;
John Thorne and Hannah Stuart, Islam on Campus: A survey of UK student opinions, Centre for Social Cohesion 2008, available
at http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1231525079_1.pdf
27 http://www.muslimsagainstcrusades.com/
28 For more information see Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Strategy (Centre for Social Cohesion; October 2009).
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members of MINAB’s Executive Board.29 The MCB and MAB fail to meet the government’s new standards
for engagement. In December 2010, MAB was identified in the House of Commons as “the Brotherhood’s
representative in the UK”.30 In February 2010, Kamal el-Helbawy, the founder of MAB,31 appeared on
British television as a representative from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).32 The MCB is closely aligned to
the South Asian Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), founded by the Islamist theorist Syed Maulana Maududi.
According to a Communities and Local Government document (CLG) from March 2009: “The JI helped to
create and subsequently dominate the leadership of the MCB”.33 Both MCB and MAB espouse a narrow form
of political Islam inspired by the Islamist parties JI and MB and senior members have refused to unequivocally
condemn suicide bombings in Israel.34
12. The Prevent Review fails to recognise the bureaucratic failures of the Charity Commission and Ofsted.
The Review stated that the regulatory body Ofsted is “fit for purpose”.35 However, repeated Ofsted inspections
of an educational charity, the Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation (ISF), failed to recognise its links to the extreme
Islamist group HT or that the schools’ curriculum taught key tenets of the group’s ideology.
13. Two of the ISF’s four founding trustees—Yusra Hamilton and Farah Ahmed—were HT members at the
time the charity was established in 2005 as well as during the financial year 2007/2008 when the ISF received
£113,411 in government grants. Yusra Hamilton, a member of HT and the wife of HT media spokesperson Taji
Mustafa, was listed as the Slough school’s proprietor in that school’s 2009 Ofsted inspection, but resigned
from ISF after the Sunday Telegraph reported her connection to HT in October 2009. Farah Ahmed, author of
the ISF religious curriculum and Head teacher of the Slough school, was also a member of HT, but resigned
from HT following revelations of the links during Prime Minister’s Questions in November 2009.36 The
Charity Commission then conducted a regulatory case review into the ISF. The review stated: “the Commission
was aware that one of the current trustees [Farah Ahmed] was formerly a member […] the trustees confirmed
that Yusra Hamilton remains a volunteer at the Charity, they reported that she was no longer a trustees, having
formally resigned on 18 November 2009”. Astonishingly, the case review concludes: “Whilst Mrs Hamilton
had been a trustee on the date the concerns were raised publicly, as she had already resigned it was not
necessary for the Commission to examine further, the impact of her being a trustee and issues it may have
raised.”37
14. An emergency Ofsted inspection in 2007 stated: “the curriculum, based on the Halaqah curriculum for
Muslims in Britain, meets pupils’ need and prepares them well for life in 21st century Britain”.38 A copy of
the curriculum written by Farah Ahmed (obtained from the ISF in 2006) shows that it mirrors key HT texts
and includes lessons on: the need to establish an Islamist state, or Caliphate and its pre-requisites; jihad,
fighting in the path of Allah, as a form of worship; how democracy differs from ‘our laws’ ie HT’s ideology;
and the rulings systems of Islam, as defined by HT, including strict gender segregation.39 In this case, therefore,
neither Ofsted nor the Charity Commission was equipped to identify and tackle extremism within ISF.
Recommendations
15. Criteria for engagement: Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) should circulate
centralised criteria to all Prevent partners for identifying group’s whose ideology, trustees, senior members or
previous speaker record would disqualify it from engagement.
16. Civic institutions: A “No Platform” policy for the groups identified by RICU should be established across
publically-funded institutions. Local authorities should also establish mechanisms to limit civic institutions
inadvertently funding or hosting such groups.
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33 The Pakistani Muslim Community in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities in England, CLG, 17 April 2009,
available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/pakistanimuslimcommunity
34 For details on the MCB’s connections to Jamaat-e-Islami, see “Radical links of UK’s ‘moderate’ Muslim group”, Observer, 14
August 2005; see also comments made by leading MAB member Azzam Tamimi during a BBC Hardtalk interview, 5 November
2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/3985403.stm
35 The Prevent Strategy, Home Office, June 2011, available at
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary
36 See Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and Strategy (Centre for Social Cohesion; October 2009) pp. 87–88; see also “Schools are run by
Islamic group Blair pledged to ban”, Sunday Times, 5 August 2007. HTB wrote to the Sunday Times denying any involvement
with the schools, but did not refute allegations that Hamilton and Ahmed were HTB members. See “Corrections: Hizb ut-
Tahrir”, 22 August 2007, available at
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/global/article2306117.ece; see also “Islamists who want to destroy the state get £100,000 funding”,
Sunday Telegraph, 25 October 2009.
37 Charity Commission publishes report on Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation, 7 June, 2010, available at
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/RSS/News/pr_isf.aspx
38 Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation, 4 October 2007 (URN 134085).
39 Haringey Council Whitewashes Hizb ut-Tahrir Schools Centre for Social Cohesion Press Release 11 December 2009, available
at http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1260791158_1.pdf; scanned copy of the curriculum available at
http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/uploads/1260554937isf_curriculum.pdf
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17. Universities: Authorities should share information regarding speakers who: may break the law; may
contravene anti-harassment and bullying guidelines; or those whose opinions, while not illegal, are intolerant
and should not be given an unopposed platform.
18. MINAB: the government must reconsider if it is appropriate for MINAB to take the lead in training
Imams to combat extremism.
19. Registered mosques and Islamic charities: The Charity Commission should support mosques combating
the influence of an Islamist ideology which the Prevent Review identifies as one that “sets Muslim against
non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and
legitimises violence in its defence”. Charitable status and public funding should be withdrawn for registered
mosques and other Islamic charities which either repeatedly host visiting speakers who fail to meet the Prevent
Review standards or allow such individuals to become trustees.
July 2011
Written evidence submitted by Universities UK
Executive Summary
1. As civil institutions, universities have a responsibility to confront violent radicalisation within the
framework of the law. This is a responsibility which institutions take extremely seriously and there are many
examples of good practice within the sector. Universities acknowledge that as institutions where large groups
of predominantly young adults live, study and socialise, they are a potential target for those who seek to
convert vulnerable individuals to violent extremism. This is a risk that institutions recognise and are actively
seeking to address. In fulfilling their duties, institutions also have an opportunity to engage with their student
bodies more closely in order to support those who may be vulnerable to a range of negative influences including
violent radicalisation. Many universities have already seized upon this opportunity.
2. Universities must take account of a wide range of legislative duties including the legal obligation to
promote and protect freedom of speech as enshrined within the Education (No 2) Act 1986, legislation to
protect academic freedom (Education Reform Act 1988) duties to protect students and staff from harassment
(Protection from Harassment Act 1997), safeguarding public order on campus (Public Order Act 1986), the
requirements of the Terrorism Acts (2000 and 2006), charity law including the Charities Act 2006 and the
Equality Act 2010. This requires universities to balance a number of competing rights and to develop effective
processes and procedures to facilitate this.
3. Universities need to ensure that potentially aberrant behaviour is challenged and communicated to the
police where appropriate. However, the presence of controversial and extremist speakers on some university
campuses has left the sector vulnerable to accusations of complacency and of giving extremists a platform to
recruit. This accusation frequently ignores the competing rights that universities must balance, as well as
overlooking the fact that exposing students to extreme views equips them with the skills to critically assess,
challenge and reject violent ideologies.
4. Universities do not operate in isolation but form a part of a much wider community network, within
which students take an active role. Universities and local communities are closely entwined. In recent years
substantial attention has been focused on the fact that a proportion of individuals who have committed acts of
violent extremism have been to university within the UK. Simplistic linkages have been made between violent
radicalisation and the fact an individual has attended university without acknowledgement that the radicalisation
process is far more nuanced and difficult to predict. There needs to be a better understanding of the process
by which individuals are violently radicalised.
5. There are concerns that the debate around the role of universities in violent radicalisation has been
hampered by selective media reporting and reliance on an evidence base that frequently ignores the positive
work universities have undertaken in addressing this issue. This has resulted in universities being
disproportionately targeted in the broader debate. This is impeding the potential for a sensible, rational and
balanced discussion to take place on the role that universities can play in preventing violent radicalisation.
Universities need to be seen as part of the solution not the problem.
Universities UK
6. Universities UK is the representative body for universities in the UK and has 133 members across the
UK. The current President is Professor Sir Steve Smith, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Exeter, and the
Chief Executive is Nicola Dandridge. Any queries about this submission should be directed to Jo Attwooll,
Policy Adviser—jo.attwooll@universitiesuk.ac.uk
Existing good practice within the university sector
7. The university sector has been engaged with the issue of violent extremism for a number of years and as
such has produced a variety of practical resources to assist institutions with fulfilling their obligations and
preventing its spread. One of the first guidance documents produced was Extremism and intolerance on campus
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published in 1998 by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (now Universities UK). Subsequent
publications have included Promoting Good Campus Relations: dealing with hate crime and intolerance (2005)
and the 2011 Universities UK (UUK) report Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in
UK universities.
8. This latest report from UUK, written in the wake of the attempted bombing of a plane in Detroit on
Christmas Day 2009, highlighted a number of examples of good practice within the sector and set out the legal
framework within which institutions must operate. The results of a survey conducted by UUK during the
drafting of the report show that universities take very seriously their responsibilities in relation to the safety
and security of their staff and students. Violent radicalisation is not an issue that institutions can be complacent
about and in recognition of this, a number of universities have spent considerable time and resources in
fostering good relations on campus, in developing protocols for external speakers and in building relationships
with community groups, the police and security forces.40
9. The survey highlighted many examples of how universities are engaging with the extremism agenda. The
survey showed that almost all respondents reported regular contact with the police; two thirds reported having
engaged with the Prevent agenda; just over half reported regular contact with the local Counter Terrorism Unit
(CTU); around half reported contact with special branch and one quarter with security services. Some
universities have created dedicated liaison roles to work with the local police counter terrorist security adviser
and a number reported involvement with local Prevent steering groups.
10. The survey also demonstrated that many universities have taken comprehensive measures to try and
manage the booking of external speakers on campus through Codes of Practice to promote freedom of speech,
the formation of independent committees to consider objections to specific speakers, the introduction of notice
periods for the planning of events on campus, policies on the display of notices and regular communication
between university management and student union officers.
11. The UUK report built on pre-existing guidance. Using relevant case studies, it gave institutions valuable
advice on how to manage a range of difficult situations. Almost all institutions that responded to the survey
reported that they were aware of and had used sector guidance such as Promoting good campus relations. The
availability of such resources has facilitated the development of good practice across the university sector and
will in future help to safeguard and expand upon this.
12. However, despite the many examples of good practice, the sector acknowledges that universities can and
should do more. The UUK report made a number of recommendations for universities and other relevant
stakeholders to act upon. These recommendations included the identification of an appropriate senior person
to lead on issues of campus security, the development of a mechanism for regular dialogue with external
organisations such as the police and community groups and the review of protocols on speaker meetings. There
also remain issues surrounding the engagement of universities with their student societies, a situation which is
complicated by the autonomous and independent status of such societies.
13. It is of vital importance that universities critically reflect upon existing practice and continue to work
together as a sector to develop, share and learn from examples of good practice and the recommendations of
the UUK report will provide a structure upon which to do this.
The legislative framework governing universities
14. Universities operate within a complex legal structure. One key area of legislation is that which facilitates
the role of universities as important arenas for debate and discussion. This role is underpinned by the Education
(No 2) Act 1986 and the Education Reform Act 1988, which give universities a legally defined role to secure
freedom of speech and promote academic freedom. These legal principles reflect the fundamental belief in
universities as places where open and uncensored debate can and must take place, not least as a way of
encouraging students to learn to think for themselves and develop their own opinions. In this context, views
within universities may sometimes appear to be extreme or even offensive. However, unless views can be
expressed they cannot also be challenged.
15. Section 43 of the Education (No 2) Act enshrines a positive and proactive duty to promote and protect
freedom of speech. It imposes a duty on university governing bodies to issue, and keep updated, a code of
practice setting out the procedures to be followed by the institution in relation to the organisation of meetings
and other activities on the university’s premises.
16. In recent years there have been some well-documented examples of unpalatable and offensive views
being expressed on university campuses. Universities have been accused of hiding behind a smokescreen of
academic freedom and freedom of speech but little has been offered in the form of constructive proposals as
to how they could have acted any differently in responding to these incidents. Furthermore, the analyses of
such occurrences has consistently failed to differentiate between views that might be distasteful and offensive
to many and those views which are illegal and indicate a serious intent to commit violence. There has been a
40 See the Universities UK report Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK universities (2011) for examples
of good practice. Report available at
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Pages/Freedomofspeechoncampus.aspx
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tendency to conflate the presence of extremist speakers on campus with the security and counter-terrorism
agenda.
17. Within universities extremist views can be subjected to censure. There are concerns about the
Government’s intention to disengage with organisations whose ideologies do not fit with “British values” and
the impact of this on universities in promoting freedom of speech. Universities perform a vital role in
challenging the ideologies of organisations and individuals through open debate. Attempts to actively disengage
with specific groups may well drive challenging and extreme viewpoints underground and out of sight where
they may be allowed to prosper unchallenged and develop into more violent ideologies.
18. In fulfilling their obligations to safeguard freedom of speech universities must take into account at all
times other relevant legislation to ensure that individuals are not given a platform to promote views outside
the boundaries of legality. This is a difficult balancing act to perform and one which has necessitated the
development of formal protocols to manage the use of university premises and resources and to scrutinise
wherever possible the booking of external speakers.
19. Universities must consider not only their legal obligations in relation to the promotion of freedom of
speech and academic freedom but consider these in line with a complex range of additional legislation. They
must balance the requirements of the Education (No 2) Act 1986 and the Education Reform Act 1988 with
duties to protect students and staff from harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997), to safeguard
public order on campus (Public Order Act 1986), to prevent the planning and committing of acts of terror
(Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006), and to act in compliance with charity law (Charities Act 2006) and equalities
legislation (Equality Act 2010). This legislative framework is not an easy one to navigate but institutions
continue to develop and improve formal processes to manage each of these legal obligations in a balanced and
consistent manner.
Universities and the wider community
20. Universities have a duty of care in ensuring that campuses remain places of safety for students, staff and
visitors. As such universities offer many services to their students to support their academic and personal well-
being and to foster a shared sense of community and belonging. Initiatives such as this can help counter peer
and family isolation which are believed to be factors in making individuals more vulnerable to recruitment into
violent extremism.41
21. This pastoral support runs in tandem with more formal processes to manage campus relations, to subject
invitations issued to external speakers to objective scrutiny, and to treat different and sometimes conflicting
groups on campus in a fair and consistent manner. Institutions have an obligation to safeguard and facilitate
the academic development of students by equipping them with the tools to critically challenge their own
perceptions as well as those of others through debate and discussion. Facilitating the development of these
skills will necessitate exposing students to extreme, radical, controversial and challenging viewpoints. This
may include exposing them to views that many would find offensive but which nonetheless do not fall outside
of the law.
22. Whilst recognising the vital role that universities can and must play as civil institutions, there must also
be a realistic and fair assessment of the role they can play in preventing violent radicalisation. Universities are
substantial institutions at which many thousands of adults undertake their studies. In many cases they are
disparate entities operating across multiple locations, buildings and departments. Unlike schools, universities
do not operate in loco parentis and as such their students are entitled to organise themselves independently.
Universities must take reasonable steps to ensure that their campuses remain places of safety and security for
staff and students, and to facilitate this, protocols to manage external speakers and the use of university
resources and facilities are commonplace. Given the huge volume of events organised on university campuses
by students, staff and external organisations, this can be a complex and labour intensive task.42
23. University employees predominantly have contact with students within an academic context as opposed
to interaction that will expose them to intimate details of students’ personal lives and religious and political
beliefs. Universities do not exist in isolation but are embedded within wider, complex local communities.
Students regularly engage in these communities outside of the parameters of the university campus,
participating in social, community and faith based activities. The permeability of the boundaries between
universities and local communities limits the extent to which universities can realistically influence the activities
of students off campus.
24. The role of universities cannot and should not extend into the monitoring of the private lives of their
students. Thus, whilst control can be exercised over the use of university facilities and resources, universities
neither have the capacity to extend their reach beyond campus-based activity nor should they be expected to
do so. There must be good communication between universities and other relevant stakeholders including
community groups and the local police on issues, groups or individuals of concern, but universities cannot be
expected to have knowledge of the minutiae of students’ lives outside of campus parameters. Evidently, if an
41 Cole J, Alison E, Cole B, Alison L, Guidance for Identifying People Vulnerable to Recruitment into Violent Extremism, University
of Liverpool. Available at
http://www.liv.ac.uk/psychology/extremism/IVP_Guidance_Draft_v0.3_web_version.pdf
42 One London based university recently reported that it manages over 6000 events per year.
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institution does become aware of activity taking place off-campus that might indicate that an individual is
becoming violently radicalised, then it has a clear duty to respond to this.
25. Current theories on the drivers or causes of radicalisation rarely prove more than the exception and never
the rule.43 As such it remains difficult to ascertain whether specific factors have been instrumental in
radicalising individuals or if they were merely present but not causal. Despite this, in those incidents where an
individual has been radicalised to commit violent acts and they are known to have attended university, their
radicalisation is often linked to the university experience irrespective of whether there is evidence to suggest a
causal relationship between them.
26. University educated individuals who have committed acts of violent extremism may have been
radicalised either before or after their university studies. Alternatively, they may have been radicalised whilst
at university but influenced by factors off-campus or they may have been radicalised by factors present on-
campus. There is no hard and fast rule and no conveyor belt theory to catalogue the path to violent extremism.
Whilst it would be foolhardy to deduce that a relationship could never exist between radicalisation and the
university experience, it is also misleading to confuse correlation with causation and simply assume that the
university experience was a causal factor in an individual’s radicalisation. As such there needs to be a better
understanding of the risks and factors influencing violent radicalisation.
27. Universities do not operate in isolation. The university experience is just one of a multitude of complex
and interconnected factors influencing students including friends, family members, religion, faith and
community representatives, personal experiences, the media, the internet and local, national and international
events. Universities cannot be held responsible for the experiences that students have had before and after their
university studies or for all the experiences they have during their studies. Despite this the fact that an individual
has attended university is frequently assumed to be a defining factor in their radicalisation, when research
would suggest that vulnerability to violent radicalisation is far more complicated, nuanced and unpredictable.44
Adopting a simplistic approach to such a critically important topic detracts from serious engagement with the
most salient issues.
Universities in the public narrative about radicalisation
28. There is concern that the debate on violent radicalisation and the role of universities is being hampered
by a reliance on evidence which does not give the full picture, is frequently anecdotal, and regularly used in
such a way as to give a misleading representation of the actual situation. This means that misconceptions are
likely and that attempts to solve the issue of violent radicalisation may be hampered.
29. A brief critique of some of the sources of evidence cited within the recent Prevent review bear testament
to this. Whilst alluding to some of the positive work undertaken by universities to counteract the radicalisation
of students, the review ignores some notable sources of sector guidance and overlooks the extent to which
universities have engaged with this issue for a number of years. The review references several research studies
including a report by the Centre for Social Cohesion within which it is stated that 31% [40] of those who
committed suicide attacks or were convicted of Islam-related terrorist offences in the UK between 1999 and
2009 had at some point attended university or a higher education institute45. What is not taken into account
is that the proportion of young men now participating in higher education stands at 41%, a fact that indicates
that attending university may actually reduce the risk of vulnerability to violent radicalisation.46
30. The findings of a survey conducted by the Institute for Community Cohesion demonstrated that only
45% of universities were engaging with the Government’s Prevent strategy but due to its response rate of 17%
this was not deemed to be representative of the sector.47 However, despite this the survey findings are being
used as evidence that the sector is failing to engage with the Prevent strategy.
31. The recent inaugural report of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security48 attracted
significant attention, with particular focus on its assertions that there is a serious problem of radicalisation in
UK universities which needs to be tackled urgently. However, in writing the report and seeking evidence on
this issue not a single university vice-chancellor was asked to contribute, nor were any sector bodies consulted.
32. Universities understand the seriousness of the threat posed by violent radicalisation and recognise that
they have a strong role to play in remaining vigilant and responsive to this threat. There is evidence of good
practice within the sector, and whilst this cannot be used as justification for complacency, it is often ignored
in the broader debate. A failure to look at all the evidence is damaging to universities and more importantly
means that the issue of how to tackle violent extremism is being considered on the basis of misconception.
43 Briggs, R & Birdwell, J Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK, Microcon Policy Working Paper 7, 2009.
44 Ibid.
45 Simcox, R, Stuart H and Ahmed, H Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections, London: The Centre for Social Cohesion,
2010.
46 41% of young men between the ages of 17and 30 and 47% of young people (men and women) between the ages of 17 and 30
participated in Higher Education 2009–10. Figures taken from Participation Rates in Higher Education: Academic Years 2006/
2007—2009/2010 (Provisional), Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011.
47 Beider, H & Briggs, R Promoting Community Cohesion and Preventing Violent Extremism in Higher and Further Education,
Institute for Community Cohesion, 2010.
48 All Party Parliamentary Group on Homeland Security, Keeping Britain Safe: An Assessment of UK Homeland Security Strategy,
2011.
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Conclusion
33. Universities should be viewed as a vital part of the solution to violent radicalisation, not the problem.
They have a crucial role in developing understanding of the process that leads to violent radicalisation, in
analysing how radicalising groups operate, and in assessing the effectiveness of interventions to prevent
radicalisation through research and through widening and enhancing the evidence base upon which future
policy can be determined.
34. They play a vital role in protecting and supporting vulnerable students, in facilitating good campus
relations, in fostering debate and equipping students with the capacity to think for themselves, challenge and
reject violent ideologies.
35. The issue of violent radicalisation is of crucial importance and it necessitates informed and rational
debate drawing upon a broad and reliable evidence base. Universities take this agenda extremely seriously and
whilst there are many examples of good practice within the sector, these must be shared and expanded upon.
July 2011
Supplementary written evidence submitted by Universities UK
Roots of Violent Radicalisation: Universities UK evidence, 15 November 2011 I am writing following the oral
evidence given of Professor Geoffrey Petts, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Westminster, on behalf of
Universities UK on 15 November 2011. During the course of his evidence Professor Petts referred to various
documents and activities. We thought it would be useful to send to you further details to assist the work of
the Committee.
1. In his evidence, Professor Petts briefly outlined the processes by which the University of Westminster
seeks to prevent activities which might lead to the violent radicalisation of individuals on university premises.
At his request I attach a short note setting out, in greater detail, the guidance which is available to university
staff (Appendix 1). For context, I also provide copies of the Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech at the
University of Essex, and the University of Roehampton’s Guidelines for Engaging with Sensitive Issues
(Appendix 2). I also attach two examples of speaker booking forms, one from Leeds University Union
(incorporating guidelines produced by the University itself) (Appendix 3), and an example of guidance for
external speakers, issued by St George’s, University of London (Appendix 4).
2. Professor Petts also referred to the conference hosted by Universities UK in July 2011 on the theme of
“Security on Campus and Freedom of Speech”. We thought the Committee might find it helpful to have a copy
of the programme of that event, which was attended by 70 representatives from 34 universities, including 11
from the Greater London area. Attendees ranged from directors of student services, heads of student affairs,
academic registrars, heads of security, interfaith coordinators and a vice-president for welfare (Appendix 5).
3. Professor Pelts undertook to send copies of Universities UK’s recent report Freedom of speech on campus:
rights and responsibilities in UK universities, which I now enclose (Appendix 6).
4. Following on from the publication of the report, Universities UK has also undertaken a variety of activities
following up the recommendations made in the report as well as those made in the Prevent review:
(i) The Universities UK conference in July was designed to facilitate the sharing of good practice
across the sector in relation to speaker meetings; maintaining effective dialogue with external
organisations such as the police, local authorities and community groups; and ensuring
institutions are fully conversant with the legal requirements operating in relation to campus
security, academic freedom, free speech and equality rights.
(ii) Since the release of the Prevent review in June, Universities UK has met regularly with officials
from the Home Office and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to discuss how
best the recommendations relating to higher education institutions can be progressed. The initial
focus of these discussions has been on the establishment of a central point of information to
share good practice across the sector and the proposed appointment of regional coordinators to
lead on Prevent-related activity. Whilst no formal agreement has been reached on these
proposals, good progress is being made.
(iii) Outside of these discussions with government officials, Universities UK is considering the
development of further guidance for the sector on external speakers. This will complement the
commitment made within the Prevent review to ensure that student societies and university and
college staff have the right information and guidance to enable them to make decisions about
external speakers.
5. During the evidence session Professor Pelts was asked to comment on what changes could be made to
the Prevent strategy. There is one area where Universities UK does have concerns, reflecting concerns in the
sector about the Government’s intention to disengage with organisations whose ideologies do not fit with
“British values” and the impact of this on universities’ promotion of free speech. Universities perform a vital
role in challenging the ideologies of organisations and individuals through open debate. Attempts to actively
disengage with specific groups may well drive challenging and extreme viewpoints underground and out of
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sight where they may be allowed to prosper unchallenged and thereby develop into more violent ideologies
than would otherwise be the case.
6. Finally, the opening question asked of Professor Petts by the Committee was, in our view, a most important
one. I thought it would be useful to reinforce Professor Petts’ response on this point. Professor Petts was asked
whether the university experience results in radicalisation. Although the Prevent strategy states that 30% of
individuals convicted of AI Qaida-related terror offences between 1999 and 2010 had been to university in the
UK, there is no clear evidence to suggest that the university experience was a predominant causal factor in their
being violently radicalised. Nonetheless, whether such violent radicalisation happens before, during, outside or
after the university setting, all universities have to be aware of the risks of this occurring and do what they can
to prevent it from happening. Where the behaviour manifests itself as radicalisation (not necessarily violent)
then how universities decide to respond has to be set within the context of universities’ legal responsibilities
to protect the safety and well-being of staff and students, to promote free speech, to comply with equality and
charity legislation, as well as a range of other rights and responsibilities. It can be a difficult balance to strike
and there is no one right answer, but it is a balance that we believe universities work hard to get right.
I hope you will find this supplementary information useful. Do not hesitate to contact me if you require
anything further.
Appendices49
Annex 1: Guidance document available to university of Westminster staff
Annex 2: Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech at the University of Essex and the University of Roehampton
Guidelines for Engaging with Sensitive Issues
Annex 3: Example of speaker booking form from Leeds University Union (incorporating guidelines produced
by the University itself)
Annex 4: Example of guidance for external speakers, issued by St. George’s, University of London
Annex 5: Copy of the programme for the conference hosted by Universities UK in July 2011 on the theme of
“Security on Campus and Freedom of Speech”
Annex 6: Universities UK’s recent report Freedom of speech on campus: rights and responsibilities in UK
universities
December 2011
Written evidence submitted by Averroes Institute
The Averroes Institute (AI) is a legal and policy think tank working to improve Muslim-Government
relations. AI believes in peaceful coexistence and inter-cultural dialogue between communities within the
framework of British multiculturalism, international human rights, minority rights, democratic principles and
fair representation. AI seeks to represent, convey and articulate the sentiments of the vast often unheard
majority of British Muslims (www.averroesinstitute.org.uk).
Executive Summary
1. This submission principally focuses on the relationship between Islam and violent radicalisation amongst
the British Muslim community. The distinction and relationship between the two is crucial to counter the
perception that the whole community is suspected of, or susceptible to, violent radicalisation.
2. Although it has been acknowledged within the revised Prevent Strategy that terrorist acts on British soil
are carried out by a mere handful of people who identify with the Al-Qaida ideology, there seems to be a
disproportionate association of terrorism with Muslims along with a failure to identify and articulate that many
terrorist attacks are committed by non-Muslims. It is this inconsistency that may be perceived as a deliberate
misrepresentation of the Muslim community. Such a portrayal of the extremist problem legitimises the ideology
of the English Defence League (EDL) and others who may sympathise with the actions of Anders Breivik,
thus facilitating factors leading to domestic extremism.
Introduction
3. The revised Prevent Strategy proposes a greater and unprecedented role for government in monitoring
and regulating ideology. In focusing too heavily on ideological precursors to violent radicalisation, it loses
sight of the need to establish a convincing link between the purported precursor and national security. As such,
the government has failed to appropriately demonstrate how either opposition or rejection to one or more of
the values specified in the revised Strategy necessitates violent extremism, indeed, by attempting to classify
those who do not fully agree with these ideals as being extremists, Muslim or otherwise, grossly exceeds the
role and rights of government in enforcing beliefs on British citizens.
49 Not printed
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4. A worrying factor in relation to the practicalities of identifying non-violent extremists is that such a charge
is left to public professionals who neither have knowledge of Islamic theology nor the intricacies that exist
amongst Muslim ideologies. Such politicisation of Islam ironically serves to strengthen the claims of extremists
that western states and their non-Muslim citizens seek to undermine the religion.
5. A key factor in the radicalisation and consequent ascription to a violent ideology (espoused by extremists)
is not only British foreign policy as attested to by a number of key personnel in the Security Services, but also
the way in which the government has disregarded the sentiments of the Muslim community prior to initiating
military campaigns against their co-religionists. The lack of consultation with the Muslim community who
make up over 2 million British citizens demonstrates the government’s failure to understand the need and
desire of British Muslims to fully participate in the decisions that concern them.
6. The basic thesis advanced is simple yet stark. Without initial grievances resulting from a perception that
Islam and/or Muslims are under attack, with such ideas sourcing from both foreign and domestic policies in
the wake of terrorist acts, the violent ideology would be rendered impotent. As a corollary, those who are
devout and grounded in the textual sources of Islam almost never follow such an ideology. Thus a religious
education that is better versed with mainstream Islamic teachings is an effective safeguard against susceptibility
to an ideology which sees no wrong in the targeting of innocent civilians in terrorist attacks.
7. Such an understanding should impact on the Home Secretary’s view of banned Muslim preachers who
are well-known amongst European Muslims for their opposition to terrorist acts. Hence the Home Secretary
should take extra care not to be easily influenced by the misrepresentation of think tanks that are ideologically
aligned to the xenophobic and Islamophobic far right.
8. The lack of specificity of the “problem” proposed within the revised Prevent Strategy as well as the
failure to distinguish between non-pacifism and “extremism” means the government makes serious flaws in the
identification of extremists. The Strategy preoccupies itself with ideas that “cause” terrorism yet the nature of
those ideas and their subtle differences with mainstream Islamic juristic interpretations of warfare have been,
on numerous occasions, overlooked by the government.
9. The lack of engagement with scholars and religious leaders who have standing within the Muslim
community has led the government to resort to skewed assumptions where resentment is borne out of two
reasons. The first is of perception, resulting from the lack of specificity and the use of contested and
controversial terms. The second type relates to the inclusion of mainstream Islamic beliefs (under the revised
Prevent Strategy) as precursors to violent radicalisation—a claim made without any rigorous examination, be
it political or religious.
Foreign Policy and Radicalisation
10. The starting point for identifying the root causes of violent radicalisation amongst the Muslim community
should rationally begin with an analysis of the articulated intent of terrorists themselves. The 7/7 bombers, for
example, explicitly cited engagement of British troops in Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. The Al-
Qaeda narrative that they were said to ascribe to also relies on either foreign occupation or the presence of
foreign soldiers in Muslim lands as one of the main instruments of self-legitimisation. Indeed the former
Director-General of MI5 Dame Manningham-Buller testified as much at the Chilcot Inquiry.
11. The Averroes Institute (AI) submits that this in essence is due to the perception that foreign policy is
directed either against Islam or Muslims. In fact, the sources of grievance are much broader than foreign policy
and extend to any hostility perceived to be anti-Muslim, including domestic policies such as Terrorism
legislation or the revised Prevent Strategy itself.
Whilst not new, AI is particularly concerned with the validity of the response by the previous and present
governments. Firstly, there has been both a silence and an unproductive aversion to the issue of violent
radicalisation relating to foreign policy. Secondly, the explanation advanced for such a position is often that
foreign policy should not be held to ransom by terrorists and that violent acts would still occur without such
resentment solely due to the ideology that sustains it, a claim made by the Prime Minister in his Munich speech.
AI, however, believes that foreign policy plays a vital role in the radicalisation of Muslims in two ways.
Firstly there seem to be contradictory practices towards different states or a failure to live up to the ideals
of justice, self-determination, and goodwill. Secondly the government has repeatedly failed to consult with
representative Muslim groups before engaging in hostilities against Muslim countries.
It is thus evident the government has failed to understand the importance of shared faith amongst Muslims
worldwide, which is very much like British citizens who hold dual nationality. In order to allay concerns and
demonstrate some sense of accountability to the public, consultation with the Muslim community would not
only demonstrate that the government acknowledges British Muslims as “British”, but also that the Muslim
community, as fully participating citizens of the state, have some say in government policies—especially those
that concern them.
Such practices not only undermine the claim of extremists, but also reassure British Muslim citizens that
they are not excluded from the political process. Of course, AI fully asserts that grievances over foreign policy
do not necessarily lead to terrorism on their own, but that terrorism is buttressed by a violent ideology (see
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below for further elaboration). However, having effective democratic practices in place, which include the
Muslim minority in the decision making process, the terrorist mindset would be less likely to take shape. If
government wishes to maintain that foreign policy grievances play a minor or insignificant role in violent
radicalisation then it must provide empirical evidence to support such a claim.
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 has been proven to indirectly target Muslims due to its arbitrary
nature.50 Other similar elements, such as Schedule 7, persist and have been criticised by the government’s
own Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, further reinforcing negative Muslim
perceptions of goverment.51
Widely documented British complicity in human rights abuses involving Muslims further exasperates the
predicament, examples being the abuse of innocent Iraqi’s by British forces,52 the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda
cases, as well as the ongoing Baha Mousa Inquiry not to mention flagrant human rights abuses by allies such
as the US Kill Team.53
Existing Approaches
12. The previous and revised Prevent strategies both fall short of addressing certain root causes of violent
radicalisation. The first cause, grievances and resentment due to a perceived attack on Islam and Muslims
emanating from, amongst other factors, foreign policy is not acknowledged, even though it is what enables the
violent ideology to take root.
13. Secondly the violent ideology is not defined specifically enough to be effectively addressed at its source
or with those over whom it is most likely to hold sway—the politically disaffected and non-devout.
14. Thirdly the lack of definition and the conflating of a violent ideology with the non-pacifist beliefs of the
vast majority give rise to a third aggravating factor that confirms the paranoia and negative perceptions of
many in the Muslim community.
15. Government appears to be unaware that those most devout are the least likely to develop a terrorist
mindset whilst remaining strong non-pacifists. There is also a failure to recognise that self-identification as
Muslims and ascription to its tenets necessitate that such individuals can only be approached, refuted and de-
radicalised with arguments grounded in Islam. Therefore those who hold credibility and legitimacy such as
scholars and non-pacifists amongst Muslims will hold most sway amongst the youth and the grass roots of
the community.
16. Therefore specific and tailored strategies must be devised to deal with those who are susceptible to the
terrorist mindset, those who have renounced fallacious and illegitimately violent interpretations of Islamic law,
and those who propagate such an ideology.
17. With regards to dealing with the source of the ideology, it is imperative that this exercise be carried out
in a methodological manner to arrive at a specific and detailed conclusion. One which correctly identifies the
precise content of the violent ideology so as to enable the Muslim community to intercept those who espouse
such views prior to them actualising their aspirations.
18. Nonetheless, this step has often been overlooked. Instead the problem is vaguely defined and the policies
employed far too “blunt” in nature to the extent that it becomes inevitable, both in perception and reality, that
Islam itself or the practice of the vast majority of Muslims is conflated with the violent ideology.
Relationship with the Muslims Community
19. Conflation only serves to reduce the chances of cooperation with the Muslim community in opposing
the violent ideology as the community itself feels at risk of being identified as those with terrorist tendencies
even though they are against it.
20. The terms employed from the outset were counterproductive, such as the Prevent program being made
specific to “Islamic extremism” but then amended due to public outcry. Even the use of “extremism” implies
a religious spectrum with one end occupied by an extreme ideology (and the other by non-observance) thus
conflating religious commitment with the likelihood of being prone to a violent ideology. The term
“radicalisation” also implies there to be a causal link between religiosity and radicalism. Any term such as
“Islamic fundamentalism” that risks religiosity being correlated with a violent ideology or risks identifying
religion itself as the root cause should be avoided too. The term “fundamentalism”, though widely used, should
also be abandoned since for many Muslims it creates resentment that the immutable aspects of their faith are
being threatened. The use of terms that link violence with religion are also unproductive given that they
legitimise extreme elements of society to attack aspects of Islam that have nothing to do with “violence”, but
merely on an ideological basis.
50 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom, judgment of 12 January 2010.
51 Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part 1 of the terrorism act 2006 (July 2011).
52 Al-Skeini/Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, judgement of 7 July 2011.
53 http://www.rollingstone.com/kill-team
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Non-Violent Extremism
21. Government should only classify ideologies as “extremist” when they are overtly violent in their means.
Thus it is essential that we maintain focus on the factors that categorically lead to violence. These must be
construed in a narrow sense, in order to limit governmental interference in the legitimate realm of freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, all of which constitute an essential corner-stone of democratic society.
22. The revised Prevent Strategy’s conception of the term “extremism” is highly problematic. Despite Mr.
Cameron’s emphatic assurances in Munich of distinguishing between Islam and “Islamist extremism”, a closer
examination of the substance of the Strategy (and his Munich speech) reveals the opposite. Mainstream
religious views such as those on systems of governance and religious law, gender, sexuality, and a belief in the
use of force as an act of self-defence—a belief that has nothing to do with the ideology of attacking one’s own
State and its citizens, have been labelled as “non-violent extremist” views—this without any visible consultation
with the Muslim community who would undoubtedly work to rectify their misrepresented beliefs and views.
23. This will also mean that almost all mainstream scholars with legitimacy and credibility in the community
can potentially be classified as “extremists”, indeed many of these scholars have been openly opposed to the
interpretations of Al-Qaida and like-minded groups since their emergence as international organisations.
24. Mr. Cameron’s attack on multiculturalism and his assertion that accommodation for cultures to develop
and co-exist has allowed for violent extremism to develop is highly counterproductive owing to the fact that
the purpose of Prevent is to diminish threats to security as opposed to threats to the British culture—as
conceived by Mr Cameron.
25. In fact the Coalition Government should not attack nor challenge any aspect of the Islamic belief system
without having established a firm link with violence against the state. Not only is his conceptualisation
incorrect, but it could, for the various reasons stated previously, also add to burgeoning antipathy amongst
many Muslims.
26. The revised Prevent Strategy is also unlikely to be within the legal bounds of international human and
minority rights law. Firstly it is an essential part of any functioning democratic society to allow differences in
view and belief, even if they challenge the form of government as long as such challenges are expressed in a
peaceful manner. Secondly, no link has been established between such beliefs and violence. Thirdly, other
religious groups who hold parallel views are not subject to the same scrutiny.
27. The Strategy is also unworkable from a policy perspective. As such the government should also
understand that a coercive approach is never sustainable. Whatever the government’s intentions, without
bringing the vast majority of Muslim community on board, a lasting solution will continue to remain elusive.
July 2011
Written evidence submitted by Centri
Brief Overview of Centri
There has been some good work in the Prevent arena and an increase in the number of experts and
organisations that are able to access and work with the Government and communities with a better
understanding of how and what causes youngsters to be radicalised to extremism. There is however a need for
more to be done in the implementation and evaluation of strategies and projects that are being undertaken and
to make them more mainstream.
CENTRI has been formed to bring together world class experts with the experience and ability to assist in
this area from the different sects and schools of thought within the British Muslim population.
The following is based upon:
1. extensive study with former radicals;
2. engagement with the research that has been done in the UK and abroad;
3. two years of counter terrorism interventions work which has been undertaken with the Police;
probation service; community referrals; through the channel process; and other forms of referral;
4. observations of the data that have been gathered over the last 10 years, and the 120 plus cases
that have led to convictions in the UK;
5. discussions with senior Police figures responsible for Channel; and
6. theoretical studies undertaken by colleagues and researchers looking at psychological
constitution in sociopathy.
Too many people like to describe radicalization towards violence as a single trajectory—a single process
and route to radicalization. People either see this as ideology or theology, or grievances or they see it as a
specific theological trajectory ie salafist Jihadism (a mixture of what is commonly referred to as the Saudi
Arabian brand of Wahabi-Salafi religious dogma which is then taken to a political extreme and seeks to enforce
this pre-modern interpretation of Islam by force upon society, and justifies violence in order to achieve this
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end). Though tempting to use as analytical tools, these views do not accurately portray what is happening “on
the ground”.
The picture on the ground demonstrates a number of trajectories which are common—these four pathways
are the most common routes traversed that lead to violent extremism.
Pathways
1. A belief in a world view where the west is at war with Islam. The selective observation of political issues
as grievances, leads to accepting the plausibility of violent ideologies as normal and appropriate to the world.
This then sees extremist ideology as the only ideology and a reading of religious texts that are consonant and
resonate with the world as it is. These individuals are often not drawn to the theology of Wahhabi jihadism,
but to the political project and activities as being a manifestation of fighting the war against Islam that is being
perpetrated by the West. Whether it is the cartoons, the wars in geo-political East, or one of the myriad other
examples cited, they are all viewed as examples of this. Acts of terror are seen in the same light; as a response
to this war—intellectual, political, and military. The way to engage such people in our experience is not to
immediately challenge the theology, but to get them to see the world in a more nuanced manner; the media,
parliamentary debate and policy, government decisions, wars etc are all not “for or against” Muslims. If this is
done, then the framework of thinking within which the world is viewed is comprehensively changed. This
change then necessitates a more nuanced approach to the religious texts, and it begins to make more sense that
such an approach should exist. Hence, this route is a mixture of grievances viewed through a specific narrative,
and an ideological view of Islam and terrorism.
2. Theological terrorism—there are individuals who have a full-blown belief that Islamist ideology is the
only valid political reality that Muslims can accept. They believe terrorism is a form of Jihad to remove
governments and their supporters ie “The West” from Muslim majority countries or what they would refer to
as “Muslim lands”. These are specific, theologically driven aims, and they believe that they have an authentic
reading of medieval Islamic scripture. This category of people can only be engaged by people with the relevant
theological expertise to demonstrate that the views held are inauthentic and are a heterodox reading of scripture.
After first dealing with the specific issue of violence, the underpinning mindset can only be engaged by
demonstrating the pluralism within Islam, and the diverse nature of Islamic thought; this is a detailed, and
specific theological engagement.
3. There are individuals in the UK of Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani origin, who have had grievous
experiences. These experiences, often of violence; traumatic loss of family members; “collateral damage”
involving our troops; or personal experiences of treatment in the UK, makes these individuals personally
susceptible to violent ideology. These individuals are often motivated by a sense of moral indignation. Engaging
with such people can be difficult. In our experience it requires: management of the emotions and allowing
them to be expressed and justified; allowing the moral reaction and building upon it (ie civilians being hurt
does not allow civilians being attacked); developing a sense of moral rectitude and re-enforcing this by
addressing the theological justifications; and building resilience on human rights, morality, and theological
principles over a period of time.
4. Those with mental health problems—whether minor or major—are targets and easily vulnerable. This is
why mainstream services identifying such people in partnership with initiatives is so important. Dealing with
the arguments, isolating the individuals, placing them in safer spaces, dealing with the causes eg the mental




In my opinion they are not the main source of radical activities nor are they the most likely place within
which to find extremist ideologues engaging in activism. But this requires elaboration:
1. There are some institutions—which a survey would identify quite easily—where all groups are
allowed to operate without restriction. A well known example of this is the Regent’s Park
Mosque which has always allowed Hizb ut-Tahrir to have regular weekly Arabic and English
language circle. Hizb ut-Tahrir are not a violent organization but they are ideological disposed
to (a) accepting Jihadist groups and activities as politically and religiously legitimate, but
different from their own brand of Islamist theology and (b) do accept forms of terrorism that
we would consider (i) obviously wrong from a moral perspective, (ii) illegal and (iii)
contradictory to the policy of counter terrorism that we have had in place since the inception
of CONTEST eg suicide bombing of civilians in Israel and bombings within the civilian
population for example. They have also given rise to violent extremist groups in the UK and
even in places like India such as the “Milli” off shoot.
2. There are other institutions which are themselves lead by people who support certain types of
terrorist groups. An anecdotal example occurred last Ramadan where a Mosque in the North
East, supplicated not merely against Israelis but for God to count their number (ie all of them)
and kill them. This was an institution run by people close to Hamas ideologically. There are a
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limited number of such institutions which in truth are Muslim Brotherhood affiliates (Hamas is
officially a part of the MB, in their constitution).These places foster not only the ideological
and theological extremist views which are close to violence and extremist ideology but are
actually places where masses are exposed to such radical views consistently.
3. Activists who operate from Mosques and within them but are not a part of them. This is
something that can only be determined by following known and active groups and individuals
with their connections and intelligence; this has been happening to some extent.
4. Some institutions theology is sympathetic to certain brands of terrorism and extremism—the
Taliban and certain factions within Pakistani Deobandi institutions. I must stress that this is not
to say that all or the majority are like this; but historically there have been many places which
have housed and given support to Pakistani groups which are religious “vigilantes” (obviously
persecuting people who commit religious “crimes” though not illegal activities). From an
experiential and “research” perspective this is, of course, not the norm nor the majority of
institutions. Actually, the opposite has been shown, though some of this will be liable to dispute
and scrutiny.
2. Internet
Experts are divided by what they see as Internet radicalization—in my work I have come across certain
cases which I would share:
1. some individuals who already have “cause” or “motivation” and then seek to find information;
2. those individuals who see it as a place for anonymously spreading their ideology and theology—
either through direct one way propaganda, and those who see those forums where “theological/
jurisprudential” discussions can take place. Justify and further radicalize those with sympathies,
and meet like-minded individuals;
3. finding a community to belong to—researchers have stated that this is a common practice with
all sorts of deviant behaviours whether suicide pacts, cults etc. Reinforcing the beliefs and
world view and further strengthening such beliefs; and
4. means of discreet communication and open propaganda—strategic communication through
alternative sites eg as has been discovered pornographic sites seem to be a route of transferring
information and also we have the Inspire Magazine-al-Qaeda’s English language online
publication attempting to both relate psychologically to a Western audience and give practical
tips on how to be a lone wolf terrorist.
3. Universities
In my opinion the Universities are the single area where there has been little or no consistent focus whilst
at the same time we have more and more extreme voices and views being presented:
1. Apparently mainstream institutions. We have for example apparently “representative”
institutions endorsing preachers who support terrorism eg Raed Saleh who recently has been
bailed after being arrested for being in the UK in violation of a notice of exclusion that he was
given. His website supports and praised Bin Laden as a martyr (shaheed) presumably dying in
“Jihad”; heads a group that has explicitly stated that it does not believe in civilians in Israel
among Jews, and Palestinians taking part in the political process are traitors and that Jews in
general—thousands of them in the US—were behind 9/11 and knew about it and conspired
against the people, in the official party magazine. This man was defended irrespective of the
facts—this is not about Israel and Palestine but about terrorism and anti-Semitic hatred—they
decided that he was a good man who should be supported.
2. Violent terrorist supporters and their activists have been operating on campus which did not
stop out of principle but actually when some of these matters became more and more public.
One institution did not do anything to stop the al-Qaeda Yemen English preacher who has
recently gained notoriety, Anwar Awlaki from speaking by live link up and recordings at the
University till pressure from public discrediting made it necessary.
3. The politicized discourses which prevent an objective analysis taking place—this is barrier to
seeing what is happening within such institutions. I am not suggesting that the majority of
University students are embracing extremist ideological narratives and considering violence. In
fact I would say that only a small percentage get involved with any type of political activism
and even Islamist activism, and only a small percentage will become radicalized. The problem
is I do not believe that any non-biased non-political analysis is currently available that is up to
date and current on the issue.
4. Institutionally there are little to no resources invested in this area—how many staff members
does BIS have related to this and looking into this subject?
5. There has been no objective criterion to differentiate (a) what are the groups and institutions
that we are engaging with actually take as their political and theological stand points? (b) what
is an acceptable minimal threshold and how do we define it? (c) based upon (a), (b) and the
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additional evidence that we have of effective engagement coupled with a developed perspective
on radicalization towards violence, have we been developing our policies and activism? The
current government does wish to do so and has started the process of developing the criterion for
doing so within the prevent review, though there is still much more that needs to be developed.
6. Counter campaigns against the prevalent totalitarian voices need to be facilitated if platforms
paid for by the University and public bodies, are to allow extreme preachers. This is in order
to allow and facilitate debate and challenge the extreme narratives. Otherwise effectively, it is
tax-payers money going to allow people to preach the killing of homosexuals, adulterers, and
demonizing Jews in the name of anti-Israeli government labels, effectively totalitarian fascists
given a public platform paid by the public to recruit and proselytize their views in the mistaken
name of freedom of speech. This is not about rights of public gathering, free speech and not
persecuting people, but rather about using state sponsored privileges to spread fascist ideals in
the name of a religion; in this case in the name of Islam.
7. Resources to support not merely criticize Universities need to be put in place—greater number
of people, advice, information sharing, developing good practice in vetting and challenging
extremists and preventing those advocating violence and terrorism or breaking laws against
hate speech are all required.
4. Prisons
There are unique circumstances which for various reasons have been created. Some as a result of normal
prison community dynamics ie it is a separate society to the rest of society inhabited by people who have
established their own criterion outside of the wider society. There is a concentration of people likely to be
receptive or “vulnerable”. There are dynamics that have been developed due to general problems such as the
gang culture and radical religion compounding together to create very unique types of extremists gangs. These
gangs provide primarily safety within prison. But also networks. They reinforce criminal behaviour mentalities
through new found religious justifications. Additionally we have had the strange scenario where communities
being placed together through religious identity, and these have been including in the past radical hate
preachers—inadvertently thereby giving terrorists and those convicted of offences related to terrorism people
with whom to interact and propagate their views and theology and political lens—to a group of people who
are arguably vulnerable to it. This alongside a complete inability—completely understandable—for the staff to
deal with this very unique situation. In conversations with Prison staff, fellow colleagues/interventionists,
leading people dealing with post prison probation and community re-assignment the following are key issues
have come to the fore:
1. existing tensions are heightened—cultures of racism and prejudice have been addressed over
the last few years within prisons but there are still tensions which exist within intra-prison
“communities” and those communities and staff;
2. lack of awareness of mainstream staff of the theological and ideological realities they are
dealing with;
3. lack of grounded evidence based training for staff on actual evidence based characteristics and
behaviours to be aware of when dealing with such cases—yet there are additional burdens that
have been placed on prison staff in terms of “policing” extremists and terrorists and seeking to
look out for their activities and signs of radicalism as opposed to religious conversion—which is
a common phenomenon—and gang related extremism/embracing of “religion” and criminality
justified in the name of religion;
4. isolating extremist/terrorist preachers and activists from the wider Muslims populace—how can
this be justified? How can it be done? How can interaction be regulated? What lessons can be
learned from previous experiences eg with the IRA and their direction and engagement with
the outside group?; and
5. what are successful interventions and unsuccessful ones? There are some or rather a few
successful interventions which have taken place but not enough of an actuarial sample/data to
be able to develop specific understanding though I would outline the following points from the
limited number of cases that have taken place that I can build on:
1. Engage without confrontation initially.
2. Understand but not justify positive and negative emotions and motivations.
3. Initially seek to develop a positive basis for interaction and change.
4. Challenge the effectively and consequences prior to the theology, as a means to questioning
the theological basis of terrorism.
5. Develop an alternative theology within their own theological framework and gradually
build alternatives as well as criticize extant extreme points of view.
6. Set clear and measurable analysis criterion which are constantly being reviewed and
monitored for change over a period of time.
7. Develop through time, positive external foci to build upon.
cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-02-2012 11:37] Job: 017436 Unit: PG09
Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 121
6. The above is the best description that I can give without elaborating into massive details of
some apparently successful interventions in a prisons set up. It is not a generic formula that
can be replicated—each intervention, whether by prisons, probation’s, community based,
through the police etc, is different, and the role played by theology is different which will be
elaborated further.
Key components for a successful deradicalization approach—again this is based upon our experiences in
interventions over the last two years and engagement with individual extremists from violent and so-called
non-violent backgrounds, and also discussions with other providers and local delivery units that we work with.
The following are key in our view:
1. Initial assessment of all factors: cognitive, behavioural, hygiene, extended environment, mental
health, social factors—personal to him, and additional risk factors such as exposure to people
etc.
2. A developed analysis and justification for how judgements are made and based should be (a)
documented, (b) the basis for developing a plan, (c) monitoring and assessing and evaluating
change and effective engagement and (d) evaluating the initial assessment and continuously
amending it based upon evidence and reassess plans constantly.
3. A developed understanding of the type of trajectory that the individual has taken and not having
a formulaic approach.
4. Understanding key issues related to an individual undertaking violence—pre-requisites that are
almost required and manifested in an individual.
5. Not isolating individuals from their human needs and working alongside mainstream services
in dealing with the individual.
6. Iidentifying and addressing key motivations and the associated thought patterns as well as
attitudes and perspectives that reinforce them within the individual and addressing them.
7. Adapting styles, upon gaining confidence enough for the individual to even consider what you
are saying/questioning, being able to first dismantle the specific emotional drivers, world view,
theological bases/claims, context in which they live, separate them if necessary from the source
of the radicalization. All of this depends upon the specific trajectory and as we have defined
and explained above an outline process of engagement above (see above—Pathways).
The Role of Theology
Much of the discussion again in this regard in my opinion is either based upon external lenses being
forced onto the debate; ideological bias—right-wing and Far-Right anti-Islam, left-wing grievance primacy
assumptions for motivators and then building analysis accordingly. In my opinion the following needs to be
documented thoroughly but can be elaborated upon briefly in the following manner:
1. Understanding of the various strands of theology in two respects (1) where do they stand on a
theological map and sectarian and intellectual backgrounds.
2. A very clear calibration of views on a clear legal and criterion—this may sound simplistic but
it has not been done in an effective manner; types of violence, which are all classified as illegal
violence in the UK, overseas, against civilians or against UK troops in illegal insurgencies.
When looking at individual motivations—these can be categorized according to the above pathways outlined:
the theology either fits into an ideological framework, the world view which presents things from an anti-
Islam/anti-Muslim perspective; there are those that hold on to core theological bases for the Islamist
justifications; those ho have specifically embraced a salafi-jihadi theological perspective.
Accordingly the level of theological input depends upon the above. If the emotional, the intellectual
parameters for viewing the world, the Islamist ideological narrative—which is partially theological and partly
intellectual—can be effectively addressed, the role of theological reinforcement is not as essential, though
arguably it is a resilience factor. In the case of actual engagement with certain theologically motivated salafi-
jihadists inspired radicals and radicalization, and also strongly slamist inspired, there are particular types of
calibrated theological engagement.
1. Primary sources and challenging them.
2. Claims of theological authenticity and challenging the sources.
3. Claims that their views are supported by medieval theological,putative authorities, and
demonstrate that these claims are factually untrue—this is different to make a Socratic
theological challenge.
4. There are other cases where there is little to no theological engagement as the case in certain
individuals—particularly those who are people with mental health problems or those with
personal experiences that have radicalized them—in one case as an example it was instilling an
emotional and intellectual connection with human rights as a universal ethical criterion that can
never be rejected.
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5. I do believe that there is a precise and specific role in various cases for theological interventions
and is necessary but not in all cases and to different extents—which requires a formal and
detailed study.
The Role of “Non-Violent” Radicals
I would challenge the common usage of the distinction that is being made between Violent and non-Violent
Islamists. For example the group, the Muslim Brotherhood is often described as a non-violent extremist
organization by people in the area. This is factually (not analytically) not true at all, Hamas, the terrorist
organization is officially in its constitution, a part of the Muslim Brotherhood. They undertake actions targeting
civilians—this is both illegal, violates all sense of morality, fundamentally in conflict with the objectives as
outlined in CONTEST.
These are not minor issues but mean that it is fundamentally impossible to describe them as non-Violent,
we may say that they do not support terrorism in the UK, they do support terrorism and illegal extremists
violence against UK troops. This is also the case with groups that have received funding previously who have
referred to scholars who have justified Jihadist violence in Muslim majority countries, support Jihad against
the West—UK, France and the US—when they have the ability to do so and the government of Saudi Arabia
or any Muslim majority country- it is at best a containment arguments and not a deradicalization process, and
the only difference between such groups and Hizb ut-Tahrir is that the latter are overtly political and not of
Saudi-Wahhabi theology.
Categorically, these cannot be deradicalization activities; and fail to meet the basic minimal legal and
strategic aims or rational necessities as actual deradicalization efforts. This is not to say that these groups are
not genuine in their personal belief. They are, but these beliefs themselves are radical, violent and also very,
very close to those who support terrorism in the UK too. They are also a part of the ideological and theological
ingredients which produce terrorism in the UK.
Proscriptions of Violent Groups
1. It is understandably and practically necessary as these groups violate legislation which requires their
being banned.
2. It has been applied inconsistently—many groups and individuals who have also violated the laws yet have
not been prosecuted.
3. There has been a failure to:
1. Apply the ban consistently on the same groups—Islam 4 UK and al-Muhajiroun and now
Muslims against Crusades—the same group despite the claims of government that it would ban
any resurgence of the group with its various names.
2. Instead of merely banning groups individuals should be prosecuted when they violate such laws
continuing activities of the banned/proscribed group whilst not being prosecuted.
3. Proscription itself does not deal with the prevalence of the ideas and propaganda of such
organizations.
4. Proscription does not deal with individuals who are undertaking activities towards radicalizing
individuals.
5. It does not deal with lone wolf terrorism.
All of the above does not invalidate the necessity of proscribing organizations, but it is in some respects a
very limited means of effective deradicalization of communities and individuals.
July 2011
APPENDIX
CENTRI—Counter Extremism coNsultancy Training Research & Interventions.
CENTRI delivers evidence-based solutions in counter-extremism. We specialise in issues related to Islam,
faith, cultural diversity, and integration. Our services are aimed at:
— National, regional, and local government.
— Police and those working in the security sector.
— Universities, research institutions, and think-tanks.
— Schools and educational establishments.
— Media and communications professionals.
— Film and documentary makers.
— Businesses.
— Religious institutions.
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We:
— Assist policy makers and policy implementers.




— Facilitate operational practice.
— Engage in faith-related dialogue.
CENTRI works with other individuals and organisations to facilitate effective project delivery. CENTRI has
links to a network of:




— Prevent practitioners and interventionists.
The amalgamation of experts allows CENTRI to be in a unique position to have a real impact within all
levels of the Prevent arena and help to plug holes in certain gaps that are naturally emerging in the strategy
and our experiences and backgrounds inform our perspectives on issues surrounding terrorism, Islamism, and
integration.
With academic, theological, and practical de-radicalization expertise and first-hand experience of Islamist
extremism we aim to enhance current thinking and practice in counter terrorism, counter extremism, and
community cohesion.
Furthermore, there is a vast network of people that are currently working with CENTRI in cyberspace as
researchers, activists and bloggers as well a number of leading Think Tanks specialising in this area.
This allows CENTRI to have a wide reach and be able to target vulnerable individuals and organisations at
all levels within the community.
Written evidence submitted by Congressman Peter T. King, Chairman, United States House Committee
on Homeland Security
Executive Summary
The spate of recent homegrown terrorist attacks within the United States and abroad has reinforced the
unquestionable fact that homegrown radicalization is part of Al Qaeda’s strategy to continue attacking the
United States and its allies. In an effort to examine the most prescient and dangerous threats facing the United
States, the Committee on Homeland Security convened a series of hearings to examine the critical issue of the
radicalization of Muslim-Americans. Specifically, the Committee has held three hearings over the past few
months that have examined various aspects of the radicalization of Muslim-Americans within the United States.
Each hearing has yielded significant findings that have shed considerable light on this critical issue. While the
Committee’s examination of this problem remains ongoing, the evidence collected thus far provides substantial
insight into the extent and threat of radicalization within tile United States.
Although the initial announcement of these hearings generated considerable controversy and opposition, the
hearings have nonetheless proven successful in that they have had a significant and beneficial impact in
fostering an honest dialogue about the growing issue of radicalization within the United States. Moreover, they
have liberated and empowered many Muslim-Americans who had been intimidated by leaders in their own
communities, but are now able to come forward and address this issue.
Committee Findings
Hearing # 1: “The extent of radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that community’s
response”
— Finding #1: The radicalization of Muslim-Americans constitutes a real and serious threat.
— Finding #2: There is a significant lack of Muslim-American community cooperation with law
enforcement.
— Finding #3: There is a need to confront the Islamist ideology driving radicalization.
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Hearing # 2: “The threat of Muslim-American radicalization in U.S. Prisons”
— Finding #4: The radicalization of prison inmates to an extremist form of Islam is a significant
problem, which can often manifest once radicalized prisoners are released.
— Finding #5: The radicalization of prison inmates is often precipitated by the presence of radical
clergy or extremist materials within the prison.
Hearing # 3: “Al Shabaab: recruitment and radicalization within the Muslim American community and the
threat to the homeland”
— Finding #6: There are direct ties between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and Al
Shabaab recruits are often indoctrinated into Al Qaeda’s ideology and network.
— Finding #7: Individuals who have been radicalized and recruited by Al Shabaab may pose a
direct threat to the national security of the United States and its allies.
— Finding #8: The Committee’s hearings on the radicalization of Muslim-Americans have
empowered Muslims to effectively address this issue.
An Examination of the Threat of Domestic Radicalization
As we commemorate the 10-year anniversary of the horrific terrorist attacks on 11 September, we must not
forget that the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its affiliates remains as deadly and paramount as ever. While
successful counterterrorism operations removed the menace of Osama bin Laden from the earth, his ideological
legacy and unwavering resolve to attack the United States and its Western allies unfortunately live on.
As a result of the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in which troops played such a major role and subsequent
counterterrorism efforts in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, core Al Qaeda’s primary safe haven is under
siege, hindering its ability to carry out large-scale attacks on the U.S. Homeland and other Western nations. Al
Qaeda and affiliates such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have been forced to transform their
strategy and adapt their operational doctrine. A key focus of this new doctrine is based on recruiting and
radicalizing Westerners and United States persons capable of perpetrating attacks within those nations. As a
result of this evolving strategy, the threat no longer emanates solely from remote Al Qaeda operatives
coordinating attacks halfway across the world, but rather from radicalized individuals residing within the
Homeland who are now ready to engage in terrorist activities in their own communities. This strategy shift
presents a critical challenge to the counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement communities within the
U.S. and for our allies. In addition, the emergence of influential, English-speaking Al Qaeda representatives
such as Anwar Al Awlaki has enhanced Al Qaeda’s ability to successfully implement its strategy of targeting
U.S. persons and Westerners for recruitment.
Al Qaeda and its affiliates are using various tools to target and radicalize recruits in the West, including
propaganda statements, videos, and magazines. For example, in July 2010, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched the first in its series of slick, online, English propaganda magazines,
entitled Inspire. To date, AQAP has produced six issues of Inspire. American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and
his protege Samir Khan are reportedly behind the development and production of the magazines, with Khan
allegedly serving as the magazine’s editor.54
Inspire appears to be targeted at American and Western European audiences in an effort to reach aspiring
terrorists. It is essentially a “how to” for would-be terrorists cloaked in pop-culture packaging, and resembles
most mainstream publications in structure: including letters from the editor, articles from well-known Al Qaeda
leaders, high-resolution graphics, and a “how to” section. The magazine is a dangerous step in AQAP’s strategy
to recruit and radicalize Americans and Western Europeans, and highlights the shifting threat posed to the
United States and its allies.
The apparent increasing frequency of U.S. persons becoming radicalized is an alarming trend and a great
concern for U.S. national security. According to Attorney General Eric Holder, in the last two years there have
been 126 people indicted for terrorist related activity, including 50 U.S. Citizens.55 As Times Square bomber
Faisal Shahzad stated in his October 2010 appearance before the Southern District Court of New York: “Brace
yourselves, because the war with Muslims has just begun. Consider me only the first droplet of the flood that
will follow me.”56
Committee Activity
On 9 February 2011, then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter testified before the
Committee that “… AQAP remains intent on conducting additional attacks targeting the Homeland and US
interests overseas and will continue propaganda efforts designed to inspire like-minded individuals to conduct
54 Cole, Matthew “Slickest Al Qaeda Magazine Yet From Young American Editor,” 17 January 2011
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/issue-al-qaeda-inspire-magazine/story?id=12632256
55 Cloherty, Jack and Thomas, Pierre “Attorney General's Blunt Warning on Terror Attacks”, 21 December 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/attorney-general-eric-holders-blunt-warning-terrorattacks/story?id~12444727
56 Times Sq bomber’s vile rant as he gets life in jail, New York Post, 6 October 2010
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/proud_to_be_terrorist_DBtc5U2eAYhWzacVpxK24K#ixzzlFEKywFDD
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attacks in their home countries.”57 At the same hearing, Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano testified
that the threat level today is as high as it has been since 11 September because of increased radicalization in
the United States.
As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, I have a responsibility to ensure that the Committee
examines the most prescient and critical threats facing the United States. Under this mandate, I convened a
series of hearings to examine the critical issue of the radicalization of Muslim-Americans. While the initial
announcement of these hearings generated considerable controversy and opposition, I remained steadfast in my
belief that these hearings are a critical facet of what I believe to be the main responsibility of this Committee—
to protect America from a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security and the Committee on
Homeland Security were formed in response to the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11. Undoubtedly, Congressional
investigation of Muslim-American radicalization is the logical response to the unquestionable fact that
homegrown radicalization is part of Al Qaeda’s strategy to continue attacking the United States and its allies.
I would not back down to political correctness.
Committee Findings
Over the past few months, the Committee on Homeland Security has held three hearings that have examined
various aspects of the radicalization of Muslim-Americans within the United States. Each hearing has yielded
significant findings that have shed considerable light on this critical issue. While the Committee’s examination
of this problem remains ongoing, the evidence collected thus far provides substantial insight into the extent
and threat of radicalization within the United States.
Hearing # 1: “The extent of radicalization in the American Muslim community and that community’s
response”
In March 2011, the Committee convened its first hearing to examine this issue. Specifically, the hearing
focused on the extent of radicalization in the Muslim-American community, and the community’s level of
cooperation with law enforcement to counter the problem.
Finding #1: The radicalization of Muslim-Americans constitutes a real and serious threat
Unfortunately, the radicalization of Muslim-Americans has become a direct threat to the national security of
the United States. Despite this fact, many refuse to fully acknowledge this problem or just how extensive this
matter has become.
Witnesses at the hearing addressed this issue and discussed the extensive nature of the threat of radicalization
within the United States, and perceived reticence to fully acknowledge the problem. One of the witnesses, Mr
Melvin Bledsoe (the father of radicalized Little Rock recruiting center shooter Carlos Bledsoe), acknowledged:
It seems to me that the American people are sitting around and doing nothing about Islamic
extremism, as if Carlos’s story and the other stories told at these hearings aren’t true. There is a big
elephant in the room, but our society continues not to see it. This wrong is caused by political
correctness. You can even call it political fear—yes, fear. Fear of stepping on a special minority
population’s toes, even as a segment of that population wants to stamp out America and everything
we stand for.
Another witness, Dr M. Zuhdi Jasser (President and Founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy)
also asserted:
The course of Muslim radicalization in the United States over the past two years makes it exceedingly
difficult for anyone to assert with a straight face that in America we Muslims do not have a
radicalization problem.
Finding #2: There is a significant lack of Muslim-American community cooperation with law enforcement
While the threat of domestic radicalization and homegrown terrorism has increased over the past few years,
many within the Muslim community have expressed criticism of law enforcement’s counterterrorism
operations. Several Muslim organizations, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), have repeatedly criticized law enforcement actions taken to stop
potential terrorist activity. They accuse the FBI of falsely entrapping Muslim-Americans and recommend
guidelines for Muslims who choose to cooperate with law enforcement and the FBI.
Witnesses at the hearing also discussed the Muslim-American community’s lack of cooperation, and
specifically the role that groups like CAIR play in discouraging Muslim-Americans from cooperating with law
enforcement. Dr Jasser noted:
When we speak about “cooperation of Muslims with law enforcement”, what is more important is
the growing culture of driving Muslims away from cooperation, partnership, and identity with our
57 Leiter, Michael, Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, “Understanding the Homeland Threat
Landscape—Considerations for the I 12th Congress”, 9 February 2011
www.nctc.gov/.../Transcript-HHSC_Understanding-the-Homeland-Threat.pdf
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nation and its security forces. Our civil rights should be protected and defended, but the predominant
message to our communities should be attachment, defense, and identification with America not
alienation and separation.
Too many so-called Muslim leadership groups in America, like the Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR) or Muslim Advocates, have specifically told Muslims across the nation, for
example, not to speak to the FBI or law enforcement unless they are accompanied by an attorney.
Rather than thanking the FBI for ferreting out radicals within our community, they have criticized
sting operations as being “entrapment”· a claim that has not stood the test of anti-terrorism court
cases since 9/11. Informants end up being showcased as bad apples and subjects of lawsuits rather
than patriots.
Another witness, Mr Abdirizak Bihi (the Director of Somali Education and Social Advocacy Center whose
nephew Burhan Hassan was radicalized and recruited in Minneapolis to join Al Shabaab in Somalia, where he
was ultimately killed) discussed this issue and how Mosque leadership in Minneapolis encouraged its
congregants (and the families of the missing young men who had fled to Somalia) not to cooperate with law
enforcement. Moreover, Mr Bihi testified that when the families of the missing young men went to law
enforcement for help, the mosque disparaged them and claimed that they were lying about the disappearance
of their children. Mr Bihi stated:
The mosque leadership continued to disseminate a strong message that there were no children
missing, rather than we the families were tools and being used by infidels to try and destroy the
mosque. As a result of this, the families united and started Saturday meetings that included
outreaching to other community members that also had missing children. We learned from the
mosque leadership’s tactics used to defame us that the community was the targeted audience, and
we framed our outreach strategy to educate the community about the realities of what was happening
to us. An intense outreach from both the mosque leadership and the family members started to unfold
in the Somali American community, where we were trying to convince the community that our
children were taken, that we weren’t trying to destroy our own mosques (that we built), and that
nobody can destroy a mosque. At the same time, the mosque leadership was sending the message to
the families that had not yet spoken out, that:
— if they speak up about their missing loved ones will end up in Guantanamo because
nobody cares about Muslims;
— they have a better chance of getting their children back into the country if they remain
silent; and
— if they speak up, they will be morally responsible for having killed all the Muslims and
destroyed all the mosques.
Mr Bihi also testified about the dangerous influence of powerful groups such as CAIR, who continue to
discourage Muslim-Americans from cooperating with law enforcement. He noted:
Just as we continued to make progress in laying out the realities to our community, powerful
organizations such as CAIR stepped into our community and stifled whatever progress we had made
by trying to tell our Somali American community not to cooperate with law enforcement. CAIR held
meetings for some members of the community and told them not to talk to the FBI, which was a
slap in the face for the Somali American Muslim mothers who were knocking on doors day and
night with pictures of their missing children and asking for the community to talk to law enforcement
about what they know of the missing kids. It was a slap in the face for community activists who had
invested time and personal resources to educate the community about forging a good relationship
with law e’1forcement in order to stop the radicalization and recruitment ofour children. We held
three different demonstrations against CAIR, in order to get them to leave us alone so we can solve
our community’s problems, since we don’t know CAIR and they don’t speak for us. We wanted to
stop them from dividing our community by stepping into issues that don’t belong to them.
Finding #3: There is a need to confront the Islamist ideology driving Radicalization
Despite the growing problem of Islamist radicalization within the United States, many appear reticent to
publicly acknowledge the ideological driver behind Al Qaeda’s radicalization and recruitment of American
citizens.
However, witnesses at the hearing acknowledged the need to address the ideological driver of radicalization
of Muslim-Americans, namely Islamist extremism. Dr Jasser asserted:
If the root cause of Muslim radicalization is Islamism (political Islam), what good is any effort at
counterterrorism that decouples any suggestion of theology no matter how separatist from terror?
How can law enforcement effectively do counter terrorism in our country without recognition that
Political Islam and its narrative is the core ideology when, at its extreme, drives the general mindset
of the violent extremists carrying out the attacks?
... Homeland Security, government, media and our general population are only focused on that final
step when the jihadists seek violence against our homeland. But we will all be chasing our tails for
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centuries if that remains your focus. I implore you to walk it back and treat the problem at its root,
at its jugular-the supremacism of political Islam.
... Our nation’s attempts at counter-radicalization have proven so far ineffective because it has lacked
a strategy and a forward ideology into Muslim communities. We have been so fixated on preventing
the next attack that we have neglected to develop the tools necessary to defeat the ideology that
drives the attack It is malpractice for us to believe that by eschewing violence we solve the problem.
Hearing # 2: “The threat of Muslim-American radicalization in U.S. Prisons”
In June 2011, the Committee convened its second hearing, which examined the threat of Muslim-American
radicalization within the United States prison system.
The current problem of Muslim-American radicalization in U.S. prisons is significant, and has been
acknowledged by Executive Branch policymakers and legislators of both parties. Former Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Harley Lappin, testified to Congress that “inmates are particularly vulnerable to recruitment
by terrorists,” and “we must guard against the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies.”58 A number of
cases since 9/11 have involved terrorists who converted to Islam or were radicalized to Islamism in American
prisons, then subsequently attempted to launch terror strikes in the U.S. upon their release from custody. These
radicalized terrorists have also carried out attacks overseas. In January 2010, Senator John Kerry, Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released a report that stated: “Three dozen U.S. citizens who
converted to Islam while in prison have travelled to Yemen, possibly for Al Qaeda training.”
Prison radicalization, unfortunately, is not unique to the United States. Recently, the British Home Secretary
emphasized the growing threat of Islamist radicalization and unveiled its new counter-radicalization strategy
to thwart terrorist recruitment behind bars. Just as home grown Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in Britain—including
the 2005 subway attacks in London, the 2006 liquid explosives plot to blow up American planes flying from
Britain and the 2007 car bomb attack on the Glasgow Airport—were emulated several years later in the United
States with the attempted New York subway bombings in September 2009, the Fort Hood murders in November
2009 and the attempted Times Square bombing in May 2010, we must assume the same with prison
radicalization.
Finding #4: The radicalization of prison inmates to an extremist form of Islam Is a significant problem,
which can often manifest once radicalized prisoners are released
Recent cases over the last few years including Richard Reid, Kevin James, Michael Finton, James Cromitie
and Jose Padilla have illustrated the danger of prison radicalization, which continues to constitute a serious
threat.
One of the witnesses, Deputy Chief Michael P. Downing (Commanding Officer of the Counter-Terrorism
and Special Operations Bureau of the Los Angeles PoliceDepartment) discussed this threat, noting:
It is generally understood that the majority of prison converts assimilate back into what they were
doing prior to going to prison, however, it is the exception cases that have and will continue to strike
fear in the hearts of Americans. It was estimated that 17 to 20% of the prison population, or
approximately 350,000 inmates comprise of Muslim inmates in 2003, and that 80% of the prisoners
who convert while in prison, convert to Islam. It is further estimated that 35,000 inmates convert to
Islam annually.
… There are several ongoing cases whose story is yet to be told, however, the common denominator
is conversion to a radical form of Islam while in prison.
… Just as isolated, and balkanized communities can become incubators of violent extremism, so too
can prisons. If left unchecked prisons can and do become incubators of radicalization leading to
violent extremism.
Another of the witnesses, Mr Patrick Dunleavy (retired Deputy Inspector of the Criminal Intelligence Unit,
New York Department of Correctional Services; and the author of The Fertile Soil of Jihad: Prison’s Terrorism
Connection), noted:
The prison population is vulnerable to radicalization by the same agents responsible for radicalizing
Americans outside of the prison walls. Despite appearances, prison walls are porous. It is easy for
outside influences to access those on the inside, and for inmates to reach from the inside out. As the
former Deputy Inspector General of the Criminal Intelligence Division in the New York State
Department of Corrections, I am aware that individuals and groups that subscribe to radical, and
sometimes violent, ideology have made sustained efforts over several decades to target inmates for
indoctrination. Some of these groups act as the certifying bodies responsible for hiring imams into
the prison system, thus affording them continuous access to the prison population. In addition, the
cycle of radicalization continues through post-release programs.
58 Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and Homeland Security
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong (2003) (statement of Director Lappin).
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While some have asserted that prisoners who are converted to a radical form of Islam do not pose a threat
once they are released, Mr Dunleavy discredited this notion by addressing the dangerous post-release activity
a number of prisoners have engaged in. Mr Dunleavy noted:
The task force investigation also found that although the initial exposure/conversion/indoctrination
to extremist jihadi Islam may begin in prison, it often matures and deepens after release through the
contacts on the outside that the inmate made while they were serving their sentences in prison.
Among those contacts are transition programs, which offer former inmates assistance in finding
housing or finding work. Most ofthe programs for Muslims transitioning out of the prison system
are sponsored by mosques that are local to the prisons. Many of these mosques have extremist
leanings and are known to adhere to Wahabbi ideology. In addition to the transition programs, many
of the sponsoring mosques also have volunteers or formal programs to provide religious instruction
inside the prisons. Thus, contact between the outreach program and the inmate has already been
established by the time the prisoner is released. The prisoner is already familiar with the program’s
personnel and ideology, and therefore their transition to the outside is facilitated by familiar hands.
... One of the influences in some of the homegrown terrorism cases has been the involvement, either
directly or indirectly, of radical Islamist clergy. Since 9/11, the involvement ofradical Islamist imams
has been mentioned as a precipitating factor in the cases of Richard Reid, Jose Padilla, and others.
In 2009 the “Newburgh Four”; James Cromitie, Laguerre Payen, David Williams, and Onta Williams,
were arrested for plotting to bomb synagogues in New York City and shoot down military aircraft
with stinger missiles. All had converted to a radical form of Islam while serving time for a variety
of offenses. They did not know each other while they were incarcerated, but met each other after
their release, while attending a local mosque connected to a prison ministry.
Finding #5: The radicalization of prison inmates is often precipitated by the Presence of radical clergy or
extremist materials within the prison
Witnesses at the hearing discussed the pervasive nature of radical clergy and literature throughout the prison
system, and its correlation with the radicalization of prison inmates. Mr Dunleavy addressed this issue, stating:
... It has been confirmed that radical Islam is present in the New York State prison system and also
in the New York City jails. The apparatus by which this radical form of Islam was introduced into
the system was identified as consisting of multiple components, including, clergy, religious
volunteers, visitors, fellow inmates and Islamic organizations from around the world that sent parcels
and literature into the prisons.
... There is certainly no vetting of volunteers who provide religious instruction, and who, although
not paid, wield considerable influence in the prison Muslim communities. Many such volunteers are
former convicts.
Deputy Chief Downing also discussed the threat of extremist literature being disseminated throughout the
prison system, noting:
Anwar Al Awlaki, a prominent United States born Islamic scholar of Yemeni descent and internet
radicalizer is wanted by the United States for Terrorism prosecution. His radical literature has found
its way into the prison system and has been used by known extremists to facilitate recruitment and
radicalization activities within prisons.
... The spiritual philosopher of Al Qaeda, Sayyid Qutb, wrote the radical Islamist manifesto Ma’alim
fi al-Tariq (Milestones Along the Road) while in an Egyptian prison. Copies of this document exist
in the prison system and contribute to radicalization.
Hearing # 3: “Al Shabaab: recruitment and radicalization within the Muslim-American community and the
threat to the homeland”
This hearing examined Somalia-based terrorist organization Al Shabaab’s ongoing recruitment, radicalization
and training of Muslim-Americans. Since 2006, a number of American citizens, many of whom are part of the
Somali-American community, have been radicalized within the United States to terrorist activity (often by Al
Shabaab recruiters or sympathizers) and have fled to join Al Shabaab. At least 40 Americans have joined Al
Shabaab in Somalia and more than a dozen have been killed there, including at least three incidents of suicide
attacks. According to a Committee review of Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutions, there are
approximately 38 cases of defendants charged in the US in connection with Al Shabaab or other extremist
organizations in Somalia, from states including Minnesota, California, New Jersey, Missouri, Alabama,
Virginia, Illinois, New York and Texas.
Reflecting a disturbing trend across global terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), Al Shabaab and its leadership appear to be actively attempting to recruit Americans, including a
targeted recruitment of Americans who are not of Somali descent. This recruitment is headed in large part by
Omar Hammami, an American (non-Somali) citizen from Alabama who joined Al Shabaab in Somalia and
now serves as its key English-speaking representative.
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In addition to Al Shabaab’s growing radicalization and recruitment of Americans, the group has also actively
recruited a number of Canadian citizens, including one recently killed. Al Shabaab spokesman Omar Hammami
spent time living in Toronto’s Somali community before he ultimately fled to Somalia. In addition, the Somali
communities in Minneapolis and Toronto often maintain close ties, including familial relationships as well as
cross-border commercial traffic.
The hearing also examined Al Shabaab’s affiliation with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and
the homeland security implications. In addition to its connections with Al Qaeda senior leadership, Al Shabaab
has also developed alliances with several al Qaeda affiliates, including Algeria’s Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and Yemen’s Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al Shabaab’s broadening
cooperation with AQAP is particularly concerning considering the critical threat AQAP poses to the U.S.
Homeland and that organization’s unwavering attempts to pursue an attack against the United States.
Finding #6: There are direct ties between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and Al Shabaab
recruits are often indoctrinated into Al Qaeda’s ideology and network
Witnesses at the hearing discussed Al Shabaab’s ties to Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the direct threat that
such cooperation poses to the United States and its allies. One of the witnesses, Mr Thomas Joscelyn (a Senior
Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) noted:
There is extensive evidence that Shabaab ‘s recruiting in the West is not limited to “nationalistic”
aims. While some recruits probably do travel to Somalia to take part in a “local” (civil) war, there
is always the potential for these same recruits to become indoctrinated in Shabaab’s al Qaeda-inspired
ideology once they arrive there. Indeed, this has been al Qaeda’s strategy, to fold “local” conflicts
into an international jihad. Moreover, some Shabaab recruits are clearly radicalized before they even
depart American soil.
… Shabaab’s recruits in the West have received training from senior al Qaeda operatives who are
also members of Shabaab. Earlier this month, the Department of Justice agreed to a plea deal with
a Minneapolis man named Omar Abdi Mohamed. According to a DOJ press release, Mohamed
admitted that he helped Shabaab recruit Somali-Americans. The DOJ explains: “Upon arriving in
Somalia, the men resided in al-Shabaab safe-houses in Southern Somalia until constructing an al-
Shabaab training camp, where they were trained. Senior members of al-Shabaab and a senior member
of al-Qaeda in East Africa conducted the training. “That is, Shabaab’s Minneapolis recruits were
delivered to a senior al Qaeda memberfor training.
Another witness who prosecuted many of the cases in Minneapolis regarding Al Shabaab recruitment and
radicalization, Mr William Anders Folk (the Former Assistant United States Attorney for the District of
Minnesota), discussed the role of Al Qaeda’s underlying ideology in the radicalization of Al Shabaab’s
recruits, stating:
In addition to recruiting by al-Shabaab as an organization and by individuals on behalf of al-Shabaab,
religious figures such as Anwar al-Awlaki have provided potential recruits with ideological
undelpinnings for individuals to fight in Somalia on behalf of al-Shabaab. As has been publicly
reported, al-Awlaki’s “Constants on the Path to jihad” has provided recruits and potential recruits
with an ideological framework, however distorted and incorrect it may be, to fight on behalf of al-
Shabaab in Somalia.
Finding #7: Individuals who have been radicalized and recruited by al Shabaab may pose a direct threat to
the national security of the United States and its allies
As previously referenced, at least 40 Americans and a number of Canadian citizens have joined Al Shabaab
in Somalia. While many believe those individuals are motivated solely to fight within Somalia, the dangerous
possibility remains that they may in fact return to the United States or Canada, with the intention of perpetrating
terrorist activity. One of the witnesses, Mr Ahmed Hussen (Canadian Somali Congress National President)
discussed this possibility, stating:
It is very disturbing to us as Canadian citizens to see the children of those who fled the civil war in
Somalia return to a country they barely know and contribute to its misery. There is an additional
concern that these individuals would come back to threaten and harm Canada, the very country that
has given us peace, security and opportunity.
Mr Folk also discussed the danger in Al Shabaab recruits returning to the United States, noting:
It is impossible to predict with certainty what, if anything, and who, if anyone, will come to the
United States after training and indoctrination by al-Shabaab. It is obvious, however, that individuals
who are trained, indoctrinated and deployed in combat by al-Shabaab have learned how to carry-out
acts of lethal violence. Additionally, it is clear that the ideology espoused by al-Shabaab echoes that
of al-Qaeda. This combination of ability and ideology illustrates the threat that is posed by even one
al-Shabaab veteran residing in the United States. The ability to prevent or detect such a person from
entering the United States or carrying-out any terrorist acts in the United States requires continued
vigilance of the group’s activities in Somalia, but also to ensure that supporters or sympathizers
within the United States are targeted for investigation.
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Finding #8: The Committee’s hearings on the radicalization of Muslim-Americans have empowered Muslims
to effectively address this issue
Despite the mindless criticism directed against the Committee hearings, the reality is that they have liberated
and empowered many Muslim-Americans who had been intimidated by leaders in their own communities but
are now able to come forward.
This point was reinforced at the last hearing held by one of the Committee’s Muslim witnesses, Mr Hussen,
who noted in his opening statement:
I would like to close by saying that these hearings are extremely important to us. They empower us,
and they remove the stigma in our community that prevents us from talking about these issues that
are really important to our community. These hearings are very empowering.
Way Forward
While I have no doubt that the Committee’s radicalization hearings have had a significant and beneficial
impact in fostering an honest dialogue about the growing issue of radicalization within the United States, I
remain concerned that this problem is far from resolved.
According to the results of a recent pew poll, 16% of American Muslims have a favourable or only somewhat
unfavorable view of Al Qaeda. Further, 13% of American Muslims believe that suicide bombing or other
violence against civilians, to defend Islam from its enemies, is often, sometimes or rarely justified. Pew states
that there are 2,750,000 American Muslims. That means that there are 440,000 American Muslims who view
Al Qaeda as only a somewhat unfavorable organization, and 357,500 who believe that killing civilians in the
name of Islam can in some cases be justified. These numbers are startling and expose a dangerous disconnect
between a number of Muslim-Americans and the democratic values cherished by Western nations.
The radicalization of Muslim-Americans by the Islamist ideology promulgated by Al Qaeda and its affiliates
is a problem that the United States cannot continue to simply ignore or deflect. Unfortunately, I am concerned
that within the United States, political correctness has prevented many from sufficiently acknowledging and
tackling this dangerous problem.
I applaud the UK government for its unwavering and honest examination of this problem, exemplified by
the recently revised “Prevent” strategy, which offers a candid assessment of the problem and a model for
effectively addressing and countering this problem. I also applaud this Committee’s inquiry into the roots of
violent radicalization, a matter critical to the national security of both the United Kingdom as well as the
United States.
Unfortunately, terrorism knows no boundaries and continues to threaten the lives of citizens of both the
United States and the United Kingdom. We are facing an adversary intent on attacking Western nations and all
we stand for. As we pass the 10-year anniversary of the September 11th attacks, we cannot allow the memories
of that tragic day to fade away. We continue to face an unwavering threat, and must be fully aware that
homegrown radicalization is part of Al Qaeda’s strategy to continue attacking the United States and the
United Kingdom.
Thank you for your time and for allowing me the opportunity to discuss this critical issue.
September 2011
Printed in the United Kingdom by The Stationery Office Limited
02/2012 017436 19585
